Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 27.03.2025 vs State Of Himachal Pradesh And Others on 10 April, 2025
2025:HHC:10012 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No. 1089 of 2024 Reserved on: 27.03.2025 Date of Decision: 10th April 2025.
Dwijesh Kant ...Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and others. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the Petitioner : Mr. Gaurav Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondents/ : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
State Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of F.I.R. No. 04 of 2020, dated 23.07.2020 for the commission of offences punishable under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act ( for short P.C. Act) and Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code ( for short IPC), registered with State Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Bureau (SV & ACB) at Police Station Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. ___________________ 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that a complaint was received in SV&ACB, Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P. against the petitioner. A preliminary inquiry was conducted and it was found that the petitioner was working as a Junior Engineer in the Irrigation and Public Health (I & PH) Department in the year 2016 in Shah Canal Project, Sub Division Thakurdwara, District Kangra, H.P. The informant was a registered contractor of the I&PH Department. He used to work on the Shah Canal Project. Jagjit Singh, Contractor obtained work of drains in village Falai, which was worth about ₹ 4. 50 Lakhs (Rupees Four Lac Fifty Thousand). Jagjit Singh gave his Power of Attorney to the informant Nitin and Neeraj Kumar to look after the work. The petitioner stopped the work. He demanded 50% of the cost of the work in cash and proceeds from the sale of the cement and bars left on the spot. The informant recorded the conversation on his mobile. The petitioner registered the case against the informant with the District Police. The recording showed that the petitioner had demanded a bribe. He had also accepted ₹10,000/- and put the money in his pocket. He demanded 3 2025:HHC:10012 ) ₹20,000/- in future. The police registered the F.I.R. conducted the investigation and filed a charge sheet before the Court.
3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the F.I.R. and presentation of the charge sheet before the competent Court, the petitioner has filed the present petition asserting that the contents of the F.I.R. are false. The petitioner was not even posted at the Shah Nahar Project at Sub-Division Thakurdwara at the relevant time. He was posted in Sub-Division Thakurdwara on 01.03.2017 after the completion of the awarded work. The work is being carried out under the supervision of Rajesh Dhiman. It is impermissible to sublet the work without the written approval of the Engineer-in-charge. A detailed inquiry was conducted by the Inquiry Officer, in which the petitioner was exonerated. The complaint filed by the petitioner is pending before the learned Trial Court at Indora. The F.I.R. was registered after the lapse of three years. The petitioner was issued a 'No Dues Certificate' at the time of his transfer. The informant did not report any incident to the authorities. The Sanctioning Authority did not apply its mind. The provisions of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act was not complied with. Therefore, it 4 2025:HHC:10012 ) is prayed that the petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings be quashed.
4. I have heard Mr. Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents No.1 and 2/State.
5. Mr Gaurav Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the informant lodged a false F.I.R. as a counterblast to the F.I.R. lodged by the petitioner against him. The F.I.R. was lodged in violation of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act. It does not disclose the commission of the cognizable offence. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings be quashed.
6. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for respondents No.1 and 2 submitted that there is a video recording showing the demand and payment of the bribe to the petitioner. The allegations in the F.I.R. constitute the commission of cognizable offence. This Court should not quash the F.I.R., therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
5
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7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -
"7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they 6 2025:HHC:10012 ) are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the 7 2025:HHC:10012 ) proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge." (emphasis added)
8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.
In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.
As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.
Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed."
9. This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:
"8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice.
These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High 8 2025:HHC:10012 ) Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.
9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia, contemplate the following situations : (i) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides; (ii) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; (iii) no prima facie offence is made out; (iv) the dispute is civil in nature; (v.) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and (vi) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335)
10. The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
11. F.I.R. clearly mentions the demand and acceptance of money by the petitioner who is a public servant, therefore, the allegations constitute the commission of a cognizable offence.
12. It was submitted that the allegations in the F.I.R. are false. This Court cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint. This position was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -9
2025:HHC:10012 ) "13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.
P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would 10 2025:HHC:10012 ) show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."
13. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392:
2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court, while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC, cannot conduct a mini-
trial. It was observed at page 397:
"17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)
6. ... As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. ...
7. ... At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider 'whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not'."11
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14. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
15. It was submitted that the F.I.R. is a counterblast to the F.I.R. filed by the petitioner. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh vs Amar Kumar Singh 2023(6) 559 that when an investigation was conducted and a charge sheet was filed, the question of mala fide would become meaningless. It was observed:
"78. Thirdly, it must be remembered that when information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered in respect of a disproportionate assets case, it is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court that is decisive for determining the fate of the accused. To our mind, whether the first information report is the outcome of mala fides would be of secondary importance. In such a case, should the allegations of mala fides be of some prima facie worth, they would pale into insignificance if sufficient materials are gathered for sending the accused up for a trial; hence, the plea of mala fide may not per se form the basis for quashing the first information report/complaint.
79. Finally, following the above, what is of substantial importance is that if criminal prosecution is based upon adequate evidence and the same is otherwise justifiable, it does not become vitiated on account of significant political overtones and mala fide motives. We can say without fear of contradiction that it is not in all cases in our country that an individual, who is accused of acts of 12 2025:HHC:10012 ) omission/commission punishable under the PC Act but has the blessings of the ruling dispensation, is booked by the police and made to face prosecution. If, indeed, in such a case (where a prosecution should have been but has not been launched) the succeeding political dispensation initiates steps for launching prosecution against such an accused but he/she is allowed to go scot- free, despite there being materials against him/her, merely on the ground that the action initiated by the current regime is mala fide in the sense that it is either to settle scores with the earlier regime or to wreak vengeance against the individual, in such an eventuality we are constrained to observe that it is criminal justice that would be the casualty. This is because it is difficult to form an opinion conclusively at the stage of reading a first information report that the public servant is either in or not in possession of property disproportionate to the known sources of his/her income. It would all depend on what is ultimately unearthed after the investigation is complete. Needless to observe, the first information report in a disproportionate assets case must, as of necessity, prima facie, contain ingredients for the perception that there is fair enough reason to suspect the commission of a cognizable offence relating to "criminal misconduct" punishable under the PC Act and to embark upon an investigation."
16. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramveer Upadhyay v. State of U.P., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 484, that a complaint cannot be quashed because it was initiated due to enmity. It was observed:
"30. The fact that the complaint may have been initiated by reason of political vendetta is not in itself grounds for quashing the criminal proceedings, as observed by Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar 13 2025:HHC:10012 ) (1987) 1 SCC 2884. It is a well-established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution if otherwise justified and based upon adequate evidence, does not become vitiated on account of mala fides or political vendetta of the first informant or complainant. Though the view of Bhagwati, CJ in Sheonandan Paswan (supra) was the minority view, there was no difference of opinion with regard to this finding. To quote Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Punjab v.
Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, "If the use of power is for the fulfilment of a legitimate object, the actuation or catalysation by malice is not legicidal."
Xxxx
39. In our considered opinion, criminal proceedings cannot be nipped in the bud by the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. only because the complaint has been lodged by a political rival. It is possible that a false complaint may have been lodged at the behest of a political opponent. However, such a possibility would not justify interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings. As observed above, the possibility of retaliation on the part of the petitioners by the acts alleged, after the closure of the earlier criminal case, cannot be ruled out. The allegations in the complaint constitute an offence under the Atrocities Act. Whether the allegations are true or untrue would have to be decided in the trial. In the exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the Court does not examine the correctness of the allegations in a complaint except in exceptionally rare cases where it is patently clear that the allegations are frivolous or do not disclose any offence. The Complaint Case No. 19/2018 is not such a case which should be quashed at the inception itself without further Trial. The High Court rightly dismissed the application under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C." 14
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17. It was submitted that the petitioner was not posted at the Shah Nahar Project at the time of the incident and he was exonerated in an inquiry conducted by the Inquiry Officer. Reliance was also placed upon the photocopies of Annexure P-2 and P-7) in support of this submission. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983 SCC (Cri) 115 that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was observed:
"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."
18. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:
"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri 15 2025:HHC:10012 ) Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C."
19. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K. Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:
"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of 16 2025:HHC:10012 ) the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".
20. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was observed at page 142:
"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the evidence collected during the course of the trial."
21. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.
22. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was observed:
17
2025:HHC:10012 ) "63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section 200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied)
23. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely upon the material brought on record before the learned Trial Court. In the present case, the authenticity of the 18 2025:HHC:10012 ) documents has not been established and the F.I.R cannot be quashed based on the photocopies of the documents.
24. It was submitted that Rajesh Dhiman was working on the Shah Nahar Project. This submission will not help the petitioner because the charge sheet shows that Rajesh Dhiman was transferred on 04.08.2017. The petitioner made the demand in August 2017. Even as per the transfer order Annexure P-2filed by the petitioner, the petitioner was transferred vide order dated 01.03.2017, therefore, the petitioner was posted at the time of the incident.
25. It was submitted that requirement of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act has not been satisfied in the present case. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by this Court in Ajay Kumar Gupta v. State of H.P., 2024 SCC OnLine HP 4692 that a bribe is not relatable to the recommendations made or decisions taken by the public official in the discharge of his official duties and the provisions of Section 17A of the PC Act do not apply to the bribe cases. It was observed:-
"31. In the present case it was submitted that as per the prosecution, the petitioner had decided to purchase the PPE Kits from Bioaide. The prosecution further asserted that the money was demanded for the clearance of the 19 2025:HHC:10012 ) bill related to the purchase made by the petitioner. Hence, the requirement that the offence alleged is relatable to any recommendation or decision taken by the public servant is satisfied. It is difficult to agree with this submission. The word relatable refers to an act closely connected to the recommendation or the decision that affects the recommendation or the decision and cannot refer to any extraneous act that would not have any impact on the recommendation or the decision. The demand for a bribe can influence the decision in the sense that further orders can be placed but that would not be in the discharge of the official duties because it is no function of any public servant to demand a bribe for doing any official act. A public servant is expected to do the official act uninfluenced by any extraneous consideration solely on the merits of the matter pending before him. The word relatable cannot be so stretched to include everything that does not have any relation to the decision or recommendation made by the public servant.
32. As was pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, if two interpretations are possible, the interpretation that prevents corruption has to be preferred rather than the one that encourages corruption. Even, if two interpretations are possible namely (i) that the demand for a bribe is relatable to the recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant and (ii) that the demand for a bribe is not relatable to a recommendation made or decision taken by the public servant, the second interpretation has to be preferred because it will protect an honest public servant and discourage the dishonest public servant demanding bribe, whereas the first interpretation will encourage the public servants to demand bribe with impunity. Such an interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the enactment of the Prevention of Corruption Act.
33. Therefore, with due respect, it is difficult to agree with the judgments of the Rajasthan and Gujarat High Court that the demand for a bribe would be covered under 20 2025:HHC:10012 ) Section 17A of the Prevention of Corruption Act and it is held that when the demand for bribe is made for doing any official Act, the protection under Section 17A will not apply to such a demand because such a demand is not relatable to the discharge of the official function of the public servant. It is pertinent to mention here that Gauhati High Court had also differed from the views of Rajasthan and Gujarat High Courts in Rounak (supra) and held:
XXIII. In Himangshu Yadav (supra), decided by the Rajasthan High Court the fact of the case was that the petitioner therein, who was a Village Development Officer, demanded a sum of Rs. 7,000/- for clearing the bill of the informant of Rs. 32,000/-, and in the aforesaid factual backdrop it was held that allegation of demanding illegal gratification relates to discharge of official duties. Therefore, it cannot be said that a proposition was laid down that in all cases, the approval under Section 17(A) of the PC Act shall be required inasmuch as the allegation made in the aforesaid case is relatable to a decision of releasing a bill on payment of illegal gratification. That being the position, such a decision shall not help the petitioner herein, in the given facts of the present case.
XXIV. In Yogesh Nayyar (supra), the high court of Madhya Pradesh held in the given facts of the said case that lodging of FIR in the absence of approval is not barred under section 17A of the PC, however, said provision prohibits investigation by a police officer without approval. This court is in respectful disagreement with such a view, for the reasons as discussed and recorded hereinabove.21
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26. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim the quashing of the F.I.R. on the ground of violation of Section 17-A of P.C. Act.
27. The F.I.R. has been registered for taking bribes under the provisions of the P.C. Act. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Chhattisgarh v. Aman Kumar Singh, (2023) 6 SCC 559 that corruption is eroding the public life and it is the constitutional duty of the Courts to show zero tolerance to corruption. It was observed:-
"47. We preface our discussion, leading to the answers to the above two questions, taking note of a dangerous and disquieting trend that obviously disturbs us without end. Though it is the preambular promise of the Constitution to secure social justice to the people of India by striving to achieve equal distribution of wealth, it is yet a distant dream. If not the main, one of the more prominent hurdles for achieving progress in this field is undoubtedly "corruption". Corruption is a malaise, the presence of which is all-pervading in every walk of life. It is not now limited to the spheres of activities of governance; regrettably, responsible citizens say it has become a way of one's life. Indeed, it is a matter of disgrace for the entire community that not only on the one hand is there a steady decline in steadfastly pursuing the lofty ideals which the Founding Fathers of our Constitution had in mind, degradation of moral values in society is rapidly on the rise on the other. Not much debate is required to trace the root of corruption.
48. "Greed", regarded in Hinduism as one of the seven sins, has been overpowering in its impact. In fact, 22 2025:HHC:10012 ) unsatiated greed for wealth has facilitated corruption to develop like cancer. If the corrupt succeed in duping the law enforcers, their success erodes even the fear of getting caught. They tend to bask under a hubris that rules and regulations are for humbler mortals and not them. To get caught, for them, is a sin. Little wonder, an outbreak of scams is commonly noticed. What is more distressing is the investigations/inquiries that follow. More often than not, these are botched and assume the proportion of bigger scams than the scams themselves. However, should this state of affairs be allowed to continue? Tracking down corrupt public servants and punishing them appropriately is the mandate of the PC Act.
49. "We the People", with the adoption of our Constitution, had expected very high standards from people occupying positions of trust and responsibility in line with the constitutional ethos and values. Regrettably, that has not been possible because, inter alia, a small section of individuals inducted in public service for "serving the public" appears to have kept private interest above anything else and, in the process, amassed wealth not proportionate to their known sources of income at the cost of the nation. Although appropriate legislation is in place to prevent the cancer of corruption from growing and developing, wherefor maximum punishment by way of imprisonment for ten years is stipulated, curbing it in adequate measure, much less eradicating it, is not only elusive but unthinkable in present times.
50. Since there exists no magic wand as in fairy tales, a swish of which could wipe out greed, the constitutional courts owe a duty to the people of the nation to show zero tolerance to corruption and come down heavily against the perpetrators of the crime while at the same time saving those innocent public servants, who unfortunately get entangled by men of dubious conduct acting from behind the screen with ulterior motives and/or to achieve vested interests. The task, no doubt, is onerous but every effort ought to be made to achieve it by sifting the grain 23 2025:HHC:10012 ) from the chaff. We leave the discussion here with the fervent hope of better times in future."
28. It was further held that ordinarily, the Court should not quash the F.I.R. related to the corruption except in exceptional cases where there is absolutely no material to support the case or even a reasonable suspicion. This would harm innocent public servants but it is a small price to pay to ensure probity in the society. It was observed:-
80. Having regard to what we have observed above in paras 47 to 50 (supra) and to maintain probity in the system of governance as well as to ensure that societal pollutants are weeded out at the earliest, it would be eminently desirable if the High Courts maintain a hands-off approach and not quash a first information report pertaining to "corruption" cases, especially at the stage of investigation, even though certain elements of strong-arm tactics of the ruling dispensation might be discernible. The considerations that could apply to quashing of first information reports pertaining to offences punishable under general penal statutes ex proprio vigore may not be applicable to a PC Act offence.
Majorly, the proper course for the High Courts to follow, in cases under the PC Act, would be to permit the investigation to be taken to its logical conclusion and leave the aggrieved party to pursue the remedy made available by law at an appropriate stage. If at all interference in any case is considered necessary, the same should rest on the very special features of the case.
81. Although what would constitute the special features has necessarily to depend on the peculiar facts of each case, interference could be made in exceptional cases where the records reveal absolutely no material to support even a reasonable suspicion of a public servant 24 2025:HHC:10012 ) having intentionally enriched himself illicitly during the period of his service and nothing other than mala fide is the basis for subjecting such servant to an investigation.
82. We quite appreciate that there could be cases of innocent public servants being entangled in investigations arising out of motivated complaints and the consequent mental agony, emotional pain and social stigma that they would have to encounter in the process, but this small price has to be paid if there is to be a society governed by the rule of law. While we do not intend to fetter the High Courts from intervening in appropriate cases, it is only just and proper to remind the courts to be careful, circumspect and cautious in quashing first information reports resting on mala fide of the nature alleged herein.
29. In the present case, the allegations in the F.I.R. and the material collected by the prosecution show that the petitioner had demanded and accepted the bribe of ₹10,000/- for carrying out his official work. He further demanded ₹20,000/-. All these were video recorded. Therefore, the F.I.R. cannot be quashed as per the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
30. No other point was urged.
31. In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same stands dismissed, so also the pending applications, if any.
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32. The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
( Rakesh Kainthla ) 10 April 2025 th Judge (ravinder)