Bombay High Court
Goa Plast Pvt. Ltd. vs Shri Chico Ursula D'Souza on 12 January, 1996
Equivalent citations: 1996CRILJ2344
JUDGMENT
1.The appellant, Goa Plast Pvt. Ltd., a registered company, challenges the findings recorded by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Panaji, in Pvt. N.C. Case No. 149/93/B, whereby the respondent/original accused Shri Chico Ursula D'Souza came to be acquitted by the order dated August 25, 1995.
2. In this appeal against acquittal, it is vehemently argued by Mr. Usgaokar, learned Counsel for the appellant, that the learned Counsel for the appellant, that the learned trial Judge has neither considered the facts nor the law in true and correct perspective. Thereby, the finding of acquittal as recorded by the trial Court is ipso facto erroneous and deserves to be set aside. Further it is submitted that the respondent/original accused be convicted according to law. Alternatively, it is claimed that the case be remanded to the trial Court for fresh trial.
3. The facts leading to the institution of the criminal case as transpired in the cross-examination of P.W. 1, Eric Cordeiro, are as follows :
The respondent/original accused was working as a Director of the appellant-Company. During the tenure of his service, some defalcation came to the notice of the Company which, according to the Company, was to the tune of Rs. 7,00,000/-. It is deposed by Eric Cordeiro that to satisfy the liability, the respondent, on July, 2, 1992, had issued ten post-dated cheques in favour of the appellant. In the present case, we are concerned with the cheque which was issued in favour of the appellant for Rs. 40,000/-. The cheque is dated January 10, 1993, drawn on the Goa Urban Co-operative Bank, Panaji. As per the complaint as also the examination-in-chief of P.W. 1, Eric, the cheque issued by the respondent on January 10, 1993, was presented in the Bank and the Bank returned the same on April 12, 1993. In a nut shell, the cheque was dishonoured. The appellant issued a legal notice by registered post A/D to the respondent/accused on April 27, 1993 and the same was received by him on April 28, 1994. As there was no compliance even to the notice, the appellant was compelled to institute criminal proceedings against the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. The learned trial Court considered the evidence, oral and documentary, as also the letter dated February 12, 1993, admittedly sent by the respondent/accused to the appellant-Company and after appreciating the evidence, the respondent-accused was acquitted vide judgment and order dated August 25, 1995. The acquittal is based on the following circumstances :-
1. The appellant/complainant has suppressed or made no whisper of the letter sent by the respondent/accused on February 12, 1993, at Exhibit 12/P.W. 1/D. By the said letter the accused had brought to the notice of the appellant/complainant, the circumstances under which the cheque was issued. By the said letter the appellant/complainant was specifically apprised that he was not responsible for any defalcation, but one Rajan Kinnerkar was entrusted with the financial dealings. Thereby he specifically stated in the letter that he owed nothing to the appellant-Company.
2. In the complaint as also in the deposition of P.W. 1, there is no whisper in respect of the letter dated February 12, 1993, sent by the appellant/accused. Thus, this is a suppression of material fact.
3. The accused had already informed not only the appellant/complainant but the Bank regarding the stoppages of payment. In spite of this, the cheque was presented in the Bank; and
4. In the cross-examination, P.W. 1, Eric Cordeiro specifically admitted that the accused was not responsible for the entire amount of Rs. 7,00,000/- towards the unexplained expenditure, nor there is any evidence that the accused is liable or responsible for any part of the amount shown as unexplained expenditure.
5. Mr. Usgaokar, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that mere issuance of cheque in favour of the appellant-Company is sufficient to show that the accused owes liabilities of the appellant-Company. While construing the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, besides the fact that the cheque issued by accused was dishonoured, nothing is required to be proved by the complainant.
It is for the accused to rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. It is first submitted that merely by sending a letter or a communication to the appellant-Company, unless and until the presumption cannot be said to be rebutted. It is further submitted that it was incumbent on the respondent/accused to examine Rajan Kinnerkar as the accused stated in the letter dated February 12, 1993, that Rajan was responsible for the financial transactions of the Company and, therefore, he is responsible for the unexplained expenditure of the Company's Accounts. It is further submitted that as soon as the respondent/accused presented or delivered the cheques to the appellant-Company, he admitted the liability. The cheque on presentation to the Bank being dishonoured, the ingredients of Section 138 are satisfied, and the accused committed an offence, punishable u/S. 138 of the Act.
The presumption has to be rebutted by leading evidence and not by mere explanation or statement. In support of the contention, the learned Counsel relied on 'Bratindranath Banerjee, Director, Standard Chartered Bank v. Hiten P. Dalal, . Before the learned Spl. Court, the case was also under the provisions of Sections 138 and 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. In paras 31 onwards, the learned Brother has considered various cases on the point of discharging the burden which is on the accused.
A reference was made in para 31 to a case reported in 'Dhanvantrai Balwantrai Desay v. State of Maharashtra, . Their Lordships observed that :
"there is a difference between a presumption under Section 115 of the Evidence Act which was open to a Court to draw or not to draw and a presumption as to the existence of a fact."
Further Their Lordships observed that :
"under Section 114, it was not at all obligatory on a Court to draw any presumption. However, under Section 4(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, if a certain fact was proved, i.e. that a gratification or a valuable thing has been received by the accused the court was required to draw a presumption that it was received as a motive for reward. Under the circumstances, it was open to the accused to show that though the money was not due to him as legal remuneration, it was legally due to him in some other manner or that it was received under a transaction or arrangement which was lawful."
Their Lordships further observed that :
"The burden on the accused person in such a case would not be as light as it is in the case under Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The burden cannot be discharged by the accused by offering an explanation which is reasonable and probable. The explanation must be shown to be true. The words, "unless the contrary is proved make it clear that the presumption has to be rebutted by proof and not by a bare explanation which is merely plausible. Unless the explanation is supported by proof, the statutory presumption cannot be said to be rebutted."
6. In the Bombay case itself, the following cases on this point have been discussed, namely :-
1. State of Madras v. Vaidyanath Iyer, ;
2. State of Ajmer (now Rajasthan) v. Shivaji Lal, ;
3. V. D. Jhingan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, ; and
4. Ram Krishna Bedu Rane v. State of Maharashtra, (1973) 1 SCC 1366.
The learned Brother in the case of Bratindranath Banerjee (supra) in para 41 has drawn the conclusion which is reproduced hereunder :-
"From the abovementioned authorities, the position of law which emerges is that even in cases where the burden is on the accused the proof that is required to be given by him cannot be equated with the degree and character of proof which normally rests on the prosecution. Whilst the prosecution must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused may discharge his burden and prove his case on the basis of preponderance of probabilities. Also if facts so justify, and if the story put forward by the prosecution inherently militates against the facts presumed, then the presumption will at its inception be rendered sterile. To be remembered that in case of statutory presumptions the Court is compulsorily bound to draw the presumption raised by the statute. Therefore, for the presumption to be rendered sterile the facts must clearly make out that the ingredients of the offence are absent. A Court cannot render a statutory presumption sterile by a process of convoluted logic or by giving benefit of doubt. Even in cases of Statutory Presumptions, how the accused discharges the burden and the quantum and nature of proof required, will undoubtedly vary according to circumstances of each case. Depending on facts and circumstances of each case, the proof may partake of circumstances appearing in the prosecution case or evidence or those brought out in cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. It may also partake of defence evidence, oral or documentary. However, as emphasised by the Supreme Court in Dhanwantrai's case (supra) and subsequently accepted and followed in Ram Krishna B. Rane's case (supra), the presumption has to be rebutted by proof. The bare word of the accused is not enough. It is necessary for him to show that his explanation is so probable that a prudent man ought in the circumstances of the case accept it. It necessarily follows that if the case suggested by the accused leaves questions unanswered and unexplained even on probabilities and in certain respects is entirely unbelievable and/or bordering on absurdity, then it can not be said that even on a preponderance of probabilities, the accused had discharged his burden. In such cases there can be no question of the presumption being rendered sterile."
Mr. Usgaokar, the learned Counsel further submitted that if the cheque is dishonoured even on the ground that the payment was stopped, dishonour of the cheque would constitute an offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, unless the payment was forthcoming within the prescribed period. To strengthen his submission reliance has been placed on a case of Prithviraj v. Bhupendra (1994 (3) Crimes 579).
7. The learned Counsel for the appellant further submitted that to constitute the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, even if the cheque drawn by one person towards the debt or liability of another person, is dishonoured, the drawer of the cheque be held liable for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. To strengthen his proposition, reliance has been placed on a case of Alexander v. Joseph Chacko, 1994 (1) Crimes 388.
8. It is furthere submitted that once the cheque is issued in favour of the complainant and subsequently either in defence or at an earlier stage it is said that the cheque was presented not in connection with the transaction but for other reasons, the burden is on the accused to prove that the cheques were not issued in connection with the transaction. Reliance has been placed on the case of Adapa Bhogi Raju v. S. G. Ramayya, 1994 (1) Crimes 351.
9. Before giving verdict on the submissions made by Mr. Usgaokar, learned Counsel for the appellant, I feel it necessary to reproduce the purpose of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, as discussed in the "Law of Negotiable Instruments" by Dr. P. W. Rege.
Negotiable instruments have been devised as safe and facile substitute for cash and it has been the intention of the law that they should be capable of being passed from hand to hand like goods without the hindrance of multifarious or dilatory legal formalities. If they are expected to be circulated and accepted with ease and speak they must be capable of being passed on and received at their face value. This objective is achieved by the apparent tenor theory according to which the rights and liabilities arising out of a negotiable instrument can be judged only by looking to the instrument itself. Thus, only the person whose name appears on the instrument can make a claim thereunder, the person whose name appears on the instrument as a maker, acceptor or endorser can alone be held liable thereunder and the liability would be limited to the extent of the amount stated therein. These three principal inferences spring from the apparent tenor theory of negotiable instruments.
10. The main impact of this theory can be appreciated from the language of Section 8 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which says :
"S. "Holder".
The "holder" of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque means any person entitled in his own name to the possession thereof and to receive or recover the amount due thereon from the parties thereto."
11. In the case of Bacha Prasad v. Janki Rai, (FB), Choudhary, J., it is observed :
"The law relating to negotiable instruments is the law of commerce in general and contains mercantile usages which requires that the contract appearing on the fact of the instrument should be taken as the real contract."
The Mercantile Community found Negotiable Instrument Act as boon and, therefore, expressed gratitude for the man who discovered the brilliant idea of Negotiable paper in the words :
"The man who discovered the brilliant idea of negotiable paper has done at least as much for the commercial world as Christopher Columbus or Francis Drake has done for the Science of Cartography or Sir Issac Newton and Prof. Albert Einstein have done for Physics and Astrophysics respectively. (Law of Negotiable Instruments by Dr. P. W. Rege)."
Negotiable instruments came to be recognised as instruments carrying along with them proprietory rights which could be transferred only delivery or endorsement and delivery of such instruments. The negotiable instruments are generally, though not invariably, to be accepted at their face value, i.e. the rights and the obligations arising from such instruments themselves and not by taking stock of the evidence that may lie beyond the periphery of the document itself.
12. Considering the specific purpose of the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, I do not find any commercial or mercantile relation between the appellant and the respondent. At this stage, it needs to be recorded that the appellant/complainant scrupulously avoided, in the complaint and in the examination-in-chief of P.W. 1 to state the relation with the respondent/accused.Similarly, there is no whisper in the complaint as well as in the evidence led on behalf of the complainant regarding the receipt of the letter dated February 12, 1993. Thereby, no history or details were placed before the trial Court regarding how the accused is liable for any dues alleged to be against the respondent.
Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, with great respect to the learned Senior Counsel, I do not agree with the proposition that mere presentation or delivery of the cheque in the instant case to the appellant by the respondent, amounts to acceptance of the debt or liability. On the contrary, in the letter dated February 12, 1993, the respondent has given the entire history before presentation of the cheque in the month of April, 1993, to the Bank. It is specifically stated that he had issued cheques for Rs. 4,00 lacs to Goa Plast Pvt. Ltd. at his request. Ten post-dated cheques of Rs. 40,000/- each were issued on 20th July, 1992. Further it is stated that very letter of 20-7-92 was drafted by Mr. Rajan Kinnarkar at his instance (Mr. Auduth Timblo) and was directed to prepare such letter as per draft and so he did.
13. In this letter he has specifically disowned the liability of Rs. 4,00 lacs, much less of Rs. 40,000/- involved in the instant case. In the last para he has specifically stated "treat the said cheque as in valid as I cannot be expected to pay the said amount in view of the proof, that I have now been able to produce to you i.e. the letter in the hand of Mr. Auduth Timblo, assigning financial work to Shri Rajan Kinnarkar". The accused annexed the copy of the letter with the letter dated 12-2-93.
14. In order to attach the penalty provided under Section 138 of the Act the following ingredients have to be established :
1. The cheques should have been issued for the discharge, in whole or part, of any debt or other liability;
2. The cheques should have been presented within the period of six months or within the period of its validity which ever is earlier;
3. The payee or the holder in due course should have issued a notice in writing to the drawer within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and
4. After the receipt of the said notice from the holder in due course the drawer should have failed to pay the cheque within 15 days of receipt of the said notice.
15. Chapter XVII is introduced by amendment in 1989. The title of the Chapter is "Of Penalties In case of Dishonour of Certain Cheques for Insufficiency of Funds in the Accounts". The title of the Chapter itself speaks eloquently of the new tilt the Amending Act wanted to provide for remedial provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The object of this Chapter has been nicely discussed in the Commentary on "Law of Negotiable Instruments" by Dr. P. W. Rege at page 954. Some portion needs to be reproduced :-
"It has been very often repeated in the earlier parts of the commentary that negotiable instruments were devised by the mercantile community as a safe and a very dependable method of discharging pecuniary liabilities and as a substitute for cash payment which would always involve an element of ample risk due to either the magnitude of the amount sought to be paid or the geographical distance between the prayer and the payee. Such instruments could also be cleverly and conveniently used by several persons to discharge their financial liabilities inter se. However, a smooth working of the system of negotiable instruments primarily depended upon the honesty and the integrity of the parties thereto without which, of course the negotiable instrument would not be."
16. There was already a big clamour in the mercantile community about the element of insincerity and light heartedness which had crept into the practice of issuing cheques and a fairly effective, though not highly deleterious, remedy had to be provided for to eradicate the evil which had incarcerated the operational anatomy of the business world.
It is well known that a cheque that is dishonoured may cause incalculable loss, injury or inconvenience to the payee or endorsee thereof in view of the fact that due to the latter's unexpected disappointment he has also to lick the dust while meeting his own future commitments to other persons. It is true that Negotiable Instruments Act has not failed to provide a remedy for the aggrieved party, but the foregoing provisions of the Act lay down a procedure which is, in the first place very elaborate and since the remedy would be merely of a civil nature, the process to seek civil justice, in the second place becomes notoriously dilatory. To ensure promptitude in remedy against defaulters, therefore, was the only way in which the element of credibility and dependability could be reintroduced in the practice of issuing negotiable instruments in the form of cheques. The best way to do this was to provide a criminal remedy of penalty, which is just the thing that is sought to be done by the Amending Act.
It is no doubt that the High Court in hearing an appeal against an order of acquittal has full powers to review and reassess the evidence on the record and reach its own conclusions upon its estimate of the evidence. But it is settled law that while exercising these powers, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matter as :
(1) The view taken by trial Court is palpably wrong or manifestly erroneous as to the credibility of witnesses or any material irregularity or illegality committed by Trial Court;
(2) The presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at the trial;
(3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) slowness of the appellate Court in disturbing the findings of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.
17. In a case of Batindranath Banerjee , the learned brother observed;
"Dealing in cheques was vital and important not only for banking purposes but also for commerce and industry and the economy of the country".
The prosecution must indicate and prove the debts or liabilities.
18. The learned counsel for the respondent/accused has submitted that it was for the prosecution to first prove;
(i) that the liability of the nature specified existed;
(ii) that it was the liability of the accused; and
(iii) that the cheque was given towards that liability.
In this case, no evidence or history is being traced to show the relationship between the complainant and the respondent accused. From the cross-examination it transpired that the respondent-accused was working as Manager of the Factory. Thus, relations were that of master and servant or Employee and Employer. No evidence laid to show how the respondent-accused was liable to pay and due or part thereof. Means liability is not proved. Similarly, it is not proved that the cheque was given towards those liabilities. The complaint, this, remains simpliciter a complaint for non-payment, of dishonoured cheque even after notice. On the contrary, the accused much earlier to the presentation of cheques to the Bank, had apprised the complainant vide letter dt. 17-2-1990 that he is not liable to pay any amount and, therefore, stopped payment. The accused also apprised in the above letter under what circumstances cheques were issued in favour of appellant-complainant. Therefore, according to me, it is rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent accused that there being no business or commercial or mercantile relations between the parties, and secondly filed to prove the liability to attract the provisions of S. 138 of the Act. As the complainant failed to prove the case to attract the provisions of S. 138 of the Act, the question does not arise to rebut the presumption under S. 139 of the Act. Even considering the letter dated 12th February, 1990, issued by the accused, the presumption, if any, has been rendered sterile from its inception.
19. Considering the facts and circumstances as transpired from the complaint and evidence, it is apparent that the appellant/complainant has utterly failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused lowed anything or is liable to pay any amount, much less the Rs. 4,00,000/- or Rs. 40,000/- in the instant case to the appellant company. The appellant company has attempted to short circuit the suit by compelling the accused/respondent to pay the amount. It is no doubt found that the tendency on the part of the litigants to short circuit civil suits or proceedings by instituting complaints would be vigilantly checked. Therefore, the complaints should be vigilantly checked by the Criminal Courts and they should not allow such short circuits the parties should not be allowed to appease their anger or return their vengeance by starting proceedings in criminal courts where the proper remedy is to resort to Civil Courts. Criminal Courts have to be on their guard to see that their processes are not abused for obtaining decisions on complicated matters of civil nature or for putting pressure on parties with a view to obtain settlement of disputed question.
20. Giving conscious thought to the submissions made by the learned counsel, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the findings recorded by the trial Court. The learned counsel has not made out a case for remand. There being no substance in the instant appeal, the same is dismissed.
21. Appeal dismissed.