Bombay High Court
Anusuchit Jati Jamati Shikshan Sanstha ... vs State Of Maharashtra Through Its Chief ... on 3 April, 2024
2024:BHC-OS:5597-DB
30945.23-wpl.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 30945 OF 2023
Anusuchit Jati Jamati Shikshan
Sanstha, through its President
Mr. Bhushan Govind Ramteke & Ors. .. Petitioners
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Anr. .. Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33274 OF 2023
Seva Samajik Vikas Sanstha, through
Its authorized representative
Mr. Bhushan Govind Ramteke .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33281 OF 2023
Yukti Multipurpose Society, through
Its Chairman Mrs. Anupama Maroti
Nagarkar .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
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WITH
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33310 OF 2023
Prasang Magaswargiy Samajkalyan
Sanstha, through its President
Mr. Gajapal Payaruji Ingole .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33311 OF 2023
Bharatiya Samajik Bahuuddeshiy Vikas
Sanstha, through its President
Mr. Mangal Kawdu Telang .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
Mr. Nitin Thakkar, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Sanjiv Sawant, Mr.
Sandeep Barve, Mr. Santosh Wagh and Ms. Sonali Patil i/by B. K.
Barve & Co. for petitioners in WPL/30945/2023.
Mr. Bhushan Ramteke, petitioner-in-person in WPL/33274/2023.
Dr. Uday Warunjikar a/w Mr. Sandeep Barve and Ms. Sonali Patil
i/by B. K. Barve and Co. for petitioner in WP/33281/2023.
Mr. Abhijeet Desai a/w Sandeep Barve and Ms. Sonali Patil, Mr.
Karan Gajra, Mr. Digvijay Kachare, Ms. Daksha Punghera and Mr.
Vijay Singh i/by B. K. Barve & Co. for petitioner in
WPL/33310/2023.
Mr. Sanjiv Sawant a/w Mr.Sandeep Barve and Ms. Sonali Patil
i/by B. K. Barve & Co. for petitioners in WPL/33311/2023.
Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Mr. Milind V. More,
Addl. Govt. Pleader with Mr. Kushal Amin for State in
WPL/30945/2023 and WPL/33281/2023.
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Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Smt. P. H. Kantharia,
Govt. Pleader with Mr. Abhay L. Patki, Addl. Govt. Pleader with
Mr. Kushal Amin for State in WPL/33274/2023 and
WPL/33310/2023.
Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Smt. P. H. Kantharia,
Govt. Pleader, Smt. Jyoti Chavan, Addl. Govt. Pleader with Mr.
Kushal Amin for State in WPL/33311/2023.
CORAM: DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ. &
ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 1, 2024
PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 3, 2024
JUDGMENT (PER : CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. Heard learned counsel representing the respective parties.
BACKGROUND FACTS:
2. Challenge in this batch of Writ Petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is to a Government decision / resolution dated 30th October 2023 whereby the earlier Government decision dated 28 th October 2021 has been revoked and it has been resolved to establish uniform guidelines for various scholarships, fellowships, autonomous institutions, hostel accommodations and stipends to candidates / students who opt for being imparted training to take various competitive examinations in certain autonomous institutions established by Basavraj Page | 3 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx the State Government such as Tribal Research and Training Institute (TRTI), Pune, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Research and Training Institute (BARTI), Pune, Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj Research and Training Institute (SARTHI), Pune, Mahatma Jyotiba Phule Research and Training Institute (MAHAJYOTI), Nagpur and Maharashtra Research and Training Prabodhini (AMRIT), Mumbai. As per the impugned decision of the Government, dated 30th October 2023, a Committee headed by Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department has been constituted which comprises of the Additional Chief Secretary (Planning), Additional Chief Secretary (IMBK), Additional Chief Secretary, (TDD), Principal Secretary, Higher and Technical Education Department, Principal Secretary, Minority Affairs Department, Secretaries of other concerned Departments and Secretary, Social Justice and Special Assistance, who are its members. The impugned Government decision further requires that proposals for various such programmes to be implemented and proposed under the aforesaid autonomous institutions and all other similar autonomous institutions shall be submitted to the respective Departments and shall be presented before the Committee which shall be considered as per the Basavraj Page | 4 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx recommendations made by a Committee in its meetings held on 4th May 2023, 1st June 2023 and 12th October 2023 as mentioned in Appendix-A appended to the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023.
3. Appendix-A attached to the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 provides, inter alia; that the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 shall stand rescinded/revoked.
4. At this juncture itself, we find it relevant to mention as to what was provided for by the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021. The said Government Resolution was issued taking into consideration that BARTI, Pune has since 2012 been conducting a preparatory training for written examinations and interview for various competitive examinations and such training was aimed at supporting students from scheduled caste category to secure employment opportunities in Government, semi-Government and in private/corporate sector. BARTI, thus, under the earlier scheme i.e. the Schemes prevalent prior to impugned decision dated 30th October 2023 imparted training to prepare candidates/students for taking aptitude tests, written Basavraj Page | 5 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx examination and interviews etc. and thus, the purpose of the scheme was to empower the students with necessary expertise to succeed in competitive examination for employment in Banks, Railways, LIC etc. and other equivalent examinations. Thus, the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 was issued to grant approval to the BARTI, Pune for conducting training for Banks, Railways and LIC and other equivalent examinations and police and military recruitment examinations through 30 training centres working under the BARTI. The training duration under the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 was minimum of 6 months. The students who were selected through screening examination and eligibility for the students to be admitted to such training courses were to be determined by the BARTI on the basis of educational qualification and age and other criteria. The BARTI was to pay training fee of Rs.50,000/- plus taxes per student and trainees were also receiving monthly stipend of Rs.6000/-. As per Clauses 9 and 12 of the scheme embodied in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, the training programme was to be conducted for a minimum duration of 5 years.
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5. We may also notice that prior to introduction of the scheme enunciated in the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, BARTI was imparting training to the candidates belonging to the category of scheduled castes for competitive examinations and that for selecting the training centres a tender was floated on 15th September 2017 in which 47 entities were held eligible and accordingly, training was being provided by these 47 training centres through the selected entities under BARTI till June 2019. BARTI conducted evaluation of these training centres on 12 th June 2019 and out of 47 training centres, it was decided to close down 17 centres on account of non fulfillment of prescribed parameters. These 30 centres, thus, continued to impart training the candidates preparing them for competitive examinations.
6. As already observed above, the training under BARTI was being imparted at 30 training centres preparing the scheduled caste candidates for taking up competitive examinations leading to employment in Railways, Banks and LIC etc. Parallel to this training programme, the Home Department also floated a scheme to impart training for preparing the candidates for recruitment of police personnel, for which purpose a tender was Basavraj Page | 7 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx floated on 29th January 2018 based on which 9 institutions were held eligible and accordingly, work orders were issued to these 9 institutions on 9th March 2018 for imparting training for police and military recruitment. This training programme for police and military recruitment was completed in the year 2019.
7. On account of pandemic caused by COVID-19, the training programmes under both the aforesaid schemes, viz. the one run for scheduled caste candidates under BARTI and the other run by the State Government through Home Department for preparing the candidates for police and military recruitment, came to a halt and thereafter the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 was issued post lock-down whereby it was decided to continue training programme for Banks, LIC, Railways and equivalent examinations. The Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 provides that the programme under the said Government Resolution shall be conducted by the approved 30 centres and these training centres were those which were earlier selected in the tender process initiated vide tender notice dated 15th September 2017. It is worthwhile to notice that after Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021, no tender process to select the centres/ institutes for imparting training Basavraj Page | 8 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx was undertaken by the State Government and there are 30 training centres which were imparting training, were allowed to continue conducting the training by the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021. Pursuant to the said Government Resolution, an agreement was entered into between BARTI and 30 respective training centres/institutions. One such agreement entered into between BARTI and the Petitioner of Writ Petition (L) No.30945 of 2023 on 10th December 2021 may be referred to. Similar agreements were entered into between BARTI and other training centres. The agreement was executed as per Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 for conducting preparatory programme for a period of one year. The agreement also provided that the training centre shall provide required infrastructure and other facilities and conduct the examinations under the supervision of BARTI representative. It also provided that in the event of any irregularity/unsatisfactory performance during the training programme, BARTI will have full right to recover the training fee and to cancel the continuation of such training centre and also to black-list such training centre /institute. The agreement also provided that the terms may be changed from time to time by BARTI, which shall be binding on Basavraj Page | 9 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx the training centre/institute concerned. As regards duration of agreement, it clearly provided that the validity of agreement would be for a period starting from the date of agreement till the completion of scheduled training for the next one year with a further stipulation in the agreement that this period can be increased as per the provisions of the Government Resolution. The agreement also provided that right to reduce or extend the duration of the agreement shall be with the BARTI and also that the right to amend the terms and conditions of the agreement and right to cancel the agreement at any time shall also be with BARTI.
8. Thus, the Petitioners-training centres/institutions were imparting training in terms of the agreement entered into between the Petitioners and the BARTI as per the prescription available in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021. We may also note that since by the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 has been rescinded/revoked, the arrangement between the Petitioners - training centres/institutions and BARTI has come to an end which has led the Petitioners to challenge the impugned Basavraj Page | 10 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Government decision contained in the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023.
9. Besides the above facts, we may also notice certain litigation which took place between the Petitioners - training centres/institutions and the State Government prior to filing of the instant Writ Petitions wherein challenge has been made to the Government decision dated 30th October 2023. In this regard, it is noticed that under a note dated 19 th January 2022, the Hon'ble Minister, Department of Social Justice and Special Assistance directed to initiate selection of new entities/training centres/institutions through e-tender process and accordingly, the State Government directed BARTI to initiate fresh tender process, pursuant to which the tender notices were issued which became subject matter of challenge by the Petitioners before this Court at Bombay and at Aurangabad and Nagpur as well. In these Writ Petitions, challenge to the e-tender process was made primarily on the ground that the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 created a right in favour of the Petitioners- training centres/institutions to continue to impart training for a period of five years. This Court and Benches at Aurangabad and Nagpur passed certain interim orders providing therein that the Basavraj Page | 11 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx e-tender process may go-on but the same shall not be finalized. All such Petitions were clubbed and by the order dated 9 th November 2023 were dismissed by this Court as having been rendered infructuous on issuance of impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023. The Court, while dismissing the said Writ Petitions as infructuous, further made an observation that it will be open for the Petitioners to challenge the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 by taking out appropriate proceedings with all permissible pleas and ancillary prayers. The said order was, however, challenged before Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP(C) No.2778 of 2023 which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by means of an order dated 3rd January 2024 with the following observations:
"1. In pursuance of the liberty which has been granted by the impugned order of the High Court, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner states that the Petitioner has already filed a substantive petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. All that needs to be clarified is that the petitioner is at liberty to raise all appropriate contentions before the High Court including on the grounds which were raised in the earlier petition."
10. Thus, in the above said background facts these petitions came to be filed assailing the validity of the Government decision Basavraj Page | 12 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx contained in the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
11. As already observed above, the Petitioners - training centres / institutions are the entities which were appointed to impart training under BARTI through tender process initiated by issuing the tender notice on 15 th September 2017. Thus, the Petitioners were never subjected to any tender process for being selected to impart training under BARTI; rather were assigned to work of imparting training under the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 itself. The main plank of argument on behalf of the Petitioners is that in terms of earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 since the term of the scheme was five years and the Petitioners were engaged for imparting training by BARTI by entering into an agreement in pursuance of Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 itself, hence, before completion of period of five years of their engagement, no action was permissible to be taken by the Government Resolution which would result in their disengagement from the work relating to imparting training. It is, thus, contended by learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners that since the Basavraj Page | 13 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx impugned decision of the State Government contained in the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 rescinds the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, as such they have been disengaged from the work of imparting training which is contrary to the terms contained in the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 based on which the Petitioners had accepted the work relating to imparting training by entering into an agreement with BARTI and as such once the Petitioners altered their position by accepting the work of imparting training under the representation/promise made to them vide Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021, it was not open to the State Government to resile from the representation/ promise made to the Petitioners. Essentially, thus, the Petitioners have invoked the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation to assail the validity of impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023. It has also been argued on behalf of the Petitioners that the impugned Government Resolution is infested with mala fide for the reason that it has been issued only to defeat the interim orders passed by this Court in earlier batch of Writ Petitions.
12. Further submission is that the impugned Government Basavraj Page | 14 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Resolution dated 30th October 2023 takes away vested right of the Petitioners available to them as per the agreement entered into between the Petitioners and the BARTI pursuant to the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and that the impugned decision is absolutely arbitrary as there is no supervening public interest which the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 seeks to serve or achieve. Learned Counsel representing the Petitioners have also argued that pursuant to the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, the Petitioners - training centres / institutions have invested heavy amounts in developing the infrastructure relying on the promise made by the Government by issuing Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 that the scheme shall be available for a period of five years and now by issuing the impugned Government decision dated 30th October 2023 they have been discontinued from the work of imparting training, which is legally unsustainable.
13. It is also the submission on behalf of the Petitioners that the Cabinet, in its meeting dated 19 th October 2021 based on which the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 has been issued, only decided to form a Committee to Basavraj Page | 15 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx bring uniformity in training programmes and schemes of BARTI, SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT and other such autonomous institutions but no decision as is reflected from Clause 6 of the Appendix-A appended to the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 superseding the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 was taken by the Cabinet and in fact, insertion of points 5, 6 and 7 in the Appendix-A has mischievously been done.
14. Urging the aforesaid grounds, the Petitioners have thus impeached the Government decision contained in the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 and have prayed that the same may be quashed and the Petitioners may be allowed to continue to impart training in terms of the provisions contained in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021.
15. To buttress the submissions based on the doctrine of promissory estoppel, the Petitioners have relied upon the judgments in the case of State of Jharkhand and Ors. Vs. Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., Ranchi & Anr. 1, State of UP Vs. 1 2020 SCC OnLine SC 968 Basavraj Page | 16 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Birla Corporation Ltd.2, Devi Multiplex Vs. State of Gujarat3, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State of U.P.4 In support of the submission that the impugned Government decision suffers from the vice of mala fide, reliance has been placed by the Petitioners on the judgment in the case of Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab State Electricity Board & Ors.5
16. Per Contra, Shri Birendra Saraf, learned Advocate General has opposed the Writ Petitions, firstly by submitting that doctrine of estoppel, in the facts of the present case, cannot be invoked to challenge the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023. He has argued that for invoking the principle of promissory estoppel, the promise made by one party should be clear and unequivocal and it should be intended to create a legal relationship. It has also been argued that for putting the doctrine of promissory estoppel into service to challenge a Government action, it needs to be established that acting on an unequivocal promise, the Petitioners altered their position and that there is no overwhelming public interest which the 2 (2020) 20 SCC 320 3 (2015) 9 SCC 132 4 (1979) 2 SCC 409 5 (2009) 13 SCC 758 Basavraj Page | 17 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Government by taking the impugned decision intends to achieve or serve. It is also the submission of Shri Saraf, learned Advocate General that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a principle of equity which is invoked to ensure justice and fairness and to prevent manifest injustice and thus, all relevant factors including the result sought to be achieved by subsequent decision and the public good sought to be served have to be taken into account by the Court while invoking the said principle.
17. It is the submission of learned Advocate General that the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 did not create any vested right in the Petitioners and that whatever rights were available to the Petitioners though flowed only from the agreement entered into between BARTI and the Petitioners training centres/institutions pursuant to the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and since the term of agreement entered into between BARTI and the Petitioners, admittedly, was one year, hence any such right, much less any vested right is not available to the Petitioners to continue to impart training beyond one year. Learned Advocate General has also argued that the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 or the agreement entered into between the Petitioners Basavraj Page | 18 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx training centres and the BARTI did not contain any promise in any unequivocal or clear terms to allow the Petitioners to continue to impart training for five years and hence in absence of any such clear promise, invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, in the facts of the present case, is not permissible.
18. Laying much emphasis on the fact that the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 did not require the Petitioners to undergo any tender process or public competition for their selection as training centres, Shri Saraf, learned Advocate General has argued that considering the huge expenditure involved in the training scheme which is to be borne by the State exchequer, the State Government found it appropriate to rescind the policy contained in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021. It is also submitted by Shri Saraf that cancellation/supersession of the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 for the reason that it did not provide for any competitive bidding for selection of the entities to impart training, in itself achieves public good and public purpose for the reason that such large expenditure cannot be permitted to be made by the State Basavraj Page | 19 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Government involving private entities without subjecting them to a competitive bid process.
19. Emphasizing further that the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 has been issued to achieve larger and overriding public interest, it has been argued by Shri Saraf, that the Petitioners were engaged in imparting training only by one autonomous institution viz. BARTI, whereas, the impugned Government decision contained in the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 seeks to formulate a unified policy for imparting training to candidates belonging not only to scheduled caste category under BARTI but also all other disadvantaged sections of the society under other autonomous institutions of the State Government which are SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT and TRITI. It is his contention that it is well within the authority and powers of the State Government to come-forth with a uniform policy for providing scholarship and coaching for competitive examinations and also for providing other facilities such as hostel facilities and stipends to the eligible candidates under all schemes to be run by various Departments other than the Department of Social Justice and Special Assistance. He has stated that the earlier Government Basavraj Page | 20 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Resolution dated 28th October 2021 aimed at the scheme run by only one Government department viz. Department of Social Justice and Special Assistance under supervision of only one autonomous institution viz. BARTI, however, by the impugned Government decision, the State Government has decided to promulgate a unified policy for all such schemes run by different Government departments under other autonomous institutions as well. He, thus, submits that promulgating such a unified policy in itself seeks to achieve public purpose and such policy decisions being primarily in the realm of State Government need not be interfered with by this Court unless it is found to be manifestly arbitrary or suffering from any other vice of illegality or unconstitutionality.
20. Thus, to support the argument on behalf of the State - Respondents in opposition of the prayers made in the Writ Petition, it has been argued by the learned Advocate General that principle of promissory estoppel in the facts of the present case cannot be invoked for three reasons, viz; (i) the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 did not create any right, much less any vested right in the Petitioners to continue to impart training for five years, (ii) the earlier Basavraj Page | 21 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 does not contain any unequivocal promise based on which the Petitioners can be said to have altered their position and, (iii) the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 seeks to achieve public purpose (a) by unifying all the schemes of the State Government being run by different Departments under different autonomous institutions and (b) by rescinding the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 which did not provide for any competitive mechanism for selection of the training centres/institutions through imparting training involves huge expenditure, burden of which is borne by the State exchequer, as such, in absence of any competitive process of selection in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, its continuance would not have been in public interest.
21. Shri Saraf, learned Advocate General has also argued that the Petitioners' submission that the impugned Government decision dated 30th October 2023 is mala fide for the reason that it seeks to defeat the interim orders passed by this Court in earlier batch of Writ Petitions, is also not tenable. In support of this submission, it has been stated by Shri Saraf that the Basavraj Page | 22 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx purpose for which the impugned decision dated 30 th October 2023 has been taken, is legitimate in its character as it seeks to achieve larger public interest. In this regard, he has taken us through the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 which clearly mentions that there is no consistent approach in maintaining equality in the decisions relating to providing scholarships and coaching for competitive examinations across autonomous institutions like BARTI, SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT and TRITI and different departments and autonomous institutions are free to take independent decisions and hence, it was found appropriate to have some scheme for all the Government departments and all autonomous institutions. His submission is that it is with this object and aim that the impugned decision has been taken and hence, attributing the impugned decision of the Government Department contained in the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 to any mala fide against the Petitioners training centres/institutions, is wholly incorrect. He has also submitted that by the impugned resolution a Committee has been formed which shall take final decision in the matter based on the proposals to be submitted by different Government Departments in tune with the prescriptions Basavraj Page | 23 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx set out in the Appendix-A appended to the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023. His submission is that thus, all the Government departments are bound by the prescriptions available in Appendix-A and therefore by adhering to the said prescriptions, the object of having a unified scheme to impart training by different departments and autonomous institutions shall be achieved.
22. Regarding the submission made on behalf of the Petitioners that Clauses 5, 6 and 7 as available in Appendix-A appended to the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 were not part of the accompanying decision by the Cabinet and the same have been inserted mischievously by the State Respondent, it has been stated by learned Advocate General that the said contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners training centres is absolutely incorrect and as a matter of fact, the clauses contained in Appendix-A form integral part of the accompanying decision which have been mentioned in the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023, which, in fact, is formal expression of the decisions taken by the Cabinet.
23. On behalf of the Respondents - State, it has also been Basavraj Page | 24 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx argued that in pursuance of the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023, the proposals by different Departments are to be considered by the committee headed by the Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department and once the schemes are finalized, the selection of training centres/institutions shall be made through the process of competitive bidding in which the Petitioners may also participate. Learned Advocate General, in support of his submissions has thus prayed that Writ Petitions be dismissed. ISSUES:
24. Considering the pleadings available on record and the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respective parties, the issues which have emerged for our consideration are; (a) as to whether in the facts of the case, doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation can be invoked to impeach the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 ? (b) as to whether on the basis of the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021, any vested rights can be said to be available to the Petitioners which have been taken away by issuing subsequent Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 ? (c) as to whether impugned Government Basavraj Page | 25 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx Resolution dated 30th October 2023 has been issued with mala fide intent to defeat the interim orders passed by this Court in the earlier bunch of Writ Petitions which has resulted in unlawful removal of Petitioners from the work of imparting training ? and
(d) as to whether Appendix-A appended to impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 does not form part of the Cabinet decision dated 19th October 2023 ? DISCUSSION:
25. We will, first examine the ground urged on behalf of the Petitioners based on doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation. In Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that doctrine of promissory estoppel is now firmly established and is well accepted in our jurisprudence. Reviewing all earlier judgments on the principle of promissory estoppel, Hon'ble Supreme Court in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. (supra) has observed, inter alia; that plea of principle of promissory estoppel is available where one party has, by his word or conduct, made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise or representation which is intended to create a legal 6 (2012) 11 SCC 1 Basavraj Page | 26 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx relationship to arise in future, knowing and intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or representation is made and that such promise/representation would be binding on the party making it and such a party will not be entitled to go back upon it. The principle of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only as a defense but it can also be made basis of a cause of action. In paragraph 182 of the report in the case of Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. (supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up principles which guide the Court where issue of applicability of promissory estoppel arise. Paragraph 182 is quoted hereunder:
"182. In my view, the following principles must guide a court where an issue of applicability of promissory estoppel arises:
182.1. Where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the par-
ties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not. 182.2. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied against the Government where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is ap- plicable against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. However, the Government or even a private Basavraj Page | 27 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx party under the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law. The nature and function which the Government discharges is not very relevant. The Gov- ernment is subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of this doctrine are satisfied, the Govern- ment can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it. 182.3. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also furnish a cause of ac- tion. In other words, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can by itself be the basis of action.
182.4. For invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary for the promisee to show that by acting on promise made by the other party, he altered his position. The alteration of position by the promisee is a sine qua non for the applicability of the doctrine. However, it is not necessary for him to prove any damage, detriment or prejudice because of alteration of such promise.
182.5. In no case, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be pressed into aid to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. No promise can be enforced which is statutorily prohibited or is against public policy.
182.6. It is necessary for invocation of the doctrine of promis- sory estoppel that a clear, sound and positive foundation is laid in the petition. Bald assertions, averments or allegations without any supporting material are not sufficient to press into aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
182.7. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in abstract. When it is sought to be invoked, the court must con- sider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large. The fundamental principle of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court. Absence of it must not hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation."
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26. The Petitioners have also argued the protection under principle of legitimate expectation. In this regard a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat7 may be referred to, wherein it has been observed that legitimate expectation is different from mere anticipation and any kind of anticipation cannot amount to an assertable legitimate expectation and every such expectation should be distinguishable, legitimate and protective. It is also equally well settled that protection of legitimate expectation is not available to a party seeking its umbrella, wherein every right itself requires otherwise. Referring to an earlier judgment in the case of State of Tamilnadu Vs. Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Sharwan Kumar Kumawat (supra) has laid down that decision makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the principle of legitimate expectation. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment in the case of Sharwan Kumar Kumawat (supra) are relevant to be extracted herein, which run as under:
7 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 898 Basavraj Page | 29 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx "20. Kerala State Beverages (M AND M) Corporation Limited v. P.P. Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC 710:--
"B. Legitimate expectation
14. The main argument on behalf of the respondents was that the Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention of the respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate expectation.
15. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognised by this Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499] If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should not act contrary to the promise.
16. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate expectation in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India [(1999) 4 SCC 727]. He referred (at SCC pp. 741-42, para 27) to the judgment in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1985] A.C. 374 : [1984] 3 WLR 1174 : [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL)] in which Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which,
"27. ... (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be Basavraj Page | 30 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn." (AC p. 408)"
17. Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced.
18. It has been held by R.V. Raveendran, J. in Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 1986] that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant : (SCC p. 391, para 15) "(a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or
(b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice."
Substantive Legitimate Expectation
19. An expectation entertained by a person may not be found to be legitimate due to the existence of some coun- tervailing consideration of policy or law. [ H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Eleventh Edn., Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of Government. [Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security, [1985] A.C. 776 : [1985] 2 WLR 866 (HL)]
20. The decision-makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the princi- ple of substantive legitimate expectation. [ Findlay, In re, Basavraj Page | 31 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx [1985] A.C. 318 : [1984] 3 WLR 1159 : [1984] 3 All ER 801 (HL)] So long as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or in an unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call for interference by judicial review on the ground of a legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals being defeated."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 8 has also observed that though a policy decision, which makes a representation that some benefit shall be granted, though creates legitimate expectation which is normally binding on the decision-maker, however, such policy can be changed by the decision-maker in overriding public interest since choice of policy is for the decision-maker, however, change in policy defeating the legitimate expectation must satisfy the test of Wednesbury reasonableness. The relevant portion of the judgment in the case of Punjab Communications Ltd. (supra) is extracted below:
"38. The more important aspect, in our opinion, is whether the decision-maker can sustain the change in policy by resort to Wednesbury principles of rationality or whether the court can go into the question whether the decision-maker has properly balanced the legitimate expectation as against the need for a change. In the latter case the court would obviously be able to go into the proportionality of the change in the policy.
8 (1999) 4 SCC 727
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39. This aspect has come up for consideration recently in the English courts. The debate was started by Laws, J. in R. v. Secy. of State for Transport, ex p Richmond upon Thames London BC [(1994) 1 WLR 74 : (1994) 1 All ER 577] where the learned Judge laid down that the Wednesbury reasonableness test alone applied for finding out if the change from one policy to another was justified. That was a case in which in relation to airports a new system of night-flying restrictions were imposed. The new policy related to the fixation of the maximum number of take-off and landing movements variable according to the type of air- craft involved and the noise the aircraft generated during the night-time. The Wednesbury test was held applicable. Laws, J. stated:
"The court is not the Judge of the merits of the decision- maker's policy. ... the public authority in question is the Judge of the issue whether 'overriding public interest' justifies such a change in policy.... But that is no more than saying that a change in policy, like any discretionary decision by a public au- thority, must not transgress Wednesbury principles."
But this view of Laws, J. was dissented by Sedley, J. in R. v. Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries & Food, ex p Hamble (Off- shore) Fisheries Ltd. [(1995) 2 All ER 714] The learned Judge observed that if the outcome is challenged by way of judicial re- view, he did not consider that the courts' criterion was restricted to consider the rationality of the policy-maker's conclusions. He held that while the policy was for the policy-maker alone, the fairness of his or her decision remained the courts' concern. He said that to say so did not amount to placing the Judge in the seat of the Minister.
40. The judgment of Sedley, J. has since been overruled in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Hargreaves [(1997) 1 WLR 906] . In that case, the facts were that the eligibility for "home leave" of prisoners was initially one-third of the term of sentence as per the earlier decision of the Government of 1994 (accepting Lord Woolf's Report, 1990) and Hargreaves would at- tain that eligibility by 12-4-1995 to put in his application. But the Home Secretary felt that the scheme was being abused and therefore he modified the eligibility to one-half of the period of sentence by notice dated 20-4-1995. This postponed Harg- reaves' eligibility to 12-4-1996. Though the applicant had "be- come eligible" by 20-4-1995, the courts rejected his plea of le- gitimate expectation because eligibility merely enabled consid-
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eration of the application for home leave. The case was similar to Findlay [1985 AC 318 : (1984) 3 All ER 801 HL, sub nom Findlay v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt.] which related to a change in parole policy and which was held valid. It was held that the change in home-leave policy did not violate the earlier policy. In the Court of Appeal, Hirst, L.J. described the principle laid down by Sedley, J. as based on "heresy" and stated:
"On matters of substance (as contrasted to procedure) Wednesbury provides the correct test. It follows that ... his (Sedley, J.'s) ratio insofar as he propounds a balancing exercise to be undertaken by the court should, in my opinion, be over- ruled."
The result is that a change in policy can defeat a substan- tive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on Wednesbury reasonableness. We have noticed that in Hindustan Develop- ment Corpn. case [(1993) 3 SCC 499] also it was laid down that the decision-maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of the policy is for the decision-maker and not for the court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made."
28. In Sethi Auto Service Station and Anr. Vs. Delhi De- velopment Authority & Ors.9 Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly laid down that though doctrine of legitimate expectation is not accepted as a part our legal jurisprudence, however, a per- son who bases his claim on the said doctrine, has to first satisfy that he had relied upon such representation and denial of that expectation is detrimental. It has further been held in this judg- ment that Court will interfere only if the decision taken by the authority is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and in gross 9 (2009) 1 SCC 180 Basavraj Page | 34 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx abuse of power or has not been taken in public interest. Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that a claim based on mere legiti- mate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto gives rise to a right to invoke this principle. Hon'ble Supreme Court further observes that concept of legitimate expectation does not have any role where the State action is as a public policy or in public interest unless such action amounts to abuse of power. Paragraph 32 and 33 of the judgment in the case of Sethi Auto Service Station and Anr. (Supra) are relevant which are ex- tracted hereinbelow:
"32. An examination of the aforenoted few decisions shows that the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate ex- pectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.
33. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an Basavraj Page | 35 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx abuse of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the de- cision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. (Vide Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499])"
29. For examining the grounds based on the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation as urged by the Petitioners in this case, we may state that Court has its own limitation when called upon to interfere in the policy decision of the State. In Dhampur Sugar (Kshipur) Ltd. Vs. State of Uttaranchal & Ors.10, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that the public authorities must have liberty and freedom in framing policies and that though such discretion is not absolute and Courts, in exercise of their powers of judicial review, can interfere in such executive actions, however, it is also well established that Courts are ill-equipped to deal with such matters and that in complex social, economic and commercial matters, decisions are to be taken by the Government 10 (2007) 8 SCC 418 Basavraj Page | 36 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx authorities keeping in view several factors and it will not be possible for Courts to consider competing claims and conflicting interests. Said observations find expression in paragraph 63 of the report in the case of Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. (supra), which is extracted hereunder:
"63. In our judgment, it is well settled that public authorities must have liberty and freedom in framing policies. No doubt, the discretion is not absolute, unqualified, unfettered or uncanalised and judiciary has control over all executive actions. At the same time, however, it is well established that courts are ill-equipped to deal with these matters. In complex social, economic and commercial matters, decisions have to be taken by governmental authorities keeping in view several factors, and it is not possible for courts to consider competing claims and conflicting interests and to conclude which way the balance tilts. There are no objective, justiciable or manageable standards to judge the issues nor such questions can be decided on a priori considerations."
30. If we examine the facts of the present case as pleaded by the Petitioners invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, in the light of the law relating to these doctrines as discussed above, what we find is that to invoke such a ground the Petitioners have to first establish that they had, upon some promise/representation made by the Government allowing the Petitioners to continue to impart the training for five years, altered their position. For asserting that the Government had made such promise/representation, learned Counsel for the Petitioners have more than once referred to clauses 9 and 12 of Basavraj Page | 37 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx the Government policy embodied in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 which states that (1) training programme shall be conducted by the 30 centers for a minimum duration of five years and (2) this programme shall be conducted for a duration of five years. However, Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 was followed by separate agreements entered into between the Petitioners and BARTI where the term of conducting preparatory training programme is clearly mentioned as one year. The relationship, thus, between the Petitioners and BARTI which is an autonomous institution functioning under the State Government, is to be governed by the terms of the agreement which clearly provided that the Petitioners were engaged for a period of one year. Thus, having regard to the terms of agreement entered into between the Petitioners and BARTI, what we find is that it cannot be said that there was any categorical and unequivocal promise made by the State Government allowing the Petitioners to run the training programme for five years.
31. It is also to be noticed that the principle of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation have to give away to change of policy by the State Government in case by the changed or Basavraj Page | 38 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx altered policy, some larger public good or overriding public interest is sought to be achieved. We have already noticed the reasons available in the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 for issuance of the same according to which the policy promulgated by Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 aimed at evolving a unified policy of preparatory training to the candidates seeking employment in Government, semi-Government and private/corporate sector, which was also being provided by different Government departments other than the department of social justice and assistance, through different autonomous institutions such as SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT, TRITI etc. One of the reasons as argued by the learned Advocate General for promulgating the new policy is that pursuant to the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, no competitive bidding was resorted to for selecting the training centres/institutions for imparting preparatory training involving huge expenditure to be borne by the State exchequer. If to provide for competitive bidding for selection of training centres/institutions, the earlier Government policy contained in the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 has been done away with, in our opinion, such a policy shift is in public Basavraj Page | 39 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx interest.
32. We are also of the opinion that it is well within the authority and power of the State Government to formulate a policy which envisages a unified mechanism for imparting training to the candidates by different Government departments. It is difficult for the Court to accept any objection as urged by the Petitioners against the decision of the State Government to have a unified policy of scholarship for imparting training. It is also, in our opinion, beyond the scope of judicial review of this Court to opine as to which of the policies can be said to be better and even if this Court finds that a particular policy is better, that in itself cannot be a ground for striking down the policy adopted by the State Government.
33. Even if it is presumed that there was some kind of promise/ representation made by the State Government by issuing the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, in view of the law as discussed above, it is always open to the State Government to bring a change in the policy which may result in defeating such an expectation aroused in the Petitioners on account of promise allegedly made, provided change in policy Basavraj Page | 40 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx passes the test of Wednesbury reasonableness. We do not see any unreasonableness in the Government policy promulgated by the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023. Since it is the prerogative and within the ambit of the State Government to adopt a particular policy and unless such a policy is arbitrary and infringes any right - constitutional, statutory, vested or otherwise, such policy is not susceptible to challenge.
34. The submission of the Petitioners that the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 vested any right in the Petitioners, is not acceptable. Right, if any, which was created with the Petitioners arose from the agreement entered into between the Petitioners and BARTI and as observed above, the term of the said agreement was one year and accordingly, it is not open for the Petitioners to plead that they have any vested right available to them to continue to impart training for five years. The earlier Government Resolution does not create any vested right. There is nothing on record from where it can be inferred that by issuing impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 any of the constitutional or statutory rights of the Petitioners have been infringed. To the contrary, what we have found is that the impugned Government Resolution dated Basavraj Page | 41 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx 30th October 2023 aims at evolving a unified policy of scholarship and preparatory training for employment being imparted by different Government departments and different autonomous Government institutions. One of the reasons which appears to have impelled to issue Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 is absence of any mechanism for competitive bidding process in selection of the training centres/institutions in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021.
35. For the reasons aforesaid, we have no hesitation to hold that the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th November 2023 cannot be said to unsustainable and consequently, cannot be struck down on the grounds as urged by the Petitioners based on the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory estoppel. We have also no hesitation to hold that the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 does not take away any right of the Petitioners, much less any vested right.
36. The next submission made on behalf of the Petitioners that the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th November 2023 issued with mala fide intent to defeat the interim orders passed by this Court in earlier bunch of Writ Petitions as a result of Basavraj Page | 42 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx which the Petitioners have been removed from the work of imparting training, is also not made out for the reasons that we have already discussed. The objects which are sought to be achieved by the impugned Government Resolution are clearly set out therein. The primary aim of the impugned Government Resolution is to evolve a unified mechanism for scholarship and preparatory training programmes being conducted by different departments under different autonomous institutions. In our opinion, there does not exist any material before us to conclude that the impugned Government Resolution has been issued with any mala fide intent.
37. As regards the submission made on behalf of the Petitioners that clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the Appendix-A appended to the impugned Government Resolution were not part of the decision of the Cabinet taken on 19 th October 2023, it is to be observed that the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 is a formal expression of decision of the Cabinet. We do not find any reason or material to conclude that such clauses in Appendix-A have been added mischievously to the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 though no such decision was taken by the Cabinet. Government Resolution dated 30 th Basavraj Page | 43 ::: Uploaded on - 03/04/2024 ::: Downloaded on - 04/04/2024 16:33:09 ::: 30945.23-wpl.docx October 2023 explicitly mentions the chronology relating to the scheme of scholarship and preparatory training and also mentions the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021. The policy as embodied in the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 is at complete variance with the earlier policy contained in the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and hence, both the mechanisms of imparting preparatory training, the one contained in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and the other contained in the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023 cannot run parallel to each other. Thus, the very issuance of the Government policy as contained in the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023, in effect, overrides the earlier Government policy available in the Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021.
38. Accordingly, unhesitatingly, we hold that the assertion of the Petitioners that there has been any mischievous attempt on the part of the State Government to include clauses 5, 6 and 7 available in Appendix-A appended to the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 though no such decision by the Cabinet was taken, is not tenable.
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39. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any good ground to interfere with the Government decision/Resolution dated 30th October 2023. The Writ Petitions are, thus, devoid of merit.
40. Resultantly, the Writ Petitions fail, which are hereby dismissed.
41. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
(ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
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