Karnataka High Court
Pushpavati Medar vs The State Of Karnataka on 14 September, 2023
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662
CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 14TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2023
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 103871 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
PUSHPAVATI MEDAR,
AGE. 40 YEARS,
OCC. PANCHAYAT DEVELOPMENT OFFICER,
R/O. #104, 1ST FLOOR, SHARADA HOMES APARTMENT,
SAPATAPUR, 2ND MAIN, NEAR SBI JAYANAGAR BRANCH,
DHARWAD-580001.
... PETITIONER
(BY SMT. ARCHANA .A. MAGADUM, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
THROUGH HD CITY WOMEN PS,
SPP, HIGH COURT BUILDING,
DHARWAD-580011.
VIJAYALAKSHMI 2. MANJUNATH PADIYAPPA BENGERI,
M KANKUPPI AGE. 35 YEARS, OCC. LABOURER
R/O.SHIVALLI VILLAGE,
Digitally signed by
VIJAYALAKSHMI M DHARWAD-580112.
KANKUPPI
... RESPONDENTS
Date: 2023.10.12
14:32:11 +0530 (BY SRI. V.S. KALASURMATH, HCGP FOR R1;
R2 IS SERVED)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED U/S 482 OF CR.P.C.,
SEEKING TO ALLOW THE ABOVE CRIMINAL PETITION AND QUASH
THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN CRIME NO. 222/2022 FOR THE
OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 341, 504 AND 506 IPC
PENDING BEFORE THE PRINCIPAL CJ (JR. DV)JMFC COURT,
DHARWAD, HUBLI DHARWAD IN SO FAR AS THE PETITIONERS ARE
CONCERNED.
THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, THE
COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662
CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022
ORDER
1. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question the proceedings in Crime No.222/2022, registered for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 IPC.
2. Heard Smt.Archana Magadum, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri.V.S.Kalasurmtah, learned HCGP appearing for the respondent No.1.
3. Facts adumbrated are as follows:
The 2nd respondent is the complainant. The petitioner at the relevant point in time was working as a Panchayath Development Officer, Dharwad taluk. On 19.10.2022, it appears that the complainant visits the office of the petitioner. The visit was on account of a request to the authority to engage the labourers from Shivalli village, when the complainant goes to submit a representation in writing for the aforesaid request, the petitioner is said to have restrained his movement and directed the complainant to work as a daily wage employee. This forms the crux of -3- NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 the complaint, it becomes a crime in Crime No.222/2022 for the offence punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 IPC.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Smt.Archana Magadum would take this Court through the documents appended to the petition, particular with reference to the complaint so registered and would seek to contend that none of the ingredients as necessary under Section 339 of IPC is present in the complaint, so registered by the 2nd respondent. The imaginary allegations are made in the complaint and therefore, the complaint should not be permitted to investigated into, is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
5. Learned HCGP though would seek to refute the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner contending that the matter is still at the stage of investigation, but would admit that ingredients of Section 339 are conspicuously absent in the case at hand. He -4- NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 would nonetheless seek dismissal of the petition and permission of further investigation into the matter.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.
7. The aforenarrated facts are not in dispute as the date and link to the chain of event now lies in a narrow compass. The facts narrated hereinabove lie in a narrow compass. The only incident narrated in the complaint is of 19.10.2022. The petitioner at that point in time was working as a Panchayath Development Officer, Dharwad.
The complaint visits the office, wanting to submit a representation. The allegation of restraint is at the time when he goes to the office of the petitioner to submit the said representation. Since the entire issue has now sprung from the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint.
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²æêÀÄw. ¥ÀĵÁàªw À ªÉÄÃzÁgÀ EªÀgÀÄ vÀªÀÄä «gÀÄzÀÞ ªÀÄ£À«PÉÆqÀ®Ä §A¢zÉÝêÉAiÉÄAzÀÄ w½zÀÄ f¯Áè ¥ÀAZÁAiÀÄvÀ PÀbÃÉ jUÉ ºÉÆÃUÀzA À vÉ vÀqz É ÄÀ -6- NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 CªÁåZÀ ±À§ÝU½ À AzÀ ¤A¢¹ fêÀ ¨Ézj À PÉ ºÁQzÀÄÝ EªÀgÀ ªÉÄÃ¯É ¸ÀÆPÀÛ PÁ£ÀÆ£ÀÄ PÀª æ ÀÄ dgÀÄV¸À®Ä «£ÀAw F WÀl£ÉAiÀÄ §UÉÎ »jAiÀÄjUÉ «ZÁj¹ F ¢ªÀ¸À vÀqª À ÁV zÀÆgÀÄ ¤ÃrzÀÄÝ EgÀÄvÀÛz.É "
8. The complaint then becomes a crime in crime No.222/2022 for the offences punishable under Sections 341, 504 and 506 of IPC. Since the allegations are for the aforesaid offences, it is germane to notice whether the complaint meets the necessary ingredients of those offence or otherwise, Section 341 reads as follows:
341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.-
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
9. Section 341 has its ingredients in Section 339 of IPC. Section 339 of IPC reads as follows:
339. Wrongful restraint.-Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.-7-
NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022
10. Section 339 of IPC has its ingredients of wrongful restraint for an act to become an offence under Section 341 of IPC, mandates that the victim should be restrained from a movement in a manner that he would not be able to move towards any side. The complaint does not narrate any such circumstances, the complaint is only hurling of certain abuse with regard to reason why the complainant approaches the petitioner for registering the complaint and beyond that there is nothing narrated about any fact that would become ingredients of any wrongful restraint.
11. The Apex Court in the case of Keki Hormusji Gharda & Ors vs Mehervan Rustom Irani & Anr reported in (2009) 6 SCC 475 interpreting section 339 has held as follows:
12. Wrongful restraint' has been defined under Section 339 of the IPC in the following words:
-8-NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 "339. Wrongful restraint - Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.- The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good-faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this Section."
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily;
(2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that direction.
13. Section 341 of the IPC provides that :
341. Punishment for wrongful restraint-
Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both.
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14. The word `voluntary' is significant. It connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It should be a physical one. They should have common intention to cause obstruction.
12. The said judgment of the Apex Court, this court is followed by this Court in the case of Kota Rohit Karanth V/s State of Karnataka By Police Sub-
Inspector, Sanjayanagar Police Station, Bengaluru and another reported in 2023(2) Kar.L.J 372 and in W.P.No.1254/2023, dated 11.7.2023, wherein this Court has held
11. The only offence that remains is Section 341 of the IPC. For an offence to become punishable under Section 341 of the IPC, the ingredients as obtaining under Section 339 of the IPC is necessary to be present. Section 339 of the IPC reads as follows:
"339. Wrongful restraint - Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.--The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section."
In terms of Section 339 of the IPC (supra) for a wrongful restraint to be proved, the foundation should be that the person against whom such wrongful restraint is made should not be permitted to move around in any direction. That is not the issue in the case at hand. The complaint narrates that when he wanted to step into the office of the accused he was stopped and not let in. This is not wrongful restraint as obtaining in Section 339 of the IPC for it to become an offence. The Apex Court in the case of KEKI HORMUSJI GHARDA V. MEHERVAN RUSTOM IRANI1 has delineated as to what would amount to wrongful restraint under Section 341 of the IPC. The Apex Court holds as follows:
1(2009)6 SCC 475
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 "12. "Wrongful restraint" has been defined under Section 339 IPC in the following words:
"339. Wrongful restraint.--Whoever voluntarily obstructs any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongfully to restrain that person.
Exception.--The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of this section."
The essential ingredients of the aforementioned provision are:
(1) Accused obstructs voluntarily; (2) The victim is prevented from proceeding in any direction;
(3) Such victim has every right to proceed in that direction.
13. Section 341 IPC provides that:
"341. Punishment for wrongful restraint.-- Whoever wrongfully restrains any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees, or with both."
14. The word "voluntary" is significant. It connotes that obstruction should be direct. The obstructions must be a restriction on the normal movement of a person. It should be a physical one. They should have common intention to cause obstruction."
12. In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court quoted (supra) and also in view of none of the facts meeting the ingredients that are necessary to drive home the offences as alleged, permitting
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 further proceedings against the petitioners would amount to abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
13. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand or the complaint is considered on the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment, as followed by this court supra, the complaint so registered for the offences as aforequoted would be rendered unsustainable. The unsustainability of it would lead to its obliteration.
14. The other offences that are alleged are the once punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of IPC. For an offence punishable under Sections 504 and 506 of IPC, what is required is the presence of the ingredients as obtaining under Section 503 of IPC. 504 and 506 of IPC appears to have been loosely laid against the petitioner in the case at hand. The Apex Court in the case of Mohammad Wajid and another V/s. State of U.P. and others reported in 2023 SCC online SC 951 has held as follows:
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 "24. Chapter XXII of the IPC relates to Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. Section 503 reads thus:--
"Section 503. Criminal intimidation. --Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. Explanation.--A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested, is within this section. Illustration A, for the purpose of inducing B to resist from prosecuting a civil suit, threatens to burn B's house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation."
25. Section 504 reads thus:--
"Section 504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.--Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
26. Section 506 reads thus:--
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 "Section 506. Punishment for criminal intimidation. --Whoever commits, the offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both;
If threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, etc.--And if the threat be to cause death or grievous hurt, or to cause the destruction of any property by fire, or to cause an offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or to impute unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or with both."
27. An offence under Section 503 has following essentials:--
1) Threatening a person with any injury;
(i) to his person, reputation or property; or
(ii) to the person, or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested.
2) The threat must be with intent;
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat; or
(iii) to cause that person to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.
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28. Section 504 of the IPC contemplates intentionally insulting a person and thereby provoking such person insulted to breach the peace or intentionally insulting a person knowing it to be likely that the person insulted may be provoked so as to cause a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. Mere abuse may not come within the purview of the section. But, the words of abuse in a particular case might amount to an intentional insult provoking the person insulted to commit a breach of the public peace or to commit any other offence. If abusive language is used intentionally and is of such a nature as would in the ordinary course of events lead the person insulted to break the peace or to commit an offence under the law, the case is not taken away from the purview of the Section merely because the insulted person did not actually break the peace or commit any offence having exercised selfcontrol or having been subjected to abject terror by the offender. In judging whether particular abusive language is attracted by Section 504, IPC, the court has to find out what, in the ordinary circumstances, would be the effect of the abusive language used and not what the complainant actually did as a result of his peculiar idiosyncrasy or cool temperament or sense of discipline. It is the ordinary general nature of the abusive language that is the test for considering whether the abusive language is an intentional insult likely to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace and not the particular conduct or temperament of the complainant.
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29. Mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence, may not amount to an intentional insult within the meaning of Section 504, IPC if it does not have the necessary element of being likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace of an offence and the other element of the accused intending to provoke the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace or knowing that the person insulted is likely to commit a breach of the peace. Each case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that case and there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under Section 504, IPC if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant. In King Emperor v. Chunnibhai Dayabhai, (1902) 4 Bom LR 78, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court pointed out that:--
"To constitute an offence under Section 504, I.P.C. it is sufficient if the insult is of a kind calculated to cause the other party to lose his temper and say or do something violent. Public peace can be broken by angry words as well as deeds."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. A bare perusal of Section 506 of the IPC makes it clear that a part of it relates to criminal intimidation. Before an offence of criminal intimidation is made out, it must be established that the accused had an intention to cause alarm to the complainant.
31. In the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly, considering the nature of the allegations levelled in the FIR, a prima facie case to
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 constitute the offence punishable under Section 506 of the IPC may probably could be said to have been disclosed but not under Section 504 of the IPC. The allegations with respect to the offence punishable under Section 504 of the IPC can also be looked at from a different perspective. In the FIR, all that the first informant has stated is that abusive language was used by the accused persons. What exactly was uttered in the form of abuses is not stated in the FIR. One of the essential elements, as discussed above, constituting an offence under Section 504 of the IPC is that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional insult. Where that act is the use of the abusive words, it is necessary to know what those words were in order to decide whether the use of those words amounted to intentional insult. In the absence of these words, it is not possible to decide whether the ingredient of intentional insult is present.
32. However, as observed earlier, the entire case put up by the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra). The parameters are:--
"(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
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33. In our opinion, the present case falls within the parameters Nos. 1, 5 and 7 resply referred to above.
34. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc., then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.
35. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court held:--
"5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings :
(AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death....."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. Interpreting Sections 504 and 506 of IPC, the Apex Court holds that intimidation under Section 506 must have ingredients of Section 503 of IPC. On a perusal, of the complaint would not indicate any of the ingredients present that would become an offence under Section 506 of IPC and the same goes with Section 504 of IPC. Therefore, none of the offence alleged against the petitioner is present
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 in the case at hand, and its improbability or them being instituted with malafide intention would lead to obliteration of the crime itself at the stage of registration of the crime.
To arrive at this conclusion, I am fortified by the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors vs Ch. Bhajan Lal And Ors reported in 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335. Apex Court has held as follows:
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non- cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022 Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
16. In the light of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court, I deem it appropriate to consider this is a fit case to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
and obliterate the crime against the petitioner, failing which it would become an abuse of process of law, and result in miscarriage of justice.
17. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
i) Criminal Petition is allowed.
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NC: 2023:KHC-D:10662 CRL.P No. 103871 of 2022
ii) The proceedings in Crime No.222/2022 pending on the file of the Prl. Civil Judge (Jr.Dn) and JMFC, Dharwad stands quashed.
Sd/-
JUDGE vb ct:bck List No.: 1 Sl No.: 77