Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Toyota Kirloskar Motor P Ltd vs Mr.L.Sunil Reddy on 15 September, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI
***
CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1179/2024 Between:
# TOYOTA KIRLOSKAR MOTOR PVT. LTD.
...PETITIONER AND $ L.SUNI REDDY AND OTHERS ...RESPONDENT(S):
DATE OF JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED : 15-09-2025
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN
&
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.HARI HARANATHA SARMA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers : Yes/No may be allowed to see the judgments?
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be marked : Yes/No to Law Reporters/Journals:
3. Whether the Lordship wishes to see the fair copy : Yes/No Of the Judgment?
____________________________ JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN __________________________________ JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA 2 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 *IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI * THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN & * THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A.HARI HARANADHA SARMA + C.R.P. No.1179 of 2024 % Dated: 15-09-2025 Between:
# Toyoto Kirlosakar Motor Pvt. Ltd.
...Petitioner(s) And $ L.Sunil Reddy and others ...Respondent(s) ! Counsel for the Petitioner(s) : N.Bharath Simha Reddy ^ Counsel for Respondent(s) : J.Ugra Narasimha <GIST :
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1. (2001) 8 SCC 97
2. (2023) 11 SCC 594
3. (2024) 9 SCC 148
4. (2024) SCC Online SC 4285
5. (2024) SCC Online Del 6415
6. (1997) 5 SCC 76
7. (2006) 3 SCC 312
8. (2007) SCC Online AP 819
9. Civil Appeal No.3953 of 2018, dt.28-08-2024
10. Civil Appeal No(s).927 of 2024, dt.04-12-2024
11. 2019(1) RLW 90 (Raj.)
12. 2024 SCC Online Kerala 4243
13. (2022) 6 SCALE 587
14. (1999) 4 SCC 521
15. (2010) 4 SCC 350
16. (1983) 4 SCC 566
17. (2003) 6 SCC 641 3 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 APHC010217132024 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI [3527] (Special Original Jurisdiction) MONDAY, THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF SEPTEMBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B KRISHNA MOHAN THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO: 1179/2024 Between:
1. TOYOTA KIRLOSKAR MOTOR P LTD, REP BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE, DEEPAK RAO KR, PLOT NO.1, BIDADI INDUSTRIAL AREA RAMANAGARA DISTRICT KARNATAKA 562109 ...PETITIONER AND
1. MR L SUNIL REDDY, S/O L. NAGESWARA REDDY OFFICER, GE INDIA TECHNOLOGY CENTER P LTD, 122, EPIP, WHOODI WHITE FIELD, BANGALORE
2. NANDI TOYOTA MOTOR WORLD LTD, REP BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE, 46/3A, KUDLU GATE, 7TH MILE, HOSUR ROAD, BANGALORE
3. HARSHA AUTO ENTERPRISES P LTD, REP BY ITS AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE, 4034, MAMIDALAPADU, SANTOSH NAGAR, KURNOOL 518 004 ...RESPONDENT(S):
Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India,praying that in the circumstances stated in the grounds filed herein,the High Court may be pleased topleased to A.Allow the Revision Petition and set aside the final order and judgment dated 16th February, 2024 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in Revision Petition No. 2117 of 4 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 2019, cause titled 'M/s Toyota Kirloskar Motor P Ltd. v. L. Sunil Reddy and others' and consequently the judgments of the Forums below B.Dismiss the Complaint filed by Respondent No. I bearing Case No.56 of 2014 titled 'L. Sunil Reddy v. The Manager, Toyota Kirloskar Motor P Limited and Others on the file of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Kurnool C.Any other order which this Honourable Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may also be passed in favour of the Petitioner herein and against the Respondent(s).
IA NO: 1 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to issue appropriate Order or Direction for stay of all further proceedings in pursuance of Final Order in RP.No.2117/2019 dated 16.2.2024 on the file of National Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Delhi confirming the Final Order in FA.No.467/2015 on the file of State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Vijayawada and the Final Order in CC.No.56/2014 dated 27.11.2014 on the file of District Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Kurnool pending disposal of the main CRP and pass IA NO: 2 OF 2024 Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased pleased to vacate the interim order dated.21.06.2024 passed in lA No.1 of 2024 in CRP No.1179 of 2024 and dismiss the CRP with exemplary costs Counsel for the Petitioner:
1. N BHARATH SIMHA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. J UGRANARASIMHA 5 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 This Court made the following Order:
(per Hon'ble Sri Justice B.Krishna Mohan) This Civil Revision Petition was filed against the order in Revision Petition No.2117 of 2019 on the file of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, dated 16.02.2024, confirming the order in First Appeal No.467 of 2015 on the file of Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Vijayawada, dated 02.07.2019, confirming the order in C.C.No.56 of 2012 on the file of District Consumer‟s Forum, Kurnool, dated 27.11.2014.
2. The revision petitioner herein is the Opposite Party No.1 and the respondent Nos.2 and 3 are the Opposite Party Nos.2 and 3 respectively and the 1st respondent herein is the complainant in C.C.No.56 of 2012 on the file of District Consumer‟s Forum, Kurnool.
3. Heard the learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner herein and the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent herein.
4. As per the complaint in C.C.No.56 of 2012, the complainant purchased a brand new four wheeler Toyota Innova 2.5 V(M4)(7S)(VX) model vehicle from the opposite party No.2 on 11.03.2011 for a sum of Rs.12,43,045/- and the same was registered with registration No.KA 53P 7697 on 11.03.2011.
When the complainant was travelling in the said vehicle from Kurnool to Bangalore on 16.08.2011 at about 3 P.M., suddenly it met with an accident 6 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 and all the inmates of the opposite vehicle sustained severe injuries, the air bags of the said Innova vehicle belonging to the complainant were not deployed/opened and even ten days prior to the said accident, when the complainant was travelling in Bangalore city in the said car, heavy smoke came out from the clutch plates and it burnt on the road itself. Hence alleged that the complainant was supplied with a defective vehicle by the opposite parties and as such, the above said complaint was filed before the District Consumer‟s Forum, Kurnool.
5. The prayer in the said complaint was to replace the complainant‟s vehicle with a new vehicle and in default, the opposite parties shall refund the cost of the vehicle i.e., Rs.12,43,045/- with interest @ 24% per annum from the date of purchase till the date of realization, to pay a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-
for the mental agony suffered by the complainant and payment of costs Rs,10,000/-.
6. The opposite parties filed objections to the said complaint stating that the SRS (Supplemental Restraint System) front air bags are designed to provide further protection for the driver and front passenger in addition to the primary safety protection provided by the seat belts. The SRS air bag, in response to a severe frontal impact, work with the seat belts to help reduce injury by inflating. The SRS front air bags are designed to deploy in severe (usually frontal) collisions where the magnitude and duration of the forward deceleration of the vehicle exceeds the designed threshold level. The SRS 7 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 front air bags will deploy in the event of an impact that exceeds the set threshold level (the level of force corresponding to a 20-30 km/h frontal collision with a fixed wall that does not move or deform). However, this threshold velocity will be considerably higher if the vehicle strikes an object, such as a parked vehicle or sign pole, which can move or deform on impact, or if the vehicle is involved in an under ride collision (e.g., a collision in which the front of the vehicle "under rides" or goes under, the bed of a truck, etc.). It is possible that in some collisions where the forward deceleration of the vehicle is very close to the designed threshold level, the SRS front air bags and seat belt pretensioners may not activate together. It is important to note that the SRS front air bags are generally not designed to inflate if the vehicle is involved in a side or rear collision, if it rolls over, or if it is involved in a low-
speed frontal collision.
7. In the instant case, on close observation of the photographs of the impugned car, one can clearly observe that the extreme left portion of the impugned vehicle hit the object and as a result the extreme left portion of the vehicle was damaged. Hence, the impact was not frontal but a side impact collision. As a result, the air bags have not been deployed. Since the impugned vehicle has hit the moving object (auto), the requisite threshold velocity to deploy air bags might not have been achieved, hence the air bags have not deployed. Such being the case, the complainant‟s allegation of manufacturing defect cannot be accepted and the same is denied. The 8 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 owner‟s manual provided to the complainant at the time of delivery, explains in detail the working of the SRS air bags. The vehicle is installed with the air bag sensor assembly, which contains of a safing sensor and air bag sensor. This indicator comes "ON" when the engine switch is turned to the "ON". It goes "OFF" after about 6 seconds, which indicates that the SRS air bags are operating properly. If there is any malfunction of air bags, the light does not lit when the engine switch is turned "ON" or the light is continuously lit while driving. In such case, the complainant has to report the same to the authorized Toyota dealer. In the instant case, the complainant has neither reported nor complained any such complaint before the opposite parties or with any of its dealers. Hence, the allegation of defective air bag cannot be accepted.
8. For the complainant, PW.1 was examined and Exs.A1 to A7 were marked. For the opposite parties, RW.1 was examined and Exs.B1 to B12 were marked before the District Consumer Forum, Kurnool in C.C.No.56 of 2012. One of the issues framed by the learned District Forum was that "Whether there is a manufacturing defect in the vehicle sold by the opposite party No.2 to the complainant which was manufactured and delivered by the opposite party No.1?" Upon hearing the merits, the learned District Forum in its final order dated 27.11.2014 in C.C.No.56 of 2012 observed as under:
Sri.V.Karthikeyan who was examined as RW1 on behalf of opposite parties clearly admitted in his cross examination, it is a fact that the Toyota Company recalled vehicles for faulty air bags and wipers throughout the world which is reported in News Paper Hindu dated 31- 9 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 11-2013, but not in India. The complainant produced the Xerox copy of the Hindu dated 11-11-2014. where in it is stated Toyota to recall 45,000 units in Innova in India. The admission of RW1, that recall of the Innova Vehicles by the company and paper cutting in 11-11-2014 which shows Toyota Kirloskar Motor to recall nearly 45,000 units of its multi-utility vehicle Innova in India to rectify defect in steering column. The said recall is relating to defect in deployment of air bags only in the event of any accident. The contention of complainant is that the vehicle supplied to the complainant by opposite party No.2 is suffering with manufacturing defect, air bags not deployed when the vehicle met with severe accident, when it had collision to the opposite vehicle with high speed and burning of clutch plates within short span of 5 months from the date of its purchase. The contention of opposite party because of non maintenance of fluid levels properly may be cause for burning of clutch plates is not tenable, as the vehicle is high end model and purchase had taken place only 5 months prior to that incident. Another defense of opposite parties is that the air bags did not deploy when the vehicle met with an accident because the collision had taken place on left side of the vehicle that too to a moving object is also not sustainable in view admission of RW1 that the vehicle met with major accident and extensive damage which occurred to the Innova vehicle on its entire front portion and also the estimation prepared by opposite party No.3 by mentioning all minute details of repairs that required to the accident vehicle to make it road worthy. The contention of the complainant further supported by the evidence of Sri.V.Karthikeyan, Innova Vehicles were recalled through out the globe and also the publication made in Hindu dated 11-11-2014 where in opposite party No.1 expresses their intention to recall 45,000 units of Innova in India to rectify defect in steering column. The complainant says he purchased the vehicle as he was attracted by the words of opposite parties 1 and 2 that the vehicle is having safety protection of opening of air bags in the event of occurrence of any accident by giving additional protection to the driver and the front passenger in addition to seat belt protection. When these air bags were not deployed though major accident had taken place on 16-08-2011, it is not fair on the part of opposite parties 1 and 2 to say that there is no manufacturing defect in the vehicle basing on some flimsy and untenable defences. There is clear cut manufacturing defects in the instant case. Hence we hold this point also in favour of complainant and against opposite parties 1 to 3.
And consequently gave the following relief:10
HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 In the result, the CC filed by the complainant is partly allowed and we direct opposite parties 1 and 2 to replace the vehicle to the complainant, of the same model with new one (which is free from manufacturing defects) and if for any reason such model vehicle is not available, to return the amount Rs. 15,09,415/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of accident i.e., on 16-08-2011 till the date of payment. As the complainant suffered with a lot of mental agony from the date of purchase of vehicle, we direct opposite parties 1 and 2 to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- towards compensation for mental agony which he suffered due to defective vehicle and negligence of opposite parties 1 and 2 in rendering the service and a sum of Rs.5,000/- towards costs of this CC. We direct opposite parties 1 and 2 to replace the vehicle of the same model with new one or for any reason if it is not available to pay the amounts as directed above within one month from today failing which complainant is at liberty to execute this order and realize the fruits of the order according to law CC against to opposite party No.3 is dismissed but without costs.
9. Aggrieved by the same, the opposite parties preferred an appeal in F.A.No.467 of 2015 on the file of A.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Vijayawada and the same was dismissed on merits vide its order dated 02.07.2019 observing at the relevant paragraphs of the said order as under:
13. However, we are not concerned with other conditions. But the present controversy is whether the collision is a front collision with severe impact or the impact of the collision was on the extreme left hand side of the vehicle when the collision was on one side of the vehicle but not front collision, it is an accepted principle as per the literature that the Airbags would not be deployed.
16. Thus, from the evidence of P.W.1 and R.W.1. who are the technical persons, collision is a frontal collision and the SRS Airbags have not inflated in the vehicle at the time of the accident. As per the literature and the admitted case of the opposite parties, the Airbags intend to function in severe front collisions. In order to appreciate the nature and severity of the accident, we have perused the sworn affidavit of the complainant in which he has affirmed that the front portion of his vehicle was badly damaged, this is a major accident and almost all the inmates of the vehicle been 11 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 sustained severe injuries. But the Airbags were not opened. A perusal of Ex.A-4 photographs would clinchingly show that it is a major accident, that there is a frontal collision of the vehicle and the vehicle badly damaged.
This fact is further fortified by Ex.B-12 first three photographs filed on behalf of the opposite parties.
17. Ex A-5 is a crucial document, it is the FIR presented by the driver of the opposite auto. In this document, it is clearly mentioned that the driver of the car was driving the car with terrific speed from Kurnool side and dashed against his auto from front side and the auto turned turtle. It is also mentioned that the auto driver and other inmates of This document itself is sufficient to prove that the vehicle was driven with terrific speed and there is a frontal collision at the time of the accident. The statement in the complaint and in the evidence of the complainant that within a short time after the vehicle was purchased, when the complainant was travelling in Bangalore city, heavy smoke came out from the clutch plates and the clutch plates of the vehicle burnt on the road. The opposite parties tried to explain that the clutch plates were burnt due to improper maintenance of fluid levels or negligent driving. This theory of impossible either to burn clutch plates or emanating smoke in a new high end and high quality of Innova vehicle like the present vehicle. Therefore, it is quite obvious that there is inherent defect in the vehicle
18. It is the specific stand taken by the opposite parties only one vehicle will be put for testing of working of Airbags etc. in a batch before the vehicles are released for sale. It is not the case of the opposite parties that the vehicle in question was tested before it was sent to the showroom for sale. By placing the aforesaid material and evidence, the complainant has established that there is a mechanical defect in the vehicle. Only due to the said mechanical defect, Airbags were no deployed at the time of the accident.
19. We find probable evidence in the cross-examination of R.W., which supports the claim of the complainant. R.W.1 V.Karthikeyan in his evidence, admitted that Toyota Company recalled vehicles for faulty Airbags and wipers throughout the world, which was reported in Hindu Daily on 31.03.2013. The complainant produced photostat copy of the said Hindu Daily, wherein it is stated that Toyota to recall 45,000 units of Innova in India. The evidence of R.W.1 coupled with the newspaper clipping would clinchingly establish that the recalling of Toyota vehicle is due to defect in deployment of Airbags only in the event of accident.
20. Thus the complainant has established that the Airbags were not deployed in the vehicle though it is a major accident and frontal collision 12 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 and this non-deployment of Airbags in the car is due to mechanical defect of the vehicle. We did not find any error to interfere with the finding of the Forum. Therefore, we hold that the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
10. Still aggrieved by the order in the above said First Appeal, the opposite party No.1 filed Revision Petition No.2117 of 2019 on the file of National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi and the same was dismissed on merits vide its order dated 16.02.2024 observing at the relevant paragraphs of the said order as under:
20. We are in agreement with the findings of District Forum and State Commission regarding the collision in question being a frontal one, with an impact velocity in which airbags ought to have deployed. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-1 in this regard, who is an expert in the field. Moreover, the evidence of RW-1 in cross examination also supports the version/opinion given by PW-1. This coupled with evidence of RW-1 with respect to recall of vehicles by Toyota company for faulty airbags and wipers in the many parts of the world, which have been reported in the newspaper also, lends credence to the case of complainant/respondent that vehicle in question had a manufacturing defect due to which the airbags did not deploy despite the collision being frontal one and of impact velocity in which it ought to have deployed, coupled with problem relating to burning of clutch plates or emanating smoke about 10 days before the date of accident. We are unable to accept the contentions of OP-1/Petitioner that collision in the state case was on the left side, and not the frontal one. Both the District Forum and State Commission have correctly and appropriately appreciated the evidence placed before them. Contention of OP-
1/Petitioner that State Commission has based its findings solely on photographs is not factually correct. Both District Forum and State Commission have correctly interpreted the evidence of RW-1 in cross examination. District Forum/State Commission have not relied upon newspaper reports as any main piece of evidence, rather just quoted it as supplemental evidence, to be taken note of in conjunction with evidence of RW-1 Contentions of OP-1/Petitioner about lack of expert evidence are not valid.
22. In view of the foregoing we find no illegality or material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order of State Commission. We find no reason 13 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 to interfere with the well-reasoned orders of District Forum and State Commission. Hence, the order of the State Commission is upheld. Accordingly the RP is dismissed. As District Forum has held both the OP-1/Petitioner and OP-2 liable, they shall/implement the order of the District Forum within 30 days from today. They are liable jointly and severely. On replacement of the vehicle with a new one or refund of the amount as per order of the District Forum, the complainant/respondent, will hand over the existing vehicle to the OP-1/Petitioner and OP-2.
23. It is to be noted that District Forum has held both OP-1 (petitioner herein) and OP-2 (Respondent-2 herein) liable, jointly and severely. Both OP-1 and OP-2 filed appeal before the State Commission, which was dismissed vide impugned order 02.07.2019. The present RP has been filed by OP-1 only. No RP, challenging the impugned order dated 02.07.2019 has been filed by OP-2. Hence, as regards OP-2, order of District Forum, read with State Commission order has already attained finality.
24. The pending IAs in the case, if any, also stand disposed off.
11. The learned senior counsel for the revision petitioner submits that the finding of the learned District Forum as confirmed by the learned A.P. State Commission and the learned National Commission respectively is a perverse finding contrary to record and based on no evidence. The subject vehicle dashed the auto and the front air bags did not open as it was a side collision and there was a burning in the clutch plates. The FIR copy also suggests the side collision. Even the defective driving also can cause the burning of the clutch plates. Since it is a case of perverse finding, this Hon‟ble Court can show indulgence under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
12. His alternative submission is that the learned single non judicial member only decided the above said revision petition on the file of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at New Delhi and as 14 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 there was no coram comprising of judicial and non-judicial members, the said order is to be set aside by remanding the matter to the NCTRC for fresh hearing with a full-fledged coram comprising of judicial and non-judicial members.
13. In support of his contention, he relies upon the following decisions:
(i) In Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd.,1 at para Nos.6 & 7, it was observed that;
6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to.
1(2001) 8 SCC 97 15 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
7. This Court in Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. Ltd vs. Ramtahel Ramanand and Ors. [AIR 1972 SC 1598] in para 12 has stated that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution is intended to be used sparingly and only in appropriate cases, for the purpose of keeping the subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and, not for correcting mere errors. Reference also has been made in this regard to the case Waryam Singh & Anr. vs. Amarnath & Anr. [1954 SCR 565]. This court in Babhutmal Raichand Oswal vs. Laxmibai R. Tarte and Anr. [AIR 1975 SC 1297] has observed that the power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal and that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. Judged by these pronounced principles, the High Court clearly exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 227 in passing the impugned order.
(ii) In Ibrat Faizan v. Omaxe Buildhome Pvt. Ltd.2, at para Nos.18 & 20 to 24, it was observed that;
18. Whether the National Commission can be said to be a tribunal for the purpose of exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by the High Court is concerned, has been considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Associate Cement Companies Limited (supra), which is required to be referred to. In paragraphs 44 and 45, it is observed and held as under:
"44. An authority other than a court may be vested by statute with judicial power in widely different circumstances, which it would be impossible and indeed inadvisable to attempt to define exhaustively. The proper thing is to examine each case as it arises, and to ascertain whether the powers vested in the authority can be truly described as judicial functions or judicial powers of the State. For the purpose of this case, it is sufficient 2 (2023) 11 SCC 594 16 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 to say that any outside authority empowered by the State to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 136. Such a power of adjudication implies that the authority must act judicially and must determine the dispute by ascertainment of the relevant facts on the materials before it and by application of the relevant law to those facts. This test of a tribunal is not meant to be exhaustive, and it may be that other bodies not satisfying this test are also tribunals. In order to be a tribunal, it is essential that the power of adjudication must be derived from a statute or a statutory rule. An authority or body deriving its power of adjudication from an agreement of the parties, such as a private arbitrator or a tribunal acting under Section 10-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, does not satisfy the test of a tribunal within Article 136. It matters little that such a body or authority is vested with the trappings of a court. The Arbitration Act, 1940 vests an arbitrator with some of the trappings of a court, so also the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 vests an authority acting under Section 10-A of the Act with many of such trappings, and yet, such bodies and authorities are not tribunals.
45. The word "tribunal" finds place in Article 227 of the Constitution also, and I think that there also the word has the same meaning as in Article 136."
Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be a „Tribunal‟ which is vested by Statute the powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them. Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and therefore may be regarded as a „Tribunal‟ within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the Constitution of India. Also, in a given case, this Court may not exercise its powers under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, in view of the remedy which may be available to the aggrieved party before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as it is appropriate that aggrieved party approaches the concerned High Court by way of writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
17HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
20. We may also refer to the decision of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. Vishwabarathi House Building Co-operative Society and Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 412. In the said case, the contest before this Court was with regard to the Constitutional validity of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. The validity of the Act was challenged, inter-alia, on the ground that the Parliament, was not empowered to establish a hierarchy of Courts, which would operate parallelly with the Courts established under the Constitution. Upholding the validity of the Act, this Court observed that the very fact that a given party could always approach the High Court under Article 227, or the Supreme Court, as the case may be, against an order of a Commission constituted under the Act, was itself an adequate safeguard. The observations of this Court, to the effect that a party aggrieved by an order of a Commission constituted under the Act, could approach a High Court, or this Court, have been extracted as under:
"52. The very fact that in a given case a party under the said Act may approach upto this Court and or may otherwise take recourse to the remedy of judicial review, the interest of the parties must be held to have been sufficient safeguard.
53. The provisions relating to power to approach appellate court by a party aggrieved by a decision of the forums State Commissions as also the power of High Court and thus Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India and Article 32 of this Court apart from Section 23 of the Act provide for adequate safeguards. Furthermore, primarily the jurisdiction of the forum/commissions is to grant damages. In the event, a complainant feels that he will have a better and effective remedy in a civil court as he may have to seek for an order of injunction, he indisputably may file a suit in an appropriate civil court or may take recourse to some other remedies as provided for in other statutes."
21. No so far as the remedy which may be available under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is concerned, it cannot be disputed that the remedy by way of an appeal by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution of India may be too expensive and as observed and held by this Court in the case of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), the said remedy can be said to be inaccessible for it to be real and effective. Therefore, when the remedy under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the 18 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 concerned High Court is provided, in that case, it would be in furtherance of the right of access to justice of the aggrieved party, may be a complainant, to approach the concerned High Court at a lower cost, rather than a Special Leave to Appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
22. In view of the above, in the present case, the High Court has not committed any error in entertaining the writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by the National Commission which has been passed in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. However, at the same time, it goes without saying that while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court subjects itself to the rigour of Article 227 of the Constitution and the High Court has to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 227 within the parameters within which such jurisdiction is required to be exercised.
23. The scope and ambit of jurisdiction of Article 227 of the Constitution has been explained by this Court in the case of Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97, which has been consistently followed by this Court (see the recent decision of this Court in the case of Garment Craft v. Prakash Chand Goel, 2022 SCC Online SC 29). Therefore, while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to act within the parameters to exercise the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution. It goes without saying that even while considering the grant of interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to bear in mind the limited jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. Therefore, while granting any interim stay/relief in a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution against an order passed by the National Commission, the same shall always be subject to the rigour of the powers to be exercised under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
24. In view of the above discussion and for the reasons stated above and subject to the observations made hereinabove, it cannot be said that a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before the concerned High Court against the 19 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 order passed by the National Commission in an appeal under Section 58(1)(a)(iii) of the 2019 Act was not maintainable. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. As the matter on merits is yet to be considered by the High Court, we do not express anything on merits in favour of either of the parties. However, it is observed that while considering the question of interim relief/stay, the High Court will bear in mind the observations made hereinabove.
(iii) In Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd., v. Suresh Chand Jain and others 3, at para Nos.32, 37 & 39, it was observed that;
32. The appellant submitted the following before this Court:
(a) Against the order of NCDRC, a petition before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not maintainable.
(b) Only appeal is maintainable before this Court against the order of NCDRC as per the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act.
(c) Without exhausting the appellate remedy, the High Court ought not to have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution.
(d) The High Court ought not to have stayed the order passed by the NCDRC in the limited jurisdiction available under Article 227 of the Constitution.
37. Having regard to the aforesaid, this Court in Ibrat Faizan (supra) observed as under:
"18. ... Therefore, the National Commission can be said to be a „Tribunal‟ which is vested by Statute the powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them. Therefore, as observed hereinabove in the aforesaid decision, it satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of 3 (2024) 9 SCC 148 20 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 the State and therefore may be regarded as a „Tribunal‟ within the meaning of Article 227 and/or 136 of the Constitution of India. ..." (Emphasis supplied)
39. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we have reached to the conclusion that we should not adjudicate this petition on merits. We must ask the petitioner herein to first go before the jurisdictional High Court either by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution or by invoking the supervisory jurisdiction of the jurisdictional High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. Of course, after the High Court adjudicates and passes a final order, it is always open for either of the parties to thereafter come before this Court by filing special leave petition, seeking leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.
(iv) In Siddhartha S.Mookerjee and another v. Madhab Chand Mitter and another 4, at para Nos.4 to 10, it was observed that;
4. The present appeals have been filed by the appellants being aggrieved by the order dated 04th October, 2023, passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi on petitions1 filed by the respondent no.1 herein under Article 227 of the Constitution of India assailing the common judgment and order dated 26 th August, 2022, passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission2, New Delhi, in two revision petitions 3; one filed by the appellants Nirmala Negi CMM Nos. 1609/2023 & 1614/2023 Date: 2024.03.09 12:56:57 IST Reason: For short the 'NCDRC' 3 R.P. No. 629/2020 (Filed by the appellants herein) & R.P. No. 645/2020 (Filed by respondent no.2 herein) herein and the other filed by the respondent no.2 herein.
5. The grievance of the appellants is that the High Court of Delhi ought not to have entertained the petition filed by the respondent No.1 under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as it cannot be treated as a jurisdictional High Court in the instant case as has been referred to in M/s. Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Suresh Chand Jain & Anr4. He 4 (2024) SCC Online SC 4285 21 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 submits that the entire cause of action in the instant case has arisen in Kolkata. The respondent no.1 had filed a complaint5 against the appellants and the respondent no.2 before the District Consumer Dispute Redressal Forum, (Unit-I) at Kolkata, which was rejected vide order dated 13th October, 2017. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent no.1 had filed an appeal6 before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission 7, West Bengal, at Kolkata, which was allowed vide order dated 13th February, 2020. Dissatisfied by the said order, the appellants herein and the respondent no.2-Hospital filed review petitions before the NCDRC, that were allowed.
6. Initially, the respondent no.1 had filed petitions for special leave to appeal 8 before this Court challenging the order dated 26th August, 2022, passed by the SCDRC. However, in view of the judgment of this Court in Universal Sompo (supra) liberty was granted to him to approach the jurisdictional High Court. 4 2023 AIR 3699 7 For short the 'SCDRC'
7. Treating the High Court of Delhi as the jurisdictional High Court, the respondent no.1 has filed petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Notice was issued on the said petitions on 04 th October, 2023, on the adjudication of jurisdictional aspect. This is what has brought the appellants before this Court.
8. Learned counsel for the respondent no.1 contends that the jurisdictional High Court in the instant case ought to be treated as the High Court of Delhi, inasmuch as the judgment impugned before the High Court was passed by the NCDRC at Delhi.
9. In our opinion, that can hardly be treated as a ground to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court of Delhi. The respondent No.1 ought to have approached the High Court of Calcutta being aggrieved by the impugned judgment as the entire cause of action in the present case has arisen in Kolkata, where the patient was operated for ovarian cancer on 24 th February, 2012, and expired on 30 th July, 2014. The complaint case was filed at Kolkata based on the aforesaid cause of action. Merely, because the NCDRC has allowed the revision petitions filed by the appellants and the respondent 22 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 no.2 would not be a ground to vest jurisdiction in the High Court of Delhi.
10. Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The petitions filed before the High Court of Delhi are disposed of with liberty granted to the respondent no.1 to approach the High Court of Calcutta for seeking appropriate relief. In the event the respondent no.1 files a petition before the High Court of Calcutta within four weeks from today, the appellant herein shall not raise any objection as to the maintainability of the said petition on the ground of limitation. It is further directed that in this duration, the appellants shall not rely on the order passed by the NCDRC.
(v) In General Manager, Punjab National Bank and others v. Rohit Malhotra 5, at para Nos.8, 66 to 73, it was observed that;
8. Whether in view of the fact that situs of NCDRC is in Delhi, High Court of Delhi or whether in view of Siddharth S Mookerjee (supra), the jurisdictional High Court where the original cause of action had arisen.
66. Cause of action is bundle of facts existing at the stage of pre- institution of any case. After filing of case, merely because of the fact that the orders were passed, during the course of its legal journey, by a Superior Court or Authority should not be equated with accrual of any fresh cause of action.
67. Ms. Kanika Agnihotri, learned counsel for petitioner has strongly relied upon Dr. Valsamma Chacko (supra) and has contended that in virtually similar fact-scenario, the Hon‟ble High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam has dismissed writ petition filed under Article 227, holding that since NCDRC fell within the territorial jurisdiction of Delhi High Court, said court i.e. High Court of Kerala had no supervisory jurisdiction.
68. It is important to mention that though the judgment in said case was delivered by the High Court of Kerala on 31.07.2024, the concerned parties did not draw the attention of the Court to 5 (2024) SCC Online Del 6415 23 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 the above said pronouncement of Siddhartha S Mookerjee (supra) and, therefore, this Court, very humbly, is not persuaded by said pronouncement of High Court of Kerala.
69. In view of foregoing discussion, it is quite apparent that as per the ratio decidendi and the binding principle in L. Chandra Kumar (supra) the exclusion of High Courts and Hon‟ble Supreme Court for the purposes of filing petitions under Article 226/227 and Article 32 respectively was held as unconstitutional. As noted already, the issue before the Constitution Bench of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in said case was never in relation to the situs i.e., to which High Court any such petition under Article 227 could be filed.
70. The Authority in question i.e. NCDRC is a National Commission which entertains appeals and revisions, emanating from the orders passed by State Commissions situated across the country and keeping in mind the aforesaid unique feature of said Commission, it cannot be permitted to be contended that decision given in Siddhartha S Mookerjee (supra) would not be a binding one.
71. Moreover, Ambica Industries (supra) and Calcutta Gujarati (supra) also go on to hold that situs would not be a deciding factor where any such Tribunal or Authority exercises control over multiple States.
72. The words "jurisdictional High Court" as used in Universal Sompo General Insurance Co. Ltd (Supra) cannot be automatically inferred to be Delhi High Court only. In Ibrat Faizan (supra), which related to a matter pertaining to NCDRC only, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that the aggrieved party would be required to approach the „concerned High CM(M) 2933/2024 & 38 of 41 Other connected matters Court‟ having jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India and such phrases "concerned High Court" and "Jurisdictional High Court"
73. Resultantly, all the present petitions are disposed of while holding that these petitions are not maintainable before this Court for want of jurisdiction. Needless to say, the petitioners would, always, be at liberty to pursue appropriate remedy by filing petitions before the respective jurisdictional High Courts.
24HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
(vi) In Achutananda Baidya v. Prafulla Kumar Gayen and others 6, at para Nos.10 & 11, it was observed that;
10. The power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the Courts and Tribunals, inferior to High Court, have done what they were required to do. Law is well settled by various decisions of this Court that the High Court can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary ot capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material, or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the inferior court, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the subordinate court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate court came to the conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse.
11. If the evidence on record in respect of a question of fact is not at all taken into consideration and without reference to such evidence, the finding of fact is arrived at by inferior court or Tribunal, such finding must be held to be perverse and lacking in factual basis. In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse finding of fact.
(vii) In Kishore Kumar Khaitan and another v. Praveen Kumar Singh 7, at para Nos.12 & 13, it was observed that;
6(1997) 5 SCC 76 25 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
12. The High Court, we must say, has also not properly exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In fact, it has failed to exercise its jurisdiction. Though the High Court rightly noticed that the burden was on the plaintiff to show that he was in possession on the date of the order directing the parties to maintain status quo and that he was dispossessed in violation of the subsisting interim order, it did not scrutinize the order to find out whether the requisite findings had been entered by the Additional District Judge on both those aspects. It did not even consider whether there was a clear finding that the plaintiff was forcibly dispossessed on 20.6.1998 as alleged by him. It did not also consider whether the finding on possession was rendered based on a discussion of the available evidence and whether the directions in the order of remand had been complied with. In short, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, it behoved the High Court to consider whether the order of interim mandatory injunction was supported by the necessary findings. That is certainly a question of jurisdiction, since the jurisdiction to pass an interim mandatory order can only be based on such clear findings and the grant of an interim order without such findings would be acting without jurisdiction. We may incidentally notice that there is no prima facie material to indicate that on 20.6.1998 the plaintiff was, in fact, dispossessed by the defendants. We may in this context notice that the plaintiff could not show that he had either become a member of the tenants association of the building or had entered into an arrangement with it for the consumption of electricity in terms of the alleged rental arrangement. We have already noticed that none of the occupants of the building was examined to prima facie show dispossession.
13. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the 7 (2006) 3 SCC 312 26 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 necessary findings to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction. Here the jurisdiction to grant an interim mandatory injunction could be exercised on entering a finding that on the day the order for maintaining the status quo was passed, the plaintiff was in possession and a day after the interim order was passed, he was in fact dispossessed. The interim direction to maintain status quo was an ex parte order. From the order of the Additional District court it is not possible to come to the conclusion that on a proper advertence to the relevant materials, prima facie clear findings had been rendered by that court on these aspects. The prima facie infirmities attached to the letter said to create the tenancy cannot also be ignored, since that transaction is the foundation of the plaintiff's claim of possession.
(viii) In Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, Hyderabad v. Philomena Education Foundation of India, Hyderabad 8, at para Nos.13 & 14, it was observed that;
13. Under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court may interfere in cases of errors of law apparent on record, (as distinguished from a mere mistake of law), arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, or where it results in manifest injustice. Interference would be justified if the subordinate court has come to a conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction. If the evidence on record, on a question of fact, has not been taken into consideration, or if relevant and material documents have been ignored while arriving at the finding of fact by the inferior court, such finding must be held to be lacking in factual basis.
14. The supervisory jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly, and only in appropriate cases, where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest gross failure of justice or grave injustice occasion. Care, caution and circumspection needs to be exercised when this jurisdiction is sought to be 8 (2007) SCC Online AP 819 27 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a subordinate court and the error, though calling for correction, is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition, invoking the supervisory jurisdiction, would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where refusal to do so would result in travesty of justice. Surya Dev Rai (2003) 6 SCC 657 : 2003 (5) ALT 35.1 (DN SC); D.N. Banerji v. P.R. Mukherjee .
(ix) In Tiki Tar Industries (now known as Tiki Tar Industries (Baroda) Ltd.) v. National Insurance Company Ltd. 9, at para Nos.3 to 5, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that;
3. At this stage, Mr. Sukumar Pattjoshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant draws the attention of this Court to the impugned judgment to urge that the same has been delivered by a sole Non-Judicial Member of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi1, which is not permissible as the Coram cannot be treated to be complete. The submission made by learned Senior counsel is borne out from the record. The impugned judgment has been passed by a Single Member of the Tribunal and the Coram itself being incomplete, we are of the opinion that the matter ought to be remanded back to the Tribunal for a fresh decision.
4. Needless to state that the records as available before the Tribunal shall be relied on by both parties for addressing arguments afresh and for a decision to be rendered by a Bench comprised of a proper Coram.
5. The impugned judgment is quashed and set aside. The parties to appear before the Registrar of the Tribunal on 20th September, 2024 for a date to be fixed for appearance before the Bench for arguments.
9Civil Appeal No.3953 of 2018, dt.28-08-2024 28 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
(x) In SR. Divisional Manager, The New India Assurance Company Ltd., v. M/s Panchsheel Organics Ltd. 10, at para Nos.2 & 2.3, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed that;
2. We will not be dealing with the merits of the matter in as much as the learned counsel for the appellant has raised a preliminary objection that the order impugned has been passed by a single member (admn.) of the National Commission. He has also brought to our notice an order passed by this Court in Civil Appeal No. 3953 of 2018 wherein, taking note of a similar situation where a single member had passed an order, this Court set-aside the said order and remanded the appeal to the Commission for listing it before an appropriate bench for disposal.
3. At this stage, Mr. Sukumar Pattjoshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant draws the attention of this Court to the impugned judgment to urge that the same has been delivered by a sole Non-Judicial Member of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, which is not permissible as the Coram cannot be treated to be complete.
(xi) In Divisional Manager N.I.C. Ltd., Jodhpur v. Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and others 11, at para Nos.8, 9 & 14, it was observed that;
8. Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically laid down that the conjoint reading of sub section (2) of Section 14 read with Section (13 of 20) 18 of the Act requires that the proceedings shall be conducted by the President of the District Forum/State Commission and at least one member thereof sitting together. Thus viewed outwardly, in light of the above observations made by Hon'ble the Supreme Court, there remains hardly any scope for deviation from the conclusion that the State Commission must be comprised by the President and at least one member thereof sitting together. However, controversy on this aspect 10 Civil Appeal No(s).927 of 2024, dt.04-12-2024 11 2019(1) RLW 90 (Raj.) 29 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 has arisen with the amendment introduced in Section 16 of the Act of 1986 in the year 2002 whereby President of the State Commission has been conferred the discretion to constitute one or more Benches of the Commission. Previously, there was no provision for constitution of the benches of the State Commission. Composition of the Bench is unquestionably within the exclusive domain of the President as per Section 16(1B) of the Act. Section 16(1) of the Act of 1986, stipulates that the State Government shall constitute the State Commission which shall consist of a President, who is or has been a Judge of the High Court and not less than two and not more than such number of persons as may be prescribed. Thus, composition of the State Commission for deciding the appeals would mandatorily require the presence of the President and two members appointed under the Act at the seat of the Commission. The fact that the State Commission's bench too cannot function without there being at least two members, (one of whom may be the President) is clearly spelt out from a straight line holistic reading of Section 16(1B)(iii) which contemplates a situation of (14 of 20) difference in opinion, on single or more issues "amongst the members of the Bench"
while deciding a matter and reference thereof to be resolved by either the President or another member. Difference in opinion is not contemplated in the decisions rendered by the State Commission which is mandatorily required to be constituted of three persons including the President and thus, the majority opinion would prevail. There are various other indicators in the Act for coming to the conclusion that the bench must be constituted by two or more members. As per Sections 14(2) and 14(2A) of the Act, every proceeding of the District Forum has to be conducted by the President and at least one member thereof sitting together. Sub-clause 14(2A) makes it abundantly clear that the order of the District Forum has to be signed by the President and the member/members, who conducted the proceedings. Proviso to Section 14(2A) of the Act foresees difference in opinion amongst the President and one member on any point or points and the reference thereof to the another member for hearing on such point. Section 18 of the Act puts it beyond pale of doubt that the provisions of Sections 12, 13 and 14 providing the procedure for disposal of complaints by the District Forum, would be mutatis mutandis applicable to the procedure applicable for disposal of appeals by the State Commission. From a logical analysis of the provisions referred to supra, the only visible and marked difference in procedure applicable to the District Forums and the State Commission is available in Section 16(1B) which allows for constitution of Benches whereas, Bench of a District Forum is not (15 of 20) contemplated under the Act. Learned 30 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 counsel for the respondents were put pertinent queries by the Court regarding any manifest statutory modification brought around (by way of rules/notifications etc.) in the procedure of the State Forum in context of Section 18 of the Act apart from the provision to constitute Benches. No other significant modification in procedure could be pointed out by them. As a result, it can safely be concluded that the only modification which has been introduced in the procedure applicable to the State Commissions vis-a-vis the District Forum is that the State Commission has been empowered to constitute and function in Benches as well. However, the composition of a Bench would indisputably be governed by Section 14 of the Act because no dilution has been allowed on this aspect in the entire scheme of the Act. Section 14(2A) of the Act makes it abundantly clear that every order made by the District Forum (which would mutatis mutandis apply to the State Commission in view of Section 18 of the Act) shall be signed by the President and the member/members who conducted the proceedings. The Act does not contemplate an order signed by the President or a single member in case of the District Forum and a consequently of the State Commission or its Benches as well. The two High Court judgments in the cases of Shankuntala Yadav and Bhagwandas Vyapar Udhyog Ltd. (supra) though do refer to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Gulzari Lal Agarwal but manifestly, in neither of these cases was this issue elaborated or considered. The observation made by the Calcutta High Court in the judgment (16 of 20) of Bhagwandas Vyapar Udhyog Ltd. (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow :
"The order impugned before me is passed by a single member of the State Commission. The question, therefore, coming up for consideration is whether a single member of the State Commission can hear an appeal and pass an order thereon. Bereft of the niceties of law the question can be answered, in the instant case, by the two Office Orders of the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. I, therefore, propose not to consider the question as to whether the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 permits constitution of a single member bench of the State Commission to hear an appeal and pass an order thereon in this revisional application."
9. These observations clearly indicate that the issue was not decided and was left open. The plea put forth by learned counsel for the petitioners that if a single member of the Commission decides the appeals, the possible difference in 31 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 opinion contemplated by Section 16(1B)(iii) would never arise, is not without merit. Since the scheme of the Act contemplates a scenario of difference of opinion amongst two members of the State Commission or the District Forum as the case may be and resolution thereof by the third member, manifestly, this provision cannot be allowed to be whittled away or diluted by permitting a single member to hear and decide the appeals.
14. As, it has been concluded by this Court that for lawful decision of the cases (appeals or original complaints, as the case may be), the Bench/Benches of the State Commission must be constituted by at least two members of the Commission one of whom may be the President, manifestly, the orders passed by the single member of the State Commission which are assailed in these writ petitions are without jurisdiction and hence, the same cannot be sustained and are thus quashed and set aside. The matters are remanded to the State Commission, who shall either by itself or through properly constituted Benches, ensure fresh expeditious disposal of the appeals after providing opportunity of hearing to all concerned. The decision on remand shall be made without being influenced by the previous orders.
14. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/complainant submits that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not disputed and in so far as the facts of the case are concerned, he submits that the subject vehicle is a defective piece and as such the air bags did not deploy at the time of the above said accident. The learned District Forum, the learned State Commission and the learned National Commission concurrently gave findings that there was a frontal collision and the air bags did not deploy in the subject vehicle. When the concurrent findings are there on facts and law, this Court will not interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India even if there are factual errors and even if it is a wrong judgment. It cannot be 32 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 interfered with. In this revision, the appellate powers cannot be exercised.
He further submits that the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter called as „old Act‟) was replaced by the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (hereinafter called as „new Act‟) for timely and effective administration and settlements of the consumer disputes and for the matters connected therewith. The old Act contains only 31 sections, whereas the new Act contains 107 sections. He refers to the sections 107 and 64 of the new Act and section 29(a) of the old Act. Under section 64 of the new Act, "coram non judice" principle has gone and it has no relevancy. The new Act came into force on 09.08.2019 and the above said order of the National Commission is dated 16.02.2024. He also relies upon the following decisions:
(i) In Dr. Valsamma Chacko Professor of Obstetrics & Gynaecology (Retd), Senior Consultant, Obstetrics and Gynaecology, Kerala Institute of Medical Sciences, Thiruvananthapuram v. Leelamma Joseph and others12 the Division Bench at para Nos.5 to 7 observed that;
5. Article 227 Article 227 of the Constitution is a replica of S.224 of the Government of India Act, 1935. The provision is akin to the provisions of the Charter Act, 1861 and the Government of India Act, 1915 and 1935. The Apex Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [AIR 1954 SC 215] explained the legislative history of conferment of power of superintendence on High Courts, culminating with incorporation Article 227 in the Constitution. The power of superintendence is judicial as well as administrative. Primarily, the power is conferred to ensure that courts and tribunals within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court discharge their duties and 12 2024 SCC Online Kerala 4243 33 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 obligations in accordance with law. There are many common features in the matter of exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 and supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. However, the jurisdictions under these Articles have fine distinctions. We are concerned in this case, only about the extent of jurisdiction under Article 227, as the petitioner has specifically invoked the same to institute this writ petition. Therefore, to be precise, the question to be deliberated is as to whether the High Court can exercise supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 over a tribunal situated outside its territorial limits.
6. Indications regarding jurisdiction, in the plain language of Articles 226 &227.
Comparative reading of Articles 226 and 227, focusing on the jurisdictional facet, shows that there is substantial difference between Articles 226 and 227. Article 226(1) confers every High Court with power to issue directions, orders or writs to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. There is a specific mention about "territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction" in this provision. However, Article 226(2) broadens the jurisdiction by empowering the Court to exercise jurisdiction when cause of action, wholly or in part, arises within its territories notwithstanding that seat of Government or Authority or the residence of such person mentioned in Article 226(1) is not within its territories. It is to be noted that accrual of cause of action was added as an additional ground to confer jurisdiction in Article 226 by way of 15th Amendment Act of 1963. Article 227(1) confers superintendence to the High Court over all courts and tribunals "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction". Article 227 was not noticeably chosen for such a broad conferment of jurisdiction on the basis of cause of action, as was provided to Article 226 through the 15 th Amendment Act. Therefore, plain reading of the provision gives us the impression that when the High Court exercises power under Article 227, it can be only over courts and tribunals situated within the territorial limits of the High Court and whether the cause of action has arisen within its jurisdiction is not a germane 34 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 consideration. Of course, normally, the courts and tribunals situated within the jurisdiction of a High Court would be entertaining cases in which the cause of action arose within their respective jurisdictions and in that sense, within the jurisdiction, correspondingly of the High Court too. However, the pertinent consideration, revealed from the language of the Article appears as to whether the situs of the court or tribunal is within the territories of the High Court.
7. Relevant case law A) L.Chandrakumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261] :-
Regarding the jurisdiction under Article 227 over tribunals, judgment of the Apex Court in L.Chandrakumar v. Union of India [(1997) 3 SCC 261] is the leading authority. A bench of seven Judges of the Apex Court considered the realm of power of judicial review conferred on the High Court under Articles 226/227 in relation to tribunals constituted either under Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution, in this case. The Apex Court, unequivocally held that power of judicial review vested in the High Court and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution. It was held that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Apex Court further held that all decisions of tribunals will be subject to the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the tribunal concerned falls. Thus, the judgment in Chandrakumar settled the proposition that all decisions of the tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned tribunal is situated.
(ii) In Hyundai Motor India Limited v. Shailendra Bhatnagar 13 , the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed at para Nos.9, 10 & 14 that;13
(2022) 6 SCALE 587 35 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
9. There are findings of the two fora about the defect in the product sold, in this case being a vehicle. This was sold with front airbags and there was frontal damage. The airbags did not deploy. The accident caused injuries to the respondent.
The appellant referred to various portions from the owner's manual to contend that the impact of the collision was not sufficient to activate the sensor which in turn would have resulted in deployment of the airbags. We would not like to revisit the facts on which findings have been returned by the two fora against the appellant. The State Commission relied on the principle of Res Ipsa Loquitur to affix the liability of the manufacturer as regards defect in the airbag system, having regard to the nature of the collision. The National Commission affirmed this finding referring to certain photographs of the damaged vehicle, which showed substantial frontal damage. In such circumstances, both the aforesaid fora took the view that expert evidence was not necessary in the subject case. Such view cannot be faulted as being unreasonable, in the given facts.
10. We do not find any reason to interfere with the finding of the National Commission. We would like to add here that ordinarily a consumer while purchasing a vehicle with airbags would assume that the same would be deployed whenever there is a collision from the front portion of the vehicle (in respect of front airbags). Both the fora, in their decisions, have highlighted the fact that there was significant damage to the front portion of the vehicle. Deployment of the airbags ought to have prevented injuries being caused to those travelling in the vehicle, particularly in the front seat. A consumer is not meant to be an expert in physics calculating the impact of a collision on the theories based on velocity and force. In such circumstances, we do not find that there is any error in the findings of the two fora as regards there being defect in the vehicle.
14. The aforesaid decision arose out of a case involving the death of an individual and injuries to several others in an industrial accident. But in our opinion, in the subject dispute also the same principle can be extended. We are dealing with a case where in a collision, the airbags did not deploy. The complainant, driving the vehicle, suffered substantial injuries 36 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 as a result thereof. The impact of the collision was such that it would have been reasonable for the respondent to assume that there would have been deployment of the airbags. The safety description of the goods fell short of its expected quality. The content of the owners' manual does not carry any material from which the owner of a vehicle could be alerted that in a collision of this nature, the airbags would not deploy. Purchase decision of the respondent complainant was largely made on the basis of representation of the safety features of the vehicle. The failure to provide an airbag system which would meet the safety standards as perceived by a car buyer of reasonable prudence, in our view, should be subject to punitive damages which can have deterrent effect. And in computing such punitive damages, the capacity of the manufacturing enterprise should also be a factor. There was no specific exclusion clause to insulate the manufacturer from claim of damages of this nature. Even if there were such a clause, legality thereof could be open to legal scrutiny. But there is no reason for dilating on that aspect in this case. That question doesn't arise here.
(iii) In Union of India and others v. Himmat Singh Chahar 14, at para No.4, it was observed that;
4. Since the entire procedure is provided in the Act itself and the Act also provides for a further consideration by the Chief of the Naval Staff and then by the Union Government then ordinarily there should be a finality to the findings arrived at by the Competent Authority in the Court Martial Proceeding. It is of course true that notwithstanding the finality attached to the orders of the Competent Authority in the Court Martial Proceeding the High Court is entitled to exercise its power of judicial review by invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 but that would be for a limited purpose of finding out whether there has been infraction of any mandatory provisions of the Act prescribing the procedure which has caused gross miscarriage of justice or for finding out that whether there has been violation of the principles of natural justice which vitiates the entire proceeding or that the authority exercising 14 (1999) 4 SCC 521 37 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 the jurisdiction had not been vested with jurisdiction under the Act. The said power of judicial review cannot be a power of an Appellate Authority permitting the High Court to re- appreciate the evidence and in coming to a conclusion that the evidence is insufficient for the conclusion arrived at by the Competent Authorities in Court Martial Proceedings. At any rate it cannot be higher than the jurisdiction of the High Court exercised under Article 227 against an order of an inferior Tribunal. This being the parameter for exercise of power of judicial review against the findings of a Competent Authority in a Court Martial Proceeding, and applying the same to the impugned judgment of the High Court we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court over-stepped its jurisdiction in trying to re-appreciate the evidence of Mrs. Nirmala Sharma and in coming to the conclusion that her evidence is not credible enough to give a finding of guilt of the respondent of a charge under Section 354. We have also perused the statement of Mrs. Nirmala Sharma and the conclusion becomes inescapable on the basis of the said statement of Mrs. Nirmala Sharma that the respondent has been rightly found to have committed offence under Section 354 by the Authorities in the Court Martial Proceedings.
(iv) In State of Haryana and others v. Manoj Kumar 15, at para Nos.29 to 35, it was observed that;
29. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. We are clearly of the opinion that the High Court, in the impugned judgment, has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact of the courts below under its limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. The High Court erroneously observed that the "the authenticity of the decree passed by the court cannot be questioned. Therefore, the genuineness of the sale price has to be presumed." This finding of the High Court cannot be sustained. It would have far reaching ramifications and consequences. If the genuineness of the sale price entered into by the buyer and the seller cannot be questioned, then in majority of the cases it is unlikely that the State would ever 15 (2010) 4 SCC 350 38 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 receive the stamp duty according to the circle rate or the collector rate. The approach of the High Court is totally unrealistic.
30. The High Court in the impugned judgment has also erroneously observed that "there cannot be any opportunity with the vendee to fabricate an agreement of sale for showing the incorrect sale price because the litigating parties would not ordinarily reach such an agreement and sign the fabricated document."
31. The High Court gravely erred in not properly comprehending the facts of this case in proper perspective and which has led to grave miscarriage of justice.
32. It is not disputed that the commercial plot of 788 sq. yards located at Delhi-Mathura Mewla Maharajpur, Faridabad was valued by the Circle rate at Rs.4,200 per sq. yard fixed by the Collector of Faridabad meaning thereby that after the notification, no sale deed can be registered for an amount lesser than Rs.4,200/- per sq.yard. It may be pertinent to mention that, in order to ensure that there is no evasion of stamp duty, circle rates are fixed from time to time and the notification is issued to that effect. The issuance of said notification has become imperative to arrest the tendency of evading the payment of actual stamp duty. It is a matter of common knowledge that usually the circle rate or the collector rate is lower than the prevalent actual market rate but to ensure registration of sale deeds at least at the circle rates or the collector rates such notifications are issued from time to time by the appellants.
33. In the impugned judgment, the High Court has not properly construed the observations of the District Collector, Faridabad in which he has clearly stated as under :-
"It appears that the suit has been filed in the Civil Court and decree passed with the intention to avoid tax and stamp duty to be paid to the Government, because when respondent had paid entire sale consideration to the vendor, then he should have got the sale deed also executed at that time, whereas the same has not been done. Therefore, keeping into consideration 39 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 the above facts, I come to this conclusion that sale deed No.11200 dated 9.2.2001 has been executed in respect of land measuring 788 sq.yard situated in village Mewla Maharajpur, which abuts Delhi Mathur Road. This plot is commercial and this fact has been concealed by the respondent. The sale deed had been registered for less value. The market value of the land in dispute as per Collector rate is Rs.33,09,600/- on which a total stamp duty of Rs.5,13,050/- was payable whereas the respondent has affixed stamp duty of Rs.31,000/-. In this manner on the above deed, the stamp duty of Rs.4,82,050/- is payable, which is ordered to be recovered from the respondent in accordance with law."
34. This order was upheld by the Commissioner. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 has set aside the orders passed by the District Collector, Faridabad and upheld by the Commissioner, Gurgaon without any basis or rationale. Apart from the jurisdiction, even what is factually stated in the order of the District Collector, Faridabad as upheld by the Commissioner, Gurgaon is unexceptionable and any interference was totally unwarranted.
35. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside and the order passed by the District Collector, Faridabad which was upheld by the Commissioner, Gurgaon is restored. The respondent is directed to pay the balance stamp duty within four weeks from the date of this judgment, otherwise the appellants would be at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law.
(v) In Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim and others 16, at para No.7, it was observed that;
7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts udder Art. 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority", and not to correct an error apparent on the face of 16 (1983) 4 SCC 566 40 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 the record, much less an error of law. In this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Art.227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or re-weigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision.
(vi) In State through Special Cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afshan Guru and others 17, at para No.28, it was observed that;
28. Thus the law is that Article 227 of the Constitution of India gives the High Court the power of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. This jurisdiction cannot be limited or fettered by any act of the State Legislature. The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate Tribunal's within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunal's within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise".
17(2003) 6 SCC 641 41 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
15. In the light of the above said facts and circumstances, upon consideration of the rival submissions made, the above said decisions and the material available on record, it can be discussed and reasoned as under:
The cause of action arose in this case within the jurisdiction of the above said District Forum as the subject accident took place on 16.08.2011 at 3.00 P.M. near Yerrakatwa Cross Road, Ulindikonda Village of Kurnool District on NH-7 Road. Hence, pursuant to the orders of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, this revision was filed before this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
In view of the settled legal position, this Court is the jurisdictional High Court to decide the issue under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent as stated supra did not dispute the same.
16. Upon consideration of the depositions of the PW.1 and the RW.1 and the exhibits marked on both the sides, the learned District Forum gave a finding that as per the admission made in the cross examination of RW.1, the Toyota company recalled all the Innova vehicles for faulty air bags and wipers throughout the world and paper cutting dated 11.11.2014 shows that the Toyota Kirloskar Motor recalled nearly 45,000 units of its multi-utility vehicle Innova in India to rectify the defect in steering column and the said recall is relating to defect in deployment of air bags only in the event of any accident.
42HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 It was observed further that as per the admission of RW.1, the vehicle met with major accident and extensive damage was occurred to the Innova vehicle on its entire front portion and also the estimation prepared by the opposite party No.3 mentioned all the minute details of repairs that required to the accident vehicle to make it road worthy and held that there was a clear cut manufacturing defect in the instant case. Accordingly, the above said complaint was allowed partly directing the Opposite Party Nos.1 and 2 to replace the vehicle to the complainant of the same model with a new one (free from manufacturing defects) and if for any reason that model of the vehicle is not available, to return the amount of Rs.15,09,415/- with interest at 9% per annum from the date of accident i.e., on 16-08-2011 till the date of payment and Rs.10,000/- towards compensation for mental agony and Rs.5,000/- towards costs of the CC.
17. Similarly, the State Commission also considered the evidences of PW.1 and RW.1, the other exhibits marked and found that the collision was a frontal collision and the SRS air bags have not inflated in the vehicle at the time of accident.
It was further observed that a perusal of Ex.A4 Photographs would clinchingly show that it was a major accident that there was a frontal collision of the vehicle and the vehicle badly got damaged. This fact was further fortified by Ex.B12. Even as per the Ex.A5/FIR copy, the driver of the subject Innova vehicle drove the vehicle with a terrific speed from Kurnool side and 43 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 dashed against the auto from the front side and the auto turned turtle.
Consequently, the driver and the other inmates of the auto sustained severe injuries. It was also observed that within a short time after the vehicle was purchased, when the complainant was travelling in Bangalore city, heavy smoke came out from the clutch plates and the clutch plates of the vehicle burnt on the road. Therefore, it is quite obvious that there was inherent defect in the vehicle. Only due to the said mechanical defect, the air bags did not deploy at the time of the accident. The evidence of RW.1 coupled with the news paper clippings establishes that the recall of Toyota Innova vehicle was due to the defect in deployment of air bags at the time of accident.
Ultimately, the State Commission found that the air bags were not deployed in the vehicle though it was a major accident and frontal collision and thus non deployment of air bags in the vehicle was due to the mechanical defect of the vehicle and as such, it did not interfere with the findings of the District Forum. Accordingly the above said appeal was dismissed.
18. Similarly, when the above said revision was filed at the instance of the opposite party No.1, the National Commission also gave finding that it is in agreement with the findings of District Forum and the State Commission regarding the collision in question being a frontal one, with an impact velocity in which airbags ought to have deployed. There is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW-1 or RW-1 and there was a recall of vehicles by Toyota company for faulty airbags and wipers in the many parts of the world, which 44 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 have been reported in the newspaper also, lends credence to the case of complainant/respondent that vehicle in question had a manufacturing defect due to which the airbags did not deploy despite the collision being frontal one and of impact velocity in which it ought to have deployed, coupled with problem relating to burning of clutch plates or emanating smoke about 10 days before the date of accident. It further observed that both the District Forum and the State Commission have correctly interpreted the evidence of PW.1 and RW.1. Hence the order of the State Commission was upheld.
Accordingly, the above said revision petition was dismissed vide its order dated 16.02.2024.
19. The scope and ambit of Article 227 of the Constitution of India:
It is a settled law that the High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court or tribunal to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record.
The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or 45 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to. The power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be invoked to correct an error of fact which only a superior court can do in exercise of its statutory power as a court of appeal and that the High Court in exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal.
20. The National Commission can be said to be a tribunal which is vested by statutory powers to determine conclusively the rights of two or more contending parties with regard to any matter in controversy between them. It satisfies the test of an authority vested with the judicial powers of the State and may be regarded as a tribunal within the meaning of Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, the remedy would be available to the aggrieved party before the concerned High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Since the above said District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission are the adjudicatory bodies having all the trappings of the tribunal, this Court can examine their above said orders in the light of Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
21. The power of superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution is not confined to administrative superintendence only but such power includes within its sweep the power of judicial review. The power and duty of the High Court under Article 227 is essentially to ensure that the 46 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 courts and tribunals, inferior to High Court have done what they were required to do. It can interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in cases of erroneous assumption or acting beyond its jurisdiction, refusal to exercise jurisdiction, error of law apparent on record as distinguished from a mere mistake of law, arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority or discretion, a patent error in procedure, arriving at a finding which is perverse or based on no material or resulting in manifest injustice. As regards finding of fact of the inferior court or tribunal, the High Court should not quash the judgment of the subordinate court merely on the ground that its finding of fact was erroneous but it will be open to the High Court in exercise of the powers under Article 227 to interfere with the finding of fact if the subordinate court came to the conclusion without any evidence or upon manifest misreading of the evidence thereby indulging in improper exercise of jurisdiction or if its conclusions are perverse. If the evidence on record in respect of a question of fact is not at all taken into consideration and without reference to such evidence, the finding of fact is arrived at by inferior court or tribunal, such finding must be held to be perverse and lacking in factual basis. In such circumstances, in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 227, the High Court will be competent to quash such perverse finding of fact.
22. The jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be restrictive in the sense that it is to be invoked only to correct errors of jurisdiction. But when a court asks itself a wrong question or approaches the question in an 47 HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 improper manner, even if it comes to a finding of fact, the said finding of fact cannot be said to be one rendered with jurisdiction and it will still be amenable to correction at the hands of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The failure to render the necessary findings to support its order would also be a jurisdictional error liable to correction.
23. Upon careful reading of the above said impugned orders passed by the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, it is to be noted that the concurrent findings were given on appreciation of the pleadings and the evidence on record both oral and documentary. All the above said adjudicatory bodies held that it was a major accident, there was a frontal collision and the air bags did not deploy at the time of accident. By any stretch of imagination, it cannot be said that there is no evidence at all to declare that the above said findings are perverse.
24. It is not a case to be held that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion which the above said adjudicatory bodies have come to.
There is no error of jurisdiction exercised by the above said adjudicatory bodies and as such it does not call for any interference of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Since it is not a case of perverse finding based upon no material and resulting in manifest injustice, this Court cannot quash the above said orders of the above said adjudicatory bodies while exercising powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
48HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024
25. In respect of the alternative submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner/opposite party No.1 that the above said impugned revision order was passed by the non judicial member of the National Commission dated 16.02.2024 alone confirming the orders of the District Forum and the State Commission, the following sections of law are relevant to be looked into.
* Section 107 of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 (35 of 2019) [for the sake of convenience it is to be called as New Act] :
107. Repeal and savings :-
(1) The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (68 of 1986) is hereby repealed.
(2) Notwithstanding such repeal, anything done or any action taken or purported to have been done or taken under the Act hereby repealed shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken under the corresponding provisions of this Act.
(3) The mention of particular matters in sub-section (2) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897) with regard to the effect of repeal.
* Section 58 of the New Act:
58. Jurisdiction of National Commission :-
(2) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the National Commission may be exercised by Benches thereof and a Bench may be constituted by the President with one or more members as he may deem fit.
Provided that the senior-most member of the Bench shall preside over the Bench.
* Section 64 of the New Act:
64. Vacancies or defects in appointment not to invalidate orders.
- No act or proceeding of the District Commission, the State Commission or the National Commission shall be invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy amongst its members or any defect in the constitution thereof.
49HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 * Section 20 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 [for the sake of convenience it is to be called as Old Act] :
20. Composition of the National Commission.--
(1)The National Commission shall consist of--
(1A) (i) The jurisdiction, powers and authority of the National Commission may be exercised by Benches thereof.
(ii)A Bench may be constituted by the President with one or more members as the President may deem fit.
* Section 29A of the Old Act:
29A. Vacancies or defects in appointment not to invalidate orders.--
No act or proceeding of the District Forum, the State Commission or the National Commission shall be invalid by reason only of the existence of any vacancy amongst its members or any defect in the constitution thereof.
26. The Section 29A amendment came into force with effect from 15.06.1991 under the Old Act, whereas the above said New Act came into force on 09.08.2019. The order of the National Commission assailed under this revision is dated 16.02.2024. In view of Section 58(ii) and Section 64 of the New Act (35 of 2019), the issue of coram non judice principle does not arise under the above said express provisions of law. In other words, the President of the National Commission can constitute a Bench with one or more members as he/she may deem fit and accordingly assign the work by categorizing the cases filed before the National Commission. Basing upon the pecuniary value of the cases also such categorization can be made to be heard by the Benches concerned with one or more members of the National Commission, as per the arrangement made by the President for the said purpose exercising his/her statutory powers.
50HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 In Tiki Tar Industries (now known as Tiki Tar Industries (Baroda) Ltd.) v. National Insurance Company Ltd. and in SR. Divisional Manager, The New India Assurance Company Ltd., v. M/s Panchsheel Organics Ltd. cases, the above said provisions of law were not brought before the Hon‟ble Apex Court for its consideration and in Divisional Manager N.I.C. Ltd., Jodhpur v. Rajasthan State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission and others case also, the above said provisions of law did not fall for consideration. Hence this Court is not persuaded with the submission of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that there is a defective composition of the Bench in the NCDRC, New Delhi and the matter be remanded for fresh consideration by it with full fledged Coram comprising judicial and non judicial members. Accordingly, it is negatived.
The petitioner and the respondent Nos.2 and 3 are directed to implement the above said orders of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission dated 27.11.2014, 02.07.2019 & 16.02.2024 respectively within a period of one month from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
27. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Interim order, if any, deemed to have been vacated.
51HBKM,J & HAHHS,J C.R.P.No.1179 of 2024 As a sequel, Interlocutory Applications pending, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________ JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN _________________________________ JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA 15.09.2025 Note: LR to be marked B/o PND