Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
The State Of A.P. vs Malla Visweswara Rao Kasi on 31 October, 2025
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APHC010296742009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE THIRTY-FIRST DAY OF OCTOBER
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1157/2009
Between:
1. The State of A.P., represented by the Public Prosecutor, High Court of
A.P.
...AP
...APPELLANT
AND
1. Malla Visweswara Rao Kasi, S/o. /o. Paravatha Rao Gavara r/o.
Gavarapalem, Kothavalasa, Vizianagaram Dist
District.
2. Malla Venkata Appa Rao Peddi, S/o. Paravatha Rao Gavara
Gavara, Railway
Employee, Gavarapalem
Gavarapalem, Kothavalasa Mandal, r/o. Kothavalasa,
Kothavalasa
3. Malla Venkata Ramana,
Ramana S/o. Late Parvathi Gavara, Railway Employee,
Gavarapalem, Kothavalasa,
Kothavalasa Vizianagaram District.
4. Kalla Surya Chandra Rao, S/o. Konda Railway Employee At
Visakhapatnam Gavarapalem
Gavarapalem, Kothavalasa, Vizianagaram District.
District
5. Ithamsetty Srinivasa Rao
Rao, S/o. Simhachalam Gavara Gavarapalem,
Gavarapalem
Kothavalasa, Vizianagaram District.
...RESPODENT(S):
Appeal under Section 372/374(2)/378(4) of Cr.P.C., praying that the High
Court may be pleased to present this Memorandum of Criminal Appeal
against the judgment in S.C.No.119
S.C. 119 of 2003 on the file of the Assistant
Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram, dated 08th day of October, 2007 and prays
that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to set aside the order of acquittal and
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convict the accused (Respondents) for the offences with which they were
charged for the following among others.
IA NO: 1 OF 2008 (CRLAMP 2310 OF 2008
Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
condone the delay of "288" days in presenting the appeal against the order of
acquittal of the accused/respondents in S.C.No.119/2003 on the file of the
Assistant Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram, dated 08.10.2007.
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
Counsel for the Respondent(S):
1. UPENDRA CHAKRAVARTHY
The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This appeal is preferred by the Appellant / State against the judgment of
acquittal rendered by the Sessions Court in Sessions Case No.119 of 2003 on
the file of Assistant Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram (for short, 'the Sessions
Court') by its judgment dated 08.10.2007, acquitted the accused for the
offences punishable under section 493, 496 and 313 of Indian Penal Code,
1860 (for short, 'IPC').
2. Perused the impugned judgment of acquittal rendered by the Sessions
Court, which is challenged under this appeal. It consisted of evidence of
PWs.1 to 12, documents marked Exs.P.1 to P.6 and Ex.D.1.
3. The facts in a nutshell, which give rise to the present appeal, are as
follows:
The de facto complainant is a resident of Seethampeta Village. She
completed her Intermediate education and obtained a Diploma in
Pharmacy. Accused No. 1 (A1) was unemployed at the time and had
previously worked as an assistant in various medical stores at
Kothavalasa. In 1998, A1 developed a friendship with the de facto
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complainant, which subsequently turned into an intimate
relationship, with the promise of marriage. Despite continuing the
relationship, A1 repeatedly evaded marrying her. On 25.07.2001, A1
took the complainant to Simhachalam Devasthanam and married her
in Room No.14 of Gajapathi Choudhary in the presence of Yellapu
Ramulamma and Nalam Sarveswara Rao. Subsequently, the
complainant conceived. A1 took her to Sridevi Nursing Home,
Pendurthy, and, stating that it was not convenient to have a child at
that time, got her pregnancy terminated by Dr. K. Lakshmi in August
2001. Thereafter, A1 and the complainant continued to live together
secretly as husband and wife whenever opportunities arose.
Eventually, their relationship became known to the elders of both
families. A.2 to A.5 placed A.1 under strict supervision and
prevented him from joining the complainant. The issue was brought
before the elders on three occasions. However, with the support of
A.2 to A.5, A.1 denied his marital relationship with the complainant
and attempted to settle the matter by offering her money, which she
refused. Consequently, the de facto complainant lodged a report,
based on which Crime No. 8 of 2003 was registered on 15.02.2003
by the Sub-Inspector of Police. After due investigation, a charge
sheet was filed.
4. The learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Kothavalasa, vide orders
dated 04.11.2003 in P.R.C.No.04 of 2003, has committed the accused to the
Court of Sessions, Sessions Division, Vizianagaram, to take up the trial for the
offences punishable under Section 417, 376 r/w 114 of the IPC.
5. The Court of Sessions, Sessions Division, Vizianagaram, has made
over the case to the Court of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram, for
disposal according to law. Subsequently, the case in Sessions Case No.119 of
2003 has been numbered.
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6. As per the orders dated 28.10.2004, the composite High Court of
Andhra Pradesh in Criminal Petition No.205 of 2004, quashed the
proceedings in S.C.No.119 of 2003 insofar as they pertain to A.2 to A.4.
7. After hearing the Public Prosecutor and the defence counsel, the
Sessions court framed charges against A.1 under Sections 493, 496 and 313
of the IPC, which were read over and explained to him in Telugu, as required
under Section 228(2) of the Cr.P.C. The accused did not plead guilty and
claimed to be tried.
8. The learned Sessions Judge examined the accused as required under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C., to enable him to consider the evidence led on the part
of the prosecution and also against him. However, the accused denied the
evidence adduced by the prosecution and reported no defence witnesses on
his behalf.
9. After considering the available material on record, the learned Sessions
Judge found the accused not guilty of the offences punishable under Sections
493, 496 and 313 of the IPC and acquitted him.
10. Sir K. Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor appearing for the
State, contends that the prosecution has successfully established the
essential ingredients constituting offences punishable under Sections 493,
496, and 313 of the IPC against the accused; the learned Judge ought to have
accepted the prosecution's version, as the case, though resting on the solitary
testimony of PW.1, cannot be disbelieved if such evidence carries a ring of
truth; it is a well-settled principle of law that conviction can be based on
solitary evidence when it is trustworthy and reliable; the other reasons
assigned by the learned Judge for acquittal are also unsustainable.
11. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing for the accused
supported the findings and conclusions recorded by the Sessions Court.
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12. I have heard learned counsel on either side and perused the material on
record, including the oral and documentary evidence produced by the
prosecution before the Sessions Court.
13. The point for determination is:
Was the Sessions Court justified in acquitting the accused?
P O I N T:
14. Before re-appreciation of the evidence on record, it is necessary here to
mention the power of the Appellate Court regarding interference. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court, in the case of A. Shankar V. State of Karnataka 1 , at
paragraph 26 of the judgment, has held as follows:
"26. It is settled legal proposition that in exceptional circumstances the
appellate Court, under compelling circumstances, should reverse the
judgment of acquittal of the Court below if the findings so recorded by the
Court below are found to be perverse i.e. the conclusions of the Court
below are contrary to the evidence on record or its entire approach in
dealing with the evidence is found to be patently illegal leading to
miscarriage of justice or its judgment is unreasonable based on erroneous
law and facts on the record of the case. While dealing so, the appellate
Court must bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and
further that acquittal by the Court below bolsters the presumption of his
innocence."
15. In State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Anr. 2, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court, while considering the power of the appellate Court to interfere in an
appeal against acquittal, after adverting to various earlier decisions on this
point, has concluded as under:
"16.....while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal
the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal
unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest
illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any
reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as
perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal
would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the
Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the
evidence if it is of the view that the view arrived at by the Court below is
perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored
the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in
1
(2011) 6 SCC 279
2
(2007) 3 SCC 755
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such circumstances, to reappreciate the evidence to arrive at a just
decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any
of the accused is connected with commission of the crime he is charged
with."
16. With the above principles in mind, this Court analyze the reasoning and
ultimate conclusion of the Sessions Court in interfering with the order of
acquittal.
17. The victim woman was examined as PW.1, and her father
(V.Adinarayana Murty Raju) was examined as PW.2. PWs.3 to 5
(Y.RAmulamma, N.Sarveswara Rao and K.Satish Kumar respectively) were
cited as eye-witnesses to the marriage ceremony that took place between A.1
and PW.1. PW.1 testified that she and the accused are husband and wife;
their marriage was solemnized on 25.07.2001 at Simhachalam Devasthanam,
Gajapathi Choultry, in the presence of PWs.3 and 4, who are the aunt and
friend of A.1, respectively. Her evidence further discloses that it was a love
marriage performed without the knowledge of either her parents or those of
A.1. The evidence of PW.1 that both she and the accused were engaged in
giving tuitions to students is not in dispute. PW.1 further testified that the
accused proposed marriage in the year 1998, to which she consented, and
that prior to their marriage, they had no physical relationship. PW.1's evidence
further discloses that she was required to undergo one year of training and
that the accused insisted on an immediate marriage, contending that
otherwise, his marriage might be arranged with another woman during that
period; consequently, they got married without informing their respective
parents. PW.1 further testified that in the second week of August 2001, she
proceeded to Hyderabad to undergo Ophthalmology Technician training, and
that the marriage was consummated soon after the wedding; she became
pregnant while undergoing training at Hyderabad; she informed the accused
of her pregnancy, which was confirmed at the hospital of Dr. K. Lakshmi,
Pendurthi; the accused, however, insisted on termination of the pregnancy on
the ground that delivery during the training period would cause inconvenience
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to her; though she initially refused, she eventually consented and underwent
an abortion, after which she returned to Hyderabad to continue her training.
18. Section 313 of IPC, penalizes voluntary causing of miscarriage of a
woman with child without her consent while miscarriage with consent is dealt
with under Section 312 of IPC. Under Section 313 of IPC, the person
procuring the abortion alone is liable to punishment, whereas under Section
312 of IPC, the woman is also liable for punishment.
19. The prosecution examined PW.9, Dr. K. Lakshmi, who was alleged to
have conducted an abortion on PW.1 after confirming her pregnancy. In her
testimony, PW.9 stated that when the police had earlier questioned her about
performing an abortion on a girl, she categorically denied having done so.
Hence, PW.9 did not support the version of PW.1 regarding the alleged
abortion. Considering these facts, the Sessions Court observed that, in the
absence of any other independent evidence, it was difficult to accept the
testimony of PW.1 that the accused had caused her pregnancy to be
terminated through PW.9. The Sessions Court further observed that even if
the statement of PW.1 was accepted that she had undergone an abortion, the
provisions of Section 313 of the IPC would not be attracted, as the act was
with her consent. On these grounds, the Sessions Court rightly acquitted the
accused of the charge under Section 313 of the IPC.
20. Coming to the prosecution's case regarding the accused's alleged
dishonest intention, it is contended that the accused deceived PW.1 into
believing that she was lawfully married to him, though no valid marriage had in
fact taken place. To establish this, the prosecution examined PW.3, who
deposed that the accused and PW.1 used to visit her house together; the
accused had informed her about their intention to get married, that the mother
of PW.1 was aware of their marriage proposal, whereas PW.2 was not, and
that the marriage was said to have taken place at Simhachalam Hills, though
not inside the temple. PW.3 further testified that the marriage was held in a
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choultry, where a Purohit conducted the Ceremony; she, along with two
friends of the accused, attended the event. According to PW.3, the customary
rituals of Basikam and Kankanam were performed, Jeelakarra Bellam was
placed on each other's heads, karpuram (camphor) was lit, and the couple
circumambulated the burning camphor while the Purohit recited mantras.
However, PW.12, K. Suryanarayana, Investigating Officer, stated that PW.3
had not mentioned these rituals in her earlier statement during the
investigation.
21. PW.4 deposed that on 25.07.2001, while he was on his way to college,
the accused requested him to accompany him and PW.1 to Simhachalam;
accordingly, he went along with them and they reached there around 12:00
noon; they waited for PW.5, who had informed them that he would bring the
money required for the expenses; however, the accused later informed him
that PW.5 would not be coming as he was unable to arrange the money;
thereafter, at about 2:00 p.m., the accused arranged for a Purohit from the
local area and performed a marriage ceremony with PW.1 at a cottage
situated on the hilltop; after the Ceremony, all of them returned to
Kothavalasa. The testimony of PW.4 thus indicates that it was the accused
himself who engaged the Purohit to get the marriage with PW.1.
22. The prosecution examined PW.5, who testified that he could not secure
money, and even then, he went to Simhachalam at about 2.00 PM and the
marriage of the accused and PW.1 took place on the up hills in a room
performed by a Purohit. Even according to PW.4, PW.5 was not reached to
Simhachalam with money. The evidence of PWs.1, 3 and 4, as rightly
observed by the Sessions Court, shows that the accused had taken a room in
a Choultry at Simhachalam and married PW.1 on 25.07.2001. PWs.2 and 3
categorically testified that Purohit performed the marriage.
23. PW.11, Chilla Srinivasa Reddy, testified that he worked at Simhachalam
Devasthanam as Junior Assistant from 1994 to 2006, and he has given Ex.P5
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receipt after verifying the original receipt counterfoil. His evidence shows that
the receipt counter foil indicates that one M. Visweswara Rao had taken room
No.14 at Gajapathi Choultry on 25.07.2001 at 12.30 pm and vacated it at
about 04.30 pm. PW.11's evidence shows that he gave Ex.P5 to the Sub-
Inspector of Police when he examined him. The testimonies of PW.1 and other
witnesses clearly established that Purohit performed the marriage of the
accused and PW.1 in the room taken by the accused. Though the accused
has disputed the prosecution's case, he did not explain why he had taken a
room on that day at Simhachalam, as the said fact is established by the
evidence of PW.1.
24. As evident from the record, PW.5 testified that although he was unable
to arrange the required funds, he nevertheless went to Simhachalam at
around 2:00 p.m., where he witnessed the accused and PW.1 being married in
a room on the hilltop by a Purohit. However, as per the testimony of PW.4,
PW.5 had not reached Simhachalam with the money as earlier planned. The
evidence of PWs.1, 3, and 4, as rightly observed by the Sessions Court,
establishes that the accused had taken a room in a choultry at Simhachalam
and that the marriage between the accused and PW.1 took place there on
25.07.2001. PWs.2 and 3 categorically stated that a Purohit performed the
marriage. PW.11, who was working as a Junior Assistant at the Simhachalam
Devasthanam from 1994 to 2006, testified that he had issued Ex.P5 receipt
after verifying the original counterfoil. His evidence reveals that the counterfoil
indicated that one M. Visweswara Rao had taken Room No.14 at Gajapathi
Choultry on 25.07.2001 at 12:30 p.m., and vacated it at about 4:30 p.m; he
handed over Ex.P5 to the Sub-Inspector of Police during examination. The
testimonies of PW.1 and other witnesses clearly establish that the Purohit
performed the marriage of the accused and PW.1 in the room taken by the
accused at Simhachalam. Although the accused disputed the prosecution's
version, he failed to offer any explanation as to why he had taken the said
room on that date, a fact that stands proved through the evidence of PW.11.
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25. The Sessions Court, after analyzing the evidence of PWs.1, 3, and 4,
arrived at a categorical finding that the accused had married PW.1 and that
the marriage ceremony was performed by a Purohit. Upon appreciation of the
testimony of PW.1, the Sessions Court observed that there was no reason
whatsoever for PW.1 to falsely implicate the accused by alleging that he had
married her, had sexual intercourse with her, and caused her pregnancy, as
she was carrying a child at the time of lodging the complaint. The record does
not disclose any material to suggest that PW.1 had any motive to depose
falsely against the accused, even at the risk of tarnishing her own character.
Similarly, there is nothing to show the existence of any prior enmity between
the parties, nor has the accused put forth any case indicating hostility between
himself and PW.1 or her family members. Thus, there appears to be no
plausible reason for PW.1 to make such allegations against the accused. The
accused, while denying the paternity of the child, also opposed the application
filed by PW.1 through the Public Prosecutor seeking to subject him to a DNA
and fingerprint test. In view of this conduct, the Sessions Court observed that
an adverse inference could be drawn against the accused, as laid down in
Haribhai Chanabhai Vora and others V. Keshubhai Haribhai Vora 3.
26. The prosecution examined PW.8, Y.Rajanna, to establish that PW.2 had
requested the accused to lead a matrimonial life with PW.1, which the
accused refused; a sum of ₹70,000/- was offered to PWs.1 and 2 towards a
compromise, which they declined, and instead, PW.8 and others advised the
accused to lead a family life with PW.1. PW.10, Y.Vidhya Rama, Assistant
Professor and Gynaecologist, testified that on 20.02.2003 she examined PW.1
upon the requisition of the Sub-Inspector of Police, Kothavalasa Police
Station; based on clinical and ultrasonographic examinations, she opined that
PW.1 was pregnant, and that the gestational age of the pregnancy at that time
was approximately 19 weeks and one day, with a margin of error of plus or
minus two days; she issued the corresponding medical certificate marked as
3
AIR 2005 Gujarat 157
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Ex.P4. Relying on Ex.P4 and the report (Ex.P1) lodged by PW.1, the Sessions
Court rightly concluded that, at the time of submitting Ex.P1 report, PW.1 was
indeed pregnant.
27. The Sessions Court, after considering and relying upon various
decisions of different High Courts, observed that, to attract the penal provision
under Section 496 of the IPC, the essential ingredient of deception must be
proved, and further, that the dishonest or fraudulent intention of the accused
must be clearly established. The Sessions Court further observed that it must
be shown that the accused was fully aware that no lawful marriage could take
place, yet he went through certain ceremonial formalities solely with the
intention of deceiving PW.1 into believing that she was lawfully married to him.
28. It is apposite at this stage to refer to the provisions of sections 493 and
496 of the IPC, which are set out hereunder:
"493. Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of lawful
marriage.--
Every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not lawfully married to
him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have
sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
"496. Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful
marriage.--
Whoever, dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention, goes through the
Ceremony of being married, knowing that he is not thereby lawfully married,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
29. Under section 493, Indian Penal Code, the offence consists in making a
woman believe that she is lawfully married to him by deceit and inducing her
to cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that belief. What is required
is that by deceitful means, the accused must induce a belief of lawful marriage
and then make the woman cohabit with him. Under section 496, Indian Penal
Code, the offence consists in dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention going
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through the Ceremony of being married, knowing that he is not thereby
lawfully married.
30. In Arun Singh v. State of U.P.4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to
the judgment in the case of Ram Chandra Bhagat Vs. State of Jharkhand5,
and explained the essential ingredients to constitute the offence under Section
493 IPC as follows:
"19. A plain reading of the section goes to show that in order to constitute
an offence under this section, it has to be demonstrated that a man has
deceitfully caused any woman, who is not lawfully married to him, to believe
that she is lawfully married wife and thereby to cohabit with him. In other
words, the accused must induce a woman, not lawfully married to him, to
believe that she is married to him and as a result of such misrepresentation,
woman should believe that she was lawfully married to the man and thus
there should be cohabitation or sexual intercourse.
***
21. The essence of an offence under Section 493 IPC is, therefore, the practice of deception by a man on a woman as a consequence of which the woman is led to believe that she is lawfully married to him, although she is not and then make her cohabit with him.
22. Deceit can be said to be a false statement of fact made by a person knowingly and recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another who on believing the same after having acted thereupon suffers an injury. It is an attempt to deceive and includes such declaration and statement that misleads others or causes him to believe which otherwise is false and incorrect.
23. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 493 IPC, the allegations in the FIR must demonstrate that the appellant had practised deception on the daughter of the complainant causing a false belief of existence of lawful marriage and which led her to cohabit with him."
31. The section 493 of IPC does not penalize mere cohabitation or sexual intercourse with a woman who is not lawfully married to him. The section is attracted only when certain other ingredients are also associated therewith. The section envisages the case when a man deceitfully induces a woman to have sexual intercourse with him causing her to believe that she is lawfully married to him. The essence of the section is therefore the deception caused by a man on a woman, in consequence of which she is led to believe that she 4 (2020) 3 SCC 736 5 (2013) 1 SCC 562 13 is lawfully married to him while, in fact, they are not lawfully married. In order to establish deception there must first be allegations that the accused falsely induced her to believe that she is legally wedded to him.
32. So in order to prove a charge under the Section 496 of IPC the prosecution is to prove that there was fraudulent intention on the part of the accused and he went through the Ceremony of marriage dishonestly inducing the woman to believe that she is the lawful wife of that particular person. It also speaks that the person who fraudulently has gone through a marriage ceremony must have the knowledge that the girl is not legally or lawfully married to him. In that situation the person who fraudulently or dishonestly induces the girl to believe through a marriage to be legal wife of that person, the person will be liable for punishment under Section 496 of the Code.
33. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to the contents of Ex.P1, wherein PW.1 stated that she and the accused had been in love since 1998 and were married on 25.07.2001 in the presence of PW.3 and the accused's friend, PW.4. The report further indicates that, at the time of lodging the report, PW.1 was in her fourth month of pregnancy, and that the accused had denied their relationship and expressed reluctance to marry. Even according to the contents of Ex.P1, PW.1 stated that the accused was willing to live with her and lead a family life, but was prevented from doing so by his elder brother. In light of these facts, it is difficult to conclude that the accused was having any dishonest or fraudulent intention at the time of marrying PW.1 in Room No.14 of Gajapathi Choultry, Simhachalam, or at the time of engaging in sexual intercourse with her thereafter as husband and wife. Had the accused been having any dishonest or fraudulent intention, he would not have gone to the extent of marrying PW.1 in the presence of others, thereby making the marriage publicly known. Nowhere in the evidence of PW.1 is it suggested that the accused harboured any improper or ulterior motive at the time of the marriage or at any subsequent time when he had sexual intercourse with her;
14there is no indication that his acts were motivated solely by the desire to gain sexual gratification.
34. As discernible from the evidence on record, the accused's denial of the relationship and his failure to live with PW.1 were attributable to the opposition of his family members to their union. Based on the said evidence, the Sessions Court concluded that the essential ingredients of dishonest or fraudulent intention or deception, as alleged by the prosecution to invoke the provisions of Sections 493 or 496 of the IPC, were not established. There is nothing on record, as rightly observed by the Sessions Court, to suggest that the accused dishonestly or fraudulently underwent the marriage ceremonies with the knowledge that no lawful marriage existed, or that he deceived PW.1 to engage in sexual intercourse with her.
35. To establish an offence under Sections 493 and 496 of the IPC, it is essential to demonstrate that deceit and fraudulent intention, as contemplated by these provisions, existed at the time of the marriage. In the present case, the evidence does not demonstrate the existence of these essential ingredients. The record indicates that the marriage was solemnized publicly and was known to the community, underscoring the absence of any concealment or fraudulent conduct at the time of the Ceremony. Any subsequent disclaimer or later assertion cannot be taken into consideration in determining the commission of the offence, particularly in a case of this nature. Since there is no evidence indicating that deceit or fraudulent intention was present at the time of the marriage ceremony, the essential ingredients required to constitute an offence under Sections 493 or 496 IPC are lacking. Consequently, no case is made out against the accused, and there are no sufficient grounds for convicting the accused under Sections 493 or 496 IPC.
36. It is a settled proposition of law that in a criminal trial, suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof. The prosecution must prove its 15 case and establish the charge by adducing convincing evidence to ward off any reasonable doubt about the accused's complicity.
37. In a criminal case, the degree of proof is the standard that is required in civil proceedings, and if there is the slightest doubt in the mind of the Court regarding the involvement of the accused person, then the Court should not convict the accused person with such a doubt. Instead, it would be proper for the Court to pass a judgment of acquittal in favour of the accused. When Sessions Court after adequate appreciation of the evidence of witnesses passed a judgment of the acquittal, it would not be appropriate for the appellate Court to disturb the said judgment, unless the said judgment of acquittal is unreasonable, even if two views are possible, then also, the appellate Court should not disturb the said judgment, instead, the Court should upheld the view favoured the accused.
38. In Mohan @ Srinivas @ Seena @ Tailor Seena V. State of Karnataka6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the scope of section 378 of the Code as under:
"Section 378 Cr.P.C. enables the State to prefer an appeal against an order of acquittal. Section 384 Cr.P.C., speaks of the powers that can be exercised by the Appellate Court. When the trial Court renders its decision by acquitting the accused, the presumption of innocence gathers strength before the Appellate Court. Consequently, the onus on the prosecution becomes more burdensome as there is a double presumption of innocence. Certainly, the Court of the first instance has its advantages in delivering its verdict, which is to see the witnesses in person while they depose. The Appellate Court is expected to involve itself in a deeper, studied scrutiny of not only the evidence before it. Still, it is duty bound to satisfy itself whether the decision of the trial Court is both a possible and plausible view. When two views are possible, the one taken by the trial court in a case of acquittal is to be followed on the touchstone of liberty and the advantage of having seen the witnesses.
39. So far as the main issue is concerned, that scope of acquittal appeal is well defined by now by series of decisions and the same is not to be repeated time and again, however, one of the recent decision in case of Harbeer Singh 6 2021 (15) SCALE Pg. 184 16 V. Sheeshpal 7 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down that mere fact that another view could also have been possible that cannot be a ground to reverse the acquittal. The powers of High Court are wide enough to turtle the acquittal order, however, some parameters are well defined by series of decisions in which this Court is of the considered opinion that State has not made out any case which would permit this Court to exercise such wide powers. Neither any material irregularity is pointed out nor any perversity is reflecting on the contrary it is reflecting that there is an application of mind on the part of learned Judge as the entire material on record has been dealt with specifically and the principle of appreciation of evidence appears to have been rightly undertaken by the Court below and therefore when such eventuality is reflecting sitting in a jurisdiction dealing with an order of acquittal Court is of the opinion not to interfere with such exercise. The relevant observations of the aforesaid decision in paras: 10 and 11 (Cri.L.J.) are reproduced herein after:
"10. The above principle has been reiterated by this Court in a number of judicial decisions and the position of law that emerges from a comprehensive survey of these cases is that in an appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the High Court unless the same is clearly unreasonable or perverse or mainfestly illegal or grossly unjust. The mere fact that another view could also have been taken on the evidence on record is not a ground for reversing an order of acquittal.
11. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the guilt of the accused must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. The burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt lies with the prosecution, and it never shifts. Another golden thread that runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view that is favourable to the accused should be adopted.
40. In light of these circumstances, and upon a comprehensive evaluation of the entire evidence, the Sessions Court rightly concluded that the prosecution had failed to prove the guilt of the accused for the offences under sections 493 and 496 of the IPC beyond a reasonable doubt. Consequently, the Sessions Court acquitted the accused of the said charges.7
(2017) CriLJ 169 17
41. Considering the aforesaid set of circumstances and in view of the conjoint reading of the conclusion arrived at in co-relation with the evidence on record, this Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution makes out no case to establish the guilt of the respondent / accused.
42. It is a settled principle of law that if the Trial Court takes the view, it should not be reversed, even if another view is possible. The view taken by the Trial Court is a plausible one. Therefore, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to reverse the Trial Court's finding.
43. The Sessions Court rightly reached its conclusion, providing sound and justifiable reasons. Therefore, the appellant's request for interference lacks merit. A re-appreciation of the evidence reveals no misdirection or misinterpretation by the Sessions Court. Upon careful reconsideration, there is no flaw in the findings of fact by the Sessions Court. Therefore, the acquittal of the respondent cannot be interfered with. Accordingly, the appeal against the acquittal is dismissed, and the order of acquittal is confirmed, and there is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Sessions Court. Accordingly, the point is answered.
44. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present Criminal Appeal No.1157 of 2009 fails and the same deserves to be dismissed and is dismissed, accordingly. The judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Vizianagaram, in Sessions Case No.119 of 2003, dated 08.10.2007, stands confirmed.
Interim orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated, and all pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.
_____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 31.10.2025 SAK 18 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL NO: 1157 of 2009 Date: 31.10.2025 SAK