Uttarakhand High Court
Committee Of Management vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 28 March, 2016
Author: V.K. Bist
Bench: K.M. Joseph, V.K. Bist
IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Special Appeal No. 501 of 2015
Committee of Management. ............ Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & others. ............. Respondents
&
Special Appeal No. 395 of 2015
Committee of Management. ............ Appellant
Versus
State of Uttarakhand & others. ............. Respondents
Mr. Parikshit Saini, Advocate for the appellant.
Mr. A.K. Joshi, Addl. Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand /
respondents.
Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate for the intervener in the writ petition.
JUDGMENT
Coram: Hon'ble K.M. Joseph, C.J.
Hon'ble V.K. Bist, J.
Dated: 28th March, 2016 K.M. JOSEPH, C.J. (Oral) These two appeals being connected, we are disposing of the same by this common judgment.
2. A single writ petition has led to these two appeals. Writ Petition (M/S) No. 1595 of 2015 was filed by the appellant Committee of Management seeking the following prayers:
"I. To issue writ of certiorari by quashing the order dated 17-4- 2015 issued by respondent no. 3 (Contained as Annexure no. 8 to this writ petition).
II. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent no. 3 approve the amended scheme of administration forthwith (Contained as Annexure no. 2 to this writ petition)."
3. Appellant is the Committee of Management as represented by one Sri V.K. Singh. There is a society namely Rashtriya Inter College 2 Society, Rohalki, registered under the Societies Registration Act. The term of the Committee was to end on 31.07.2015. It is, while so, that the prayers were sought in the writ petition, as we have indicated. When the present writ petition was pending, however, certain developments took place. The intervener represented by Mr. Siddhartha Sah, Advocate, filed an Application for intervention. He had been expelled from the Committee. The learned Single Judge not only allowed the Intervention Application, but also directed that his objections to the expulsion be decided by the Chief Education Officer. Pursuant to the said order, it is not in dispute that the intervener's complaint before the Chief Education Officer was allowed and his expulsion was found to be bad in law. Still further, a perusal of the impugned order in Special Appeal No. 501 of 2015 would show that, since the term of the Committee was drawing to a close, attempts were made to hold elections. That was sought to be interdicted by the learned Single Judge. It is pertinent to note that, on 30.07.2015, the following order was passed:
"The Court feels that conducting of election is in the utter haste, which must not have been shown by the petitioner. The Court stays the effect and operation of the election, which is scheduled today itself. The Court will not allow foul play in the field. In any case, the outcome of such election will not be given effect to.
Chief Education Officer, Haridwar is hereby directed not to recognize the outcome of such election, if any."
4. It appears that, as noted by the learned Single Judge, the election could not be stopped and the new Committee also could not come into play in view of the order dated 30.07.2015 and, hence, the State Government, in purported exercise of the powers under Section 35 of the Education Act, appointed an authorised Controller / Administrator for the purpose. It is after this that the appellant moved an Application to withdraw the writ petition. The learned Single Judge, by the order impugned in Special Appeal No. 501 of 2015, took the view that Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not strictly applicable in view of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, then, the learned Single Judge proceeded to take the view that the Application for 3 withdrawal is intended to get over the orders passed by the Court, which we have referred to. He, further, took note of the fact that, in view of the subsequent development by which, under Section 35, authorised officer has been appointed, the Committee of Management could no longer be represented by Sri V.K. Singh, as, apparently, the Committee of Management can be represented, in law, only by the authorised officer. Hence, the Application for withdrawal was dismissed.
5. In Special Appeal No. 395 of 2015, appellant, which was the Committee of Management represented by Sri V.K. Singh, purports to challenge two orders. The first is an order by which the Intervention Application, which we have referred to earlier in the course of the judgment, was allowed. The next impugned order is order dated 30.07.2015.
6. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.
7. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned Single Judge ought to have allowed the Withdrawal Application. It is his case that the election to the Committee can be subjected to a challenge only in the manner provided under Section 25 (UP Amendment to the Societies Registration Act) and the Chief Education Officer has no authority in the matter. He would also submit that, therefore, the orders, which are impugned, cannot be allowed to stand. He would also submit that as dominus litis, it is for the appellant to decide whether to continue with the litigation or not and the appellant was merely seeking withdrawal of the writ petition and that should have been allowed.
8. Mr. Siddhartha Sah, learned counsel for the intervener, whose Intervention Application was allowed and order dated 10.07.2015 was also issued, would point out that, under the Education Act, a Committee of Management can manage only one institution; whereas, in this case, there is one Committee of Management and there are two institutions, which is legally impermissible (Mr. Parikshit Saini would, in fact, point 4 out that there are two separate Committees of Management for the two institutions, both coming under the same Society). Mr. Siddhartha Sah would reiterate that an authorised officer having been appointed, without the said decision being set aside, the learned Single Judge was right in what he did. In this regard, he would point out that the term of the Committee had also expired on 31.07.2015. He would submit that the appellant is not correct in contending that it was on the basis of impugned order dated 30.07.2015 (which merely directed that approval be withheld) that the order was passed under Section 35. The proceedings under Section 35 are independent and necessitated on account of the illegalities in permitting the previous management to continue beyond the expiry. He would also point out that there was a letter dated 27.07.2015 issued by the Chief Education Officer, Haridwar, addressed to the appellant not to continue with the election and still the appellant defied the same and election was purported to be held.
9. Mr. A.K. Joshi, learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel would point out that an authorised officer has already been appointed and, once authorised officer is appointed, Committee of Management can only be represented by him. Furthermore, it was submitted that, pursuant to order dated 30.07.2015, order dated 06.08.2015 was issued by the Chief Education Officer, wherein approval has been refused. Mr. Parikshit Saini would point out that the Chief Education Officer has no authority in the matter; whereas, the learned Additional Chief Standing Counsel would point out that, in terms of the scheme of management, quite apart from the fact that the Committee of Management is acting under the society registered under the Societies Registration Act, the Chief Education Officer has the authority to look into the question.
10. Mr. Parikshit Saini would point out that, if the appellant is to challenge the order of the Chief Education Officer, it will be told off the gates on the ground that it has no locus standi, as its term has come to an end. Furthermore, he would also point out to an obstacle in the form of 5 the direction issued by order dated 30.07.2015 to the Chief Education Officer not to approve the election.
11. Though it is pointed out by Mr. Siddhartha Sah that court fee is paid only in respect of one order, in the circumstances of this case, we proceed to dispose of the matter, but making it subject to the condition that the appellant will pay further court fee of ` 100/- in Special Appeal No. 395 of 2015 within a period of two days from today.
12. In order to bring a quietus to the matter, we pass the following order:
Since there is no dispute that there is no alternative remedy for the appellant in regard to the refusal to grant approval by the Chief Education Officer, we leave it open to the appellant to challenge the order dated 06.08.2015 passed by the Chief Education Officer, Haridwar. We make it clear that the competent forum will decide the matter totally untrammeled by the direction issued by the learned Single Judge in his order dated 30.07.2015 not to grant approval. We also leave it open to the appellant to raise all contentions available to it in law before the said forum.
13. The appeals are, accordingly, disposed of. In the nature of the litigation and the order that we have pronounced today, the writ petition will stand disposed of.
(V.K. Bist, J.) (K.M. Joseph, C. J.)
28.03.2016 28.03.2016
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