Central Administrative Tribunal - Jabalpur
Ramjagdish Meena vs Union Of India on 7 May, 2015
RESERVED
CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, JABALPUR BENCH,
JABALPUR
Original Application No.200/00075/2014
Jabalpur, this Thursday, the 07th day of May, 2015
Mr. G.P.Singhal, Administrative Member
Mr. Arvind J. Rohee, Judicial Member
Ramjagdish Meena, S/o Chhitat Lal Meena, aged about 25 years
R/o Village-Mandariya, Post-Jhargaon Tehsil Digod
Distt. Kota (Rajasthan) Pin 325201 - Applicant
(By Advocate Shri Ankur Shrivastava)
V e r s u s
1. Union of India, Through : the Secretary, Ministry of Defence,
Govt. of India, South Block, New Delhi PIN 110001
2. The General Manager, Grey Iron Foundry, Jabalpur
Distt.-Jabalpur (M.P.) PIN 482009
3. The Deputy General Manager, Grey Iron Foundry, Jabalpur
Distt. Jabalpur (M.P.) PIN 482009 - Respondents
(By Advocate: Shri R.S. Siddiqui)
ORDER
By G.P.Singhal, AM.-
By filing this Original Application the applicant has sought to quash the order dated 19.12.2013 (Annexure A-6) by which the respondents have cancelled his candidature for the post of Fireman. The applicant has also prayed for direction to the respondents to appoint him on the post of Fireman.
2. The applicant had applied for the post of Fireman on 22.09.2013 in the respondent-organization in response to advertisement published in Employment News dated 8-14 September,2013. Based on written examination, physical standard measurement and endurance test, his name was placed in the select list, and accordingly a letter was issued to him on 5.8.2013, along with attestation form. Prior to his aforementioned selection, two different cases were registered against the applicant - one was registered as Case No.337/2007 under Section 307,323,325 and 143 of IPC at Police Station Nayapura, Kota City in which the applicant was acquitted vide order dated 09.08.2011, and another case was registered as Case No.168/10 under Sections 451, 323 and 34 of IPC in which a compromise was made between the parties and the case was closed on 12.9.2012 (Annexures A-4). The respondents vide impugned order dated 19.12.2013 cancelled the candidature of the applicant for the aforementioned post holding that the applicant has a history of criminal cases and acquittal in those cases can not be regarded as honourable acquittal or exoneration on merit.
3. The learned counsel for the applicant has contended that since in both the cases the applicant has been acquitted and even charges levelled in those cases were of simple in nature, therefore, the candidature of the applicant should not be cancelled.
4. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the respondent-factory is a defence production unit under the Ministry of Defence and, therefore, a person like the applicant having history of criminal antecedents will not be fit for appointment. He placed reliance on the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in the matters of Delhi Administration& others Vs. Sushil Kumar (1996) 11 SCC 605 wherein it has been held that though the respondent was discharged or acquitted of the criminal offences, the same had nothing to do with the question. The consideration relevant to the case is of the antecedents of the candidate and the appointing authority has rightly found the respondent not desirable for appointment to the service.
5. Heard the learned counsel of both sides and carefully perused the pleadings of the respective parties and the documents annexed therewith.
6. The Honble Supreme Court in the matters of Joginder Singh Vs. UT of Chandigarh, (2015) 2 SCC 377 has recently considered similar issue. Relevant paragraphs of the said order read thus:
(15). To answer Point (i), we must first consider whether the acquittal of the appellant from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal. It is the contention of the respondent that even though the appellant was acquitted in the criminal case, the appointment of the appellant by the appointing authority to the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police, which is a disciplined force was not desirable. The High Court has held that what would be relevant is the conduct and character of the candidate to be appointed in the service of the State police and not the actual result thereof in the criminal case as claimed by the appellant. Further, the relevant consideration to the case is the antecedents of the candidate for appointing him to the post of Constable.
(16). However, adverting to the criminal proceeding initiated against the appellant, we would first like to point out that the complainant did not support the case of the prosecution as he failed to identify the assailants and further admitted that the contents of Section 161 CrPC statement were not disclosed to him and his signatures were obtained on a blank sheet of paper by the investigating officer. Further, Sajjan Singh, who was an eyewitness of the case, who was also injured, had failed to identify the assailants. Both the witnesses were declared hostile on the request of the prosecution.
(17). The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bhiwani held that the prosecution has not been able to prove in any way the allegations against the appellant. Thus, the learned Judge held that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the appellant in the criminal proceedings. Therefore, we are in agreement with the findings and judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge and are of the opinion that the acquittal of the accused from the criminal case was an honourable acquittal.
18. The learned counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in Inspector General of Police v. S. Samuthiram(2013) 1 SCC 598 of which relevant paragraph is extracted as under: (SCC p. 609, para 24) 24. The meaning of the expression honourable acquittal came up for consideration before this Court in RBI v. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 In that case, this Court has considered the impact of Regulation 46(4) dealing with honourable acquittal by a criminal court on the disciplinary proceedings. In that context, this Court held that the mere acquittal does not entitle an employee to reinstatement in service, the acquittal, it was held, has to be honourable. The expressions honourable acquittal, acquitted of blame, fully exonerated are unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Penal Code, which are coined by judicial pronouncements. It is difficult to define precisely what is meant by the expression honourably acquitted. When the accused is acquitted after full consideration of prosecution evidence and that the prosecution had miserably failed to prove the charges levelled against the accused, it can possibly be said that the accused was honourably acquitted. (emphasis supplied) (19). Further, an acquittal of the appellant is an honourable acquittal in every sense and purpose. Therefore, the appellant should not be deprived from being appointed to the post, in the public employment, by declaring him as unsuitable to the post even though he was honourably acquitted in the criminal case registered against him.
(20). Further, undisputedly, there has been no allegation of concealment of the fact that a criminal case was registered against him by the appellant. Thus, the appellant has honestly disclosed in his verification application submitted to the selection authority that there was a criminal case registered against him and that it ended in an acquittal on account of compromise between the parties involved in the criminal case, he cannot be denied an opportunity to qualify for any post including the post of a Constable.
(21). Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Deptt. of Home, A.P. v. B. Chinnam Naidu (2005) 2 SCC 746 which states herein: (SCC p. 750, para 9) 9. A bare perusal of the extracted portions shows that the candidate is required to indicate as to whether he has ever been convicted by a court of law or detained under any State/Central preventive detention laws for any offences whether such conviction is sustained or set aside by the appellate court, if appealed against. The candidate is not required to indicate as to whether he had been arrested in any case or as to whether any case was pending. Conviction by a court or detention under any State/Central preventive detention laws is different from arrest in any case or pendency of a case. By answering that the respondent had not been convicted or detained under preventive detention laws it cannot be said that he had suppressed any material fact or had furnished any false information or suppressed any information in the attestation form to incur disqualification. The State Government and the Tribunal appeared to have proceeded on the basis that the respondent ought to have indicated the fact of arrest or pendency of the case, though Column 12 of the attestation form did not require such information being furnished. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that such a requirement has to be read into an attestation form. We find no reason to accept such contention. There was no specific requirement to mention as to whether any case is pending or whether the applicant had been arrested. In view of the specific language so far as Column 12 is concerned the respondent cannot be found guilty of any suppression. (emphasis supplied) (22). Further, reliance has been placed by this Court in Commr. of Police v. Dhaval Singh (1999) 1 SCC 246 wherein it is stated as under: (SCC pp. 248-49, para 6) 6. The learned counsel for the appellants has drawn our attention to a judgment rendered by a Bench of this Court on 4-10-1996 in Delhi Admn. v. Sushil Kumar (1996) 11 SCC 605. On the first blush, that judgment seems to support the case of the appellants but there is a material difference between the two cases. Whereas in the instant case, the respondent has conveyed to the appellant that an inadvertent mistake had been committed in not giving the information against the relevant column in the form much before the cancellation of his candidature, in Sushil Kumar case2 no such correction was made at any stage by the respondent. That judgment is, therefore, clearly distinguishable on facts. (23). Further, a bare perusal of Rules 12.12, 12.14 and 12.18 of the Rules, which would indicate that the recruit should be of a good character and suitability. The said Rules are extracted hereunder:
12.12. Supervision of recruitments.The standard of performance and the reputation of the whole police force depend above all upon the quality of its Constables. Standards for recruits are laid down in the rules which follow, but, over and above these, constant attention and effort to raise the general standard of recruitment are essential. Gazetted officers shall at all times devote special attention to discovering and encouraging men of a thoroughly good stamp to enrol themselves. Efforts shall be made to enrol a proportion of men belonging to communities or classes, whose representation in the force is desirable, but who appear reluctant to offer themselves. The examination and measuring of candidates for enrolment shall invariably be carried out by a gazetted officer, who shall concern himself specially to prevent the victimisation of, or the taking of illegal gratification from, candidates by subordinate government servants concerned in the conduct of their examination. Superintendents shall personally satisfy themselves that the arrangements for the reception of new recruits in the Lines, and for providing them with bedding and warm clothing, whether as a sanctioned government issue or under a system whereby the cost is recovered later in instalments from pay, are adequate, and that recruitment is not discouraged by initial and avoidable hardships. Deputy Inspectors General, in addition to exercising a careful control over recruitment generally, and preventing the enrolment of undesirable types, shall, at their inspections, formal and informal, pay special attention to the observance of this rule.
* * * 12.14. RecruitsStatus of.(1) Recruits shall be of good character and great care shall be taken in selecting men of a type suitable for police service from candidates presenting themselves for enrolment.
* * * 12.18. RecruitsVerification of character of.(1) The character and suitability for enrolment of every recruit shall be ascertained by a reference to the lambardar of the village or ward member of the town of which the recruit is a resident. A search slip shall also be sent to the Finger Print Bureau in order to establish his freedom or otherwise from conviction. Such lambardar or ward member shall, if the recruit is of good character, furnish a certificate to that effect which shall be verified and attested by the Sub-Inspector in charge of the local police station. The Sub-Inspector shall complete the information required by Form 12.18 (I). It is the submission made on behalf of the respondents that the abovereferred rules lay down the criteria that clean antecedents and good moral character is indispensable for a candidate to even fall within the zone of consideration.
(24). However, in the present case, we have observed that the appellant was involved in a family feud and the FIR came to be lodged against him on 14-4-1998, after he had applied for the post of Constable. Further, he had been acquitted on 4-10-1999 i.e. much before he was called for the interview/medical examination/written test. Further, as per Rule 12.18, emphasis has been laid on the freedom or otherwise from conviction. An interpretation of the Rules referred to supra clearly indicate that an acquittal in a criminal case will qualify him for appointment to the post of Police Constable, as the appellant had successfully qualified the other requisites required for his selection. Thus, as rightly pointed out by the trial court that as the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the appellant by adducing cogent evidence, therefore, the police authorities cannot be allowed to sit in judgment over the findings recorded by the Sessions Court in its judgment, wherein the appellant has been honourably acquitted. Denying him the appointment to the post of a Constable is like a vicarious punishment, which is not permissible in law, therefore, the impugned judgment and order1 passed by the High Court is vitiated in law and liable to be set aside.
(25). Further, apart from a small dent in the name of this criminal case in which he has been honourably acquitted, there is no other material on record to indicate that the antecedents or the conduct of the appellant was not up to the mark to appoint him to the post. The appellant was also among the list of the 40 selected successful candidates, who had fulfilled all the other requirements of the post. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Jagtar Singh v. CBI 1993 Supp (3) SCC 49 which states as under: (SCC pp. 50-51, para 4) 4. It is not necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the claim of privilege by the respondents is justified or not. We also do not wish to go into the details of the investigations made regarding the antecedents and character of the appellant. We have carefully examined the material on the basis of which the respondents have come to the conclusion that the appellant is not suitable for appointment to the post of Senior Public Prosecutor in the Central Bureau of Investigation and we are of the view that the respondents are not justified in reaching a conclusion adverse to the appellant. No reasonable person, on the basis of the material placed before us, can come to the conclusion that the appellants antecedents and character are such that he is unfit to be appointed to the post of Senior Public Prosecutor. There has been total lack of application of mind on the part of the respondents. Only on the basis of surmises and conjectures arising out of a single incident which happened in the year 1983 it has been concluded that the appellant is not a desirable person to be appointed to government service. We are of the view that the appellant has been unjustifiably denied his right to be appointed to the post to which he was selected and recommended by the Union Public Service Commission. (26). Thus, we are of the opinion that the alleged past conduct of the appellant in relation to the criminal case will not debar or disqualify him for the post of the Constable for which he was successfully selected after qualifying the written test, medical test and the interview conducted by the selection authority. Further, as stated by us earlier, there has been no concealment of any relevant fact from the respondents by the appellant. The respondents were thus not justified in denying the said post to the appellant. The conclusion arrived at by them is not cogent and lacks proper application of mind.
(27). We, therefore, hold that the High Court has committed a grave error both on facts and in law and it has failed to follow the legal principles laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra and uphold the decision of CAT. For the foregoing reasons both the appeals succeed and are allowed.
(28). Since we have upheld the judgment and order of CAT, the respondents are directed to comply with the same by issuing appointment letter to the appellant within four weeks from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.
7. We have carefully examined the material of the instant case on the basis of which the respondents have come to the conclusion that the applicant was not suitable for appointment to the post of Fireman.
8. In view of the aforementioned legal position and considering the facts of the instant case, we are of the considered view that the respondents are not justified in reaching a conclusion adverse to the applicant. Only on the basis of aforementioned incidents which happened in the years 2007 & 2010 it has been concluded that the applicant is not a suitable person for government service. We are of the view that the applicant has been unjustifiably denied his right to be appointed to the post of Fireman, to which he was selected based on written examination, physical standard measurement and endurance test. In this view of the matter, the present Original Application is liable to be allowed.
9. In the result, the Original Application is allowed. The impugned order dated 19.12.2013 (Annexure A-6) is quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reconsider the case for issuance of appointment order in favour of the applicant and in case of deciding to appoint him issue such orders within a period of one month from the date of communication of this order. No costs.
(Arvind J. Rohee) (G.P.Singhal) Judicial Member Administrative Member rkv 8 Sub: appointment OA No.200/00075/2014 Page 8 of 8