Gauhati High Court
Lalthnkhum Kuki vs State Of Manipur And Ors. on 8 December, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2007(3)GLT544
Author: U.B. Saha
Bench: I.A. Ansari, U.B. Saha
JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J.
1. This is an appeal from the judgment and order, dated 6.12.04, of the learned single Judge, in writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 1263 of 2000, whereby and whereunder, the learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellant/writ petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution impugning the order of his removal/dismissal from service.
2. The facts, in brief, short for details and necessary for disposal of this appeal lie in narrow compass and are as follows: The appellant/writ petitioner joined in service as Rifleman of the 6th Battallion (for short Bn.) Manipur Rifles, and he was serving the said Battallion, since his appointment, till he was suspended, by the authority on the basis of first information report lodged by one L. Henglilal J.C. No. 238 of 6th Bn. M.R. Ukhrul, to the effect that the appellant/writ petitioner (for short delinquent appellant) had killed his own son, Master Kaminthang, aged about 5 years old, on 10.7.92, at his rented house at Ukhrul, and that the first information report, was registered accordingly by the Ukhrul P.S. under FIR Case No. 50(7) 92-UKI PS Under Section 302 IPC. After investigation of the aforesaid alleged killing of the son of the delinquent appellant, the concerned police authority, i.e. investigating agency, on 23.7.93, filed charge sheet being No. 12 of 1993, but the trial of the aforementioned case is still pending before the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Manipur East. During Pendency of the trial of the criminal case, a disciplinary enquiry was initiated on 2.8.98, against the delinquent appellant, to inquire into the killing of his son, by furnishing copies of the charge sheet with the statement of imputation along with list of witnesses and the D.E. memorandum. In support of his defence, the delinquent appellant submitted his written statement denying all the charges levelled against him of killing his son on 13.1.99. The Disciplinary authority, i.e. Commandant 6th Bn. M.R., appointed, on 27.1.99, one Shri Gonglin Faumei, Dy. Commandant, 6th Bn. M.R. Ukhrul, as Enquiry Officer, to inquire into the matter relating to alleged misconduct of the appellant/writ petitioner.
3. After following the necessary procedures, the Enquiry Officer, after examining 3 (three) prosecution witnesses and the written statement submitted by the delinquent appellant, submitted his report to the disciplinary authority with finding inter alia that the delinquent appellant, namely Rfn. No. 22794 Lalthakum Kuki, committed homicide of his own son, on 11.7.92 while he was out of sense and stated in his report at the outset that none of those prosecution witnesses could provide very conclusive evidences in regard to the homicide alleged to have been committed by the delinquent appellant but finally held that the charge brought against the delinquent appellant is proved.
4. On receipt of the report, having been submitted by the Enquiry Officer, on 3.6.99, the disciplinary authority, the C.O. 6th Bn. M.R., issued show cause notice accompanied by the enquiry report. Basing on such enquiry report, post mortem report and other police report, the disciplinary authority, the Commandant, 6th Bn. M.R. passed an order to the effect that the charges levelled against the charged officer Rfn. No. 22794 Lalthakum Kuki, is held proved beyond all doubts and there is no alternative punishment for such act of charged officer than to award him major penalty of removal/dismissal from service. The delinquent officer did not show, any cause, in reply to the show cause notice dated 3.6.99.
5. Being aggrieved by the order of dismissal, the delinquent appellant, preferred an appeal to the appellate authority on 21.9.99, with a prayer to set aside the impugned dismissal order on the ground that the findings of the enquiry authority in its report is based on no evidence and prosecution failed to prove this case, but the disciplinary authority, without applying its mind, agreed with the findings of the Enquiry officer and removed the petitioner. The delinquent appellant assailed the said order of dismissal by way of preferring appeal to the statutory appellate authority and the said Departmental appeal was examined by the appellate authority, i.e. Dy. I/C of police (Ops.) on 24.1.01 and rejected the same, upholding the aforementioned order of dismissal, passed by the disciplinary authority, on 4.9.99 against the delinquent appellant, against which the delinquent appellant preferred writ petition before this Court, which was registered as W.P. (C) No. 1263 of 2000. The respondents filed their counter affidavit in the aforesaid writ petition denying all the allegations made by the delinquent appellant in his writ petition.
6. After hearing the parties, the learned single Judge, dismissed the writ petition and thus said judgment and order is impugned in this writ appeal.
We have heard Mr. Mark Khapai, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant/Writ petitioner and Mr. Jalalluddin, learned G.A. for the respondents.
7. Mr. Mark Khapai, learned Counsel for the appellant/writ petitioner, submits that the inquiring authority failed to consider the case of the petitioner, particularly when he himself stated in the enquiry report that one of the three prosecution witnesses could provide conclusive evidence against the delinquent appellant and when no other document was before him including appellant and when no other document was before him including the post mortem report etc. how he came to the findings that the charges levelled against the delinquent is proved by the prosecution, though there was no evidence and/or materials before him to come to such conclusion, when there was no evidence. The disciplinary authority fails to apply him mind to the enquiry report and agreed with the perverse findings of the inquiry officer on no evidence and passed the impugned order of removal, which is totally unreasonably, unfair, perverse and illegal. He also contended that the appellant authority rejected the appeal of the delinquent appellant without assigning any reason, he simply echoed with the voice of disciplinary authority. According to the learned Counsel of the delinquent appellant the order of the appellate authority is also a mechanical one, it was the duty of the appellate authority to apply his mind independently to the report of the enquiry officer, as well as order of disciplinary authority which he fails, as a result the delinquent appellant suffered. Instead, he ought to have come to such a conclusion that the petitioner is innocent and he is in no way involved with the alleged killing of his own son, inasmuch as the fact of petitioner's illness was available on record, including the fact that three witnesses of the prosecution failed to conclusively prove the case of prosecution. Similarly, learned single Judge also, in his impugned judgment and order, failed to consider the case of the petitioner on proper aspect, he, basing on a general principle of law that in the departmental proceedings, the standard of proving charges is preponderance of probability and the evidence against the charged officer should have nexus between the alleged charge and the charged officer and he came to a wrong conclusion that the finding of the disciplinary authority is based on evidence and this Court, in its writ jurisdiction, has limitation to hold different view from that of the disciplinary authority. He further contends that the writ Court has the power to inquire to the impugned conclusion of the enquiry authority as well as disciplinary authority, whether they acted on the basis of some evidence or materials or no evidence or no materials at all, to come to such conclusion that delinquent appellant is guilty for the charges levelled against him. His another contention is that when the criminal case is pending, the departmental proceeding ought to have been kept in abeyance, till the criminal case is completed, which the learned single Judge failed to consider, at the time of deciding the writ petition though that was his duty, as the delinquent was before him against the injustice caused by the departmental authority, hence, the judgment and order of the learned single Judge upholding the order of removal passed by the disciplinary authority and approved by the departmental appellate authority is liable to be set aside. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on paragraph 22 of the case in Cap. M. Paul Anthony, v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. reported in (1993) 3 SCC 679, and contended if the departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it was desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till conclusion of the criminal case. As the subject matter of criminal case and charges in the Departmental proceedings are same and pending against the delinquent appellant, in that situation the departmental proceedings ought to have been stayed, but the authority failed to do so, as a result, the appellant rifleman is prejudiced, which itself, is a ground for setting aside the order of the disciplinary authority, as well as the departmental appellate authority.
8. On the same point, he also relied paragraph 28 and 30 of the case of G.M. Tank v. State of Gujarat and Ors. . As relied by Mark Khapai, the paragraph 28 and 30 of the aforesaid decision, hence the same is quoted hereunder:
28. This Court in Depot Manager, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya in para 8 held as under:
The purpose of departmental enquiry and of prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence for violation of a duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public. So crime is an act of commission in violation of law or of omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in the service and efficiency of public service. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to law down any guidelines as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceedings may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with departmental enquiry and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in the criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public (sic duty), as distinguished from mere private rights punishable under criminal law. When trial of criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with proof of the offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse is the case of departmental enquiry. The enquiry in a departmental proceedings relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer to punish him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statutory rules or law. That the strict standard of proof or applicability of the Evidence Act stands excluded is a settled legal positionUnder these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In this case,the charge is failure to anticipate the accident and prevention thereof. It has nothing to do with the culpability of the offence under Sections 304-A and 338 IPC. Under these circumstances, the High Court was not right in staying the proceedings.
30. The judgments relied on by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents are distinguishable on facts and on law. In this case, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in a departmental case against the appellant and the charge before the criminal court are one and the same. It is true that the nature of charge in the departmental proceedings and the criminal case is grave. The nature of the case launched against the appellant on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during enquiry and investigation and as reflected in the charge-sheet, factors mentioned are one and the same. In other words, charges, evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same. In the present case, criminal and departmental proceedings have already noticed or granted on the same set of facts, namely, raid conducted at the appellant's residence, recovery of articles therefrom. The Investigating Officer Mr. V.B. Raval and other departmental witnesses were the only witnesses examined by the enquiry officer who by relying upon their statement came to he conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case and the criminal court on the examination came to the conclusion that the prosecution has not proved the guilt alleged against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt and acquitted the appellant by its judicial pronouncement with the findings that the charge has not been proved.
It is also to be noticed that the judicial pronouncement was made after a regular trial and on hot contest. Under these circumstances, it would be unjust and unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded in the departmental proceedings to stand.
9. In response to the contention of the learned Counsel of the delinquent appellant, Mr. Jalalluddin, learned G.A., submitted that, writ Court has no jurisdiction to look into the evidence, on the basis of which, the enquiring authority gave its findings and on the basis of which the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order of dismissal/removal and in the order of appellate authority when he approved the order of said removal, rejecting the appeal.
10. He contended that as there was no procedural lapses on the part of the departmental authority in the disciplinary proceedings, the learned single Judge rightly dismissed the writ petition, filed by the petitioner. He also contended that finding of facts recorded by the inquiring officer cannot be reversed by way of reappreciation of the evidence by the writ Court. The learned Counsel tried to convince us that it is settled by this time that the disciplinary proceeding is not like the criminal trial and, therefore, scope of enquiry is quite different from that of criminal trial, and departmental proceeding can be concluded, even when the criminal case is pending, not only that even after acquittal from criminal case also departmental proceeding can be initiated, mere acquittal from criminal case does not conclude departmental proceeding even on same charge.
In support of his aforesaid contentions, he relied on the following case of Senior Supdt. of Post Offices, Pathananthitta and Ors., Appellant v. A Gopalan, Respondent reported in AIR 1999 SC 1514 wherein the Apex Court rejected the contention that the disciplinary proceedings could not be continued in the face of acquittal in the criminal case and has held that the nature and scope of the criminal case are very different from those of departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of departmental disciplinary proceedings and an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot conclude the departmental proceedings. This is so because in a criminal case, the charge to be proved beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings, the standard of proving the charge is preponderance of probability, and case of Dr. Anil Kappur v. Union of India and Anr. where the apex Court stated that though it is possible to take another view in this matter, that will not be a ground for interfering with the orders passed in the disciplinary proceedings.
11. He also placed reliance in support of his contention on the case of South Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Sapan Kumar Mitra and Ors. wherein the Apex Court discussed scope of Article 226 of the Constitution and nature of departmental proceeding and also the function of the disciplinary authority. He further contended that when the disciplinary authority and appellate authority came to impugned conclusion on the basis of evidence on record, then, if other view is possible to take, that should not be done for the interest of justice, as the delinquent being a police personnel, violated the law, in other hand, he takes law in his own hand, in that way he committed misconduct, for which, the impugned order of removal is justified. He further relied the case of Union of India and Ors. v. P.R. Bhattacharjee (1998) 4 GLT 239 and his submission is that examination of witness in a case where a police personnel has been charged relating to misconduct coupled with maintenance of public order, cannot be looked into by the writ Court as well as appellate Court.
12. The points of law arises for our decision in the present appeal are as follows: (1) whether finding of inquiring authority and that of the decision of the disciplinary authority, as well as the order of appellate authority, are perverse or not; if so what would be the effect, (ii) whether writ Court has the power to enquire about the conclusion of the disciplinary authority or not; (iii) whether writ Court, can look into if there is any evidence at all in support of the conclusion of the enquiring officer, disciplinary authority as well as appellate authority for removal of the delinquent employee, on such evidence or not and/or whether there are any materials for such conclusion.
13. We have given our anxious thought to the points involved in the matter and also considered the rival submissions made by the parties, together with the records available before us, as well as the citations relied upon by learned Counsel of the parties.
14. There is nothing to disagree with the submission of Mr. Jalalludin, the learned G. A. to the aspect that Departmental proceeding is different than that of criminal proceedings. In a disciplinary proceeding, the disciplinary authority considers whether the delinquent appellant was ignorant to his official duty or not, and in a criminal proceeding the Courts decides whether the accused committed the penal offence or not. It is also well settled that if the disciplinary inquiry has been conducted, i.e. disciplinary authority cannot be interfered with where there is no procedural flaws at the time of decision making process and where the departmental proceeding is based on some evidence, but at the same time Apex Court also stated where the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is wholly perverse and based on no evidence and/or no materials, in that case, the writ Court cannot act as an idle spectator, it is the duty of the writ Court to see the records of disciplinary proceedings and find out whether the conclusion is proper or not to do justice to the delinquent employee. It will be evident even from the decision relied by Mr. Jalall, learned G.A., in South Bengal State Transport Corpn. (supra) that 'when finding of fact was arrived at without any material or upon a view of the facts which could not reasonably be entertained or the facts found were such that no person acting judicially and properly instructed as to the relevant law would have come to the determination, the decision can be said to be perverse. It is, however, true that if perversity is shown and proved, it would be open to the writ Court to hold as such' (emphasis added) In the aforesaid case, the apex Court also discussed with the function of inquiring officer and disciplinary authority, which goes against the contention of Mr. Jalal, learned G.A.
15. By now, it is, also settled, that both the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings can run simultaneously, even, when criminal case is pending, then also the disciplinary proceedings can continue. But the question arises, in this case, is different from the points raised by the learned G.A. and points arose for decision in the cases relied by him. There is no quarrel with the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court as well as by this Court in the case of A. Gopalan, (supra) Dr. Anil Kappoor (supra) & P.R. Bhattacharjee (supra). But, those cases have no direct bearing in the present case, as the question involved in the present case is different from the question arose in those cases and the facts of the cases are also on different footings than that of the case in hand as stated above. In the foregoing paragraphs of this judgment, we have already formulated the points involved for decision in this case.
16. For consideration of the point No. 1, we go through the records, particularly the enquiry report and the order of the Disciplinary authority and we are of considered opinion that the findings in the report and order of removal, in question, are wholly perverse. The effect of such illegality will follow its consequence.
17. The point No. II, whether writ Court has the power to inquire the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is concerned, it is to be stated that being disciplinary authority is a quasi judicial statutory authority, it has to act like a legal authority, though he is not a Court, but he has to act with fairness, and it is his duty to examine the statements of prosecution witnesses and find out whether there is any evidence or not, in any way he ought to have seen that no innocent persons is to be punished, before issuing order of punishment, as because, an employee like the appellant delinquent when facing trial in a departmental proceeding entitled to get a fair trial, and if disciplinary authority fails to discharge his duties as a statutory authority and comes to a wrong and perverse findings, then writ Court has obviously the power to enquire the reasons for such conclusion. Hence, the answer to the point No. 1 is positive. When we turn to the point No. III, which has now to be answered, we find that a Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. H.C. Goel has already decided the matter to the aspect that 'In dealing with writ petitions filed by public servant who have been dismissed, or otherwise dealt with so as to attract Article 311 (2), the High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to enquire whether the conclusion of the Government on which the impugned order of dismissal rests is not supported by any evidence at all. It is true that the order of dismissal which maybe passed against a Government servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an administrative order; nevertheless, the proceedings held against such a public servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty of the charges framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for instance, can be claimed to be a public servant if he is able to satisfy the High Court that the ultimate conclusion of the Government in the said proceedings, which is the basis of his dismissal, is based on no evidence'.
(emphasis added)
18. The judgment in H.C. Goel (supra) is subsequently relied by the Apex Court in the case of Nantlkrisho re Prasad v. State of Bihar and Ors. respondent in (1978) 3 SCC 466, relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow:
19. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, we may remind ourselves of the principles, in point, crystallized by judicial decisions. The first of these principles is that disciplinary proceedings before a domestic tribunal are of a quasi-judicial character; therefore, the minimum requirement of the rules of natural justice is that the tribunal should arrive at its conclusion on the basis of some evidence, i.e. evidential material which with some degree of definiteness points to the guilt of the delinquent in respect of the charge against him. Suspicion cannot be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic inquiries. As pointed out by this Court in Union of India v. H.C. Goel, "the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous care must be taken to see that the innocent are not punished, applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries held under the statutory rules.
19. In the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police the Apex Court considering the earlier decision on judicial review and scope under Article 226 and Article 32 in a departmental enquiry held that "the power of judicial review available to the High Court as also to this Court under Constitution takes in its stride the domestic enquiry as well and it can interfere with the conclusions reached therein if there was no evidence to support the findings or the findings recorded were such as could not have been reached were perverse or made at the dictates of the superior authority.
20. In the case of Bank of India and Anr. v. Digla Surye (1999) 5 SCC 372, the Apex Court further relied the said judgment of Constitution Bench in H.C. Goel (supra) wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:
11. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. The only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent officer must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravemen of the charge against the delinquent officer. Mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in departmental enquiry proceedings. The court exercising the jurisdiction of judicial review would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings excepting in a case of mala fides or perversity, i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at that finding. The court cannot embark upon reappreciating the evidence or weighing the same like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel the Constitution Bench has held:
The High Court can and must enquire whether there is any evidence at all in support of the impugned conclusion. In other words, if the whole of the evidence led in the enquiry is accepted as true, does the conclusion follow that the charge in question is proved against the respondent? This approach will avoid weighing the evidence. It will take the evidence as it stands and only examine whether on that evidence legally the impugned conclusion follows or not.
(emphasis added)
21. In the case of High Court of Judicature v. Shashikantthis Court Patil , their lordships held thus:
16 Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations pre-scribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to be evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it. is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above.
(emphasis added)
22. From the decision referred to above, what can be safely gathered is that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental proceedings. While a finding based on mere conjecture or surmises cannot be sustained even in a departmental proceeding, the fact remains that the Court, exercising powers of judicial review would not interfere with the finding of facts excepting in a case of mala fide or where there is no evidence to support a finding or where the finding is such that no man, acting reasonably and with objectivity, could have arrived at that finding. While exercising power of judicial review against the finding reached a departmental proceeding, the High Court cannot embark upon reappreciation of evidence nor can the High Court weigh evidence like an appellate authority. So long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, such a conclusion cannot be disturbed. The approach of the High Court, in such a case, shall be only to examine whether the evidence led in the enquiry, if accepted in their entirety can bring one to the conclusion that the charge, in question, stands proved.
23. In short, while the High Court has the power to inquire if there is any evidence or material in support of the impugned conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority, its inquiry must remain confined to the extent as indicated hereinbefore. Therefore, the point No. (iii) stands answered accordingly.
24. Bearing in mind the principles of law, which govern the exercise of power of judicial review against the finding of facts reached in a departmental proceeding, when we turn to the facts of the present case, what we notice is that the appellant, at the relevant point of time, was suffering from mental illness. That he was so suffering has not been disputed in the departmental proceeding. In his written statement, the appellant denied the charges by asserting that the charges levelled against him were all false, baseless, concocted and manufactured one. In his written statement, he also stated that the killing of his son, namely, Kminthang, aged about 6 years, in his rented house at Ukhrul, may have been caused during the period of his illness and when he was under medical treatment.
25. There is, admittedly, no direct evidence to show that the appellant had killed his said son. The only evidence, which surfaced against him, was that he was found holding a blood-stained knife outside his rented house and-from near the place, where he was seen standing, dead body of his son had been recovered. There is no evidence if the blood in the knife was human blood. This apart, the Post Mortem report clearly reveals that the appellant's son died of strangulation. There was no other incised or cut injury found on the said body. In the face of these facts, the fact that the appellant was seen holding a blood stained knife was not, nor could it have been, proof of the fact that he had killed his son, particularly, when it is not even proved that his son was killed on the day, when the appellant was seen with the blood-stained knife. In the face of the unquestioned findings in the Post Mortem Report and in the absence of any ocular evidence showing that the appellant's son was killed by any stab wound, the knife, in question, could have played no role at all. This apart, the appellant was not the sole occupant of his rented house, for, the materials on record reveal that besides the appellant, his wife also used to reside in the said house. As the cause and the time of death of the appellant's son is also not established, one does now know if the appellant was present at all, at his house, at the time, when his son was killed. Viewed thus, it is clear that there was not even an iota of evidence or material on record to hold that the appellant had killed his son. In other words, there was no evidence or material, which could have been brought a reasonable man to conclude, even on the strength of preponderance of probability, that it is the accused, who had killed his son. This aspect of the case appears to have escaped the attention of the learned single judge.
26. The learned single Judge appears to have also not taken into account the fact that a writ Court does have the power to inquire if the conclusion reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence or material. When a finding is based on no evidence or material, as is the case at hand, such a finding cannot, but be regarded as perverse. To the case at hand, therefore, the decision in Dharmanthma Raibahadur Arcot Rama Swami Madaliar Educational Institute v. The Educational Appellate Tribunal and Anr. has, strictly speaking, no application.
27. Because of what has been discussed and pointed out above, we have no hesitation to hold that the finding of guilt reached against the accused-appellant and the punishment imposed on him cannot be and ought not to have been, sustained.
28. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal partly succeeds. The judgment and order, dated 6.12.2004, shall accordingly set aside and in consequence thereof, the order impugned, in the writ petition, shall also stand set aside and quashed. The appellant shall be re-instated in service; but in the facts and circumstances of this case, we do not direct that he shall be paid his back wages.
No order as to costs.