Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Ram Niwas Panga vs State & Anr on 27 September, 2016
Author: P.K. Lohra
Bench: P.K. Lohra
[1]
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
AT JODHPUR
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1. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1280/2016
Ram Niwas Panga s/o Shri Moola Ramji, aged 52 years,
resident of Village & Post Rarod, Tehsil Bhopalgarh,
District Jodhpur, presently J.T.A. (Junior Technical
Assistant) Panchayat Samiti, Bhopalgarh, District
Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain Choudhary S/o Late Phusaram, RTI
Activist, resident of Village Khangta, Panchayat
Samiti Pipar Sahar, Police Station Pipar Sahar,
District Jodhpur
...Respondents
2. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.951/2016
Ram Narayn Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram, by
caste Jat, Age 46 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
3. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1281/2016
Ram Niwas Panga S/o Shri Moola Ramji, aged 52 years,
resident of Village & Post Rarod, Tehsil Bhopalgarh,
District Jodhpur, presently J.T.A. (Junior Technical
Assistant) Panchayat Samiti, Bhopalgarh, District
Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain S/o Phusaram, RTI Activist, resident of
village Khangta, Panchayat Samiti Pipar Sahar,
Police Station Pipar Sahar, District Jodhpur
...Respondents
[2]
4. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1282/2016
Ram Niwas Panga S/o Shri Moola Ramji, aged 52 years,
resident of Village & Post Rarod, Tehsil Bhopalgarh,
District Jodhpur, presently J.T.A. (Junior Technical
Assistant) Panchayat Samiti, Bhopalgarh, District
Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain S/o Phusaram, RTI Activist, resident of
village Khangta, Panchayat Samiti Pipar Sahar,
Police Station Pipar Sahar, District Jodhpur.
...Respondents
5. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1283/2016
Ram Niwas Panga S/o Shri Moola Ramji, aged 52 years,
resident of Village & Post Rarod, Tehsil Bhopalgarh,
District Jodhpur, presently J.T.A. (Junior Technical
Assistant) Panchayat Samiti, Bhopalgarh, District
Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain S/o Phusaram, RTI Activist, resident of
Village Khangta, Panchayat Samiti Pipar Sahar,
Police Station, Pipar Sahar, District Jodhpur
...Respondents
6. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1284/2016
Ram Niwas Panga S/o Shri Moola Ramji, aged 52 years,
resident of Village & Post Rarod, Tehsil Bhopalgarh,
District Jodhpur, presently J.T.A. (Junior Technical
Assistant) Panchayat Samiti, Bhopalgarh, District
Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain Choudhary S/o Late Phusaram, RTI
Activist, resident of village Khangta, Panchayat
Samiti Pipar Sahar, Police Station Pipar Sahar,
District Jodhpur.
...Respondents
[3]
7. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1285/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramkishore S/o Sugna Ram, by caste Lakhara,
resident of Village Khangta, Police Station Pipar
Sahar, District Jodhpur
...Respondents
8. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1286/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Nimba Ram S/o Madha Ram, by caste Devasi,
resident of Village Khangta, Panchayat Samiti
Pipar Sahar, Police Station Pipar Sahar, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
9. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1287/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, District
Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk, Gram
Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur.
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Smt. Teeja Devi w/o Ramjiram Kadwasara, by
caste Jat.
3. Smt. Jhankari w/o Baburam Meghwal.
4. Smt. Munni Devi w/o Goparam Meghwal
Respondent No.2 to 4, residents of Village Khangta,
Police Station Pipar Sahar, District Jodhpur.
...Respondents
[4]
10. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1288/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain S/o Phusaram, by caste Jat, resident of
village Khangta, Police Station Pipar Sahar,
District Jodhpur.
...Respondents
11. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1289/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur.
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Smt. Muni Devi W/o Daleep, by caste Baori,
resident of village Khangta, Police Station Pipar
Sahar, District Jodhpur.
...Respondents
12. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1290/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur.
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain S/o Phusaram, by caste Jat, resident of
village Khangta, Police Station Pipar Sahar,
District Jodhpur.
...Respondents
13. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1291/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya s/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
[5]
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Ramnarain S/o Phusaram, by caste Jat, resident of
village Khangta, Police Station Pipar Sahar,
District Jodhpur
...Respondents
14. CRIMINAL MISC.(PET.)(CRLMP) NO.1292/2016
Mahipal Pichkiya S/o Shri Ramdeen, aged about 31
years, resident of village & post Khangta, Tehsil Pipar
City, District Jodhpur, presently Lower Division Clerk,
Gram Panchayat Khawaspura, District Jodhpur
...Petitioner.
V/s
1. State of Rajasthan.
2. Smt. Sayari W/o Bhinyaram, by caste Meghwal,
resident of village Khangta, Police Station Pipar
Sahar, District Jodhpur
...Respondents
15. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.1724/2016
Ram Narayan Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram Ji, by
caste Jat, Age 47 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
16. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.1725/2016
Ram Narayan Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram Ji, by
caste Jat, Age 47 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
[6]
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
17. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.1726/2016
Ram Narayan Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram Ji, by
caste Jat, Age 47 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
18. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.1727/2016
Ram Narayan Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram Ji, by
caste Jat, Age 47 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
19. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.950/2016
Ram Narayan Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram, by
caste Jat, Age 46 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
[7]
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
20. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.1234/2016
Ram Narayn Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram, by
caste Jat, Age 47 years, Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
21. CRIMINAL MISC. (PET.)(CRLMP)NO.1624/2016
Ram Narayan Choudhary S/o Late Shri Pusa Ram Ji, by
caste Jat, Age 47 years Resident of Village Khangta,
Police Station and Panchayat Samiti, Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
....Petitioner
V/s
1. The State of Rajasthan.
2. The Director General of Police, Jaipur.
3. The Superintendent of Police, Jodhpur Rural.
4. The S.H.O., Police Station Pipar City, District
Jodhpur.
...Respondents
Date of Order :: September , 2016
HON'BLE MR. P.K. LOHRA, J.
Mr. VIKAS BIJARNIA, for petitioners in Cri. Misc.
Petition Nos.1280/2016, 1281/2016, 1282/2016,
1283/2016, 1284/2016, 1285/2016, 1286/2016,
1287/2016, 1288/2016, 1289/2016, 1290/2016,
1291/2016, 1292/2016.
[8]
Mr. M.S.PANWAR, Public Prosecutor for the State.
Mr. RAM NARAYAN CHOUDHARY, respondent present in
person in Cri. Misc. Petition Nos. 1280/2016,
1281/2016, 1282/2016, 1283/2016, 1284/2016,
1285/2016, 1286/2016, 1287/2016, 1288/2016,
1289/2016, 1290/2016, 1291/2016, 1292/2016 and
petitioner in Cri. Misc. Petition No.950/2016, 951/2016,
1234/2016, 1624/2016, 1724/2016, 1725/2016,
1726/2016, 1727/2016.
ORDER
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Reportable
BY THE COURT:
Invoking inherent jurisdiction of this Court enshrined under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in all these petitions, accused persons and the complainant have sought redressal of their afflictions with choicest reliefs. While in petitions No.1280/2016, 1281/2016, 1282/2016, 1283/2016, 1284/2016, 1285/2016, 1286/2016, 1287/2016, 1288/2016, 1289/2016, 1290/2016, 1291/2016, 1292/2016, the accused- petitioners have craved for quashment of FIRs and further proceedings, the remaining petitions No. 950/2016, 951/2016, 1234/2016, 1624/2016, 1724/2016, 1725/2016, 1726/2016, 1727/2016, at the behest of complainant, in juxtaposition to the petitions of accused persons, a direction is sought against the investigating agency to conduct fair, impartial and expeditious investigation into the FIRs.
[9]The bone of contention, in all the FIRs, is precisely founded on implementation of schemes floated under Mahatama Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (for short, 'Act'), by those incumbents who are in helm of affairs at various levels under the Panchayati Raj institutions.
In all the petitions filed at the behest of accused persons, while impugning FIRs, the petitioners have castigated the complainant for persecuting them without any rhyme or reason. It is averred that the complainant is involved in a witch hunt and all these FIRs are designed to harass them, which is a glaring example of abuse of the process of the Court. It is also submitted that the complainant, by claiming himself to be a whistle blower, has laid complaints against the petitioners before many authorities but nothing has turned out of all these complaints. Thus, in substance, challenge laid to the impugned FIRs is on the anvil that none of these FIRs are disclosing commission of cognizable offence and instead all are oppressive actuated with malice causing hurdles in implementation of various schemes floated under the Act. It is further pointed out that one FIR bearing No.354 of 2014 dated 8th of October 2014 filed by the complainant is pending investigation before Anti Corruption Bureau, CPS, Jaipur, wherein identical allegations are there and preliminary inquiry has already been conducted. Therefore, the petitioners have also craved for [10] quashing the FIRs on a plea that for identical allegations second FIR is not entertainable and investigation is not permissible. By setting out all these grounds, the petitioners have prayed for annulment of the impugned FIRs to secure ends of justice.
Contrary to the contentions raised by the accused-petitioners, complainant in his petitions has ventilated his grievances that the FIRs lodged at his behest are disclosing commission of cognizable offence by the accused persons but the investigating agency is soft-paddling vis-à-vis them to unearth the truth. It is also averred in the petitions that the complainant, as whistle blower, has highlighted many loopholes and pitfalls in implementation of various schemes under the Act and works carried out in furtherance thereof including defalcation of public funds by these individuals. The complainant has also submitted that the accused persons have manipulated and maneuvered official records and are involved in serious offences like forgery, cheating, using forged documents as genuine and criminal conspiracy, therefore, necessary directions are required to be issued to the investigating agency to conduct fair and impartial investigation with promptitude.
Learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, Mr. Vikas Bijarnia, has strenuously urged that none of the impugned FIRs are disclosing commission of a [11] cognizable offence by the petitioners and therefore allowing investigation in all these matters would result in abuse of the process of the Court. Learned counsel for the accused-petitioners would contend that one FIR lodged by the complainant on 8th of October 2014 before the Anti Corruption Bureau, CPS Jaipur, bearing No.354 of 2014, with identical allegations, is under investigation and preliminary inquiry has already been completed in the matter, therefore, for the same allegations second FIR is per se illegal, oppressive and unwarranted, which is not permissible. Learned counsel has urged that whole endeavour of the complainant is to harass and intimidate the petitioners, which cannot be countenanced at the cost of jeopardizing legitimate development works undertaken under the Act. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that frivolous and vexatious complaints were laid by the complainant from time to time and impugned FIRs are simply designed to thwart proper implementation of schemes under the Act, and therefore, for securing ends of justice all the impugned FIRs merit annulment.
Complainant-petitioner appearing in person, while countering all the arguments of learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, has vehemently argued that in all his FIRs he has narrated the facts with clarity and precision to expose gravamen of the petitioners and therefore looking to the seriousness of allegations, more particularly, the allegations of misappropriation of [12] public funds, cheating, forgery etc., a fair and impartial investigation with promptitude is desirable from the investigating agency. The complainant submits that the allegations made in the impugned FIRs against the accused-petitioners are liable to be investigated thoroughly for proving their guilt and bringing them on book to ensure implementation of various schemes under the Act with transparency in the best interest of the rural poor. Complainant has lastly urged that prayer of the accused-petitioners for clogging investigation perpetually in the impugned FIRs and their quashment is not permissible in exercise of inherent powers of this Court.
Learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. M.S. Panwar, has urged that investigation in all the impugned FIRs is in vogue and the investigating agency shall make sincere endeavour to proceed with the investigation fairly and impartially. Learned Public Prosecutor has further submitted that some reasonable time be allowed to the investigating agency to complete investigation in respect of impugned FIRs.
I have heard learned counsel for the accused-petitioners, complainant in person and learned Public Prosecutor, and thoroughly examined the impugned FIRs.
Promulgation of the Act is aimed with solemn object of enhancing livelihood security of the [13] households in rural area of the Country. Various schemes floated under the Act are meant for providing atleast 100 days of guarantee wage employment in a financial year to every household whose adult members volunteered to do unskilled manual work. The Act provides for 8 categories of works; viz., water conservation and water harvesting, drought proofing including afforestation and plantation, land development on the private lands of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, Indira Awas Yojana, Land reforms beneficiaries and BPL families, land development, flood protection and drainage works and providing all-weather connectivity in rural areas. Under the Act, Panchayati Raj institutions are principal planning, implementing and monitoring authorities, therefore, it is expected of those individuals, who are manning the Panchayati Raj institutions in various capacities, to take a vow to implement various schemes under the Act in promoting the social status of down trodden and have-nots of the Society, i.e., rural poor. Any attempt by the incumbents, who are in helm of affairs and monitoring various schemes under the Act, to circumvent the aims and objects of the scheme cannot be countenanced. In recent past, rampant corruption, infiltrated favoritism and nepotism, in implementation of various schemes under the Act, is a cause of grave and serious concern. It is noticed that at times this sort of situation is proving a welfare scheme counter-productive, inasmuch as, instead of helping rural poor, the schemes are paving way into [14] bonanza for unscrupulous and corrupt individuals, who are in helm of affairs for planning and implementation of schemes; i.e. officers, employees and elected representatives of the Panchayati Raj institutions. Enriching the coffers of such persons at the cost of putting the rights of rural poor to jeopardy has its obvious repercussions including frustration of schemes and to whittle down the very object of promulgation of the Act and the welfare schemes launched thereunder.
The Act under Chapter III envisages employment guarantee schemes and employment allowances. Under section 5 of the said Chapter, conditions for providing guaranteed employment find mention. The State Government may, without prejudice to the conditions specified in Schedule ll, specify in the scheme the conditions for providing guaranteed employment under this Act. Chapter IV deals with implementation and monitoring authorities. Section 13 of the Act postulates principal authorities for planning and implementation of schemes, which reads as under:
13. Principal authorities for planning and implementation of Schemes. - (1) The Panchayats at district, intermediate and village levels shall be the principal authorities for planning and implementation of the Schemes made under this Act.
(2) The functions of the Panchayats at the district level shall be-
(a) to finalise and approve blockwise shelf of projects to be taken up under a programme under the Scheme;
(b) to supervise and monitor the projects taken up at the Block level [15] and district level; and
(c) to carry out such other functions as may be assigned to it by the State Council, from time to time.
(3) The functions of the Panchayat at intermediate level shall be-
(a) to approve the Block level Plan for forwarding it to the district Panchayat at the district level for final approval;
(b) to supervise and monitor the projects taken up at the Gram Panchayat and Block level; and
(c) to carry out such other functions as may be assigned to it by the State Council, from time to time.
(4) The District Programme Coordinator shall assist the Panchayat at the district level in discharging its functions under this Act and any Scheme made thereunder.
Therefore, as per Scheme of the Act, Panchayats are responsible for planning and implementation of various schemes under the Act. Looking to the pious object for promulgation of the Act, the Panchayats, while implementing the schemes, are expected to carry out their responsibilities in strict adherence of Sections 16 & 17 of the Act. Need of the hour for effectual implementation of schemes is to maintain transparency, accountability and pragmatic approach. Any attempt made by an individual, may it be an officer, employee or elected representative of Gram Panchayat, to circumvent the scheme cannot be countenanced.
[16]Now switching on to the issues involved in the present petitions, suffice it to state that both accused-petitioners and the complainant have locked horns by urging respective grounds for achieving their cherished mission. In most of the FIRs, the complainant has alleged serious financial irregularities allegedly committed by the accused persons in carrying out certain construction works in furtherance of the schemes by slapping charges against them under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 477A and 120B IPC. Bare reading of the impugned FIRs and meaningful consideration of the allegations contained therein clearly and unequivocally reveal that disclosure of commission of cognizable offence against the accused persons is ex facie discernible. Law on the point is no more res integra that in exercise of inherent jurisdiction FIR is to be quashed very sparingly and with circumspection and only in rarest of rare cases when no offences spelt therein. While considering the question of quashing FIR, on a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., pre-judging the prosecution case by examining its weakness and contradictions is not permissible. Where allegations in FIR do not, prima facie, disclose commission of a criminal offence, FIR would be quashed. The authoritative pronouncement on the subject, by the Supreme Court, in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors. [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], is very much relevant, wherein the Court has discussed ambit and scope of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. threadbare. The Court has laid down [17] guidelines for exercising extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution or inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR or complaint and the criminal proceedings. The Court held:
102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
[18](4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
The Court has also issued a word of caution that in exercise of inherent powers an inquiry, as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, is not required to be made. The Court held:
[19]103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice.
Supreme Court, in case of State of Orissa Vs. Saroj Kumar Sahoo [(2005) 13 SCC 540], has held that "It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in the court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceedings."
Supreme Court, in a later judgment in case of Indian Oil Corporation Vs. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. [(2006) 6 SCC 736], has reiterated the principle laid [20] down in Bhajan Lal's case (supra) and culled out following principles:
1. The High courts should not exercise their inherent powers to repress a legitimate prosecution. The power to quash criminal complaints should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
2. The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the alleged offence. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the criminal complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed.
Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the alleged offence.
3. It was held that a given set of facts may make out (a) purely a civil wrong, or (b) purely a criminal offence, or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence.
In the backdrop of the legal position, emerged out from various pronouncements of the Supreme Court, I am at loss to say that the contentions raised on behalf of accused-petitioners that impugned FIRs are not prima facie disclosing commission of cognizable offence by them, is not tenable. The plea sought to be raised by the accused-petitioners that complainant's whole endeavour is to harass and intimidate them, appears to be quite alluring but devoid [21] of any substance in want to any factual foundation that complainant is inimical to them or the impugned FIRs are actuated with ulterior motive. The contention of the accused-petitioners, that complainant has laid frivolous and vexatious complaints against them to thwart proper implementation of schemes under the Act, even on its face value cannot be construed as a plausible ground to scuttle investigation into the impugned FIRs much less for their quashment. If the complainant, as a whistle blower, has made an attempt to point out certain irregularities in implementation of the schemes, obviously, the august judicial forum cannot be utilized by these persons to camouflage their alleged financial irregularities and the so called offences. The extraordinary inherent jurisdiction enshrined under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised to circumvent legitimate prosecution prematurely wherein allegations against the accused persons are of squandering public money. Supreme Court in a famous case, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC 305] while relying on Bhajan Lal's case (supra) has held:
136. Thus, the inherent power under this section can be exercised by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; or (2) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court; or (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In relation to exercise of inherent powers of the High Court, it has been observed in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, that the power is not to be resorted to if there is a specific provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party and that it [22] should be exercised very sparingly to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice and that it should not be exercised as against the express bar of law engrafted in any other provision of the Code. Vide (1) Talab Haji Hussain v.
Madhukar Purhsottam; (2) Khushi Ram v. Hashim; and (3) State of Orissa v. Ram Chander Agarwala.
137. This inherent power conferred by Section 482 of the Code should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a premature decision in a case wherein the entire facts are extremely incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved whether factual or legal are of great magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to the cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. This Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, to which both of us were parties have dealt with this question at length and enunciated the law listing out the circumstances under which the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction in quashing proceedings. We do not, therefore, think it necessary in the present case to extensively deal with the import and intendment of the powers under Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the Code.
Further, dilating on the inherent powers conferred on the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., while relying on two English decisions, the Court held:
[23]147. Most of the decisions of the English cases laid down the dictum that only in cases where there is substantial amount of delay or potential abuse of process or vexatious prosecution or the proceedings are tainted with malice etc. alone the Court can step in by exercise of the inherent power.
148. The Privy Council in Emperor v.
Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, examined the question of the inherent power of the High Court in interfering with the statutory investigation of the police and laid down the following dictum:
"Just as it is essential that every one accused of a crime should have free access to a Court of justice so that he may be duly acquitted if found not guilty of the offence with which he is charged, so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping andthe combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the Court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Criminal Procedure Code, to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the Court's functions begin when a charge is preferred [24] before it and not until then. It has sometimes been thought that Section 561- A has given increased powers to the Court which it did not possess before that section was enacted. But this is not so. The section gives no new powers, it only provides that those which the Court already inherently possess shall be preserved and is inserted, as their Lordships think, lest it should be considered that the only powers possessed by the Court are those expressly conferred by the Criminal Procedure Code, and that no inherent power had survived the passing of that Act. No doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed, and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed, the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation."
149. Lord Denning in R. v. Metropolitan Police Commissioner, has observed thus:
"Although the chief officers of police are answerable to the law, there are many fields in which they have a discretion with which the law will not interfere. For instance, it is for the Commissioner of Police or the chief constable, as the case may be, to decide in any particular case whether enquiries should be pursued, or whether an arrest should be made or a prosecution brought. It must be for him to decide on the disposition of his force and the concentration of his resources on any particular crime or area. No court can or should give him direction on such a matter."
Therefore, substantially, most of the arguments advanced on behalf of accused-petitioners are falling short of the requirements envisaged by law and are also not satisfying the guidelines enunciated in authoritative judicial pronouncements for exercising inherent powers in these matters.
[25]Now, adverting to the argument of the accused-petitioners that complainant has lodged FIR No.354 of 2014 with identical allegations and it is under investigation, I feel persuaded to examine this vital question in the light of two judgments of the Supreme Court on which heavy reliance is placed by the accused-petitioners, viz., T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala & Ors. (2001 AIR SCW 2571) and Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah Vs. CBI & Anr. (2013 AIR SCW 2353).
In T. T. Antony (supra), the Court held that if gravamen of the charges in the two FIRs - the first and the second - is in substance and truth the same, registering the second FIR and making fresh investigation and forwarding report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. will be irregular and the Court cannot take cognizance of the same. The Court has further considered a vital fact that when on earlier FIR pending investigation report is given by the inquiry commission and that report is accepted by the Government, subsequent FIR against the accused persons showing date and place of occurrence same and so also narration of events same, is unwarranted and illegal. The Court held in Para 28 & 35, as under:
"Coming to the facts of this case, which are not free from political overtones, the incident which gave rise to registering of FIRs, took place on November 25, 1994 on the occasion of the visit of the Minister to Alakkandy Complex at Kuthuparamba, [26] Tellicherry Road (Kannur District) for inauguration of the evening branch of the Co- operative Urban Bank. The events that developed there led to firing by police at two places - (i) in the vicinity of the town hall for which FIR was lodged and Crime No.353/94 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 332, 353, 324, 307 read with Section 149 IPC, Section 3(2)(e) of P.D.P.P. Act and Sections 3 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act, was registered and (ii) in the vicinity of the Police Station, Kuthuparamba in respect of which FIR was filed and Crime No.354/94 of Kuthuparamba Police Station under Section 143, 147, 148, 307 and 427 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 3(2)(e) of P.D.P.P. Act was registered. While the investigations on the basis of the said FIRs were pending, the report of Mr.K.Padmanabhan Nair, Inquiry Commission, was submitted to the Government. On June 30, 1997, the Additional Chief Secretary wrote to the Director-General of Police that the Government had accepted the report of the Commission and directed that the legal action be taken against those responsible on the basis of the findings of the Commission. On July 2, 1997, the Director General of Police, however, wrote to Inspector General of Police (North Zone) to register a case immediately and have the same investigated by a senior officer. Two days thereafter, the Inspector General of Police added his own remarks - "firing without justification by which people were killed amounted to murder" - and ordered the Station House Officer to register a case under the appropriate sections and forward the investigation copy of the FIR to the Deputy Inspector General of Police (North Zone) for urgent personal investigation. On the date when the Additional Chief Secretary wrote to the Director-General of Police, the investigations initiated in the said two crimes relating to the same incident were in [27] progress. The investigating agency should have taken advantage of the report of the Commission for the proper further investigation into the case. On the facts which might come to light during investigation, if necessary, the investigating agency should have altered the offences under appropriate section of the relevant Acts and concluded the investigations. In view of the orders of the Director General of Police to register a case and on the further direction of the Inspector General of Police, the officer in-
charge of Police Station registered Crime No.268/97 of Kuthuparamba Police Station. A comparison and critical examination of the FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 & 354 of 1994 on one hand and FIR in Crime No. 368/97 on the other, discloses that the date and place of occurrence are the same; there is alluding reference to the deaths caused due to police firing in the FIRs in Crime Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994. In any event, that fact was evident on the scene of occurrence. The narration of events, which we need not repeat here, are almost the same. The additional averments in Crime No. 268/97 are based on the findings in the report of the Commission. Having regard to the test laid down by this Court in Narangs' case (supra), with which we are in respectful agreement, we find that in truth and substance the essence of the offence in Crime Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994 is the same as in Crime No. 268 of 1997 of Kuthuparamba Police Station. In our view, in sending information in regard to the same incident, duly enclosing a copy of the report of the commission of inquiry, to the Inspector General of Police for appropriate action, the Additional Chief Secretary adopted the right course of action. Perhaps the endorsement of the Inspector General of Police for registration of a case misled the subordinate police officers and the said letter with regard to the incident of November 25, 1994 at Kuthuparamba was registered again under [28] Section 154 of Cr.P.C. which would be the second FIR and, in our opinion, on the facts of this case, was irregular and a fresh investigation by the investigating agency was unwarranted and illegal. On that date the investigations in the earlier cases (Crime Nos. 353 and 354 of 1994) were pending. The correct course of action should have been to take note of the findings and the contents of the report, streamline the investigation to ascertain the true and correct facts, collect the evidence in support thereof, form an opinion under Sections 169 and 170 Cr.P.C., as the case may be, and forward the report/reports under Section 173(2) or Section 173(8) Cr.P.C. to the concerned Magistrate. The course adopted in this case, namely, the registration of the information as the second FIR in regard to the same incident and making a fresh investigation is not permissible under the scheme of the provisions of the Cr.P.C. as pointed out above, therefore, the investigation undertaken and the report thereof cannot but be invalid. We have, therefore, no option except to quash the same leaving it open to the investigating agency to seek permission in Crime No. 353/94 or 354/94 of the Magistrate to make further investigation, forward further report or reports and thus proceed in accordance with law.
For the aforementioned reasons, the registration of the second FIR under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. on the basis of the letter of the Director General of Police as Crime No. 268/97 of Kuthuparamba Police Station is not valid and consequently the investigation made pursuant thereto is of no legal consequence, they are accordingly quashed. We hasten to add that this does not preclude the investigating agency from seeking leave of the Court in Crime No. 353/94 and Crime No. 354/94 for making further investigations and filing a further report or reports under [29] Section 173(8) of Cr.P.C. before the competent Magistrate in the said cases. In this view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment of the High Court under challenge insofar as it relates to quashing of Crime No. 268/97 of Kuthuparamba Police Station against the ASP (R.A. Chandrasekhar); in all other aspects the impugned judgment of the High Court shall stand set aside."
While fully concurring with the ratio decidendi of the judgment in T.T. Antony (supra), in my considered opinion, the judgment is factually distinguishable inasmuch as in most of the impugned FIRs date and place of occurrence as well as narration of events are not same and those FIRs are not based on identical facts and allegations. Moreover, it is also noteworthy that unlike in the aforesaid case, there is no finding by any agency or inquiry report exonerating the accused-petitioners from their alleged omissions.
In Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), wherein second FIR was registered against the accused persons with the allegation of fake encounters as part of conspiracy, based on identical facts, the Court held:
52. a) This Court accepting the plea of the CBI in Narmada Bai (supra) that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR directed the CBI to "take over" the investigation and did not grant the relief prayed for i.e., registration of a fresh FIR. Accordingly, filing of a fresh FIR by the CBI is contrary to various decisions of this Court.[30]
b) The various provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly show that an officer-in-charge of a police station has to commence investigation as provided in Section156 or 157 of the Code on the basis of entry of the First Information Report, on coming to know of the commission of cognizable offence. On completion of investigation and on the basis of evidence collected, Investigating Officer has to form an opinion Under Section169 or 170 of the Code and forward his report to the concerned Magistrate Under Section173(2) of the Code.
c) Even after filing of such a report, if he comes into possession of further information or material, there is no need to register a fresh FIR, he is empowered to make further investigation normally with the leave of the Court and where during further investigation, he collects further evidence, oral or documentary, he is obliged to forward the same with one or more further reports which is evident from Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code. Under the scheme of the provisions of Sections 154, 155, 156, 157, 162, 169, 170 and 173 of the Code, only the earliest or the first information in regard to the commission of a cognizable offence satisfies the requirements of Section 154 of the Code. Thus, there can be no second FIR and, consequently, there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more cognizable offences.
d) Further, on receipt of information about a cognizable offence or an incident giving rise to a cognizable offence or [31] offences and on entering FIR in the Station House Diary, the officer-in-charge of the police station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in the FIR but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the course of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more reports as provided in Section 173 of the Code. Sub-section (8) of Section 173 of the Code empowers the police to make further investigation, obtain further evidence (both oral and documentary) and forward a further report (s) to the Magistrate. A case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs not being a counter case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is underway or final report Under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, is liable to be interfered with by the High Court by exercise of power Under Section 482 of the Code or under Articles226/227 of the Constitution.
e) First Information Report is a report which gives first information with regard to any offence. There cannot be second FIR in respect of the same offence/event because whenever any further information is received by the investigating agency, it is always in furtherance of the first FIR.
f) In the case on hand, as explained in the earlier paras, in our opinion, the second FIR was nothing but a consequence of the event which had taken place on 25/26.11.2005. We have already concluded that this Court having reposed faith in the CBI accepted their contention that Tulsiram Prajapati encounter is a part of the same chain of events in which [32] Sohrabuddin and Kausarbi were killed and directed the CBI to "take up" the investigation.
g) For vivid understanding, let us consider a situation in which Mr. 'A' having killed 'B' with the aid of 'C', informs the police that unknown persons killed 'B'. During investigation, it revealed that 'A' was the real culprit and 'D' abetted 'A' to commit the murder. As a result, the police officer files the charge sheet Under Section 173(2) of the Code with the Magistrate. Although, in due course, it was discovered through further investigation that the person who abetted Mr. 'A' was 'C' and not 'D' as mentioned in the charge sheet filed Under Section 173 of the Code. In such a scenario, uncovering of the later fact that 'C' is the real abettor will not demand a second FIR rather a supplementary charge sheet Under Section 173(8) of the Code will serve the purpose.
h) Likewise, in the case on hand, initially the CBI took a stand that the third person accompanying Sohrabbuddin and Kausarbi was Kalimuddin. However, with the aid of further investigation, it unveiled that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Therefore, only as a result of further investigation, the CBI has gathered the information that the third person was Tulsiram Prajapati. Thus a second FIR in the given facts and circumstances is unwarranted; instead filing of a supplementary charge sheet in this regard will suffice the issue.
i) Administering criminal justice is a two-end process, where guarding the ensured rights of the accused under Constitution is as imperative as ensuring justice to the victim. It is definitely a daunting task but equally a compelling [33] responsibility vested on the court of law to protect and shield the rights of both. Thus, a just balance between the fundamental rights of the accused guaranteed under the Constitution and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the court. Accordingly, the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. As a consequence, in our view this is a fit case for quashing the second F.I.R. to meet the ends of justice.
j) The investigating officers are the kingpins in the criminal justice system. Their reliable investigation is the leading step towards affirming complete justice to the victims of the case. Hence they are bestowed with dual duties i.e. to investigate the matter exhaustively and subsequently collect reliable evidences to establish the same.
While agreeing with the proposition laid down in the judgment, Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), it may be observed here that the learned Public Prosecutor in most of the cases has differentiated the factual position by urging that in many of the impugned FIRs allegations are uncommon to FIR No.354 of 2014. It is also submitted by learned Public Prosecutor that in FIR No.354 of 2014, the accused persons are charged for offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act besides other offences of IPC.
[34]Be that as it may, if the investigating agency considers that in some of the FIRs the allegations are identical to FIR No.354 of 2014 and the offences attributed to the accused-petitioners are based on same set of works undertaken by them under various schemes of the Act, then those FIRs can very well be sent to ACB, CPS, Jaipur for proceeding with investigation into those FIRs alongwith FIR No.354 of 2014. My this view is also fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in Shiv Shanker Singh Vs. State of Bihar [(2012) 1 SCC 130], wherein Supreme Court observed that there is no bar to entertain a second complaint on same facts under exceptional circumstances. While laying emphasis on the exceptional circumstances, the Court held:
"Thus, it is evident that the law does not prohibit filing or entertaining of the second complaint even on the same facts provided the earlier complaint has been decided on the basis of insufficient material or the order has been passed without understanding the nature of the complaint or the complete facts could not be placed before the court or where the complainant came to know certain facts after disposal of the first complaint which could have tilted the balance in his favour. However, second complaint would not be maintainable wherein the earlier complaint has been disposed of on full consideration of the case of the complainant on merit.
The Protest Petition can always be treated as a complaint and proceeded with in terms of Chapter XV of Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, in case there is no bar to entertain a second complaint on the [35] same facts, in exceptional circumstances, the second Protest Petition can also similarly be entertained only under exceptional circumstances. In case the first Protest Petition has been filed without furnishing the full facts/particulars necessary to decide the case, and prior to its entertainment by the court, a fresh Protest Petition is filed giving full details, we fail to understand as to why it should not be maintainable."
Thus, in totality, challenge thrown to the impugned FIRs by the accused-petitioners wholesomely on this unsubstantiated plea about bar of registration of second FIR is bereft of any merit. There is yet another aspect of the matter that so far there is no material progress in the investigation of FIR No.354 of 2014 and as per the version of accused-petitioners also only preliminary inquiry has been completed. In such circumstances, clogging investigation into subsequent FIRs containing identical allegations in exercise of inherent jurisdiction does not sound good. However, investigation on such FIRs with FIR No.354 of 2014 in respect of various offences under the Indian Penal Code is advisable/desirable for securing ends of justice.
Although I feel disinclined to quash the impugned FIRs, but that itself cannot absolve police officer of its obligation to record its satisfaction that arrest of the accused person is necessary for one or more purposes envisaged by sub-clause (a) to (e) of Clause (1) of Section 41 Cr.P.C. and adherence of Section 41A Cr.P.C. This minimum safeguard [36] envisaged under the aforesaid provisions of the Cr.P.C. is a check on arbitrary or unwarranted arrest and the right of personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
My aforesaid view is also fortified by a judgment of Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar (AIR 2014 SC 2756) has meticulously analyzed both Sections 41 & 41A Cr.P.C., and held:
"Our endeavour in this judgment is to ensure that police officers do not arrest accused unnecessarily and Magistrate do not authorise detention casually and mechanically. In order to ensure what we have observed above, we give the following direction:
(1) All the State Governments to instruct its police officers not to automatically arrest when a case Under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code is registered but to satisfy themselves about the necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41, Code of Criminal Procedure;
(2) All police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-
clauses Under Section 41(1)(b)(ii);
(3) The police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before the Magistrate for further detention;
(4) The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse [37] the report furnished by the police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention;
(5) The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be extended by the Superintendent of police of the district for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
(6) Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Code of Criminal Procedure be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing;
(7) Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the police officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished for contempt of court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.
(8) Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the judicial Magistrate concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.
We hasten to add that the directions aforesaid shall not only apply to the cases Under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code or Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the case in hand, but also such cases where offence is [38] punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years;
whether with or without fine."
(emphasis supplied) Coming to the misc. petitions laid on behalf of complainant for fair and impartial investigation with promptitude, suffice it to observe that it is bounden duty of a police officer to investigate under Section 156 Cr.P.C. in cognizable cases. The duty of the police is to prevent and detect crime and to bring the accused to justice. Essentiality of impartial and full investigation of a case is a hallmark of an effective and truly trustworthy investigating agency. If the officials want to be vindicated and confidence to be instilled in the public the investigation must be done on the proper lines and all relevant evidence must be collected with promptitude. A coordinate Bench of the Court in identical fact situation has disposed of Criminal Misc. Petition No. 1570 of 2016 (Ram Narayan Choudhary Vs The State of Rajasthan & Ors.) vide order dated 02.09.2016 with following directions:
"Accordingly, the present petition is disposed of with a direction to the investigating agency to investigate the matter in a fair and proper manner and thereafter, submit the charge-sheet or final report, as the case may be, in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible, preferably within two months from today."[39]
Speedy trial is a recognized fundamental right and such right also embraces police investigation proceedings in it. The right of fair trial is not confined to accused alone and therefore the complainant/victim and the prosecution are also equal stakeholders. This being the situation, all the petitions laid on behalf of complainant can be disposed of with a direction to the investigating agency to investigate the matter in a fair, impartial and dispassionate manner with promptitude. It is also expected of the investigating agency to submit final report in these matters strictly in accordance with law.
The upshot of the above discussion is that, while declining reliefs craved for by the accused- petitioners for quashing impugned FIRs, all these petitions are disposed of with following directions:
1. The prayer for annulment of impugned FIRs on behalf accused-petitioners is declined;
2. The investigating agency is ordained to examine all the impugned FIRs objectively and if it is found that any of the impugned FIRs is founded on identical narration of events and facts as well as works undertaken by the accused persons, which are subject matter of FIR No.354 of 2014, then same may be forwarded to ACB, CPS, Jaipur for being clubbed with the said FIR [40] for investigation without any delay;
3. The investigating agency is directed to make fair, impartial and dispassionate investigation with promptitude in relation to the remaining impugned FIRs;
4. The investigating agency is also expected to ensure compliance of 41 and 41A Cr.P.C. during investigation and interrogation of accused-petitioners, if occasion arises.
5. Considering the pious aims and objects of the Act, the investigating agency is expected to make thorough investigation into the FIRs for facilitating submission of Final Report in the matter, or chargesheet, as the case may be.
6. The investigating agency, while proceeding with the investigation into the impugned FIRs, is required to submit conclusions solely on the basis of evidence and material collected during investigation, uninfluenced by any observation made by this Court.
7. The accused-petitioners and the complainant are expected in all fairness to cooperate with the investigating agency.
( P.K. LOHRA ), J.
arora/