Madhya Pradesh High Court
Smt. Radhabai vs Arjundas on 3 May, 1988
Equivalent citations: AIR1989MP73, AIR 1989 MADHYA PRADESH 73, 1988 MPRCJ 151, (1988) JAB LJ 441, (1988) MPLJ 342, (1988) 2 RENCR 161, (1988) 2 RENTLR 274
ORDER K.L. Shrivastava, J.
1. This revision petition Under Section 23-E of the M. P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act') is directed against the order dated 14-7-87 passed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Indore (for short 'the authority').
2. Circumstances giving rise to this petition are these. Smt. Radhabai, the petitioner on 15-1-86 filed an application Under Section 23-A of the Act against the non-applicant before the authority for his eviction from the accommodation situate at Indore. She had let out the same to him after her widowhood.
3. By the impugned order the learned Authority has held that the application has to be transferred to the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction on the ground that the petitioner is not included in the category of the 'landlord' contemplated in Section 23-J of the Act as the accommodation had been let out to the non-applicant after she had become a widow. Reliance for this view was placed on the decision in Badri Prasad's case (1987 MPRCJ 66) which relates to a retired Govt. servant.
4. The contention of the petitioner's learned counsel is that the learned authority was wrong in placing reliance on the decision in Badri Prasad's case (supra) which relates to the case of retired Govt. servant. According to him in the case of a widow no distinction can be made on the ground of letting out of the accommodation by her being prior or subsequent to her widowhood.
5. The point for determination is whether the petitioner who is a widow is not covered under Section 23-J of the Act, she having let out the accommodation after her widowhood.
6. It may be stated at the outset that Chapter III-A (Sections 23-A to 23-1) was inserted in the Principal Act by the Amendment Act of 1983 providing a special forum to the landlords having the ground of bona fide requirement. According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the later 1984 amendment Act, the new forum provided by the amendment Act of 1983 was being misused by certain landlords. Therefore, with a view to restrict the benefit of the new forum only to the specified categories of landlords like retired Govt. servants, widows and handicapped persons etc. The Legislature by the Amendment Act of 1985 inserted Section 23-J in Chapter III-A therein providing a restrictive definition of the term landlord for the purposes of the said Chapter.
7. Section 23-J of the Act defines 'landlord'. Section 23-J(i) and (iii) may usefully be reproduced. They read as under : --
For the purposes of this Chapter 'landlord' means a landlord who is :
(i) a retired servant of any Govt. including a retired member of defence services; or
(ii) ......
(iii) a widow or a divorced wife; or-
8. The decision in Badri Prasad's case (supra) is based on the S.C. decision in Winifred's case, AIR 1984 SC 458. It relates to the case of a retired member of the Armed Forces under the Bombay Act. In paragraph 9 the Supreme Court has observed thus :--
"Since a liberal interpretation of Section 13A(1) of the Act is likely to expose it to a successful challenge on the basis of Article 14 of the Constitution, it has to be read down as conferring benefit only on those members of the Armed Forces who were landlords of the premises in question while they were in service even though they may avail of it after their retirement. Such a construction would save it from the criticism that it is discriminatory and also would advance the object of enacting it, namely, that members of the Armed Forces should not while they are in service feel worried about the difficulties of a long drawn out litigation when they wish to get back the premises which they have leased out during their service. Persons in the position of the landlord in the present case cannot therefore maintain a suit under Section 13A of the Act.
9. From the extract above, it is clear that the interpretation by the Supreme Court is based on a consideration of Article 14 of the Constitution which guarantees equality before law and the object behind the provision covering members of the armed forces. In the case of a widow no such consideration arises. The provision on a reasonable classification is meant for widows and, therefore, in the case of a widow, no distinction can be drawn with reference to the tenancy in question being prior or subsequent to her widowhood. The decision in B. Johnson's case, 1985 Jab LJ 793, holds that the provision is constitutionally valid.
10. From the foregoing discussion it is clear that the impugned order is vitiated and deserves to be set aside.
11. In the result, the revision petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded to the learned authority for disposal according to law. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs as incurred.