Karnataka High Court
Narang Charitable Trust vs Smt Geetha Rai on 28 November, 2012
Author: L.Narayana Swamy
Bench: L. Narayana Swamy
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2012
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE L. NARAYANA SWAMY
CRP NO.290 OF 2012
A/W
CRP NO.291 OF 2012
CRP NO.290/2012
BETWEEN:
1. NARANG CHARITABLE TRUST
A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST
HAVING ITS PRINCIPAL OFFICE
AT #12/19 (NEW NO.19)
SESHARI ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 009
REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS
TRUSTEE
SRI.BHART BHUSHAN NARANG
2. BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG
S/O LATE OMPRAKASH NARANG,
AGED 52 YEARS,
RESIDING AT #9,
NORTH PART ROAD,
KUMARA PARK EAST,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.DHYAN CHINNAPPA, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT.GEETHA RAI
2
W/O BHUPINDER RAI &
D/O OMPRAKASH NARANG,
AGED 56 YERS,
RESIDING AT NO.26/14,
ABSHOT LAYOUT, SANKEY ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 052.
2. SMT.UMA MANCHANDA
W/O ASHOK KUMAR MANCHANDA &
D/O OMPRAKASH NARANG,
AGED 57 YEARS,
RESIDING AT # 72/1-6/1,
CUNNINGHAM ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 052.
3. VIJAY KUMAR NARANG,
S/O SHANTHILAL NARANG,
AGED 57 YEARS
RESIDING AT #141, 5TH CROSS,
RMV EXTENSION,
BANGALORE-560 080.
4. SMT.CHITRA NARANG
W/O BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG
AGED 51 YEARS,
RESIDING AT #9,
NORTH PARK ROAD,
KUMARA PARK EAST,
BANGALORE-560 001.
5. VAIBHAV NARANG,
S/O BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG,
AGED 27 YEARS,
RESIDING AT #9,
NORTH PARK ROAD,
KUMARA PARK ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.S.S.NAGANAND, SR.COUNSEL FOR R1 TO R3)
3
CRP NO.291/2012
BETWEEN:
1. VAIBHAV NARANG,
S/O BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG,
AGED 27 YEARS,
RESIDING AT #9,
NORTH PARK ROAD,
KUMARA PARK ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 001.
2. SMT.CHITRA NARANG
W/O BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG
AGED 51 YEARS,
RESIDING AT #9,
NORTH PARK ROAD,
KUMARA PARK EAST,
BANGALORE-560 001.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI.SRINIVASA RAGHAVAN, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. NARANG CHARITABLE TRUST
A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST
HAVING ITS PRINCIPAL OFFICE
AT #12/19 (NEW NO.19)
SESHARI ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 009
REPRESENTED HEREIN BY ITS
TRUSTEE
SRI.BHART BHUSHAN NARANG
2. SMT.GEETHA RAI
W/O BHUPINDER RAI &
D/O OMPRAKASH NARANG,
4
AGED 56 YERS,
RESIDING AT NO.26/14,
ABSHOT LAYOUT, SANKEY ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 052.
3. SMT.UMA MANCHANDA
W/O ASHOK KUMAR MANCHANDA &
D/O OMPRAKASH NARANG,
AGED 57 YEARS,
RESIDING AT # 72/1-6/1,
CUNNINGHAM ROAD,
BANGALORE-560 052.
4. VIJAY KUMAR NARANG,
S/O SHANTHILAL NARANG,
AGED 57 YEARS
RESIDING AT #141, 5TH CROSS,
RMV EXTENSION,
BANGALORE-560 080.
5. BHARAT BHUSHAN NARANG
S/O LATE OMPRAKASH NARANG
AGED 52 YEARS,
RESIDING AT #9,
NORTH PARK ROAD,
KUMARA PARK EAST
BANGALORE-560 001.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI.S.S.NAGANAND, SR.COUNSEL FOR R2-4)
THESE CRPs ARE FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF CODE OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AGAINT THE ORDER DATED: 14/2/2012
PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSION JUDGE,
BANGALORE IN MISC.NO.398/2009.
THESE CRPs HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
JUDGEMENT, AND COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
JUDGEMENT TODAY, COURT THE MADE THE FOLLOWING.
5
ORDER
These Civil Revision Petitions are filed under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the order dated 14.2.2012 in Misc. No.398/2009 on the file of the Principal City Civil Judge & Sessions Judge, at Bangalore. Misc. No.398/2009 was filed by the petitioner-respondents under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking permission to initiate proceedings. The respondents 1 & 2 in the said Misc. case filed C R P No.290/2012 and Respondents 4 & 3 therein filed C R P No.290.2012. The trial court has allowed the Misc. case and granted permission to file suit.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the trial court has grossly erred in allowing the Misc. Case. There are inconsistencies and falsities of case of the respondents. The trial court failed to consider the mala fides on the part of the respondents. The court below ought to have noted that the respondents did not have any interest in the functioning of the trust. The respondents have not done any acts to further the 6 objects of the trust. The respondents have failed to produce single document or any material as to how they have any substantial interest or real interest in the working of the trust. In the statement of objections the petitioners have given detailed account and have specifically pleaded that the respondents have abandoned the trust by virtue of not performing any act or participating in any manner which is not properly appreciated by the trial court. The learned Judge has failed to note that the respondents, in fact, have acquiesced in the trust properties being used by companies in which the respondents are also shareholders and therefore they cannot now turn around and say that the trust properties are used in a manner contrary to the trust deed. The object or purpose of the petition ought to be seen and the same is clearly for vindicating personal vendetta and for settling personal scores. The trial court did not consider delay and latches even though the same was raised by the petitioners. The intention of author of the trust was not to change use of the trust properties but only to use income left over and above all the expenditures towards meeting the purpose of the trust. The principles laid down in 7 AIR 1963 SC 309 are not at all applicable to the facts of the case. Therefore, the learned counsel prays to allow the revision petitions and to set aside the order passed by the trial court.
3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent-petitioners submits that the petitioners have not at all maintained the accounts of the trust properly, the petitioners have misused the facilities and misappropriated the funds of the Trust, that the accounts of the Trust are not verified and audited as per the Trust deed, that there is total mismanagement of income and properties of the trust, the petitioners have not carried out the activities of the Trust to achieve the objects and since the Trust being the Public Trust, the trial court considered the materials on record and has rightly granted the leave. The contention of the petitioners that the respondent-petitioners abandoned their position as trustees 20 years ago is not maintainable as per provisions of Section 46 of the Trust Act and further there is no such document to show the respondent- petitioners have abandoned the Trust. So far as the trust and its properties are concerned, the present case is the only case and 8 there are no other cases. Therefore, there is no merit in the contentions raised by the petitioners herein and prays for dismissal of the revision petitions.
4. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, it is necessary to refer Section 92 of CPC which reads as follows:
"92. Public charities.-(1) In the case of any alleged breach of any express or constructive trust created for public purposes of a charitable or religious nature, or where the direction of the Court is deemed necessary for the administration of any such trust, the Advocate-General, or two or more persons having an interest in the trust and having obtained the leave of the Court may institute a suit, whether contentious or not, in the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction or in any other Court empowered in that behalf by the State Government within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the trust is situate to obtain a decree-
(a).....
(d) directing accounts and inquiries;
(e) declaring what proportion of the trust property or of the interest therein shall be allocated to any particular object of the trust;
(f) authorizing the whole or any part of the trust property to be let, sold, mortgaged or exchanged; ........."9
Therefore the important ingredients to be looked into while granting permission are; (1) breach of any express or constructive trust, and (2) Persons so seeking permission must be having interest in the trust.
5. There is no dispute that the trust in question is a public trust created with certain objectives as set out in the petition. The petitioners pleaded that there is breach committed by the petitioners herein in carrying out the said objectives. The petitioners though contended that the respondent-petitioners have abandoned their right as trustees, such a contention is not proved in terms of Section 46 of the Trust Act, which clearly stipulates that a trustee who has accepted the trust cannot afterwards renounce it except with the permission of a principal civil court. No such documents are made available by the petitioners. Further the trial court has relied upon decision in AIR 1963 SC 309 and come to the conclusion that the respondent- petitioners cannot give up their duties, liabilities and functions and they cannot delegate the same to any other trustees or body without the prior permission of the court or beneficiaries 10 themselves or unless it is permitted by the Trust deed itself. Moreover, it is not made clear in the objection statement filed by the petitioners herein, how there is abandonment of relationship of respondent-petitioners with respondent No.1 trust. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the respondent-petitioners have abandoned their relationship with the Trust.
6. There is a specific allegation that the respondent Nos.2 to 4, particularly respondent No.2 in the Misc. Case, who is the Managing Trustee, has not carried out the affairs of the Trust as per the objects of the Trust and no accounts are maintained in respect of the income and expenditure of the Trust, no meetings are held and the accounts of the Trust are not audited by the competent auditor. The Trial court came to the conclusion that all these contentions cannot be brushed aside only on the ground that there are many litigations pending between the parties and as the petitioners did not agree for the compromise terms, the impugned petition was filed. It is true that petition under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not maintainable if the same is for vindication of private or personal 11 rights and it is maintainable if it is to vindicate the public rights. The objects of the Trust were all meant for public at large, particularly the poor people and the destitute. In the absence of proper materials to show that the activities are carried on as per the said objects of the Trust, it can be said that the impugned petition is in reality to vindicate the public rights and it cannot be said that the petition is filed to vindicate personal rights.
7. The further contention of the petitioners that the respondent-petitioners being shareholders of the companies which utilize the properties of the Trust are acquiesced and cannot complain about the same itself was not sufficient to deny leave sought for in the Misc. Case. The respondent-petitioners placed prima facie material in support of the averments made in the petition.
8. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the trial court has correctly appreciated the materials placed before it and there is no error or irregularity committed by the trial court in granting leave to file the suit calling for interference. 12
9. In the result, the revision petitions are liable to be dismissed and they are accordingly dismissed. There is no order as to costs.
Sd/-
JUDGE lnn