Delhi District Court
In Re vs Delhi Development Authority on 30 May, 2012
In the Court of Sh. P.K. Matto, Additional District Judge
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
RCA: 56/2011
Unique Case ID No.: 02402C0351662011
Date of Institution : 19.11.2011.
Date of Reserving Judgment: 25.05.2012
Date on which judgment was pronounced: 30.05.2012.
In Re:
Shri Mohd. Ilyas
s/o Shri Riazuddin
r/o E13/4 & E13/3
Gali no.2,Shastri Park
Delhi 110 053. ............ Appellant/plaintiff
Versus
Delhi Development Authority
Through Its Chairman
Vikas Sadan, I.N.A,
New Delhi ...........Respondent/defendant
: J U D G M E N T: 1. This is an appeal against the impugned judgment and decree dated 23.9.2011 passed by the court of Shri Saurabh Kulshreshtha CCJ,
East,KKD, vide which, the suit of the plaintiff was dismissed.
2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the disposal of the present appeal are that RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 1of19 the plaintiffs namely Mohd. Illyas(Appellant/plaintiff no.1) Mohd Yusuf, Bashir Ahmad and Riazuddin had field the civil suit for declaration, permanent injunction and mandatory injunction in the ld. Trial court and claimed themselves to be the owners/landlords of House no. E13/4 and 13/3, Gali no.2, Shastri Park, Delhi, area of which is 100 square yards and they had purchased the said plot, as joint family members and raised construction thereon and further averred that they are in possession of the said plot and they are running their business of dairy therein and the plaintiff no.1 is residing therein with his family members since the year 1982.
3. It is further averred that about two months back, some officials of the defendant/DDA came to the house of the plaintiffs and asked them to show the documents of ownership of the suit property and the plaintiffs had shown all the documents viz: GPA, Agreement to sell, ration card etc., and the officials of the DDA left the place being satisfied.
4. It is further averred that on 7.11.2001 some officials of the DDA alongwith labours came at the suit property and demolished the entire house of the plaintiffs without any notice and without providing any alternative accommodation and without paying any damages and that the said demolition was carried out illegally,arbitrarily, unauthorisedly on the pretext that DDA is going to construct a road at the place, where the suit property is situated. The plaintiffs approached to the higher officials of DDA and the local police, but nothing was done.
5. It is further averred that after the demolition, the debris and bricks and other RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 2of19 material are lying at the spot and the plaintiffs are still in possession of the suit property and further averred that the action of the defendant in demolishing the suit property was illegal and unjustified and have claimed a declaration to this effect. The plaintiffs have also claimed the permanent injunction restraining the defendant from removing the household goods, debris etc., lying in the suit property, constructing any road and from raising any boundary wall on the suit property and from dispossessing the plaintiffs therefrom and from preventing the ingress and outgrees of the plaintiffs in the suit property and also prayed for a mandatory injunction , directing the defendant to reconstruct the house on the plot, which has been illegally demolished and to bring the house/plot in its original shape.
6. The ld.trial court had issued the summons to the defendant and the defendant has filed the written statement and stated that the suit of the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed in view of the fact that statutory notice under section 53B of DDAct 1957, has not been served upon the defendant and further stated that the suit of the plaintiff has not been properly valued for the purpose of courts fees and jurisdiction. The defendant has further stated that the suit property forms part of Khasra no.1,etc., 61 min, Village Ghowda Chauhan Khadar, Delhi, which is land of the Govt. and it was acquired by the Government vide award no. 4/1969 and after acquisition, the possession of the vacant plot was taken over on 27.6.1969 and for the purpose of the development, this land has been placed at the disposal of the DDA vide notification no.F.8(49),69L&H dated 1.2.1972 issued under the provisions of RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 3of19 section 22(1) of the DDAct 1957. The defendant has further stated that the plaintiff had encroached upon the said land and the defendant has demolished the unauthorized construction/encroachment and the action of the defendant was legal and justified. The defendant has further stated that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest in the property in question and the defendant is having absolute rights to develop the land, as per the plan and the plaintiffs have no right to create any hindrance in the same. The defendant has further stated that the land is lying vacant under the jurisdiction of the defendant and prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
7. Plaintiffs had filed the replication to the written statement of the defendant and denied the allegations made in the written statement and reiterated and reaffirmed the contents of their plaint.
8. From the pleadings of the parties , the ld. trial court was pleased to frame the following issues:
(i) Whether the suit is not maintainable for want of statutory notice u/s 53B of DDAct?OPD.
(ii) Whether the suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction?OPD.
(iii) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of declaration as prayed for?OPP.
(vi)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of permanent and mandatofy injunction as prayed for?OPP.
(v) Relief.
RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 4of19
9. In order to prove his case the plaintiff no.1 has examined himself as PW1 and Shri Asgar Ali as PW2 and closed his evidence.
10.Whereas the defendant has examined the Patwari posted at DDA as DW1 and closed its evidence.
11.The ld. trial court has decided all the issues against the plaintiff and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.
12.Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff no.1 has filed the present appeal against the impugned judgment and decree.
13.The notice of the appeal was issued to the respondent and the respondent has put its appearance through its counsels.
14.The record of the trial court is also requestioned and perused.
15.I have heard the ld.counsel for the parties and perused the record.
16.The ld.counsel for the appellant has submitted that the ld. Trial court had erroneously passed the impugned judgment and decree under the appeal and the ld.trial court had failed to appreciate the testimony of the appellant that the appellant is in possession of the suit property and running his business since 1982. She has further submitted that the ld.trial court has erroneously held that the appellant is an encroacher of the suit property. She has further submitted that ld.trial court had wrongly relied upon the statement of the DW1 and the impugned judgment and decree are not sustainable in the eyes of law.
17.On the other hand, the ld.counsel for the respondent has submitted that the RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 5of19 plaintiffs have failed to prove on record that they have any right title or interest in the suit property. He has further submitted that plaintiffs have filed a suit for declaration, permanent injunction and mandatory injunction, but, without issuance of the notice u/s 53(B) of the DDAct. He has further submitted that plaintiffs have also failed to bring on record any document of title of the suit property. On the other hand the respondent has proved on record that the suit property is an acquired land. It was acquired vide award no. 4/1969 Ex.DW1/A and possession was taken over vide kabja karwhai dated 27.6.1969 and the suit land is at the disposal of DDA which has also been proved on record vide Notification Ex.DW1/C and the demolition has already been done by the DDA, as the plaintiffs had raised unauthorized and illegal construction. He has further submitted that since the suit land is an acquired land, which has been proved on the record by the DW1 examined in the ld. trial court and the plaintiffs have failed to prove their right, title or interest in the suit property, so the appeal of the appellant is devoid of merit, so, the same is liable to be dismissed.
18.I have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the ld.counsels for the parties and perused the record.
19.The perusal of the record shows that in order to prove their case the plaintiff no.1 has examined himself as PW1 vide his affidavit Ex.PW1/A. He has reiterated the contents of the plaint in his affidavit. He has relied upon the RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 6of19 photocopy of ration card, the notorised GPA and unregistered agreement , unregistered receipt executed by Smt Jiwani Begum in favour of Bashir Ahmad i.e. plaintiff no.3. PW1 was subjected to cross examination and during his cross examination, this witness has stated that he does not show whether the said property is an acquired land vide award no. 4/1969. He has further stated that he does not know whether the suit property is under the disposal of DDA. He has further admitted that these GPA, agreement and receipt relied upon by him, were not executed in his presence.
20.It is pertinent to mention here that the documents relied upon by the PW1 Mohd. Illyas are not executed in his favour by Smt Jiwani Begum. These documents are executed in favour of Shri Bashir Ahmad i.e. Plaintiff no.3 who never came in the witness box to depose. Whereas, it was incumbent on the part of Shri Bashir Ahmad (plaintiff no.3) to come in the witness box to assert his claim on the basis of the documents relied upon by the plaintiff. But, as Shri Bashir Ahmad(i.e. The plaintiff no.3) in whose favour, these documents viz: GPA,Agreement and receipt were executed, did not come in the witness box, so an adverse inference is drawn against the plaintiffs that the case of the plaintiff is based on the falsehood as held by their Lordship of Supreme Court in Vidhyadhar Rao V/s Mankikrao and another AIR 1999 SC 1441 (1), is pleased to hold that ''Where a party to the suit does not appear into the witness box and states his own case on oath and does not offer himself to be cross examined by the other side, a presumption RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 7of19 would arise that the case set up by him is not correct''.
21.PW1 also claims to be the one of the coowner but he has failed to bring on the record any documents of title in his favour.
22.PW2 Shri Asgar Ali has also came to support the case of the plaintiff and deposed that the plaintiffs are the owners of the suit property. But the plaintiffs have placed on the record a Notorised GPA, unregistered agreement and receipt executed by Smt Jiwani Begum in favour of Shri Bashir Ahmad. But none of these documents is registered, so they are not admissible. The plaintiffs have claimed that they have derived title on the basis of these documents, but they failed to prove on the record that Smt Jiwani Begum was the owner of the suit property. The chain of the title documents have not been proved on the record and in the absence of any title document in favour of the Smt Jiwani Begum she was not competent to transfer better title to Shri Bashir Ahmad i.e. Plaintiff no.3.
23.Even otherwise their Lordship of Supreme Court in case Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. V/s State of Haryana and Anr. SLP (C)NO. 13917 of 2009 is pleased to hold that Section 5 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 ('Transfer of Property Act' for short) defines 'transfer of property ' as under:
5.Transfer of Property defined: In the following sections''transfer RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 8of19 of property'' means as act by which a living person conveys property,in present or in future, to one or more other living persons, or to himself and one or more other living persons; and 'to transfer property' is to perform such act.''xxx xxx Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act defines ' sales' thus:
''Sale'' is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or partpaid and partpromised.
Sale how made. Such transfer, in the case of tangible immovable property of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards, or in the case of a reversion or other intangible thing, can be made only by a registered instrument.
In the case of tangible immovable property of a valueless than one hundred rupees, such transfer may be made either by a registered instrument or by delivery of the property. Delivery of tangible immovable property takes place when the seller places the buyer, or such person as he directs, in possession of the property.
Contract for saleA contract for the sale of immovable property is a contract that a sale of such property shall take place on terms settled between the parties. It does not, of itself, create any interest in or change on such property.
Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act defines 'part performance' thus:
Part PerformanceWhere any person contracts to transfer for consideration and immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty,and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract,then, RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 9of19 notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefore by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract:Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights of a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance.
Scope of an agreement to sale Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act makes it clear that a contract of sale, that is, an agreement of sale does not, of itself, create any interest in or charge on such property. This court in Narandas Karsondas v/s S.A.Kamtam and Anr.MANU/SC/0363/ 1976:(1977) 3 SCC 247 observed:
A contract of sale does not of itself create any interest in, or charge on, the property. This is expressly declared in Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act. See Rambaran Prasad vs Ram Mohit Hazra MANU/SC/0212/1966:19671 SCR 293. The fiduciary character of the personal obligation created by a contract for sale is recognized in Section 3 of the Specific Relief act, 1963, and in section 91 of the Trusts Act. The personal obligation created by a contract of sale is described in section 40 of the Transfer of Property Act as an obligation arising out of contract and annexed to the ownership of property, but not amounting to an interest or easement therein.
In India, the word'transfer' is defined with reference to the word 'convey' The word 'conveys' in Section 5 of Transfer of Property Act is used in the wider sense of conveying ownership.. that only on execution of conveyance ownership passes from one RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 10of19 party to another....
In Rambhau Namdeo Gajre vs Narayan Bapuji Chotgra MANU/ SC/0680/2004:2004 (8) SCC 614 this court held: Protection provided under section 53A of the Act to the proposed transferee is a shield only against the transferor. It disentitles the transferor from disturbing the possession of the proposed transferee who is put in possession in pursuance to such an agreement. It has nothing to do with the ownership of the proposed transferor who remains full owner of the property till it is legally conveyed by executing a registered sale deed in favour of the transferee. Such a right to protect possession against the proposed vendor cannot be passed in service against as third party.
It is thus clear that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be by a deed of conveyance(sale deed). In the absence of a deed of conveyance (duly stamped and registered as required by law), no right, title or interest in an immovable property can be transferred.
Any contract of sale(agreement to sell) which is not a registered deed of conveyance (deed of sale) would fall short of the requirements of section 54 and 55 of Transfer of Property act and will not confer any title nor transfer any interest in an immovable property (except to the limited right granted under section 53A of Transfer of Property act).
According to Transfer of Property act, an agreement of sale, whether with possession or without possession, is not a conveyance. Section 54 of Transfer of Property Act enacts that sale of immovable property can be made only by a registered instrument and an agreement of sale does not create any RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 11of19 interest or charge or its subject matter.
Scope of Power of Attorney A Power of attorney is not an instrument of transfer in regard to any right, title or interest in an immovable property. The power of attorney is creation of an agency whereby the guarantor authorizes the guarantee to do the acts specified therein, on behalf of guarantor, which when executed will be binding on the guarantor as if done by him (see section 1A and section 2 of the Powers of Attorney act,1882). It is revocable or terminable at any time unless it is made irrevocable in a manner known to law. Even an irrevocable attorney does not have the effect of transferring title to the guarantee.
InState of Rajasthan vs Basant Nehata MANU/SC/0547/2005:2005 (12)SCC 77this court held:
A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent. The agent derives a right to use his name and all acts, deeds and things done by him and subject to the limitations contained in the said deed, the same shall be read as if done by the donor. A power of attorney is, as is well known,a document of convenience.
Execution of a power of attorney in terms of the provisions of the contract act as also the powers of attorney act is valid. A power of attorney, we have noticed herein before, is executed by the donor so as to enable the done to act on his behalf. Except in case where power of attorney is coupled with interest,it is revocable. The done in exercise of his power under such power of attorney only acts in place of the donor subject of course to the powers granted to him by reason thereof. He cannot use the RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 12of19 power of attorney for his own benefit. He acts in a fiduciary capacity. Any act of infidelity or breach of trust is a matter between the donor and the done.
An attorney holder may however execute a deed of conveyance in exercise of the power granted under the power of attorney and convey title on behalf of the guarantor.
We therefor reiterate that immovable property can be legally and lawfully transferred/conveyed only by a registered deed of conveyance. Transactions of the nature of 'GPA sales' or 'SA/GPA/WILL transfers' do not convey title and do not amount to transfer, nor can they be recognized or valid mode of transfer of immovable property. The courts will not treat such transactions as completed or concluded transfers or as conveyances as they neither convey title nor create any interest any interest in an immovable property. They cannot be recognized as deeds of title, except to the limited extent of section 53A of the transfer of Property act. Such transactions cannot be relied upon or made the basis for mutations in Municipal or Revenue records. What is stated above will of leasehold property. A lease can be validly transferred only under a registered assignment of lease. It is time that an end is put to the pernicious practice of SA/GPA/WILL transactions known as GPA sales.
24.Thus, from the law laid down by their Lordship of Supreme Court in the above said judgment, it is clear that the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs do not provide any title to the plaintiffs.
25.On the other hand, Shri R S Chauhan Patwari has been examined as DW1, who has deposed vide his affidavit, he has deposed on the lines similar to the RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 13of19 written statement filed by the defendant. He has proved the award no.4/1969 Ex.DW3/A vide which the suit property was acquired and notification no.F.8 (49)63 L&H Ex.DW1/C. This witness was cross examined, but, despite of his cross examination, the testimony of this witness has gone unimpeached.
26.Thus, from the testimony of this DW1 it is proved on the record that the suit property is an acquired land of the Govt. which was acquired vide award no.
4/1969 Ex.DW3/A and the vacant possession was taken over on dated 27.6.1969 and the suit property has been placed at the disposal of DDA vide notification no.F.8(49)63 L&H dated 1.2.1972 Ex.DW1/C.
27.Their Lordship of High Court of Delhi in case Rajinder Kakkar v/s Delhi Development Authority reported as 1994 1 AD(Delhi) 432 it was held: ''......Petitioners no.1,2 and 5 have not placed on record the documents whereby they claim to have acquired the ownership of the land in question. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however, admitted that there is no sale deed executed in their favour. No permission or no objection certificate under the 1972 Act has been taken by them. What is important to note is that there is no document on record showing that the vendors had any right, title or interest which they could pass on to the said petitioners. As regards the other petitioners, in support of their title they have merely placed on record agreements to sell which have been executed. An agreement to sell does not transfer ownership in land. That apart, in the said agreements to sell it has been stated that the vendor has absolute right as an owner and is the owner in possession but there is no document showing that any of the vendors had ownership right. The land in question had vested in the RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 14of19 Gaon Sabha on the promulgation of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and thereafter became the property of the Central Government on the issuance of the Notification under section 507 of the DMC Act on 3rd June,1966. Under these circumstances the question of any person claiming ownership right in the land in question could not arise. The recital in the agreements to sell, therefore, to the effect that the vendors were absolute owners of the land in question was palpably false....'' ''.....Apart from the bare recital in the agreements to sell there is no document on record to show that there was any legal title or legal right to possession of the land in question in any of the petitioners or their predecessors in interest. It is no doubt true that the petitioners have been occupying the land for some time but their occupation was of trespassers or encroachers of public land. They have no legal right, title or interest in the same. As we have already noted, the main grievance of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the respondents have acted and are threatening to act without complying with the provisions of section 30 of the Delhi Development Act. We will deal with this contention presently but we cannot help but observe that the contention of the petitioners in effect comes to this that they have violated the law and will continue to do so but this does not give the DDA a right to follow the petitioners' example. In other words the law is meant to be obeyed by the DDA alone and not by the petitioners....'' It was further held:
''......Before action for demolition or removal of encroachment is taken the Court must be satisfied, prima facie, on the basis of some document or other tangible evidence that the petitioners or the applicants have a legal title to the property or a right to remain in possession thereof. Where a person is an encroacher and never had any right to legal possession of public land, the Courts should not grant any injunction or relief which will have the result of permitting or protecting the continued illegal occupation of public land. There may be a case where at a point of time the possession or occupation may have been valid under a lease or a grant and which lease or grant may have subsequently been wrongfully terminated and the termination RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 15of19 challenged, such a case may, however, fall in a different category where the question of balance of convenience will have to be carefully examined specially when the action of termination of lease or grant is seriously challenged. But, in a case like the present, where at no point of time the petitioners had any valid right, title or interest to the property the Court ought not to grant any relief to such a petitioner even if there has been any procedural irregularity by the respondent while seeking to get back possession of public land....''
28.Whereas, their lordship of Supreme Court in the above said case Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lt. Governor, Govt. of NCT Delhi and Ors. is pleased to hold that land once acquired, it vests in the Govt. Coming to the case in hand, the plaintiff does not have any right, title or interest in the suit property, after acquisition of the suit land. Even otherwise the plaintiff has admitted in his cross examination that he has not filed any document to prove his ownership of the suit land.
29.Whereas, their lordship of High Court of Delhi in case Moolchand V/s DDA 2006(5) AD Delhi 355, wherein Their Lordship of Delhi High Court is pleased to hold that: ''Civil Procedure Code,1908, Section 96 Suit for permanent injunction - Evidence led by respondent DDA approved and established that suit land is part of acquired land - Appellant trespassed in the said land belonging to DDA after same was acquired and possession taken by DDA - Contention of appellant that suit land is not acquired land not tenable - No sale deed or licence placed to prove ownership of appellant - Suit of appellant rightly dismissed.''
30.Coming to the case in hand, the plaintiff has also filed the suit for declaration, so, as per section 53B of the DD Act. The notice was required to be issued prior to the filing of the suit. But the plaintiffs have failed to issue the notice. So, the ld. Trial court has rightly decided the Issue no.1 against the plaintiff.
RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 16of19 So, far as the Issue no.2 is concerned, the plaintiffs have claimed the relief of declaration, permanent injunction and mandatory injunction and the suit has been valued at Rs. 200/ for the relief of declaration and Rs.130/ for permanent injunction and Rs.130/ mandatory injunction.
31.Since, substantially this is the suit for declaration with consequential relief of injunction relating to the immovable property and the plaintiffs are not in the possession of the suit property and such suit for declaration with consequential relief was required to be valued in accordance with market value of the suit property. But the plaintiffs have failed to do so. Thus, the ld.trial court has rightly decided the Issue no.2 in favour of the defendant.So, far as the findings of the ld.trial court on Issue no.3 and 4 are concerned, since it is proved on the record that the suit property is an acquired land and the plaintiffs have failed to prove on the record that they are owner of the suit property. So, in the light of the law laid down by their Lordship of Delhi High Court in case Rajinder Kakkar v/s Delhi Development Authority SUPRA, the defendant/DDA had every right to demolish the unauthorized construction over the suit land and the ld. Trial court has rightly decided the Issue no.3 in favour of the defendant.
32.Since the plaintiffs have failed to prove on the record their right, title or interest in the suit property, whereas , the defendant has sucessfully proved on the record that the suit property is an acquired land of the government and RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 17of19 the same has been placed at the disposal of the DDA/defendant. From the perusal of the photographs placed on the record, it is clear that the super structure on the property has already been demolished and only debris is lying in the suit property. The plaintiffs have failed to prove on the record that their any article is lying in the suit property. Since the property is placed at the disposal by the DDA, so the defendant has every right to remove the debris and use the land for the purpose, it is acquired. The plaintiffs have claimed that even after the demolition, they are in possession of the suit property, but, no cogent evidence has been brought forth to prove their possession. So, the ld. Trial court has rightly come to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of permanent injunction.
33.The plaintiffs have also prayed for the relief of mandatory injunction for seeking direction for the defendant to reconstruct the house of the suit land. But, the plaintiffs have failed to prove on the record their right, title or interest in the suit property. On the other hand the defendant has successfully proved on the record that the suit property is an acquired land and the same has been placed at the disposal of the DDA. So, there was nothing illegal in the action of demolition taken by the defendant. As the suit property is an acquired land and the construction thereon was unauthorized. Accordingly, the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief of mandatory injunction, as prayed for. Accordingly, the findings of the ld. Trial court on Issue no. 4 are also upheld.
RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 18of19 34.Cumulative effect of the above discussions is that this court is of the considered view that there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment and decree passed by the ld. Trial court, which may require any interference therein. The impugned judgment and decree passed by the ld. Trial court
stand upheld consequently. The appeal filed by the appellant stands dismissed, being devoid of merit. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly.The parties are left to bear their own costs. File be consigned to the record room. The record of the trial court be returned.
Pronounced in the open court:
DATED: 30.05.2012 (P.K. Matto)
Additional District Judge(EAST)
Karkardooma Courts, Delhi.
RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 19of19
RCA:56/2011 Mohd. Ilyas V/s DDA 20of19