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[Cites 2, Cited by 5]

Uttarakhand High Court

Satye Singh & Others ... Appellants vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 8 July, 2020

Author: R.C. Khulbe

Bench: Ramesh Ranganathan, R.C. Khulbe

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

                   Special Appeal No.112 of 2020

Satye Singh & others                                    ... Appellants.

                                  Vs.

State of Uttarakhand and others                         .. Respondents.

                                                   Dated: 8th July, 2020

Coram: Hon'ble Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.

Hon'ble R.C. Khulbe, J.

Hon'ble Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J. (Oral) Heard Sri Harshit Sanwal, learned Counsel for the appellants, Sri K.N. Joshi, learned Deputy Advocate General for the State Government and Sri Shobhit Saharia, learned Standing Counsel for the THDC.

2. This intra-court appeal is preferred by the petitioners in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 498 of 2020 aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge on 26.02.2020 dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay.

3. The appellants-writ petitioners approached this Court by way of the writ petition on 15.02.2020 questioning the order passed by the third respondent dated 27.12.2005 cancelling the eligibility of the appellants-writ petitioners for rehabilitation, and the subsequent order dated 29.1.2008 passed by the Director (Rehabilitation), Grievance Redressal Forum, Tehri Dam Project. They sought a direction to the respondents to grant the appellants-writ petitioners the benefit of rehabilitation in terms of the rehabilitation scheme.

4. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge observed that the order passed by the Director (Rehabilitation) in the year 2005, and by the Grievance Redressal Cell in the year 2008, suffered from inordinate delay and laches; and, as there was no satisfactory explanation for the delay, he was not inclined to entertain the writ petition. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal.

5. The orders impugned in the writ petition were passed 12 and 14 years before the appellant-writ petitioners invoked the jurisdiction of this Court.

6. When we asked the learned counsel what explanation was furnished, in the writ petition, for the inordinate delay of 12 and 14 years, Sri Harshit Sanwal, learned counsel for the petitioner, would draw our attention to Paragraph Nos. 9, 10 and 11 of the writ affidavit, wherein it is stated that the order dated 29.1.2008 was never communicated to the petitioners; it is recently, on an enquiry regarding the status of allotment of the petitioners, that they were informed that they still had not been included in the eligibility list, and they were not entitled for allotment or any other benefits; on further enquiry, they became aware of the passage of the impugned order rejecting their genuine claim; they had approached the respondents several times enquiring about the adjudication of their claim for rehabilitation; they were always informed that no decision had been arrived at; they were not negligent, and had made due enquiries; the delay in preferring the writ petition was neither deliberate nor intentional; and they became aware of the order only in January, 2020.

7. The writ affidavit is bereft of even the basic particulars as to whom the petitioners had approached and when. It is also not stated as to how and when the petitioners received both these orders, copies of which have been filed along with the writ petition. Such bald and vague assertions in the writ affidavit do not constitute sufficient explanation for the inordinate delay in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court.

8. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Nandlal Jaiswal and others (1986) 4 SCC 566, the Supreme Court observed:

".......it is well settled that the power of the High Court to issue an appropriate writ under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and the High Court in the exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent of the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner in filing a writ petition and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. The evolution of this rule of laches or delay is premised upon a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy under the writ jurisdiction because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices......" (emphasis supplied)

9. As the writ petition suffers from inordinate and unexplained delay and laches, the learned Single Judge cannot be said to be in error in non-suiting the appellants-writ petitioners on this score.

10. The scope of interference in an intra-Court appeal, under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, is extremely limited. The learned Single Judge is not a Court subordinate as both he and the Division Bench exercise the very same jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even if two views are possible and the view canvassed before it is found more attractive, the Division Bench would still refrain from interference if the view taken by the learned Single Judge is also a possible view. The opinion expressed by the learned Single Judge in the order under appeal, that the writ petition suffers from inordinate delay and laches, is undoubtedly a possible view. Save in cases where the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from a patent illegality, no interference is warranted in an intra-Court appeal. We are satisfied that the order under appeal does not suffer from any such infirmity. We see no reason, therefore, to entertain this Special Appeal.

11. The Special Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. No costs.

12. It is made clear that the dismissal of this Special Appeal shall not disable the appellants-writ petitioners from requesting the authorities concerned to release the amount which they claim has been kept in deposit by the respondents and is payable to them.

13. It is also open to the appellants-writ petitioners to make a representation to the authorities concerned seeking payment of interest for the amount lying in deposit with the respondents for the past more than 15 years. In case any such representation is made, the authorities concerned shall consider the same in accordance with law.

      (R.C. Khulbe, J.)                 (Ramesh Ranganathan, C.J.)
        08.07.2020                          08.07.2020
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