Madras High Court
Mcc Finance Limited Having Its ... vs Reserve Bank Of India A Body ... on 6 July, 2001
Author: V.S. Sirpurkar
Bench: V.S. Sirpurkar
ORDER V.S. Sirpurkar, J.
1. By this appeal, which is filed by M.C.C. Finance Limited, Chennai (hereinafter referred to as the "Company" for the sake of brevity), the order passed by the learned company Judge in C.P.No.496 of 2000, admitting the liquidation petitions and appointing the Provisional Liquidator is in challenge.
2. In all five petitions came to be filed before the learned company Judge. Four of them were by the private creditors under Sec. 433 of the Companies Act while the petition filed by the Reserve Bank of India for winding up was under Sec. 45-MC of the Reserve Bank of India Act. Along with the said petition filed by the Reserve Bank of India for liquidation of the company, an application was also filed for appointment of a Provisional Liquidator.
3. The learned company Judge has by the impugned order dated 21.8.2000 admitted all the winding up petitions. It is needless to mention the four creditors had filed the petitions on the ground that the company had been unable to pay its debts for which, due notices were served by them under Sec. 434 of the Companies Act to the company. The petition filed by the Reserve Bank, however, was based on the grounds under Sec. 45-MC of the Reserve Bank of India Act. The learned company Judge, after hearing the parlies elaborately, has admitted all the five petitions and has also appointed a Provisional Liquidator under Sec. 450 of the Companies Act. It is this order, which has been assailed before us in this appeal by the company.
4. There is one more proceeding before us, which has been filed by.the Reserve Bank of India, in the nature of the cross-objection, taking exceptions to the observations made by the learned company Judge. He propose to deal with both these proceedings simultaneously since the question and the parties are common.
5. The learned senior counsel, Mr.A.L. Somayaji, appearing on behalf of the company, at the out set urged that the appeal by the company was on both the aspects, viz. the admission of the winding up petitions and the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator. We would deal both the issues separately.
6. To begin with, the learned senior counsel vehemently contended that this order was in breach of the principles of natural justice and passed without giving any adequate opportunity to the company. According to the learned counsel, in fact, the company was never put on the notice in respect of either the liquidation petitions or the petition for the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator. In fact, the main thrust of the argument was on the denial of an opportunity to the company. Mr. Somayaji urged that the learned company Judge had referred to the two reports by the Chartered Accountants appointed by the Reserve Bank and relied upon them extensively in his order. However, the said reports never made available to the company and, in fact, the whole exercise of admitting the petitions for winding up and the petition for appointment of Provisional Liquidator was done in a hasty manner. The learned counsel referred to some dates.
7. According to the learned counsel, while the petitions for liquidation came before the Court on 21st July, 2000, it was only on 9th of August the Reserve Bank of India filed its petitions. He pointed out that the said petition was served upon the company on 11th August and thereafter, there was hardly any opportunity as the matter was heard by the learned company Judge on 11th August and 16th August and the orders came to be passed on 21st August, 2000. According to the learned counsel, therefore, this was a case where the company had very little or no opportunity to meet the allegations of financial mismanagement, unpaid debts, etc. or the other allegations made regarding the financial irregularities. The learned senior counsel very pertinently pointed out that all that was directed to the company by the learned company Judge was to give the particulars (probably of the financial affairs and status). From (hat the learned counsel says that those particulars were given by the company. There was hardly any opportunity worth the name to meet the allegations made in the petitions pertaining to the financial irregularities. Reliance was placed on the ruling reported in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others, .
8. As against this, the learned senior counsel, Mr. C.A. Sundaram, appearing on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India, Mr. Arvind P. Datar for the Provisional Liquidator and Mr. T.R. Rajagopalan for the depositors pointed out that the plea of denial of opportunity was a myth. The learned counsel pointed out that the whole exercise went on for a month. They pointed out that not only did the company filed detailed affidavits opposing the aliegatioas, but the learned counsel were also extensively heard on its behalf. It was pointed out that the learned company Judge, in fact, could have straight away passed an order to appoint Provisional Liquidator by way of ex parte orders more particularly considering the fates suffered by thousands of depositors on account of the complete mismanagement tending to be of criminal nature. However, the learned company Judge on giving full opportunity to the company had also probed himself into the facts before arriving at the conclusion to admit the liquidation petitions and the petition for appointment of Provisional Liquidator. In deed, from the records, it is clear that the company was very much on the scene even prior to 21.7.2000. The hearing exercise began on that day and thereafter it concluded on 21.8.2000 and the order was passed. However, daring this time, oil 9th August, 2000, the Reserve Bank of India came up with a petition under Sec. 45-MC of the Reserve Bank of India Act along with the application for appointment of a Provisional Liquidator which petition was served on the company. Though the learned counsel made a feeble complaint that there was no formal notice or the Judge's Summons as required under the Company Rules but the fact remains that the petitions were served upon the company which had made the acknowledgment therefor. Therefore, it can never be said that the company was not put on the notice of either the liquidation petitions by the four creditors or the petitions filed by the Reserve Bank of India.
9. We have on record two affidavits. Both were filed prior to the passing of the order. In paragraph 2 of the affidavit, there is a clear reference to the order of the Court dated 21.7.2000 whereby the Court had directed the respondents "to furnish certain details to be duly certified by the Chartered Accountant to this Hon'ble Court". There is a further reference that the matter came before the Court on 11th August on which date it was represented that there could be a delay in obtaining the particulars certified by the Chartered Accountant and, therefore, the particulars were filed on the date when the affidavit was sworn (perhaps on 16th August). When we go through this affidavit, it gives a complete history of the company ever since its incorporation. In subsequent paragraphs, the company has pointed out different reasons and its version for the financial debacle suffered by it. The affidavit has been painstakingly drafted to suggest as to how the non-banking financial institutions suffered particularly after 1995 as also the merger of the other companies with this company effected in 1996. The problem felt and faced by the company has been painstakingly put at the end of paragraph 4 and with an assertion that that has resulted in the loss of Rs.60 crores for the period ending on 31st September, 1998. In paragraph 5, it is suggested that the company was going through a great liquidity crisis and had initiated austerity measures to reduced its overhead. It is also pointed out as to how the number of its branches was reduced to 13 and the total number of employees was brought down from 400 to 70. In paragraph 6, the particulars sought by the creditors were supplied. Though they are said to be the particulars supplied, in effect, those are also the plea to avoid the liquidation. Along with this, the balance sheets of the company, the list of principal assets and the extent of deposits received by the company have all been referred to in these particulars besides the other important points like the loans obtained, the investments made, etc. Number of annexures are also filed along with this which include the actual balance sheets, the list of principal assets, the details of the secured creditors, etc. Even the details of the equity holdings of the other subsidiary companies seem to have been provided. The balance sheets of the subsidiary companies have also been provided. So also, the details regarding the three firms promoted by the company and other details of investments made and transactions have been provided in the annexures. Complete list of deposits and the creditors and Ihe pending litigations is also enclosed by way of annexures. The details of the outstanding from Ihe group companies as also the details of the investments are to be found. It is seen that the learned company Judge had directed almost a detailed questionnaire and sought the information which was extremely relevant and which would give the complete picture regarding the financial status, etc. of the company. The information sought also appears to be extremely relevant in coming to the conclusion as to whether the transactions were of bona fide nature or not. There is also a second affidavit filed on record before the orders of this Court dated 17.8.2000 seeking further information and even in this affidavit, the financial scenario of the company and its dealings with the others or its dealings generally are highlighted.
10. From reading of these two affidavits, we do not think that there was any denial of opportunity. In fact, from a reading of those affidavits, it is clear that the company had access to all that was filed before the Court including the petitions. The learned single Judge has painstakingly and studiously gone into the whole financial aspects giving a thorough picture of the financial status of the appellant company itself as also vis-a-vis the other companies floated by it. The learned Judge has also taken the stock of the various transactions with reference to the figures involved in those transactions. When such is the situation can it be said that no opportunity was given to the appellant? Mr. Somayaji reiterated that the petition filed by the Reserve Bank of India was on the basis of the two reports and more particularly the report of M/s. Venkataraman and company. It is true that the learned Judge has made a reference to that report. However, we are completely convinced that there was no necessity of supplying the copy of every document the Reserve Bank of India had relied upon in support of its petitions. In fact, Mr. Sundaram took us through the detailed correspondence by the Reserve Bank of India with the concerned company which was going on for almost more than a couple of years prior to the presentation of the petitions which convinces us that the company had a complete idea as to what was the stand of the Reserve Bank of India and what were the precise grounds on which the Reserve Bank of moving against it. A cursory glance at the list of dates alone would be sufficient to suggest that it is not a case of a bolt from the blue when the Reserve Bank of India sought to appoint a Provisional Liquidator for this company. The learned single Judge has then referred to his own directions in paragraph 24 of the order. The learned Judge has come to the conclusion that the outstanding against the company are in far excess than its assets. This order and the whole record as such, therefore, goes totally contrary to the claim made by the learned senior counsel that the company had no opportunity. Paragraph 24 of S.L. Kapoor's case, was pressed into service to suggest the importance of the observance of the principles of natural justice. We have absolutely no quarrel with any of the principles laid down there which are binding on us. However, we do not see how the natural justice was trampled in this case or how it could be said that in this case the justice was not even manifested to have been done.
11. Mr. Datar, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Provisional Liquidator invited our attention to the ruling of the Supreme Court reported in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and others, and more particularly to the observations made in paragraphs 20 and 21 and suggested that where only one conclusion was possible and permissible on admitted or undisputed factual position, the court need not issue a writ merely because there is a violation of principles of natural justice. In the present case, the learned single Judge has extensively relied upon the information given in the aforementioned affidavits referred to by us. Therefore, what the learned single Judge went by was an admitted position in the facts at least in so far as the facts and figures regarding the financial affairs of the company are concerned. The observations, therefore, apply in toto and on all fours. In the said decision, the Supreme Court was on an extreme situation. However, even here that plea was not available because everything was done after the notice to the petitioner. We are, therefore, of the opinion that there was no breach of natural justice in the earlier proceedings. This is besides the fact that in appropriate cases, the appointment of Provisional Liquidator could have been made even without notice to the company. Sec. 450(2) of the Companies Act suggests such a situation. Sec. 450(2) reads as follows:
"(2) Before appointing a provisional liquidator, the Court shall give notice to the company and give a reasonable opportunity to it to make its representations, if any, unless, for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Court thinks fit to dispense with such notice." (Italics supplied) The provision is loud and clear. Before us, however, the company not only got the notice of the petitions but a complete opportunity to show the reasons against it in writing besides the hearing in the open court. We do not therefore, think that this is a case of breach of natural justice on account of the denial of the opportunity.
12. It is significant to note that the observations regarding the financial debacle faced by the company and its inability to repay its debts have not been assailed by the learned counsel for the company in his address. At the end of paragraph 24, the learned single Judge has given a finding that the company on its own showing had to pay Rs.229 crores to 46,000 depositors out of which the figure of Rs.165 crores was the principal amount. The learned Judge then proceeds to sum up the liabilities to Rs.300 crores. The learned Judge at the end of paragraph 25 finds that the claim regarding the receivable amount was also a myth and that claim was inflated by the company. In paragraph 26, the learned Judge comments upon the investments made by the subsidiary companies of which nol even a fraction is realisable. Therefore, a prima facie finding is recorded that these investments were not bona fide. The learned Judge has taken care to suggest "that a further probe is required to be made to ascertain the real beneficiaries of the amounts siphoned off from MCC Ltd., through the investment companies. The Auditors have noted that brokerage was being paid to companies in the same group". The learned single Judge also finds in paragraph 27 that the investments made by the company to the tune of Rs.20 crores was also Questionable and needed probe. After realising alE these defects, the lack of bona fides and the total mismanagement of the finance perhaps tending to be criminal in nature, the learned Judge comes to the conclusion in paragraph 29 that the appointment of a Provisional Liquidator was fully warranted. The learned Judge thereafter has commented upon the financial debacle in the non-banking financial companies and proceeds to appoint various persons as the Auditors, Legal Advisors, Administrators, etc. The learned Judge has proceeded to give proper reasons and it is only then that the liquidation petitions have been ordered to be admitted. We do not find any fault with the reasons given by the learned single Judge in clearest possible terms. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant was not able to show as to in what manner the learned single Judge gone wrong in recording his prima facie findings regarding the financial mismanagement, the complete absence of financial viability of the company as also the inability on its part to repay the debts including the deposits.
13. A ruling was cited before us lo suggest the circumstances under which a Provisional Liquidator is appointed. It is a ruling by the learned single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Darshan Anilkumar patel v. Gitaneel Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and others, Vol.81 Com.Cases 805 where Dhanuka, J., after taking the complete stock of the available ease law, has considered the circumstances under which the appointment of the Provisional Liquidator can be made. The learned Judge says:
"The court would not hesitate to appoint a provisional liquidator of a company in an appropriate case particularly when a strong prima facie case for winding up is made out and the court is of the view that it would be just, equitable and proper to appoint a provisional liquidator in the interest of the company, the complaining shareholders or creditors or the workmen's public interest, etc. ... It is well settled that discretionary power must be exercised on just and equitable considerations and the court can appoint a provisional liquidator of a company only if it would be proper to do so after weighing all the pros and cons of the matter and after considering whether the petitioners have made out a strong prima facie case for the winding up of the company. ... The courts may appoint a provisional liquidator of the company immediately on presentation of a petition for winding up on the ground that it is necessary so to do in public interest. It does not follow therefrom that public interest is the only recognised ground which can form the basis for appointment of a provisional liquidator. It is neither possible nor desirable to exhaustively enumerate the situations in which a provisions liquidator may be appointed by the company court. Some situations in which a provisional liquidator can be appointed are: where the company is virtually insolvent or the substratum of the company has disappeared and a strong prima facie case is made out; where the assets of the company are in jeopardy; where it is proved by a strong prima facie case that the management representing the majority shareholders of the company is conducting the business of the company to the prejudice of the company and the minority shareholders, as if it were their own contrary to normal business principles, proving lack of probity and jeopardy to the interest of complaining shareholders; where the majority of the shareholders in collusion with each other are indulging in acts of manipulation and purported transactions which appear on their face to be a subterfuge or bogus; public interest; interest of company or shareholders as a class...."
We are in total agreement with the observations of the learned Judge. We have no doubt that the considerations enumerated by the learned Judge for the appointment of Provisional Liquidator are abundantly available in the present case. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the learned single Judge when the learned single Judge has admitted the petitions and has also proceeded to appoint the Provisional Liquidator.
14. The learned counsel then invited our attention to the observations made in paragraph 37 where the learned Judge has given the directions that the report forwarded by the Reserve Bank of India to the Additional Director General of Police, in charge of the Economic Offence Wing, to whom the Reserve Bank of India has forwarded the report of the Special Auditor, shall be treated as the First Information Report with regard to the apparent fraud committed by the company and those in charge of the company. This action, according to the learned single Judge, would be in addition to any of the cases that may have been registered against the company. The learned Judge then directs that steps shall be taken against those Involved in the apparent conspiracy to siphon/divert the funds of the company. In paragraph 38 also, the learned single Judge has warned against the innocent depositors being cheated after they are allured and made to believe in the capacities of the particular group. The learned counsel says that this is a final finding by the learned single Judge regarding the offences, if any, committed by the persons concerned. Our attention was then drawn to the provisions of Sections 541 to 543 of the Companies Act. It was contended by the learned counsel that these actions could be taken only after the company is wound up which was apparent from the opening sentences of Sections 541 and 542 as also Section 543 and here was a case where the company was not wound up altogether and, therefore, such observations were completely without jurisdiction. The argument is mentioned only to be rejected because it is apparent that the observations in paragraphs 37 and 38 are not in the nature of final findings and have no distant relation with Sections 541, 542 and 543. Sec. 541 speaks about the criminal liability of a person who has not kept the proper books of accounts. Similarly, Section 542 speaks about the civil and criminal liability of the persons who has fraudulently conducted the business of the company. These two sections are extremely clear and admit of no ambiguity. The learned counsel, however, said that the action under these two sections can be taken only after the winding-up. We need not go into the question because we are convinced that the observations made by the learned single Judge directing an investigation to be made has got nothing to do with Sections. 541 and 542. Section 543 also speaks about the assessment of damages for any misapplication, retainer, misfeasance or breach of trust by the Directors. Even that section has got nothing to do with the directions given by the learned single Judge in paragraphs 37 and 38. That is a general power of the Court and there can be no doubt that every Court has that power and the learned single Judge also had the same power. Section 443 of the Companies Act provides for the powers of the court. Sub-section (c) (hereof speaks of the court's powers to make any interim order which the court thinks fit to order an investigation. In our opinion, this has got no connection with Section 541 to Section 543 and, therefore, we reject the argument of the learned senior counsel that the part of the order is without jurisdiction. Instead, we hold that the court had ample powers including the power under Section 443 to recommend such an investigation. After all, an investigation into the affairs of the company does not mean a final conviction of the Directors. This argument, therefore, is to be rejected.
15. The learned senior counsel then urged that when the matter came before this Court, to begin with this Court passed certain orders by which Rs.50 crores were deposited by the appellant company and the Division Bench had then released the Chairman, Shri AL. Vadivelu and the Managing Director, Shri. Jawahar Vadiveiu on bail. These two persons were arrested in pursuance of the orders of the learned single Judge. The learned counsel says that if the appeal is to be dismissed then it will be better that the interests of the company should be safeguarded meaning thereby, that we should order back the payment of Rs.50 crores which has been made by the appellant company. We completely fail to understand the rationale behind the argument. In the first place, the said orders were passed as the "agreed orders". It is true that the said order resulted in the release on bail of the aforesaid two persons. However, we cannot countenance an argument that merely because we are dismissing the appeal, we should, order back the payment of Rs.50 crores. It is not as if it is the case of the company that it need not have paid Rs.50 crores or that it was not liable to pay that amount. In fact, it is liable to pay much more than that to the depositors. We are told by Mr. Datar that the said money had already been disbursed as part payment to the depositors. We, therefore, find no reason to order the payment of Rs.50 crores to be returned to the appellant company. On the other hand, it was pointed by Mr. Rajagopalan as also Mr. Datar even the conditions which were agreed by the appellant and by some other persons on behalf of the appellant have been breached. It is pointed out that an application to vacate the stay is pending. We will deal with that application separately. However, we may mention here that there can be no justification to return back the amount which has been paid by the company. In fact, according to us, the subject of criminal liabiiity of the Directors would not depend upon what transpires in the Company Petition before this Court. The criminal liability would be decided by the competent criminal court on the evidence tendered before it by the prosecution. The question of the bail and release would also be decided by the criminal court which is dealing with the matters. We clarify that the release of a person on bail in this case was the exclusive right of the criminal court dealing with the accused persons, viz. the Directors of the company in this case. The payment of Rs.50 crores might have been considered as one of the considerations for grant of bail but, that does not divest the criminal court of its powers to deal with the bail matter and to deal further with the criminal matter pending before it in its own rights. We, therefore, reject the contention of the learned counsel in that behalf. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and confirm the order of the learned single Judge.
16. Mr. Sundaram, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Reserve Bank of India invited our attention to some remarks against the Reserve Bank of India and contends that the said remarks amount to the adverse findings to the Reserve Bank and, therefore, presses his cross objections.
17. In the first place, we must observe that those remarks are not the "findings" as contemplated by Order XLI Rule 22 of C.P.C. providing for the cross objections. The cross objections can be only against the adverse findings though the party concerned has succeeded on the other issues. This was not a case involving any issue where the finding has gone against the Reserve Bank. The learned single Judge has merely made some observations. We will not go into the justification of those observations as Mr. Sundaram seeks liberty from us to make application before the learned single Judge for expunging the remarks which, in our opinion, would be the only right course to be adopted. We therefore dispose of the Cross Objection No.75 of 2000.
18. C.M.P.No.17067 of 2000 is for impleading some respondents including the Administrator. Since we dismiss the appeal, there will be no question of now impleading them because we are convinced that even without them the appeal did not deserve to be allowed. That impleading application is, therefore, dismissed as infructuous because of the dismissal of the appeal.
19. The appellant had sought the release of AL. Vadivelu and Jawahar VadiveJu and has also further sought the directions to the police authorities not to take these two persons into custody and not to arrest either the past or present Directors of the appellant company so as to enable them to formulate a scheme for the settlement of the substantial portion of the principal amount to the depositors to be implemented and enforced. Since the appeal is being dismissed, there will be no question of issuing any such direction. We are told that our predecessors in C.M.P. Nos.15014 and 15016 of 2000 passed an order which was more or the less an "agreed order". There it was decided that the appellant should pay Rs.5 crorcs a month for a period of ten months and an assurance to that effect was to be given before the XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidepet where the criminal case against the appellant was pending. It was further agreed that the appellant and his close relatives who held 95% to 96% shares in one other company by name M/s. Automobile Products of India Limited, Bombay were to execute an affidavit of undertaking before this Court as well as before the said XI Metropolitan Magistrate, Saidepet that the Chairman and Managing Director of the said company would take steps to work out a scheme before the B.I.F.R. for transferring 35 acres of land owned by the said Automobile Products of India Limited and thus to secure refund of the amount to the depositors possibly from the sale of that land and a resolution to that effect would be passed by circulation by the Board of Directors of the said company. It seems on that basis and more particularly on the basis of the language in paragraph 2(1)(a), the said two persons, viz. Vadivelu and Jawahar Vadivelu have been released. Therefore, it will not be necessary for us to decide C.M.P.Nos. 15014 to 15016 of 2000 also. We would only make it clear that the parties seeking modification in that order on the ground of the breach of the condition by the appellants particularly regarding the arrest of the Directors of the appellant company would not be justified in pressing for their re-arrest or the cancellation of grant of bail. Such relief can be claimed only before the court by which the bail orders were passed. Strictly speaking bait orders have not been passed by the Division Bench and order dated 4-10-2000 cannot be termed to be a bail order in strict sense. We, therefore, dispose of these three application.
20. C.M.P. No.17066 of 2000 has been filed by the appellant praying for modification of the orders dated 4.10.2000 passed in this appeal wherein a direction is sought for disbursement of the money to the depositors or to invest the same suitably in a Nationalised bank and pass such further or other orders as the Hon'ble Court may deem fit. We are already told that the amounts which have been paid by the appellant have already been disbursed. At any rate, we do not find it necessary to pass any orders and leave it to the learned single Judge to deal with the moneys. It would be for the Provisional Liquidator to seek the directions regarding those amounts from the learned single Judge, He dispo.se of the said applications accordingly.
21. By C.M.P. No.17416 of 2000 the appellant sought ihe modification of the order dated 4.10.2000 permitting it to pay Rs.40 crores by April, 2001. It seems that amount has already been paid and, therefore, it is not necessary to decide this application and the application is disposed of.
22. By C.M.P. No. 19606 of 2000 the Provisional Liquidator has sought modification of the order dated 4-10-2000 and has sought the information regarding the financial status, etc. of the other company, viz. Automobile Products India Limited. There is no point in now pursuing this aspect since the appeal itself is disposed. The Provisional Liquidator has also sought for vacating the blanket stay granted against the arrest of the Directors of the appellant company. We make it clear that the subject of arrest is entirely different subject not connected with the present proceedings under the Companies Act. We further clarify that if any orders in respect of the arrest or bail or cancellation thereof are required, they may be sought before the appropriate criminal court where the criminal prosecution is pending. We dispose of C.M.P. No.19606 of 2000 with the above observation. In so far as C.M.P. No.19607 of 2000 is concerned, the same has been filed by the Provisional Liquidator praying for modification of the order dated 4.10.2000. The application is identical with the earlier C.M.P. No.19606 of 2000. It is disposed of in the same manner. C.M.P. No. 19608 of 2000 is for amending the causetitle by impleading the Provisional Liquidator. This application need not be formally decided and can be disposed as we have permitted the Provisional Liquidator's counsel to address us at the time of final hearing. It is not now necessary to decide this application. It is, therefore, disposed of.
23. C.M.P. No.19311 of 2000 is a impleading petition filed by AL. Vadivelu for joining himself as the second appellant. It is not necessary now to decide this application since we have dismissed the appeal itself on merits. C.M.P. No. 19311 of 2000 is therefore dismissed.
24. C.M.P. No.2678 of 2001 is a!so an application by one M. Lakshmanan for impleading himself in the appeal. He claims to be interested in this litigation. We only clarify that it is not necessary for us to decide this application now as the appeal is being disposed of even otherwise on merits. If he is interested, he may join the proceedings before the learned single Judge by making an appropriate application.
25. Last but not the least, C.M.P. No. 9920 of 2001. This application is filed by one Mr, N.R. Venkatachalam on behalf of the association, of the depositors whereby the association of depositors sought to implead itself. That is one of the prayers. By another prayer they sought the re-arrest of the appellant Vadivelu and Jawahar Vadivelu on the ground that the undertaking given by the said two persons was breached. It is not necessary for us to decide this application in view of what we have already held. If the association so feels it may take the proper steps in respect of the bail orders by making appropriate application. It will not be for this Court to deal with the bail orders. We have already clarified the stand. Accordingly, this application is disposed of.