Arun Kumar Saxena vs High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad ... on 16 November, 2018

[Cites 25, Cited by 0]

Allahabad High Court

Arun Kumar Saxena vs High Court Of Judicature At Allahabad ... on 16 November, 2018

(Delivered By Hon'ble Manoj Misra,J) Writ A No. 21368 of 2006 has been filed for quashing the decision of the Administrative Committee of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (for short the High Court) taken in its meeting dated 06.04.2005 on the representation of the petitioner dated 28.06.2004, which has been communicated to the petitioner vide letter dated 13.05.2005. By the said decision, the Administrative Committee overruled the certificate of integrity/overall assessment of the petitioner as a good officer provided/made by the Administrative Judge and has restored the remarks of the District Judge, Saharanpur for the year 2003-04. The petitioner in this petition has prayed for expunction of the adverse remarks and for restoration of the entry made by the Administrative Judge in his Service Record pertaining to the year 2003-04.

Writ A No. 52347 of 2008 has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the order dated 11.08.2008 passed by the second respondent by which the petitioner has been compulsorily retired from service. The petitioner has also assailed the letter dated 23.07.2008 by which a request has been sent by the High Court to the District & Sessions Judge, Ballia to withdraw all judicial work from him.

As the annual confidential remark impugned in Writ A No. 21386 of 2006 had material bearing on the recommendation to compulsorily retire the petitioner, both the above writ petitions were heard together and are being decided by a common judgment and order.

The relevant facts are as follows: The petitioner was selected for U.P. Higher Judicial Service and was initially posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Fatehpur on 16.12.1998. In the year 2001, he was posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur where he worked till 17.11.2003. From there he was transferred to Hamirpur Judgeship. On 13.10.2003, Sri Shiv Charan Sharma, the then District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, sent a D.O. Letter No. 192/ P.A./ 2003 dated 13.10.2003 to the High Court stating therein that Sri Arun Kumar Saxena (the petitioner - Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur) is a very dishonest officer; that there are numerous complaints against his integrity and working as a result various transfer applications are being received against him on administrative as well as judicial side; and that there is a saying about him that he does not decide any case without accepting illegal gratification. After describing the petitioner as above, the District Judge went on to provide few instances concerning the conduct of the petitioner from which the District Judge could gather impression about the petitioner as above.

The aforesaid D.O. Letter dated 13.10.2003 was placed before the then Administrative Judge, Saharanpur vide Office Note dated 07.11.2003. The then Administrative Judge, on 12.11.2003, passed the following order:-

"Recommended for transfer of Sri A.K. Saxena A.D.J. And inquiry by OSD inquiry".

Thereafter, the matter was placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice upon which His Lordship, on 13.11.2003, passed the following order:-

"Officer be transferred to Hamirpur. Enquiry may be initiated by the Enquiry Officer."

In compliance of the order dated 13.11.2003 of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the OSD (Enquiry) of the High Court conducted a discreet enquiry (V.B. Enquiry No.18/2003) and submitted report dated 13.04.2004. Under order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the report was placed before the Administrative Committee of the High Court. The Administrative Committee, in its meeting, dated 24.04.2004, resolved as follows :

"Considered the enquiry report dated 13.04.2004 in V.B. Enquiry No. 18/2003 submitted by Sri Shashank Shekhar, O.S.D. (Enquiry), High Court, Allahabad against Sri Arun Kumar Saxena, the then Additional District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur now posted as Additional District Judge, Hamirpur.

Resolved that disciplinary enquiry be initiated and the officer be placed under suspension. He shall get the subsistence allowance admissible as per rules. Registry to take follow up action."

Pursuant to the resolution of the Administrative Committee dated 24.04.2004, a departmental enquiry was initiated and a charge-sheet was served upon the petitioner on 28.05.2004. The charge-sheet leveled three charges, which are extracted below:-

"Charge No. 1. That, you, while posted as Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, decided First Appeal No. 492/1993 Ved Prakash Vs. Dhiraj Singh, illegally and against all judicial norms and propriety delivered judgment on 13.12.2002, the date fixed for further arguments, by making cutting in the order sheet in the case, and rejecting application for adjournment filed on behalf of the complainant, for extraneous consideration and you thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.

Charge No.2. That you while posted as Additional District Judge Saharanpur, in Rent Control Appeal No. 05/1998, Dile Ram Vs. Pradeep Kumar having orally given the date 11.07.2003 to the parties to file case law, refused to take photocopies of the case law of the complainant,on the ground that the respondent having filed transfer application, you will not decide the case on 14.07.2003 fixed in the case, whereas after the respondent got his transfer application rejected on 14.07.2003, against all judicial norms and propriety, you delivered judgment the same day, for extraneous consideration, and you thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956.

Charge No.3. That you while posted as Additional District & Sessions Judge Saharanpur, delivered judgment in Session Trial No. 750/1997, State Vs. Prahlad & others, illegally and against all judicial norms and propriety acquitted all accused persons of offence u/s 302 I.P.C., for extraneous consideration, and you thereby failed to maintain absolute integrity and complete devotion to duty and thus committed misconduct within the meaning of Rule 3 of U.P. Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1956."

The petitioner submitted his reply to the charge-sheet. After holding the enquiry, the Enquiry Judge submitted a report dated 25.04.2005. The Administrative Committee considered the report in its meeting held on 20.09.2005 and passed the following resolution:-

"Considered the enquiry report dated 25.04.2005 in departmental enquiry No. 2/2004 submitted by Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.U. Khan, Enquiry Judge against the officer concerned.

Resolved that the report be accepted and the officer concerned be exonerated from the charges.

Further resolved that the officer concerned be reinstated and be considered to be on duty during the period of his suspension."

That, in between, the District Judge, Saharanpur in the capacity of reporting officer of the petitioner while he was working as Additional District Judge, Saharanpur recorded certain adverse remarks against the petitioner for the year 2003-04. The petitioner was apprised of those remarks through the District Judge, Jhansi to solicit his representation/ explanation. These adverse remarks, as found in Annexure C.A. 5 to the counter-affidavit filed in Writ A No. 52347 of 2008, are extracted below:-

2. Remarks by the District Judge regarding-

a. Integrity of the officer: Whether beyond doubt, doubtful or positively lacking.

Highly doubtful. He had been a most corrupt judicial officer of the district.

b. If he is fair and impartial :in dealing with the members of public and Bar.

He was most unfair and partial in dealing with the members of the public and Bar.

d. His private character, such : to lower him in the estimation of the public and adversely affects the discharge of his official duties.

No complaint was received against his private character such as to lower him in the estimation of public or adversely affects the discharge of his official duty. But his reputation was of a very corrupt judicial officer.

e. Control over the files in the matter of:

i) Proper fixation of cause list :

(ii) Avoidance of unnecessary adjournments :

(v) Whether interim orders, injunctions granted, refused or retained for sufficient reasons :

(h) Control over the office:

and administrative capacity and tact.

(m) Whether amenable to the advise of the District Judge and other superior officers.

He had no control over the files in the matter of proper fixation of cause list.

Adjourned the cases on insufficient grounds.

Interim orders, injunctions granted, retained or refused for insufficient reasons.

He had no control over the office and lacks administrative capacity and tact.

He was not amenable to the advise of the District Judge.

3. Over all assessment of the merits of the officers, outstanding, very good, good, fair and poor:

Overall assessment of the officer was very poor.

4. Other remarks, if any. :

Sri Saxena is a very corrupt judicial officer. He had no reputation like that of a judicial officer. No case was decided by him without payment of illegal gratification. Complaints were received against him. Every time he was warned and cautioned not to involve himself in corrupt activities but he paid no attention towards my warning and advise. In one case RCA No. 5/98 decided by him on 14.07.2003 it was noticed that Sri A.K. Saxena had been accepting bribe through orderly Sri Sehdev. An order was passed by me on 25.08.2003 and by this order Sri Saxena was cautioned not to involve himself in corrupt activities and also not to involve the officials of the court in corrupt activities and the officer is expected to maintain the utmost integrity. Afterwards Sri Sehdev, a class IV employee attached with his court was transferred in the outlying court at Deoband.

Sri A.K. Saxena was transferred from Saharanpur to Hamirpur as Addl. District judge. After taking over charge in pursuance of the order of the Hon'ble High Court at Hamirpur he gave a telephone call to me on 6.12.2003 at about 9 p.m. and on telephone he showed his resentment towards me for reporting to the Hon'ble High Court about his corrupt activities. On 8.12.2003 I informed the Hon'ble High Court vide my D.O. No. 211/P.A./2003 dated December 8, 2003. Sri B.R. Singh, Joint Registrar Hon'ble High Court vide D.O. No. 134/2004 Allahabad February 12, 2004 informed that Hon'ble the Administrative Judge, Saharanpur has been pleased to pass the order on 6.02.2004 in the matter as under:

"Kindly inform learned D.J. to make the comments while recording character roll entries of the concerned officer."

Hence in pursuance of the order of the Hon'ble Administrative Judge this fact has also been mentioned in the C.R. Entry of the officer.

The reputation of the officer was of a very corrupt officer. It was said about him that he has not been passing any judicial order without payment of illegal gratification. It has also been alleged about him that even in cases in which the accused persons were convicted he had accepted bribe from the complainant side. All the cases decided by him during his posting at Saharanpur require thorough examination. But even then following are some of the instances for his involvement in the corrupt activities:-

(1) R.C.A. No. 5/98 was decided by him on 14.07.2003. The appellant namely Pradeep Kumar Garg moved T.A. against the officer prior to the decision of the appeal and after hearing the arguments. Serious allegations of corruption were levelled against Sri Saxena in T.A. No. 156/03. It was moved on 11.7.03. Order was passed for issuing notice to the other party. On 12 & 13.7.03 the courts remained closed for second Saturday and Sunday. On 14.7.03 Sri Pradeep Kumar Garg made an endorsement on the T.A of not pressed. Hence the application was rejected by me. The complainant Sri Pradeep Kumar Garg alleged that Shadev is involved in negotiation of the officer with the respondent. On 15.7.03, I suo motu on administrative ground transferred the R.C.A from the court of Sri Saxena to Sri R.A. Singh, A.D.J. Court No. 2. but it was brought in my notice later on 18.7.03 by Sri A.K. Saxena that the appeal had already been decided on 14.7.03. Afterwards the respondent Dile Ram Sharma made a complaint against Sri Saxena. He also made serious allegations (sic) Sahdev, orderly of Sri Saxena. This case was a glaring example of his corrupt activities.

(2) One Smt. Bhagwati Devi w/o Sri Jamna Das r/o. House No. 1/314, Subhash Nagar, Saharanpur made a complaint against him regarding M.C.A. No. 128/03. Similar type of allegations were also made against Sri Saxena in the complaint that on 4.9.03 arguments were heard by Sri Saxena and 10.9.03 was fixed for judgment. Rulings were to be filed on 8.9.03. Later on she came to know that the other party has settled the matter with the officer. Explanation was called of Sri Saxena regarding the allegations of Smt. Bhagwati Devi and in his explanation he tried to mislead the District Judge also. Believing the explanation of Sri Saxena the complaint of Smt. Bhagwati Devi was rejected by me. But later on it was brought in my notice that the file had been requisitioned by the Hon'ble High Court.

(3) S.T. No. 510/99 u/s. 302 IPC PS Gangoh was pending in the court of Sri A.K. Saxena, Addl. Sessions Judge, Court No.4. Charan Singh s/o Sukhbir Singh, complainant of the case made a complaint against Sri Saxena that there is no hope of justice from Sri Saxena. After calling explanation from him, this S.T was recalled from his court to the file of Sessions Judge. Serious allegations of corruption were also made in this complaint.

(4) Complaint was also received in F.A. No. 492/93 Ved Prakash Vs. Dheeraj Singh. The appellant in his complaint alleged that there had been manipulation in the order-sheet of dt. 9.12.02. On 9.12.02 part arguments were heard of the Advocates of the parties and 13.12.02 was fixed for remaining arguments. But on 13.12.02 Sri Saxena instead of hearing remaining arguments of the parties decided the appeal. From the perusal of the order-sheet of 9.12.02 it was revealed that manipulations were made in the order-sheet. Earlier it was mentioned that adjourn for remaining arguments, but by cutting these words, word 'judgment' has been added.

(5) S.T. No. 750/97 State Vs. Prahlad & others u/s. 304-B, 498-A, 302/34 IPC and ¾ D.P. Act PS Deoband was pending in the court of Sri A.K. Saxena. Prior to the decision of the S.T. on 29.9.03 Sri Chandra Prakash Gupta, a senior criminal lawyer of Saharanpur made an oral complaint to me that for acquittal of accused persons illegal gratification had been paid to the father of Sri Saxena. And the murder is brutal. I summoned the file and also enquired from Sri Saxena. He denied from all these allegations and assured that he will do justice in the case. Complaint was oral and the officer assured me that he will do justice in the case, hence no order was passed by me for transfer of the case. But later on it was brought in my notice that Sri Saxena convicted accused Prahlad for the offence u/s 304-B IPC but acquitted the inlaws of the deceased. Sentence for 10 years R.I was imposed for the offence 304-B I.P.C. and the inlaws of the deceased were convicted for the offence u/s. ¾ D.P. Act for the term of sentence already undergone. The matter was also reported to the Hon'ble High Court.

(6) I have stated above that the general reputation of the officer was very poor. And his court was termed as a shop. Abovementioned are some of the instances of his corrupt activities. Such officers are blot on the judicial system.

Against the aforesaid adverse remarks, the petitioner submitted a representation dated 28.06.2004. It appears that the said representation was placed before the then Administrative Judge, Saharanpur vide Office Note dated 24.08.2004 but no orders were passed on the said representation. In the meantime, the then Administrative Judge was transferred to another High Court on 04.01.2005. Hence, the file relating to the petitioner was received back in the Registry without any order on the representation. However, the records that were received indicated that the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge had already recorded annual entry for the year 2003-04 concerning the petitioner. The same is extracted below:

"The work and performance of the officer in the working days is satisfactory. He has good relation with the members of the Bar and brother Officers. He has made regular inspections, which were effective. He is a fair and impartial officer. Disposal of cases are good. On overall assessment he is rated to be a good officer.

Integrity certified."

However, as no order had been passed on the representation of the petitioner, the representation of the petitioner was placed before the Administrative Committee vide Office Notice dated 02.03.2005 under the standing order of the Chief Justice dated 10.06.1997. The said standing order, which has been brought on record as Annexure C.A. 6 to the counter affidavit filed in Writ No.52347 of 2008, is extracted below:-

"ORDER The following directions are issued to the office regarding dealing with the representations against the adverse remarks of the Judicial Officers:-

1. All the representations made against the adverse remarks awarded by the District Judge should be placed before Hon'ble Inspecting Judge who was Incharge of that Sessions Division where the officer was posted at the time when those remarks were awarded.

2. If the remarks of the District Judge was subsequently considered and final remarks have been awarded by Hon'ble the Inspecting Judge, remarks of the District Judge shall be deemed to have merged with the remarks of the Hon'ble Inspecting Judge and in such event the representation against adverse remarks of the District Judge shall be placed before the Administrative Committee.

REGISTRAR Hon'ble the C.J.

If approved this order may be issued.

Registrar 10.06.1997 Approved Sd/- dt.10.06.1997"

As the record concerning the petitioner was placed before the Administrative Committee, the Administrative Committee, in its meeting, dated 06.04.2005, resolved as under:

"Considered the representation dated 28.06.2004 of the officer concerned against the adverse remarks recorded by the District Judge, Saharanpur for the year 2003-04 along with office notes dated 02.03.2005 and 24.08.2004.

It is resolved that the remarks of the District Judge be restored. The Administrative Committee overrules overall assessment of good and certificate of integrity given by the then Administrative Judge. The representation of the officer be thus rejected."

The aforesaid decision was communicated to the petitioner through the District Judge Jhansi vide Court's D.O. Letter dated 13.05.2005. Upon which, the petitioner moved a review representation dated 10.11.2005 which was considered and rejected by the Hon'ble Chief Justice vide order dated 04.01.2006 in view of an earlier resolution of the Full Court dated 06.01.1990 that no second representation would be entertainable.

Assailing the order of the Administrative Committee rejecting the representation of the petitioner and restoring the remarks of the District Judge, Saharanpur in the Service Record of the petitioner in respect of the year 2003-04, Writ A No. 21368 of 2006 has been filed in which it has been stated that the order rejecting the representation of the petitioner suffers from non-application of mind inasmuch as in respect of some of the instances of misconduct cited by the then District Judge, Saharanpur while making remarks against the petitioner for the year 2003-04, a departmental inquiry was held in which the petitioner was exonerated from the charges therefore there exists no material to form an opinion that the petitioner is a corrupt officer. Hence, the adverse entry for the year 2003-04 deserves to be expunged.

In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the High Court in Writ A No. 21368 of 2006 stand taken is that the proceedings of a departmental inquiry stand on a separate footing than the proceedings meant for recording annual confidential remark. It is also stated that the departmental inquiry held against the petitioner was in respect of only few instances while the adverse remarks cited several instances and were based on overall assessment of the petitioner's conduct in the reporting year 2003-04.

While Writ A No. 21368 of 2006 was pending, a Screening Committee comprising four Hon'ble Judges of the High Court examined the records whether to compulsorily retire the petitioner as per the provisions of Fundamental Rule 56 (c) as applicable in the State of U.P.. The Screening Committee in its meeting held on 02.04.2008 unanimously resolved to recommend compulsory retirement of the petitioner. The report of the Screening Committee dated 02.04.2008 was placed before the Full Court of the High Court. The Full Court, in its meeting held on 12.07.2008, resolved to accept the report of the Screening Committee and to retire the petitioner compulsorily in public interest.

Pursuant to the resolution of the Full Court, recommendation was made to the appointing authority/i.e. the Governor of the State of Uttar Pradesh. Whereafter, on the basis of such recommendation, Govt. of U.P. issued order on 23.07.2008 of compulsory retirement. As a consequence whereof, decision was taken to withdraw judicial work from the petitioner.

Assailing the order of compulsory retirement, Writ A No. 52347 of 2008 has been filed.

The order of compulsory retirement has been assailed on the ground that for taking a decision to compulsorily retire an officer, the entire service record of the officer has to be considered and not just a stray adverse remark. It is stated that except the adverse remark for the year 2003-04, which, by itself, was not sustainable in law, there was no adverse material against the petitioner to enable the Screening Committee to form an opinion that it was in the public interest to compulsorily retire the petitioner. It is stated that since the adverse remark for the year 2003-04 was made by drawing inference from certain illustrations / instances cited in the report of the then District Judge, Saharanpur and in respect of those instances a full-fledged enquiry was held in which the petitioner was exonerated, there remained no material to record adverse remark for the year 2003-04 or to compulsorily retire the petitioner.

The above two petitions were contested by the High Court by claiming that adverse entry was made on the basis of the report of the District Judge, Saharanpur which was based on his overall assessment and impression about the petitioner gathered from the functioning of the petitioner. Therefore exoneration of the petitioner from certain charges, that might have been cited as instances of misconduct to form such impression, would not completely wipe out the overall assessment of the reporting officer which was accepted by the Administrative Committee after consideration of the representation submitted by the petitioner and by taking into consideration all aspects. It is the case of the respondents that a solitary entry doubting the integrity of a judicial officer is sufficient to form basis for a decision to compulsorily retire the judicial officer inasmuch as there is no scope for having persons with doubtful integrity in judicial service. The respondents have thus prayed that both the petitions be dismissed.

We have heard Sri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Vivek Saran, for the petitioner; Sri Manish Goyal for the High Court; and the learned Standing Counsel for the State.

Before we proceed to examine the rival contentions, it would be appropriate for us to observe that on 31.08.2018, on behalf of the petitioner, a submission was made that as the Hon'ble Administrative Judge, Saharanpur had already awarded entry for the year 2003-04 and had certified the integrity of the petitioner, the Administrative Committee had no jurisdiction to sit over the entry recorded by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge, as an appellate authority, because the Rules do not permit overruling of the decision of the Administrative Judge to the extent it is favorable to the officer. Hence, the order of the Administrative Committee was without jurisdiction. In support of the above submission, a Division Bench decision of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain Vs. State of U.P. and another : 2007 (4) AWC 3209 was cited.

On the above submission made on behalf of the petitioner, on 31.08.2018, we had directed the counsel for the High Court to place the relevant records as regards the date by which the Hon'ble Administrative Judge had provided entry as also whether the said entry was ever communicated to the petitioner so as to invite his representation.

On 11.09.2018, the relevant records were placed before us. From a perusal of the records, we could not find as to on what date the Hon'ble Administrative Judge had provided favourable entry to the petitioner. However, Sri Manish Goyal, appearing for the High Court, questioned the correctness of the law laid down by this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra) by placing before us provisions of the High Court Rules. It was also brought to our notice that a Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 808 of 2008 had been preferred before the Apex Court against the judgment and decision of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra). It was pointed out that although the Apex Court did not interfere with the order of the High Court rendered in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra) but had left the question of law open to be addressed. It was thus urged by Sri Goyal that dismissal of the Special Leave to Appeal by the Apex Court would not amount to affirmance of the view taken by this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra).

Sri Manish Goyal urged that the view taken in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra) that the Administrative Committee can only sit over an adverse entry recorded by an Administrative Judge and not over a good entry is not the correct interpretation of the provisions of the High Court Rules. Sri Goyal submitted that while taking the aforesaid view, in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra), reliance was placed on Entry no. 3 of Part B of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules pertaining to Allocation of Administrative Work as also on Entry Nos. 16 and 17 of Part C of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules. It was urged that Part B of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules relates to Matters for Administrative Judge. Entry no.3 of Part B of Chapter III of High Court Rules provides as follows:

"Any adverse remarks or strictures made by an Administrative Judge about judicial work, conduct or integrity of any officer under his charge will be communicated to the officer concerned, who may make his representation, if any, within a month and the same shall be placed before the Administrative Committee for consideration and decision."

Sri Goyal urged that Entry No. 3 of Part B of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules provides for a remedy for the officer concerned to make a representation as against the adverse remarks or strictures made by an Administrative Judge communicated to him. The said entry does not limit the power conferred upon an Administrative Committee by Part C of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules.

Sri Goyal urged that the matters for the Administrative Committee are enumerated in Part C of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules. He submitted that Entry nos. 12, 16 and 17 of Part C of Rule 4 of Chapter-III of the High Court Rules are relevant. The said entries are extracted below:-

"Entry No.12: Matters referred to the Administrative Committee by the Chief Justice.

Entry No.16: Decision on the reports of the Administrative Judge including Annual Confidential Remarks recorded by him in respect of an officer in his charge.

Entry No. 17: Consideration of representations against all the Committee relating to adverse remarks and strictures."

Sri Manish Goyal submitted that under Entry No. 12, the Administrative Committee can deal with all matters that are referred to it by the Chief Justice. Likewsie, Entry No.16, empowers the Administrative Committee to deal with reports of the Administrative Judge including Annual Confidential Remarks recorded by him in respect of an officer in his charge. Sri Goyal submitted that, in the instant case, as the representation of the petitioner was undecided and the same was placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice and, under the order of the Hon'ble Chief Justice, the same was placed before the Administrative Committee, the Administrative Committee, by virtue of Entry No. 12 read with Entry No. 16, was fully empowered to deal with the Annual Confidential Entry recorded by the Administrative Judge and take its own decision.

Sri Goyal submitted that Entry No. 17 deals with consideration of representations against the decisions of a Committee relating to adverse remarks and strictures. It was submitted that Entry No. 17 is not in reference to the remarks recorded by the Administrative Judge. Sri Goyal submitted that the Chief Justice in exercise of his administrative power conferred upon him by law as well as by Entry No. 3 of Part A of Rule 4 of Chapter-III of the High Court Rules has power to constitute Committees of Judges to examine any matter specified. It was submitted that Entry No. 17 deals with representations against adverse remarks and strictures made by such Committees.

Sri Goyal submitted that in Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra), the Division Bench of this Court had erroneously taken the view that the power conferred upon Administrative Committee by Entry No. 16 of Part C and Entry No.3 of Part B of Rule 4, when read with Entry No. 17 of Part C of Rule 4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules, would be limited to review only adverse remarks recorded by an Administrative Judge. Sri Goyal submitted that Entry No. 17 of Part C serves a different purpose than what is served by Entry No. 16. Hence, the power conferred by Entry No. 16 would not be controlled by Entry No. 17 and as such the Administrative Committee had power to deal with entry recorded by the Administrative Judge notwithstanding that it may not be adverse to the officer concerned.

After noticing the submissions made by Sri Manish Goyal, questioning the correctness of the decision of this Court in the decision of Desh Bhushan Jain's case (supra) to the extent it held that the Administrative Committee had no power to overrule the decision of the Administrative Judge in respect of good entry recorded by him in respect of an officer under his charge, on 11.09.2018, we had passed the following order:-

"Pursuant to the order dated 31.8.2018, Sri Manish Goyal has produced photocopy of the relevant records. We have perused the same.

Sri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2007 (4) AWC 3209 against which though a special leave to appeal (Civil) No. 808 of 2008 was preferred by the High Court but was dismissed.

Sri Manish Goyal, representing the High Court has submitted that in the special leave to appeal preferred against the judgment and decision of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain case (supra) the Apex Court had specifically left the question of law open to be addressed. It has been submitted that dismissal of the special leave to appeal cannot be taken as binding precedent of the Apex Court.

Sri Manish Goyal, further submitted that the decision in Desh Bhushan Jain's case requires reconsideration because the Division Bench has, while interpreting the powers of the Administrative Committee to sit over a decision of the Administrative Judge in respect of recording of Annual Confidential Reports, read Entry-16 and Entry-17 of Part-C of Rule-4 of Chapter-III of the High Court Rules in conjunction so as to hold that Entry-16 is controlled by Entry-17 and, therefore, the Administrative Committee would have power only to sit over the adverse remarks recorded by Administrative Judge and not otherwise. He has submitted that Entry-17 operates on a different field than Entry-16 and, therefore, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain's case calls for reconsideration. He has also submitted that the Division Bench had not taken note of Entry-12 of Part-C of Rule-4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules which specifically confers powers on the Chief Justice to make reference of matters to the Administrative Committee. He submitted that as in the instant case, a reference was made by the Chief Justice, the Administrative Committee had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Administrative Judge, more so, because the Administrative Judge had not addressed the representation, which returned back without a decision and it could not have been referred back to the Administrative Judge as he had already been transferred.

Sri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for time to study the matter in the context of arguments advanced by Sri Manish Goyal.

Put up this matter in the Additional List on 18.9.2018 along with connected matter. "

Thereafter, when the matter was taken up on 18.09.2018, Sri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel, assisted by Sri Vivek Saran, appearing for the petitioner, specifically made a statement that he does not wish to press the ground that the Administrative Committee had no jurisdiction to overrule the decision of the Administrative Judge certifying the integrity and awarding good entry to the petitioner. Consequently, after noticing the above statement of Sri Navin Sinha and after hearing counsel for the parties at length, judgment was reserved by order dated 18.09.2018, which is extracted below:

"On 31.1.2018, following order was passed:

"One of the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the ACR (Annual Confidential Report) entry for the year 2003-04, as per averment made in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit, which was favourable to the petitioner and had certified his integrity, was already recorded by Hon'ble Administrative Judge, therefore the Administrative Committee had no jurisdiction to sit over the entry recorded by the Hon'ble Administrative Judge, as an appellate authority, when the rules do not permit so and as such the entry recorded by the Administrative Committee is without jurisdiction, particularly in view of Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Desh Bhushan Jain Vs. State of U.P. and another : 2007 (4) AWC 3209.

A perusal of the counter affidavit reflects that some representation of the petitioner was placed before the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge, vide office note dated 24th August, 2004, but the same was received back without any order as the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge stood transferred on 4th January, 2005 therefore the matter was placed before the Administrative Committee and as such the Administrative Committee gave the entry.

It is not clear from the counter affidavit as to when the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge had certified the integrity of the petitioner for the year 2003-04 and, if it was so, what was the occasion for the petitioner to make representation against the remarks made by the District Judge concerned. However, the order of the Administrative Committee does reflect that it overrides the assessment of good conduct and certificate of integrity given by the then Hon'ble Administrative Judge.

Under the circumstances, we consider it appropriate to require Sri Manish Goyal, learned counsel representing the High Court, to place the relevant records as regards the date by which the Hon'ble Administrative Judge had provided entry of which reference is there in paragraph 9 of the counter affidavit. Instruction should also be sought as to whether the said entry was ever communicated to the petitioner on the basis of which he may have filed representation, which was later considered by the Administrative Committee.

Sri Manish Goyal prays for and is allowed ten days time to produce the relevant records as well as seek instructions as above.

List this matter in the additional list on 11th September, 2018."

Thereafter, on 11.9.2018, following order was passed:

"Pursuant to the order dated 31.8.2018, Sri Manish Goyal has produced photocopy of the relevant records. We have perused the same.

Sri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain Vs. State of U.P. and another, 2007 (4) AWC 3209 against which though a special leave to appeal (Civil) No. 808 of 2008 was preferred by the High Court but was dismissed.

Sri Manish Goyal, representing the High Court has submitted that in the special leave to appeal preferred against the judgment and decision of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain case (supra) the Apex Court had specifically left the question of law open to be addressed. It has been submitted that dismissal of the special leave to appeal cannot be taken as binding precedent of the Apex Court.

Sri Manish Goyal, further submitted that the decision in Desh Bhushan Jain's case requires reconsideration because the Division Bench has, while interpreting the powers of the Administrative Committee to sit over a decision of the Administrative Judge in respect of recording of Annual Confidential Reports, read Entry-16 and Entry-17 of Part-C of Rule-4 of Chapter-III of the High Court Rules in conjunction so as to hold that Entry-16 is controlled by Entry-17 and, therefore, the Administrative Committee would have power only to sit over the adverse remarks recorded by Administrative Judge and not otherwise. He has submitted that Entry-17 operates on a different field than Entry-16 and, therefore, the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in Desh Bhushan Jain's case calls for reconsideration. He has also submitted that the Division Bench had not taken note of Entry-12 of Part-C of Rule-4 of Chapter III of the High Court Rules which specifically confers powers on the Chief Justice to make reference of matters to the Administrative Committee. He submitted that as in the instant case, a reference was made by the Chief Justice, the Administrative Committee had jurisdiction to review the decision of the Administrative Judge, more so, because the Administrative Judge had not addressed the representation, which returned back without a decision and it could not have been referred back to the Administrative Judge as he had already been transferred.

Sri Vivek Saran, learned counsel for the petitioner prays for time to study the matter in the context of arguments advanced by Sri Manish Goyal.

Put up this matter in the Additional List on 18.9.2018 along with connected matter."

Today, Sri Navin Sinha, learned Senior counsel, assisted by Sri Vivek Saran, appearing for the petitioner has made a statement that in the light of the arguments noticed in the order dated 11.9.2018, he does not wish to press the ground that the Administrative Committee had no jurisdiction to overrule the decision of the Administrative Judge in respect of certifying integrity and awarding good entry to the petitioner. He, however, contended that, on facts, the decision of the Administration Committee was not justified.

We have heard Sri Navin Sinha, assisted by Sri Vivek Saran for the petitioner at length; and Sri Manish Goyal, counsel for the High Court.

Judgment reserved."

Now, it would be appropriate for us to notice the contentions on which the petition has been pressed on behalf of the petitioner.

Sri Navin Sinha, learned senior counsel for the petitioner, contended that the adverse annual confidential remarks recorded by the District Judge, Saharanpur for the year 2003-04 were uncalled for and when read with the other remarks made, the remarks made by the District Judge appears to be a bundle of self-contradictions, inasmuch as, in paragraph no. 2(d) in respect of the remark against petitioner's private character, the District Judge reported : "No complaint was received against his private character such as to lower him in the estimation of public or adversely affect the discharge of his official duty. But his reputation was of a very corrupt judicial officer." Similarly, in respect of entry as regards behaviour with the members of the Bar, the District Judge observed : "No member of the Bar complained about his behaviour." Likewise, in respect of punctuality in sitting in the Court, the District Judge reported: " He was punctual in sitting in the Court." Similarly, in respect of the quality of judgment which the petitioner wrote the remark was : "Judgments on facts and law were on the whole sound, well reasoned and expressed in good language."

It was submitted that the opinion formed by the District Judge that the petitioner's integrity was highly doubtful and he was a corrupt judicial officer of the district is based on certain instances cited when, in respect of those cited instances, disciplinary proceedings were dropped. Therefore, once the material, on the basis of which inference was drawn, is found unsubstantiated, there remained no material to come to a conclusion that the petitioner had been a corrupt judicial officer. It was submitted that in the facts of the case, the Administrative Committee was not at all justified in overruling the good entry and certificate of integrity provided by the Administrative Judge to the petitioner for the year 2003-04.

Sri Sinha contended that since the recommendation of the Screening Committee to compulsorily retire the petitioner was based only on the entry of 2003-04, which itself was unsustainable, the consequent order of compulsory retirement is unsustainable and is liable to be set aside as there exists no material to warrant an opinion that the petitioner was a deadwood or an officer with doubtful integrity, unworthy to continue in judicial service.

Sri Sinha contended that it is trite law that for drawing satisfaction as regards the utility of an officer to continue in the establishment, the entire service record of the officer is to be considered, and the service record of the petitioner, except for the entry of the year 2003-04, was good and not such on which an inference could be drawn that the petitioner had outlived his utility for the establishment or that his integrity was doubtful. Hence, the order of compulsory retirement is based on no material as also vitiated by non application of mind on the entire service record and is, therefore, liable to be set aside.

Per contra, Sri Goyal submitted that the District Judge, had formed his opinion about the integrity of the petitioner as doubtful on the basis of the inputs which he received as an administrative head of the district judiciary. The District Judge had noticed the involvement of a Class IV employee attached with the petitioner as also the fact that that Class IV employee had to be transferred to the outlying court. The District Judge had also reported that the petitioner, on being transferred from Saharanpur to Hamirpur under the order of the High Court, gave a call to the District Judge expressing his resentment for reporting against his corrupt activities to the High Court. In his remarks, the District Judge had also observed that he had informed the High Court vide D.O. Letter dated December 8, 2003 upon which he received a communication from the Joint Registrar, High Court, vide D.O. Letter dated February 12, 2004 to record the incident while recording character roll entry of the officer.

Sri Manish Goyal submitted that in his representation the petitioner has not disclosed any good reason as to why the District Judge would proceed to make such caustic remarks without any basis. Sri Goyal submitted that there is no specific allegation that the District Judge concerned was biased against the petitioner though a bald averment has been made that the District Judge got annoyed because of non disclosure of the result of a case of which judgment was to be pronounced by him. Sri Goyal submitted that in the representation the details of that case and the factual context as to when, and under what circumstances, the District Judge had called upon the petitioner to disclose the judgment to be delivered, have not been specifically disclosed therefore there existed no substantial reason for the Committee of the High Court to discard the impression which the District Judge had about the petitioner by noticing petitioner's conduct from the position of an incharge of the district judiciary. Sri Goyal further submitted that the District Judge had referred to a telephonic call made by the petitioner to him wherein the petitioner had expressed his resentment for reporting the matter to the High Court consequent to which the petitioner had been transferred. It was submitted that in the representation although the petitioner had made a statement that someone else may have called the District Judge by taking petitioner's name but he has not made any such statement that the District Judge was not conversant with his voice and was not in a position to recognise the voice of the petitioner. Sri Goyal submitted that as an incharge of the district judiciary, the District Judge would have advantage of interaction with the officers placed under him and therefore ordinarily he would be conversant with the voice of such an officer. Hence, if the district judge makes a statement in respect of receipt of a telephonic call from an officer placed in his Judgship and that matter is put on record and is reported forthwith to the High Court and High Court, thereafter, requests the District Judge to record it in the ACR and remarks are thereafter recorded, such remarks are not to be doubted and once accepted by the Administrative Committee, upon a reference made to it by the Chief Justice, the decision of the Administrative Committee is not amenable to judicial review.

Sri Goyal submitted that the apex court had time and again observed that greater importance is to be given to remarks made by the immediate superior as regards functioning of a judicial officer because the immediate superior is better placed to observe, analyse, scrutinize from close quarters and to comment upon his working, overall efficiency and reputation.

Sri Goyal submitted that the remarks made against the petitioner were not only drawn from five instances set out in the remarks column but on the basis of his impression which the District Judge could gather from the overall conduct of the petitioner and the inputs which the District Judge received as an overall incharge of the district judiciary. It has been submitted by Sri Goyal that those instances would therefore have to be treated as illustration and not as exhaustive material on the basis of which impression was gathered. Hence, even if the petitioner has been exonerated on few matters cited as instances, the overall impression does not get wiped out. More so, because a departmental enquiry is based on evidence and proof whereas impression gathered about an officer is based on various inputs received by the person incharge under whom the incumbent is placed. Sri Goyal submitted that the instances set out in the remarks column were five in number whereas the departmental charge-sheet related to only three of those five instances. Otherwise also, exoneration in the departmental enquiry would not obliterate the remark made by the District Judge. Sri Goyal contended that it is now well settled that decision to compulsorily retire a judicial officer can be taken on a solitary entry/remark questioning the integrity of a judicial officer. Sri Goyal submitted that judicial service is not to be equated with ordinary service. Even good and sound judgment of an officer, who in public perception is of doubtful integrity, may not be acceptable. Under the circumstances, even on a solitary entry/remark, doubting the integrity of a judicial officer, an order of compulsory retirement would be legally justified.

Sri Goyal contended that annual confidential remarks provided by the District Judge are not self-contradictory as has been contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Goyal submitted that paragraph 2 (d) of the ACR related to private character of the incumbent, it does not deal with the character exhibited by the incumbent as a judicial officer. The use of the word "private" is of significance therefore, even if no complaint is received against the private character of an officer, an impression about his integrity, as a judicial officer, being doubtful or an impression of the officer being corrupt, could be drawn on the basis of various inputs. Sri Goyal submitted that even a well discussed and sound judgment could be written with improper motives and therefore the same does not become a certificate of integrity. Therefore, if, in the remarks, it is mentioned that the petitioner's judgments were sound on facts and law would not make the impression drawn about the integrity of the officer invalid or self-contradictory. Sri Goyal submitted that likewise if no complaint is received against the behaviour of an officer that would not confer a certificate of integrity on that officer. Likewise, punctuality in sitting in court hall is not a certificate of integrity. Sri Goyal thus submitted that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the annual confidential remarks were a bundle of self-contradictions is not acceptable.

Counsels appearing for the parties have supplied compilation of authorities though many of them were not cited, therefore, they are not being discussed separately as it would only add bulk to the judgment. Moreover, in the facts of the case, all of them may not be relevant. However, for the record the authorities cited are listed below :-

"(i) R.C. Chandel Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh and another : (2012) 8 SCC 58;

(ii) High Court of Judicature at Patna Vs. Ajay Kumar Srivastava and others : (2017) 5 SCC 138;

(iii) Pratap Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another : (2012) 1 SCC 214;

(iv) R. R. Parekh Vs. High Court of Gujarat and another : (2016) 14 SCC 1;

(v) State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and another : (1978) 2 SCC 102;

(vi) D.K.Agarwal Vs. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad : (1988) 3 SCC 764;

(vii) Madan Mohan Choudhary Vs. State of Bihar and others : (1999) 3 SCC 396;

(viii) High Court of Punjab & Haryana Vs.Ishwar Chand Jain and another : (1999) 4 SCC 579;

(ix) Avinash Chandra Tripathi Vs. State of U.P. and another : 2018 (7) ADJ 582 (DB);

(x) Desh Bhushan Jain Vs. State of U.P. and another : 2007 (4) AWC 3209.

(xi) Rajendra Singh Verma Vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others : (2011) 10 SCC 1;

(xii) Jugal Chandra Saikia Vs. State of Assam : AIR 2003 SC 1362;

(xiii) State of U.P. Vs. Lalsa Ram : 2001 (3) SCC 389;

(xiv) State of M.P. Vs. Indra Sen Jain : 1998 (1) SCC 451;

(xv) Registrar High Court of Madras Vs. R. Rajjah : 1988 (3) SCC 211;

(xvi) State of Haryana Vs. Inder Prakash Anand : 1976 (2) SCC 977;

(xvii) Swatanter Singh Vs. State of Haryana : 1997 (4) SCC 14; and (xviii) Union of India Vs. M.E. Reddy : 1980 (2) SCC 15."

It may be observed that authorities from Serial Nos. (i) to (x) were supplied by the learned counsel for the petitioner whereas the authorities from Serial Nos. (xi) to (xviii) have been supplied by the learned counsel for the High Court.

We have considered the rival submissions and have perused the record carefully.

On the basis of the rival submissions, the following questions arise for our consideration:

(a) Whether on exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry, the foundation of the adverse remark doubting the integrity of the petitioner stood demolished?

(b) Whether the annual confidential remarks of the District Judge were a bundle of self-contradictions hence unworthy of credence?

(c) Whether on the basis of a solitary adverse entry doubting the integrity of the petitioner, the decision to compulsorily retire the petitioner was legally justified?

To properly address the first issue as culled out above, it would be apposite for us to refer to few facts. The remark of the District Judge doubting the integrity of the petitioner and describing him as a corrupt judicial officer is based on his impression gathered from the inputs that were received by him as an incharge of the district judiciary from time to time. The District Judge had not only mentioned few instances but had also observed about the conduct of the officer in having dealings through his 'ORDERLY'. The District Judge had mentioned that an order was passed by him on 25.08.2003 thereby cautioning the officer not to involve himself in corrupt activities and also not to involve the officials of the court in corrupt activities. The ORDERLY was reportedly transferred to the outlying court. The District Judge also noticed that he had reported the matter to the High Court and the High Court had thereafter recommended for petitioner's transfer and thereafter the petitioner had spoken to him on telephone to express resentment regarding reporting of his conduct to the High Court. The telephonic conversation was mentioned by the reporting officer to the High Court in his D.O. Letter dated December 8, 2003 and the High Court had informed the reporting officer to put all the said material in the ACR entry. The involvement of the concerned Orderly was mentioned in a transfer application/complaint as is noticeable from one of the example detailed. In one of the instances mentioned by the District Judge, relating to First Appeal No. 492 of 1993 it was mentioned that on 09.12.2002, arguments were heard in part and 13.12.2002 was fixed for remaining arguments but the order-sheet was manipulated and 13.12.2002 was fixed not only for remaining arguments but also for delivery of judgment by adding the word 'judgment' in the order-sheet and the judgment was delivered on 13.12.2002.

The charges leveled in the charge-sheet that was served on the petitioner were not in respect of his dealings through the Orderly. The departmental charge-sheet also did not refer to the telephonic conversation of the petitioner with the District Judge. Under the circumstances, we are of the view that exoneration in the departmental inquiry does not completely wipe out the material on the basis of which impression was gathered by the reporting Judge (District Judge, Saharanpur) as regards the integrity and general reputation of the petitioner.

At this stage, it would be apposite for us to refer to few decisions of the apex court in which it has been observed that greater importance is to be given to the remarks made by the immediate superior officer as to the functioning of the judicial officer concerned. In Nand Kumar Verma Vs. State of Jharkhand and others : (2012) 3 SCC 580, in paragraph 38, it has been observed as follows:-

"Moreover, the District and Sessions Judge had the opportunity to watch the functioning of the appellant from close quarters, who have reported favourably regarding the appellant's overall performance except about his disposal, in the appellant's recent ACR for the year 1997-98 and 1998-99. In view of this, the greater importance is to be given to the opinion or remarks made by the immediate superior officer as to the functioning of the concerned judicial officer for the purpose of his compulsory retirement. The immediate superior is better placed to observe, analyse, scrutinize from close quarters and then, to comment upon his working, overall efficiency, and reputation."

(Emphasis Supplied) In Rajendra Singh Verma's case (supra), in paragraph 193 of the report, the apex court after considering an earlier decision in M.S. Bindra Vs. Union of India : (1998) 7 SCC 310, had observed as follows:-

"193. Further this Court in M.S. Bindra's case (Supra) has used the phrase `preponderance of probability' to be applied before recording adverse entry regarding integrity of a judicial officer. There is no manner of doubt that the authority which is entrusted with a duty of writing ACR does not have right to tarnish the reputation of a judicial officer without any basis and without any `material' on record, but at the same time other equally important interest is also to be safeguarded i.e. ensuring that the corruption does not creep in judicial services and all possible attempts must be made to remove such a virus so that it should not spread and become infectious. When even verbal repeated complaints are received against a judicial officer or on enquiries, discreet or otherwise, the general impression created in the minds of those making inquiries or the Full Court is that concerned judicial officer does not carry good reputation, such discreet inquiry and or verbal repeated complaints would constitute material on the basis of which ACR indicating that the integrity of the officer is doubtful can be recorded. While undertaking judicial review, the Court in an appropriate case may still quash the decision of the Full Court on administrative side if it is found that there is no basis or material on which the ACR of the judicial officer was recorded, but while undertaking this exercise of judicial review and trying to find out whether there is any material on record or not, it is the duty of the Court to keep in mind the nature of function being discharged by the judicial officer, the delicate nature of the exercise to be performed by the High Court on administrative side while recording the ACR and the mechanism/system adopted in recording such ACR."

(Emphasis Supplied) Further, in paragraph 195 of the report, the apex court observed as follows:-

"It is a matter of common knowledge that the complaints which are made against a judicial officer, orally or in writing are dealt with by the Inspecting Judge or the High Court with great caution. Knowing that most of such complaints are frivolous and by disgruntled elements, there is generally a tendency to discard them. However, when the suspicion arises regarding integrity of a judicial officer, whether on the basis of complaints or information received from other sources and a committee is formed to look into the same, as was done in the instant case and the committee undertakes the task by gathering information from various sources as are available to it, on the basis of which a perception about the concerned judicial officer is formed, it would be difficult for the Court either under Article 226 or for this Court under Article 32 to interfere with such an exercise. Such an opinion and impression formed consciously and rationally after the enquiries of the nature mentioned above would definitely constitute material for recording adverse report in respect of an officer. Such an impression is not readily formed but after Court's circumspection, deliberation, etc. and thus it is a case of preponderance of probability for entertaining a doubt about integrity of an official which is based on substance, matter, information etc. Therefore, the contention that without material or basis the adverse entries were recorded in the ACR of the appellants cannot be upheld and is hereby rejected."

(Emphasis Supplied) From above, it is clear that impression created in the mind of the reporting officer (which in the context of the present case would be the District Judge) about the integrity of an officer placed under him is of importance and is not to be questioned ordinarily on the basis of insufficiency of material because such impression may be drawn on the basis of repeated oral complaints, enquiries, discreet or otherwise. Such an impression may also be gathered from transfer applications received by him in different matters from different parties or from different set of lawyers. In a departmental enquiry, the charges are to be substantiated not on the basis of impression but on the basis of cogent material. Under the circumstances, if, in a departmental enquiry, there is exoneration from the charges, the general impression that a reporting officer had gathered about an officer posted under him is not wiped out completely. Such an impression can therefore form basis as to whether integrity of the incumbent is to be certified or not. We are thus of the firm view that exoneration of the petitioner in the departmental enquiry, which was drawn on some of the instances cited in the ACR to draw impression about the integrity of the petitioner, cannot be made basis to hold that the ACR of the petitioner of the year 2003-04 is rendered on no material or is now rendered worthless.

Further, it may be observed that the departmental proceeding had not been on all aspects that were covered by the remarks made by the reporting officer (the District Judge, Saharanpur). We may notice that the making of a phone call by the petitioner to the District Judge expressing his resentment with regard to reporting the matter to the High Court is also of relevance which had not been part of departmental enquiry. No doubt, the petitioner in his representation has sought to plead that the phone call was not made by him but by someone else but that explanation was considered and rejected by the Administrative Committee which proceeded to restore the remarks of the District Judge. The wisdom of the Administrative Committee in rejecting the representation of the petitioner cannot be judicially scrutinized because it is expected that all decisions are taken after due deliberation. Even otherwise, it is not expected that an in-charge Judge of the district would not be conversant with the voice of the officers directly posted under him and would not recognize the voice of an officer, when conversation is on aspects that would make the person listening on guard.

For all the reasons noticed above, we are of the firm view that subsequent exoneration of the petitioner in departmental enquiry from certain charges, which were cited as instances to comment upon the doubtful integrity of the petitioner, would not wipe out the foundation of the opinion which the reporting Judge (District Judge, Saharanpur) had about the integrity of the petitioner.

The second issue that now arises for our consideration is whether the remarks made by the District Judge, Saharanpur in the ACR of the petitioner for the year 2003-04 were a bundle of self-contradictions and as such of no value. In this regard, much emphasis has been laid by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the remarks made by the reporting officer as regards the private character of the petitioner; as regards the efficiency in judgment writing ; as regards his general behaviour with the members of the Bar; and as regards his punctuality in sitting in Court, were all favorable to the petitioner.

It was urged on behalf of the petitioner that on all these aspects, the reporting officer has given a favourable remark stating that no complaint was received against the private character of the petitioner; that the judgments of the petitioner were sound on facts and law and were well reasoned and expressed in good language; that no member of the Bar complained about his behaviour; and that he was punctual in sitting in Court. It was urged that since there were no complaints about the character of the petitioner and the judgments of the petitioner were sound on facts and law and the behaviour of the petitioner towards the member of the Bar was good and that he was punctual in sitting in Court, where was the occasion for the reporting officer to come to a conclusion that the petitioner was a person with doubtful integrity and a corrupt judicial officer.

The aforesaid contention is worthy of rejection for the following reasons :

Private character of an officer is not a reflection upon his integrity as a judicial officer. A person may not have personal vices but yet he may be crafty and may get influenced by corrupt motives in delivery/dispensation of justice. Therefore, if no complaints are received against private character of a person that, by itself, is not a certificate of integrity of a judicial officer, which is to be assessed on the basis of impression gathered from various inputs.

Similarly, if judgment of a judicial officer is well written and is sound on facts and law that by itself is not a certificate of integrity because even a procured judgment may be well written judgment so as to make it difficult to find faults in it. A judgment though well written may still not be acceptable to a party if a party finds out that the judgment has been procured. Therefore, what is important is the public perception. Under the circumstances, merely because the reporting officer mentioned that the judgments of the petitioner were sound on facts and law his perception about the integrity of the petitioner being doubtful would not be an expression of self-contradiction. Likewise, punctuality in holding court and behaviour towards members of the Bar by itself can never be a certificate of integrity.

There is another aspect of the matter. The very fact that the reporting Judge has appreciated the good points of the petitioner would go to show that the reporting Judge had no malice against the petitioner.

For the reasons detailed above, we are of the firm view that the annual confidential remarks of the District Judge cannot be discarded as a bundle of self-contradictions as has been suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

The third issue that falls for our consideration is whether on the basis of a solitary adverse remark doubting the integrity of the petitioner, the otherwise good entries of the petitioner could be given a go bye to justify a decision to compulsorily retire the petitioner.

The above issue is no longer res-integra. In number of decisions, the apex court had been consistent in its stand that judicial service is not an ordinary government service and the Judges are not like ordinary government employees. Judges hold a public office and their function is one of the essential functions of the State. In discharge of their functions and duties, the Judges represent the State. The office that a Judge holds is an office of public trust. A Judge must be a person of unimpeachable integrity. He must be honest to the core with high moral values. When a litigant enters the courtroom, he must feel secure that the Judge before whom his matter has come, would deliver justice impartially and uninfluenced by any consideration. The standard of conduct expected of a Judge is much higher than an ordinary man. It is no excuse that since the standards in the society have fallen, the Judges who are drawn from the society cannot be expected to have high standards and ethical firmness required of a Judge. A Judge, like Caesar's wife, must be above suspicion. The credibility of the judicial system is dependent upon the Judges who man it.

In Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand : 2010 (10) SCC 693, a three Judges Bench of the Apex Court, in paragraph 29 of the report, had observed:

"................a single adverse entry regarding the integrity of an officer even in remote past is sufficient to award compulsory retirement. The case of a Judicial Officer is required to be examined, treating him to be differently from other wings of the society, as he is serving the State in a different capacity. The case of a Judicial Officer is considered by a Committee of Judges of the High Court duly constituted by Hon'ble the Chief Justice and then the report of the Committee is placed before the Full Court. A decision is taken by the Full Court after due deliberation on the matter. Therefore, there is hardly any chance to make the allegations of non- application of mind or mala fide"

In view of the above, the issue no. 3 is also decided against the petitioner.

Having regard to the findings recorded by us on the issues that arose for our consideration in this case and upon a conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case as also by keeping in mind that there had been an adverse entry doubting the integrity of the petitioner, which was considered by the Screening Committee to recommend compulsory retirement of the petitioner and, thereafter, the matter was placed before the Full Court which had approved the recommendations of the Screening Committee whereafter upon the recommendations of the Court the Governor took his decision, the decision to compulsorily retire the petitioner calls for no interference. Accordingly, both the petitions are liable to be dismissed and are hereby dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

Order Date :- 16.11.2018 Sunil Kr Tiwari

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

Allahabad High Court