Bombay High Court
Usha Dilip Tanna vs Vishwanath V. Angadi on 20 April, 2026
Author: Bharati Dangre
Bench: Bharati Dangre
2026:BHC-OS:10316-DB
J-WP-839-2023.odt
rajshree
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO.839 OF 2023
Usha Dilip Tanna ....Petitioner
V/S
Vishwanath Angadi & Ors. ....Respondents
Mr.Karl Tamboly a/w Mr.Yash Momaya, Mr.Rohit Vaishya and
Ms.Teresa Daulat i/b YMK Legal for the Petitioner.
Ms.Niyami Jariwala i/b Ms.Nandita Gopalan for Respondent
Nos.2 to 4.
CORAM : BHARATI DANGRE &
MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, JJ
DATE : 20th APRIL, 2026
JUDGMENT (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J) :
1 'Rule'. By consent of Parties, Petition is heard finally.
2 The present Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner seek a direction against Respondent No. 1, the Arbitrator conducting the arbitration proceedings, as it is the claim of the Petitioner that the proceedings are non-est, in absence of an Arbitration Agreement between the Parties nor has the Petitioner ever appointed and or consented to the appointment of Respondent No.1 as the Arbitrator and no court has exercised its power under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (in short, Digitally signed RAJSHREE by RAJSHREE KISHOR KISHOR MORE MORE Date: 2026.04.22 20:21:23 +0530 1/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt the Act of 1996) appointing him as the Arbitrator.
3 We have heard the learned counsel, Mr. Karl Tamboly for the Petitioner and the learned counsel Ms.Niyami Jariwala for Respondent Nos.2 to 4.
In pursuance to the notice issued by us the learned Arbitrator through the Registrar (Judicial) has also forwarded his submissions/statements for consideration.
4 The factual background in brief would reveal that the Petitioner's father, Mr. Bhagwandas, is the Owner of "Kolipathy Tea & Coffee Estate" and the "Kolipathy Tea "Kolipathy Factory"
situated at Ootacamund, Nilgiris. He expired on 5th December 1988, leaving behind the Petitioner, her 2 sisters (Respondent Nos. 5 and 6) and her mother, as his legal heirs.
During his lifetime, the Petitioner's father had agreed to sell the Kolipathy Estate to Respondent No.2. After several years, Respondent No.3, somewhere in the year 1999, approached the Petitioner's mother and sought execution of a Sale Deed /Conveyance. At that juncture the Petitioner's mother, the Petitioner and her sisters (Respondent Nos. 5 and 6) had obliged Respondent No.3 and executed a Power of Attorney in favour of Respondent No.2, as per their instructions. Pertinently, neither the Petitioner's mother nor the Petitioner, nor the Petitioner's sisters were aware of the transaction. However, merely on the representation of Respondent No.3 and in good faith they acceded to the request of Respondent No.3.
However, even thereafter it seems that Respondent Nos.2 2/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt to 4 did not take any steps towards execution of the conveyance. Surprisingly, on 11th April 2022, the Petitioner received a Letter dated 5th April 2022 (addressed to the Petitioner and her sisters) from one Mr. S. Sidhartha Vishnu, Advocate on behalf of Respondent Nos.2 and 3 invoking arbitration and calling upon the Petitioner and her sisters to convey their willingness to nominate Respondent No.1 i.e. Mr. Vishwananth Angadi as the Sole Arbitrator.
5 The Petitioner was taken by surprise to receive the letter as there was no existing Arbitration Agreement between the Petitioner and the Respondent No.2. The Petitioner, therefore, responded to the said letter on 11 th April 2022 clarifying that there was no Arbitration Agreement and in fact the letter of 5th April, 2022, also did not disclose existence of any dispute between the Parties and the claims, if any were barred by limitation.
However, without paying any heed to the aforesaid communication, it appears that Respondent No.1 proceeded with the arbitral proceedings by assuming jurisdiction and fixed the date of first appearance and for convening the first preliminary meeting. As the Petitioner had never consented for arbitration, she once again addressed a letter to the Arbitrator alleging that invocation of arbitration by Respondent No.2 was contrary to the provisions of Act of 1996, as there was no Arbitration Agreement between the Parties and the proceedings being undertaken by Respondent No.1, were completely without jurisdiction.
3/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 :::J-WP-839-2023.odt 6 The Petitioner is constrained to approach the Court as she narrates that the Arbitrator is proceeding with the arbitral proceedings and has passed some orders by noting absence of the Petitioner and has continued the arbitration proceedings ex parte.
According to the Petitioner, the continuation of the arbitration is grave abuse of process of law, as Respondent No.1 had no authority to conduct the arbitration and by relying upon the orders passed by the learned arbitrator, it is sought to be canvassed that the Arbitrator is not a fair and impartial Arbitrator and the proceedings which are without jurisdiction, cannot be permitted to be continue.
7 Mr. Tamboly by inviting our attention to the Act of 1996, and in specific Section 7 would submit that in absence of any Arbitration Agreement existing between the Parties, the arbitral proceedings cannot be continued. He would submit that the Arbitrator is creation of a Contract and in absence of such a Contract, permitting the dispute to be resolved through arbitral proceedings, any award or final conclusion drawn by the Arbitrator would be a nullity.
According to him, the consensus to submit to the jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal forms the corner-stone of arbitration and since the Petitioner had never consented for the dispute with Respondent No.2, being referred to arbitration, the Petition deserve to be allowed.
8 The learned counsel for the Respondent has raised an 4/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt objection about maintainability of the Petition as she would submit that the remedy available to the Petitioner, being aggrieved by any order passed by the Arbitral Tribunal is in form of an Appeal as prescribed under the provisions of Act of 1996, and a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would not lie.
Apart from this, it is also the submission of the learned counsel that the claimants had had filed a Memo before the Arbitral Tribunal on 27th July 2023, where it had expressed its intention to remove Mrs.Usha Dilip Tanna, the Petitioner from the Arbitral proceedings, and, therefore, she should have no grievance.
Since we have received the submissions/statement from the learned Arbitrator through the Registry we have perused the same. The learned arbitrator has raised an objection that the Seat of Arbitration of the arbitral proceedings conducted by him is Bengaluru, Karnataka and, therefore, it will be the Court in Bengaluru or the High Court of Karnataka, Bengaluru, which would have jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, if at all it deserve to be entertained and this Court has no jurisdiction.
As far as the proceedings being conducted by him, Para 4 of the submissions read thus :
"04. It is submitted that Mr.Joseph Antony, Advocate, JSM Law Partners, Advocates, Commerce House, Nos.406 and 407, 9/1, Cunningham Road, Bengaluru-560 052, as per letter addressed to the 1st Respondent, Sole Arbitrator dated 22-07-2022 requested the Tribunal/Respondent No.1 to enter upon reference in view of the Petitioner and Respondents Nos. 5 & 6 and another, inter-se, agreeing for nomination of the 1st Respondent as the Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute between the parties arising out of immovable property of the ownership of "M/s.Kolipathy Tea & Coffee Estate and Kolipathy Tea Factory". Relevant portion of unnumbered para 2 of the 5/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt letter of request of Mr.Joseph, Advocate read thus:
"The parties have inter-se (the petitioner along with Respondents 5 & 6) agreed upon your name to act as the Sole Arbitrator and requesting the 1st Respondent to enter reference as Sole Arbitrator"."
It is stated that in pursuance to the above request of Mr. Joseph to appear before the Tribunal on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and in view of the consent of Respondent Nos. 5 and 6 and also the Petitioner Usha Tanna, the Tribunal issued notice of its first sitting on 29th July, 2022, calling upon the Parties to mark appearance before him on 17th August 2022.
The Arbitrator had adopted a stand that pursuant to his nomination as Sole Arbitrator by the Parties, he has entered the reference for adjudicating the disputes made over to him by the parties. He has also given the gist of the sittings held by him and stated that as per record 33 sittings are held and since Responded Nos.2 to 4 in the Petition did not lead evidence of filed Application to seek compromise, the Tribunal recorded that the proceedings are kept in abeyance for the time being until further orders.
9 We have heard the rival contentions and we have also before us the report of the learned Arbitrator, the Former Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge dated 27 th March, 2026, which is accompanied with necessary documents.
10 The Arbitration Agreement. is defined in Section 7 of the Act of 1996, to mean an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between the parties in respect of a defined legal 6/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt relationship, whether contractual or not. As per Sub Section (2) of Section 7, an Arbitration Agreement may be in form of an arbitration clause in a contract or in form of a separate agreement, but an arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An arbitration agreement is in writing if it is contained in -
"(a) a document signed by the parties;
(b) an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of telecommunication [including communication through electronic means] which provide a record of the agreement; or
(c) an exchange of statements of claim and defence in which the existence of the agreement is alleged by one party and not denied by the other."
11 While dealing with the objection of maintainability of the Petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, we must note that the Act of 1996 is a complete Code and the legal framework contained in the statute is towards, giving effect to the intention of the Parties to resolve their disputes through the process of arbitration. As per Section 8 of the Act, a judicial authority before which an action is brought in a matter, which is the subject of an Arbitration Agreement, then notwithstanding any judgment, decree, or order of the Supreme Court or any Court, the parties shall be referred to arbitration unless and until it is found. that prima facie no valid Arbitration Agreement exist.
The procedure to be followed by the Arbitral Tribunal, upon it being constituted by appointment of Arbitrator under section 11 of the Act of 1996, as well as the jurisdiction of Arbitral Tribunal and conduct of arbitral proceedings is specifically provided in the Act itself. The Act contains specific provision for passing of the Arbitral Award, the time limit for passing of the Award and also setting out its contents.
7/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 :::J-WP-839-2023.odt Chapter VII of the Act prescribe the remedy/ recourse against the Arbitral Award and Section 35 has attached finality to the Arbitral Award with a specific provision being included in Chapter VIII for enforcement of the Award. Further, Appeals in form of Section 37 lie to the Court authorised by law on the grounds specified therein.
12 A reading of the provisions in the Act of 1996, thus would reveal that Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, is a self- contained code and by virtue of Section 5, the judicial intervention in the matters governed by part one of the Arbitration Act has been minimized except to the extent where it is permissible. The provisions of the Act of 1996, are geared towards ensuring minimum judicial interference, and recognising the competence of the Arbitrator to rule on his own jurisdiction.
13 Arbitration being a dispute resolution mechanism it arises out of a contractual relationship between the parties and therefore, the Arbitrator is a creature of the Agreement and shall exercise the powers subject to the terms of his appointment and subject to the provisions of the Act of 1996 and the Arbitrator shall confine itself to the jurisdiction as conferred by the Arbitration Agreement. It is not permissible for Arbitral Tribunal to travel beyond the specific confines of the Arbitration Agreement as the Arbitrator owes his existence to the Agreement between the Parties, where the Parties have agreed to refer the dispute to him.
The existence of an Arbitration Agreement as defined under 8/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt Section 7 of the Act of 1996, is a condition precedent for exercise of power to appoint an Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal and in absence of an Arbitration Agreement or a consensus expressed by the Parties to refer the dispute for arbitration, the arbitration cannot take place. Since the appointment of the Arbitrator must receive by an Arbitration Agreement or when there is a consensus for referring the dispute to an Arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal or when the Arbitrator is appointed upon one party invoking the arbitration and when other party did not take any steps, then under Section 11 of the Act of 1996, the arbitration proceedings can commence.
In M.P. Rajya Tilhan Utpadak Sahakari Sangh Maryadit, Pachama, District Sehore and Ors. vs. Modi Transport Service 1, with reference to Section 21 of the Arbitration Act, it is held that a pre-existing arbitration agreement is essential for reference to arbitration and in its absence there is no power/authority or jurisdiction to refer unwilling parties to arbitration. In Para 18 and 19 the Apex Court has categorically held thus :
"18. Interpreting Section 21 of the Act, a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Firm Khetu Ram Bashamber Dass v. Kashmiri Lal Rattan Lal [Firm Khetu Ram Bashamber Dass v.Kashmiri Lal Rattan Lal, 1959 SCC OnLine Punj 102] has held : (SCC OnLine Punj) "Thus, before any matter involved in a suit pending in a Court can be referred to arbitration (a) there must be an agreement amongst all the parties interested that any matter in dispute between them in the suit shall be referred to arbitration; (b) if they come to such an agreement, then they have to make an application in writing to the Court concerned; and (c) thereafter, the Court has to pass an order referring the dispute to the arbitrator agreed upon between the parties.
There can be no manner of doubt that if there is no agreement between all the parties who are interested in the case and if the 1 (2022) 14 SCC 345 9/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt application is not made on behalf of them all, the reference made by the Court is bad and the award based on such a reference is invalid in law. This view has been consistently taken by all the High Courts. In Negi Puran v. Hira Singh [Negi Puran v. Hira Singh, 1909 SCC OnLine All 76] , while dealing with provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1882, similar to Sections 21 and 23 of the Arbitration Act, Stanley, C.J. and Banerji, J., of the Allahabad High Court held that if there was no application signed by all the parties who were interested in the settlement of the suit, the reference and the award given, thereafter, would be invalid. The same view was taken in Haswa v. Mahbub [Haswa v. Mahbub, 1911 SCC OnLine All 230] , by another Division Bench of the same Court. In Gopal Das v. Baij Nath [Gopal Das v. Baij Nath, 1925 SCC OnLine All 283] , Sulaiman, J., (as he then was), referred to a number of decisions of Allahabad and Calcutta High Courts and observed as follows : (Gopal Das case [Gopal Das v. Baij Nath, 1925 SCC OnLine All 283] , SCC OnLine All) '... it is necessary that all persons who are interested in the matter which is in difference between the parties and which is going to be referred to arbitration, should join. Although it is not absolutely necessary that they should all sign the application made to the Court, it is necessary that they should agree to the reference.' See also Tej Singh v. Ghasi Ram [Tej Singh v. Ghasi Ram, 1927 SCC OnLine All 454] . In Ram Harakh Singh v. S. Mumtaz Husain [Ram Harakh Singh v. S. Mumtaz Husain, 1948 SCC OnLine All 229] , the question of acquiescence and ratification was also considered. Following Gopal Das v. Baij Nath [Gopal Das v. Baij Nath, 1925 SCC OnLine All 283] and T.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai Aiyar [T.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai Aiyar, 1924 SCC OnLine Mad 329] , Ghulam Hasan, J., held that the foundation of the jurisdiction of the Court is the consent of the parties and the subsequent ratification does not validate the reference which was void ab initio. Calcutta and Madras High Courts have also taken a similar view. The question was considered by a Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court inLaduram Nathmull v.Nandalal Karuri [Laduram Nathmull v. Nandalal Karuri, 1919 SCC OnLine Cal 377] , Mookerjee, J., AIR at pp. 114-15 of the report observed as follows :
(Laduram Nathmull case[Laduram Nathmull v. Nandalal Karuri, 1919 SCC OnLine Cal 377] , SCC OnLine Cal) '... The foundation of jurisdiction here is the agreement amongst all the parties interested that the matters in difference between them shall be referred to arbitration. If all the parties interested do not apply and yet an order of reference is made, the order is illegal because made without jurisdiction. If an award follows on the basis of that reference, it is equally illegal, because it is founded upon a reference made without jurisdiction.' See also Dooly Chand v. Mamuji Musaji [Dooly Chand v.Mamuji Musaji, 1916 SCC OnLine Cal 205] and Khan Mohmed v. Chella Ram [Khan Mohmed v. Chella Ram, 43 IC 165] andT.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai Aiyar [T.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai Aiyar, 1924 SCC OnLine Mad 329] . In T.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai Aiyar [T.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai 10/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt Aiyar, 1924 SCC OnLine Mad 329] , Devadoss, J., while considering the provisions of Para 1 of Schedule II, Civil Procedure Code,--which in substance is the same as Section 21 of the Arbitration Act--observed as follows : (T.S. Subba Rao case [T.S. Subba Rao v. Appadurai Aiyar, 1924 SCC OnLine Mad 329] , SCC OnLine Mad) 'What gives the Court jurisdiction to refer the matter to arbitration is consent of all the parties. Consent subsequently given cannot give jurisdiction to the Court which it did not possess at the time when it referred the matter to arbitration.' "
19. In our opinion, the aforesaid ratio in Kashmiri Lal Rattan Lal case [Firm Khetu Ram Bashamber Dass v. Kashmiri Lal Rattan Lal, 1959 SCC OnLine Punj 102] expresses the correct position in law. Arbitration is an alternative to the court adjudication process by a private forum chosen by the parties. Normally reference can be made or even directed to the arbitrator only if a pre-existing arbitration agreement subsists between the parties. In the absence of a pre-existing arbitration agreement, the court has no power, authority or jurisdiction to refer unwilling parties to arbitration. Therefore, the word "agree" in Section 21 of the Act refers to consensus ad idem between the parties who take a considered decision to forego their right of adjudication before a court where the suit is pending, and mutually agree to have the subject- matter of the suit or part thereof adjudicated and decided by an arbitrator."
14 With this position emerging from the provisions of the Act of 1996, when the Petitioner is raising a specific contention that there is no Arbitration Agreement between the Parties and the Petitioner never consented to refer the dispute with Respondent No.2, for the Arbitration, the objection raised about maintainability of the Petition under Article 226, ..... not being available, as there is remedy of filing the proceedings under the Act itself, deserve a rejection at the outset. We find that in cases, where it is permissible to the Court to exercise the power of judicial review in the wake of the gross illegality, the lack of jurisdiction in this specific case, when it is the contention of the Petitioner, and we find substance in the same, that the Arbitral Tribunal is patently lacking the jurisdiction as there is no 11/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt Arbitration Agreement conferring the power on the Arbitrator to adjudicate the dispute.
The remedy available under the statute in form of Section 34 provide for challenge being raised to the Arbitral Award, but in the case before us, where the contention of the Petitioner and which is not disputed by the learned counsel representing Respondent No.2 is that there exist no Arbitration Agreement between the Parties, we deem it appropriate to exercise our power of judicial review to prevent the Arbitrator from proceeding with the arbitral proceedings without jurisdiction, and merely because the Act of 1996, provide for Appeals, we do not consider our power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the Petitioner has raised a jurisdictional issue as Arbitral Tribunal is proceeding with the arbitration proceedings in absence of an existing valid Arbitration Agreement, rendering the proceedings without jurisdiction.
15 We are supported in our view by the decision of this court in Luxempire Realty Private Ltd. vs. Eminence Landmarks LLP & Ors.2 where a coordinate bench of this court observed thus :-
"76. We may also refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in M/s Tamil Nadu Cements Corporation Limited Vs. Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council and Anr. in which the issue which fell for consideration of the Supreme Court was whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable against an order passed by the Micro and Small Enterprises Facilitation Council in exercise of power under Section 18 of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006, which is a power to make a reference to arbitration. It is in such context the Court considering the position in law, in regard to exercise of jurisdiction by 2 WP No.2068/2025 12/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution reiterated the following principles in regard to jurisdiction of the High Court:
"13. The access to High Courts by way of a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not just a constitutional right but also a part of the basic structure. It is available to every citizen whenever there is a violation of their constitutional rights or even statutory rights. This is an inalienable right and the rule of availability of alternative remedy is not an omnibus rule of exclusion of the writ jurisdiction, but a principle applied by the High Courts as a form of judicial restraint and refrain in exercising the jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and the same is not limited by any provision of the Constitution and cannot be restricted or circumscribed by a statute. It has been well settled through a legion of judicial pronouncements of this Court that the writ courts, despite the availability of alternative remedies, may exercise writ jurisdiction at least in three contingencies
-i) where there is a violation of principles of natural justice or fundamental rights; ii) where an order in a proceeding is wholly without jurisdiction; or iii) where the vires of an Act is challenged. Noticeably, the MSEFC as a statutory authority performs a statutory role and functions within the four corners of the law.
14. Following the aforesaid dictum, this Court in Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corporation, had taken notice of the fact that the High Court had referred to the arbitration clause which the writ petitioner could take recourse to, to hold that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction is a rule of discretion and not of compulsion. In appropriate case, in spite of availability of alternative remedy, the writ courts can exercise its jurisdiction at least in three contingencies, as referred to above. In the facts of the said case, this Court interfered observing that there were peculiar circumstances as the dealership had been terminated on an irrelevant and non-existence cause. Therefore, there was no need to drive the parties to initiate arbitration proceedings. Following the judgments in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Harbanslal Sahnia (supra), this Court in Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh laid down the following principles:
"27. The principles of law which emerge are that:
27.1. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue writs can be exercised not only for the enforcement of fundamental rights, but for any other purpose as well.
27.2. The High Court has the discretion not to entertain a writ petition. One of the restrictions placed on the power_of the High Court is where an effective alternate remedy is available to the aggrieved person. 27.3. Exceptions to the rule of alternate remedy arise where: (a) the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of a fundamental right protected by Part III of the Constitution; (b) there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice; (c) the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (d) the vires of a legislation is challenged.13/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 :::
J-WP-839-2023.odt 27.4. An alternate remedy by itself does not divest the High Court of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in an appropriate case though ordinarily, a writ petition should not be entertained when an efficacious alternate remedy is provided by law.
27.5. When a right is created by a statute, which itself prescribes the remedy or procedure for enforcing the right or liability, resort must be had to that particular statutory remedy before invoking the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution. This rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion."
16 The learned counsel for Respondent No.2 did not dispute that there is no existing Arbitration Agreement in writing executed between the Parties, but she would submit that JSM Law Partners addressed a communication to Respondent No.1 on 22nd July 2022, where a reference was made to the request on behalf of the present Petitioner Usha Tanna as well as Purvi Chothani and Trupti Prasad..
We have perused the said document, which is annexed along with the submission of the Arbitrator and we must refer to its contents, which are strongly disputed by Mr.Tamboly, which read thus :
" We write to you on behalf of Mrs.Usha Dilip Tanna, residing at Flat No.63/64, Umang Bld 6th Floor 114, Kashibai Navrang Marg, Near Gamdevi Police Station, Grant Road, Mumbai- 400 007; Mrs.Purvi Rohit Chothani, residing at 9 A Jeevan Asha, 60A Peddar Road, Mumbai-400 026; and Mrs.Trupti Prased residing at 523, 2 nd Main, 3rd Block, ISRO RMV Extension, 2nd Stage, Bangalore - 560094 (hereinafter referred to as "our Clients").
The father of our Clients was the absolute owner of the "Kolipathy Tea & Coffee Estate and Kolipathy Tea Factory" (Hereinafter referred to as "Estate"). However, the father of our Clients had expired on December 12, 1998 leaving behind our Clients as the legal heirs of the Estate. However, certain dispute has arisen between our Clients and an entity by the name Dethlefsen & Balk Pvt. Ltd. and also Mr.Shailesh Bhansali. The partie shave inter-se agreed upon your name to act as the Sole Arbitrator. Copy of the arbitration notice received from Dethlefsen & Balk Pvt. Ltd. and Mr.Shailesh Bhansali nominating you as the Arbitrator is enclosed herewith.
In view of the foregoing, we request you to enter reference as the Sole 14/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt Arbitrator at your earliest convenience."
According to Mr.Tamboly, the Petitioner never consented for a reference to arbitration and in fact Petitioner contested to the appointment of arbitrator by repeatedly addressing communications, and all those communications are placed on record along with the Petition.
Cumulative reading of the said communications would disclose that though the Petitioner from the very beginning contested the appointment of the Arbitrator and even addressed communication to the learned Arbitrator, requesting for terminating the proceedings, failing which it was indicated that appropriate legal proceedings shall be initiated, despite this the learned Arbitrator did not stall the proceedings and rather marked absence of the Respondent and continued to entertain the claim filed before him.
17 The learned counsel for Respondent No.2 has placed before us a memo filed on behalf of the claimants and we must refer to its contents and we are surprised to note that the deletion of name of Usha Tanna is sought from the Arbitral proceedings on the ground that she had never participated in the proceedings. The memo read thus :
"3 It is also submitted that pending the present proceedings the parties (i.e. Claimants and Respondents 1 & 2) were mutually arrived at a settlement and a duly signed settlement agreement will also be filed within next hearing with acceptable terms for two parties. 4 It is submitted that, in order to safeguard the interest of the Respondent 1 in the present proceedings it is just and necessary to remove Respondent No.1 from the party proceedings, since Respondent 1 has not been participated to the present proceedings and the settlement which will be entered between the Claimants and 15/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 ::: J-WP-839-2023.odt Respondents is in no way connected to the Respondent No.1."
We are surprised by the above approach, as merely because a party do not participate in arbitral proceedings, the claimant seeking its deletion is something unknown in law.
We are not at all impressed by the said stand adopted, as once we are of the view that the arbitration proceedings cannot proceed in absence of an Arbitration Agreement between the Parties and since existence of valid Arbitration agreement is a sine qua non for conduct of arbitral proceedings, in exercise of our writ jurisdiction, we declare that Respondent No.1/the learned Arbitrator has no jurisdiction. to continue with the arbitral proceedings. Since we have expressed that the arbitral proceedings are being conducted by Respondent No.1 without jurisdiction, we also dismiss the objection that this Court shall exercise no jurisdiction as the Seat of arbitration is in Bengaluru as the Petitioner before us has invoked our writ jurisdiction and as far as this jurisdiction is concerned the cause of action has arisen as the Petitioner is resident of Mumbai and there is no question of Seat determine the jurisdiction of the Court since we have concluded that there is no arbitration agreement between the Parties which has determined the seat/venue of arbitration.
18 In the wake of above, we allow the Writ Petition in terms of pray clause (a) and (b) which reads thus :
"(a)This Hon'ble Court be pleased issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction against the Respondent No.1 restraining him from proceeding with the said Arbitration;
(b) This Hon'ble Court be pleased to pass an order declaring that the said Arbitration is a nullity and/or otherwise bad in law."16/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 :::
J-WP-839-2023.odt We also issue a direction restraining Respondent No.1 from proceeding ahead with the arbitration proceedings, as we are satisfied that there is no Arbitration Agreement between the Parties, which had authorised Respondent No.1 to enter the reference and any continuation of such proceedings is not in accordance with law, and the proceedings cannot continue.
Writ Petition is made absolute in aforesaid terms.
[MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.] [BHARATI DANGRE, J.] 17/17 ::: Uploaded on - 22/04/2026 ::: Downloaded on - 25/04/2026 05:11:00 :::