Delhi District Court
V.S. Bisaria vs Ragini Bisaria on 1 October, 2022
1
IN THE COURT OF MS. MONIKA SAROHA
SPECIAL JUDGE-NDPS/ASJ (SOUTH)
SAKET COURTS, NEW DELHI
CA No. 112/2021
CNR No. DLST01-009031-2021
V.S. BISARIA
S/o Late Sh. CS Bisaria,
R/o A-13, First Floor, Gyandeep Apartments,
Mayur Vihar, Phase-I,
New Delhi - 110091.
....... Appellant.
Vs.
RAGINI BISARIA
W/o Sh. VS Bisaria
D/o Sh. Ramesh Chand Saxena
R/o H. No., 122, Tower-6,
Hewo Apartments - I, Sector - 56,
Gurgaon - 122011.
.......... Respondent
Date of institution : 22.11.2021
Arguments heard on : 01.09.2022
Date of Decision : 01.10.2022
Appeal u/s 29 of the Protection of Women from Domestic
Violence Act, 2005 against order dated 09.11.2021 passed by the
Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate -02 Mahila Court (South).
2
JUDGMENT
Vide this judgement, I shall decide the appeal filed against the order dated 09.11.2021 passed by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate (South) Mahila Court-02, in complaint case No.2038/19 titled "Ms. Ragini Bisaria Vs. V.S. Bisaria". This order of the Ld. Trial Court hereinafter shall be referred to as the "impugned order".
1. Vide the impugned order, the Ld. Trial Court had dismissed an application filed by the appellant, ( who was the respondent before the Ld. Trial Court ). In this application, it was prayed that the complaint under the Protection of Women against Domestic Violence Act ( hereinafter mentioned as "PWDV Act" ) as pending before the Ld. Trial Court was barred by limitation and therefore, was liable to be dismissed.
2. Before deciding this appeal on its merits, it is important to discuss in brief the proceedings which have taken place before the Ld. Trial Court and the facts which are relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. The same are mentioned below:-
i) Ms. Ragini Bisaria and Mr. VS Bisaria are husband and wife. They are both senior citizens. They are residing separately since 2008 owing to matrimonial dispute between them. The first litigation between them also started way back in 2008 itself when Ms. Ragini Bisaria filed an application u/s 18 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act ( hereinafter mentioned as HAMA ) r/w Sec. 18, 3 19 & 26 of the PWDV Act. This application was then withdrawn by her on 05.11.2008. A divorce proceeding was also initiated which is pending before the Hon'ble High Court now.
ii) In 2019, Ms. Ragini Bisaria filed the complaint / application u/s 12 of the PWDV Act which is pending before the Ld. Trial Court and was registered as complaint bearing no. CT-2038/19 (out of which this appeal arose). In these proceedings under the PWDV Act before the Ld. Trial Court, an application was filed by Mr. VS Bisaria praying that the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court under the PWDV Act are barred by limitation and therefore the complaint should be dismissed.
iii) This application of Mr. VS Bisaria was heard at length and was dismissed vide the impugned order on 09.11.2021 with the Ld. Trial Court holding that the proceedings under the PWDV Act before it as filed by Ms. Ragini Bisaria are maintainable. The appellant Mr. VS Bisaria is aggrieved of this order and has filed the present appeal challenging the impugned order on various grounds.
3. The impugned order has been challenged inter alia on the following grounds:
(i) That the impugned order is a non speaking and cryptic one without discussing in detail the applicability or non applicability of each judgement relied upon by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court.
(ii) That the Ld. Trial Court did not take into account the 4 earlier litigations which were initiated between the parties or the pendency of the civil suit between them wherein the damages have been sought by the husband against the wife.
(iii) That the Ld. Trial Court did not direct the parties to file their affidavits in terms of the directions given by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajnesh Vs. Neha, 2021 (2) SCC 324.
(iv) That the Ld. Trial Court did not deal with each and every prayer made in the application of the husband and failed to give a finding as to which particular prayer was time barred and which was within limitation.
(v) That the Ld. Trial court did not take adverse view of the fact that the wife concealed the fact of her having earlier filed an identical application claiming almost the same reliefs as were claimed by her before the Ld. Trial Court.
(vi) That the Ld. Trial Court did not give any finding on the issue of limitation despite being specifically raised before it.
4. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent wife Ms. Ragini Bisaria advanced oral arguments on this appeal. Ld. Counsel argued that the impugned order is a well reasoned speaking one and does not deserve any interference. Further, Ld. Counsel argued that the earlier proceedings between the parties have no bearing on the maintainability of the complaint under the PWDV Act now pending before the Ld. Trial Court. Further, Ld. Counsel argued that the impugned order clearly mentions that the proceedings are 5 maintainable and are not barred by limitation.
5. Having heard the arguments as advanced by both the sides and having perused the entire record including the Trial Court Record, this court finds no reason to modify or set aside the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed for reasons discussed in paragraphs that follow.
6. The main ground on which the dismissal of the application / complaint under the PWDV Act was sought before the Ld. Trial Court was that of limitation. According to the appellant the proceedings before the Ld. Trial Court are not maintainable as the parties are not residing together in a domestic relationship since 2008 and therefore, the proceedings initiated before the Ld. Trial Court on 20.02.2019 are hopelessly barred by limitation. Perusal of the impugned order, shows that the Ld. Trial Court has clearly held that the proceedings before it are maintainable for the simple reason that the wife was earlier residing in the government accommodation allotted to the husband but upon retirement of the husband, she received a notice for vacation of the government accommodation and having no alternate accommodation approached the court seeking a roof above her head i.e., the relief of residence as provided under the PWDV Act besides other reliefs. Now, according to the Ld. Trial Court, the wife was within her rights to approach the Ld. Trial Court for securing residence for herself from her husband under the PWDV Act and this court finds no error or illegality in this view taken by the 6 Ld. Trial Court.
7. It is not denied that indeed earlier an application u/s 18, 19 of the HAMA Act r/w provisions of the PWDV Act were filed by the wife and were withdrawn also. The Ld. Trial Court has also considered this aspect in the impugned order and has rightly observed that not withstanding those earlier proceedings in 2008, when the wife was on the verge of loosing her residence, she had the right to approach the Ld. Trial Court for relief under the PWDV Act in 2019. In 2008, there was no occasion for the wife to seek any directions with respect to her residence as she was residing in the government accommodation allotted to her husband and it was only in 2019 when she had the genuine apprehension of being forced to vacate the government accommodation upon retirement of her husband that she rushed to the court.
8. The case of respondent wife in the proceedings under the HAMA in 2008 was that while she was living in the matrimonial house in the IIT campus her husband had left the same, deserting her. At that time, since the wife had no fear of loosing the roof over her head as the accommodation was a government accommodation and she could not have been thrown out of the same without a proper procedure followed by the institution which had allotted the accommodation she was justified in not seeking any specific direction regarding her residence. Her conduct of approaching the 7 Ld. Trial Court seeking various reliefs under the PWDV Act, including the relief of residence when she received vacation notice from the employer of her husband, does not appear malicious or unjustified. Thus, no adverse inference can be drawn without trial, from the fact that in the earlier proceedings under HAMA, she did not press for specific relief regarding the residence.
9. The complaint under the PWDV Act cannot be said to be time barred as one of the cause of action arose only in 2019 when the wife received notice for vacation of the government accommodation. In such circumstances, whether or not the wife is able to prove her entitlement to the relief sought by her in the complaint under the PWDV Act is something which can be determined only after trial but there is nothing to hold that the complaint itself is not maintainable and is barred by limitation. Now, a complaint cannot be admitted in part and rejected in part. Once it is observed that the complaint is maintainable (as was observed by the Ld. Trial Court in the impugned order), it was not required to give any other finding on maintainability of each relief sought in the complaint before it. The Ld. Trial Court order is quite clear that the complaint before it is maintainable and the matter must be proceeded ahead with. Infact, vide the impugned order itself, the matter was listed for arguments on the interim application of the complainant wife u/s 23 of the PWDV Act.
10. Thus, there is no merit in the averment made by the 8 appellant that the complaint / application u/s 12 PWDV Act as filed before the Ld. Trial Court was time barred. The exact averment in this regard as made by the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court is extracted below:
"3. An application under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, in short the Act read with the provisions of the PWDV Rules 2006 is required to be filed within one year of the alleged domestic violence for which the reliefs are claimed by an individual....".
Further in the bullet points submitted in support of this application, it is mentioned as follows:
"There did not remain any domestic relationship (as defined u/s 2(f) DV Act) between the parties since 2008. Admittedly, the parties have been residing separately since 2008 till date. The applicant does not fall under the definition of aggrieved person (Sec.2(a) DV Act)."
Both these arguments have no merits whatsoever.
Merely because the husband and wife were residing separately does not mean that the 'domestic relationship' between them came to an end. It has been the case of the wife since the beginning that it was because of the violence upon her that she was not able to reside with her husband and it was her husband who had deserted her leaving her to reside in the government accommodation alone whereas, the couple had lived together for more than two decades since their marriage. In such circumstances, merely because the husband and wife were not residing together under the same roof, it cannot be said that the domestic relationship between them had ended. Sec. 2(f) of the PWDV Act clearly provides that a domestic relationship means a 9 relationship between two persons who live or have at any point of time lived together in a shared household. Particularly, in the facts of this case, when the wife is receiving maintenance from the husband for her survival, the parties are litigating for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act and there are other litigations also pending between them, the domestic relationship cannot be said to have ended by any stretch.
11. As far as the argument regarding the limitation period being one year for initiating proceedings under the PWDV Act is concerned, the same is also without any legal basis. It is settled law that the proceedings under the PWDV Act are neither purely criminal nor civil in nature. Not all provisions of PWDV Act are penal in nature. Not all acts of domestic violence have been made an offence by the legislature. The purpose of the PWDV Act is to protect the women against domestic violence. There are several other penal provisions which provide punishment for offences against women like u/s 498A IPC etc but the legislature made a conscious choice which is clear from the preamble of the PWDV Act itself that the intention was not to make each and every act of domestic violence a separate penal offence under this Act. Generally, the PWDV Act speaks of granting relief to the aggrieved person and not of conviction or sentence to be imposed. Thus, the bar u/s 468 Cr.PC cannot be invoked for making complaint / application u/s 12 of the PWDV Act. U/s 468 Cr.PC, the bar of limitation is only for taking 10 cognizance and thus, is intertwined with an offence. Thus, Sec. 468 of Cr.PC comes into force only if there is an offence. If there is no offence, there is no limitation u/s 468 Cr.PC. The only offence specifically mentioned in the PWDV Act is u/s 31, to which alone the provisions of Sec. 468 Cr.PC will be applicable. For this view reliance is placed upon the law laid down in Krishna Bhattacharjee Vs. Sarathi Chaudhary, (2016) 2 SCC 705.
12. The law on this aspect of limitation viz a viz the PWDV Act, as discussed and laid down in Kamatchi Vs. Lakshmi Narayanan, Crl Appeal No. 627 of 22 arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (Crl. ) No. 2514 of 21 decided on April 13, 2022 by the Hon'ble Apex Court, further clarifies the position on this aspect of limitation. This judgement clearly held that applicability of the limitation as prescribed under Sec. 468 Cr.PC would arise only after there is breach of an order passed u/s 12 of the PWDV Act. To quote from para 15 of this judgement:
"15. Let us now consider the applicability of these principles to cases under the Act. The provisions of the Act contemplate filing of an application under Section 12 to initiate the proceedings before the concerned Magistrate, After hearing both sides and after taking into account the material on record, the Magistrate may pass an appropriate order under Section 12 of the Act. It is only the breach of such order which constitutes an offence as is clear form Section 31 of the Act. Thus, if there by any offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act, the limitation prescribed under Section 468 of the Code will apply from the date of commission of such offence., By the time an application is preferred under Section 12 of the At, there is no offence committed in terms of the provisions of the Act and as such there would never be a starting point 11 for limitation from the date of application under Section 12 of the Act. Such a starting point for limitation would arise only and only after there is a breach of an order passed under Section 12 of the Act."
Further, in para 20 of this judgement, it is observed that the filing of an application u/s 12 of the PWDV Act cannot be equated to lodging of a complaint or initiation of prosecution under the Cr.PC. Thus, in view of the clear law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it is no longer res intgra that Sec. 468 Cr.PC does not apply to all provisions under the PWDV Act and are applicable only to Sec. 31 PWDV Act. In this Kamatchi judgement (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed at length the earlier judgement given by it in Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab & Anr ., 2011 SCC Online SC 1133 and has also opined how in the Inderjit judgement (supra) the issue which weighed upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court was the fact that the domestic violence was alleged after the decree for divorce. To quote :
"18. Inderjit Singh Grewal was decided before the decision of this Court in Sara Mathew. Rather than the issue of limitation, what really weighed with this Court in Inderjit Singh Grewal was the fact that the domestic violence was alleged after the decree for divorce when any relationship between the parties had ceased to exist. It is true that the plea based on Sec. 468 of the Code was noted in paragraph 32 of the said decision but the effect of inter play of Sections 12 and 31 of the Act was not noticed. In Krishna Bhattacharjee as is evident from para 33 of the said decision, the plea of limitation was rejected as the offence was found to be continuing one and as such there was no terminal point from which date the limitation could be reckoned. Thus, none of these decisions is material for the purposes of the instant matter."12
Thus, it is clear that when deciding the Kamatchi case (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court was cognizant of the earlier findings given by it in Inderjit Singh Grewal (supra) also. Therefore, this Court is relying on the law laid down in the Kamatchi case (supra) as far as the aspect of limitation is concerned and does not find any merit in the argument made by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant in this regard.
13. During the course of arguments, Ld. Counsel for the appellant harped the point that the Ld. Trial Court did not discuss in detail each of the judgement relied upon by him before the Ld. Trial Court and that no reason has been given in the impugned order as to how the judgements relied upon by the Ld. Counsel were not applicable and why his arguments were not accepted. It was his grievance that the impugned order is only a general one not giving reasons for the order passed. This court finds no merit in this argument of the Ld. Counsel. The impugned order clearly records the judgements relied before it by both the sides, which in itself makes it clear that all those judgements were considered by the Ld. Trial Court before passing the impugned order. There is no merit in the argument of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant that the Ld. Trial Court was under an obligation to discuss each judgement at length and to record how each judgement was applicable or not applicable in the facts before it.
14. It is common knowledge that Trial Courts in the city are 13 overburdened, specially those dealing with proceedings under the PWDV Act which can only be tried by the Mahila Courts. The application upon which the impugned order was passed was a short miscellaneous one and only as much time could have been spent in deciding the same. In such facts, merely because the Ld. Trial Court did not pass a lengthy, voluminous order, it cannot be said that the impugned order was passed without application of mind. The contents of the order clearly show that the Ld. Trial Court considered every averment made by both the sides and particularly by the respondent husband whose application for dismissal of the complaint it was deciding. Each court has its own style of writing orders and as long as the orders are in plain English, easy to understand, containing the reasons for the order, it cannot be said that an order is cryptic one merely because it is a brief one. If anything, in the present scenario where the pandemic induced lockdown has only delayed several proceedings, it is the need of the hour that the trial courts expeditiously decide matters before it and specially miscellaneous applications. This is not to say that lengthy orders should not be passed wherever required, however, it is only to emphasize that it is the quality of the order and not the length of the order which is material. Both the parties in this case are senior citizens, aged above 65 years. Before the impugned order was passed, the application for dismissal of the complaint was already pending for more than a year. Arguments on the application had been heard by two different judges (on account of transfer of the Presiding Officer ). Thus, in these facts, 14 no fault can be found with the approach taken by the Ld. Trial Court in dealing with the cited judgements in a brief manner. Be that as it may, for the purposes of further clarity, in the paragraphs that will follow, this Court has tried to encapsulate in brief the judgements relied by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant even before this Court and has recorded reasons why those judgements were not of much help to the appellant before the Ld. Trial Court or before this Court.
15. Some of the judgements relied upon by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant are being discussed in detail below alongwith the reason why they are of no help to the appellant at this stage:-
i) Nandkishor Pralhad Vyawahare Vs. Sau. Mangala, 2018 Cr.LJ 2992 - This judgement only lays down that the provision of Sec.
482 Cr.PC can be evoked in appropriate situations for quashing proceedings under the PWDV Act and the inherent power of the Hon'ble High court can be used under the PWDV Act. This judgement in itself does not talk about the aspect of limitation at all neither does it discuss the applicability of Sec. 468 Cr.PC. The paragraph 29, 35 & 36 of this judgement reproduced below clearly show the manner in which the Hon'ble High Court construed the applicability / non applicability of Cr.PC as a whole to the entire Act.
"29] It would be clear from these provisions that what they essentially create is a plethora of civil rights breach of which results in basically providing civil remedies which are alien to criminal law. These rights and remedies are such as; right against domestic violence to be realized through a prohibitory order (Section 18), right to reside in a shared household and right from being dispossessed or disturbed in 15 enjoying the possession of a shared household to be realized through a suitable restraining order (Section 19), right to get monetary reliefs and compensation (Sections 20 and 22), right to seek temporary custody of the child (Section 21) and right to seek interim and ex parte orders in certain cases (Section 23). These rights and reliefs are not found in classical criminal jurisprudence, which is about punishing the rule breaker by sentencing him to death or imprisonment or forfeiture of property and in some cases making him pay the compensation to the victim of crime. A prohibitory order or a restraining order or an injunction, is never a part of the sentences that the criminal law would impose upon the offender. Similarly, the notice that is issued first on an application under Section 12(1) of the D.V. Act is civil in nature as can be seen from the provision of Section 13 and neither any cognizance is taken as under Section 190 of Cr.P.C. nor any process is issued as under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. in respect of such an application. (emphasis applied) ....
35] Applicability of provisions of the Cr.P.C. and providing of criminal consequences for breaches are only indicative of the intention of the Parliament to make various civil remedies available under the D.V. Act more effective and meaningful. Parliament thought in it's wisdom that mere giving of remedies of civil nature or an order of injunction or prohibition for that matter, may not be sufficient to enable the aggrieved person realise the benefits of civil remedies. It were the speed and fear of the criminal procedure generally and the penal consequences visiting the respondent for some of his indiscretions would what really make a disobedient respondent behave. So, as an effective tool in the hands of the Court and the aggrieved person, the procedure to be followed generally is criminal and breach of protection order and directions issued in such order constitute two separate and distinct offences. Obviously, they have no bearing upon and do not determine the basic character of the proceeding initiated under Section 12 (1) of the Act which is by and large of the civil nature. Making of breach of the protection order or failure to perform by the protection officer duty in terms of the direction given by the Magistrate in the protection order are only instances of efficacy and inherent punch of the remedy provided under Section 18 of the Act which is at its core civil in nature. These provisions at best, are the effective instruments 16 by which to make available speedily the remedies under the Act to the aggrieved person and enable her to enjoy the fruits of the remedies.
36] This is also, as we find, in keeping with the vision of Parliament which sees domestic violence as a human rights issue and a serious impediment to development. Unless a wide array of remedies is provided, and it is possible only in civil law and not in criminal law and the remedies are also made speedy and effective, which is possible by infusing them with criminality, the issues of human rights and development can not be addressed properly. This is what seems to be the overall scheme and theme of the D.V. Act."
ii) Kunapareddy @ Nookala Shanka Balaji Vs. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, 2016(11) SCC 774 - This judgement also primarily deals with amendment to the original complaint under the PWDV Act and holds that such power to allow amendment is available to the court and do not touch upon the aspect of limitation or the exact nature of proceedings under the PWDV Act. This judgement merely says that such powers of amendment are available even in Criminal Law.
(iii) Inderjit Singh Grewal Vs. State of Punjab & Anr ., 2011 SCC Online SC 1133 - In this judgement, the facts were entirely different as the domestic violence was alleged for the first time after the decree of divorce only which is not the case in the present facts.
(iv) V. Nagarajan Vs. BP Thangaveni, 2019 CrLJ 3027 - In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Kamatchi judgement (supra), as discussed above, which is on exactly the same point as this judgement, no discussion is warranted on this judgement.
17v) N. Balakrishnan Vs. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) SCC 123 - This judgement also only discusses the purpose of the limitation law and the criteria for condonation of delay u/s 5 of the Limitation Act. In this judgement, the Hon'ble Apex Court had condoned the delay as prayed and therefore, this judgement hardly has any bearing on the present facts of this matter under consideration.
vi) M/s Decor India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., 2012 (3) CrLJ 115 (Del.) - In this judgement the purpose behind the law of limitation and for the existence of statutes of limitation has been discussed in length and there can be no dispute with the noble purpose behind the law of limitation. However, the said judgement is of little relevance to what was to be decided by the Ld. Trial Court. This is so as the Ld. Trial Court was only to decide whether the complaint before it was barred by limitation and not whether the Limitation Laws serve a useful purpose or not. In this judgement, the Hon'ble High Court further held that the law supports the vigilant only and litigants must be vigilant to see that they take legal action within the period of limitation only. In the facts before the Ld. Trial Court, the wife had come before it seeking a roof over her head as soon as the real apprehension of being thrown on the road in the sunset years of her life arose. This conduct of the wife only shows her legitimate desperation to secure her rights and certainly does not reflect any negligence or laxcity on her part.
1816. The impugned order is coherent and systematic. It is easily comprehensible and the reasoning appears logical. It is precise and specific clearly mentioning the facts, the submissions, the reasonings and the ultimate decision made. Therefore, is clearly not covered by the observations made by or dictum passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of India & Anr. Vs. Ajay Kumar Sood (arising out of SLP (C ) No. 4038 of 2021, Civil Appeal No. 5305 of 2022 decided on 16.08.2022. Thus, this judgement vehemently relied by the Ld. Counsel for the appellant during the course of arguments, is also not of any help.
17. There is no merit in the argument that the Ld. Trial Court did not take adverse view of the fact that the wife Ragini Bisaria did not inform the Ld. Trial Court regarding the earlier proceedings initiated by her under the HAMA and PWDV Act. Perhaps it would have been better if the wife had disclosed in her complaint before the Ld. Trial Court regarding the earlier proceedings initiated by her. However, this mere non disclosure cannot be a ground for dismissal of the entire complaint under the PWDV Act. The provisions of PWDV Act are beneficial in nature enacted with the unique objective of helping female victims of domestic violence. No hyper technical and rigid approach can be adopted while deciding the complaints made by the aggrieved females under this Act. Every non disclosure cannot be equated with or attributed to malice upon the parties. The intention behind the non disclosure, the extent of non disclosure and 19 the impact of non disclosure has to be subjectively considered in each matter. The same can be best considered after trial and there was no reason for the Ld. Trial Court to dismiss the entire complaint before it on grounds of non disclosure alone.
18. The impugned order cannot be set aside, merely on the ground that no directions were given by the Trial Court to file affidavit in terms of the Rajnesh's Judgment (supra). Even though, the Trial Court Record shows that the parties were not given any direction to file their affidavits in terms of the directions passed in Rajnesh Vs. Neha (supra), however, the final directions in this judgement were passed only on 04.11.2020 whereas the complaint u/s 12 of the PWDV Act was filed before the Ld. Trial Court on 20.02.2019 itself i.e. much before the passing of the guidelines in Rajnesh's judgment (supra). In fact on 03.05.2019 the Ld. Trial Court had passed directions for filing of the income affidavit in terms of the directions given in Kusum Sharma Vs. Mahender Kumar Sharma (decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on 06.12.2017 in case FAO 369/1996) which was the prevailing law on the aspect at that time. Interestingly, perusal of the Trial Court record revealed that on 17.02.2021 the Ld. Trial Court had indeed directed both the parties to file their income affidavit in terms of the guidelines passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Rajnesh's case (supra). Thus, it is even factually incorrect that the Trial Court never gave instructions for filing the income affidavit in terms of the Rajnesh's judgement 20 (supra). Even otherwise, the impugned order cannot be set aside on the ground that the Trial Court did not pass directions for filing the affidavit by the parties in a particular format.
19. Thus none of the grounds raised in the appeal hold any merits and are accordingly rejected for the reasons given above. The appeal is dismissed. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated.
A copy of this judgement alongwith TCR be sent back. A copy of this judgement be also given to both the parties.
Appeal file be consigned to Record Room.
Announced in open Court (Monika Saroha)
on 01.10.2022 Special Judge-NDPS/ASJ (South)
Saket Courts/01.10.2022