Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 03.03.2025 vs Shashi Kumar on 6 March, 2025
Bench: Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Sushil Kukreja
1 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 125 of 2015 Reserved on: 03.03.2025 Decided on: 06.03.2025 ____________________________________________________ State of Himachal Pradesh .....Appellant.
Versus
Shashi Kumar ......Respondent.
_____________________________________________________ Coram The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Singh Chauhan, Judge. The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sushil Kukreja, Judge. 1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes.
_____________________________________________________ For the appellant: Mr. I.N. Mehta, Mr. Y.W. Chauhan, Senior Additional Advocates General, with Mr. Navlesh Verma, Ms. Sharmila Patial, Additional Advocates General and Mr. Raj Negi, Deputy Advocate General.
For the respondent: Mr. Vijender Katoch, Advocate. Sushil Kukreja, Judge.
The instant appeal has been preferred by the appellant/State under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the judgment, dated 20.08.2014, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 37-P/VII/13/12, whereby the accused (respondent herein) was acquitted for the offences punishable under Section 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC").
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal, as per the prosecution story, can be summarized as under:
2(a). On 02.07.2012, Meena Kumari (deceased) wife of Shashi Kumar (accused), committed suicide at her in-laws' house at village Arla, by hanging herself with the help of her dupatta, due to the maltreatment of the accused, who compelled and abetted her to commit suicide. As per the prosecution story, the accused used to beat and harass his wife (deceased) due to which she committed suicide. On the same day, around 09:25 p.m., the then Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Arla telephonically informed the police qua the suicide committed by the deceased, whereupon LHC Krishana Kumari alongwith other police officials went to the spot.
LHC Krishna Kumari telephonically informed CDPO, Palampur and ASI Ram Swarup, Investigating Officer, Police Station, Palampur, was also sent to the spot, who recorded the statement of Shri Roomi Ram under Section 154 Cr.P.C. PSI Raj Kumar, I.O. Police Station, Palampur, and ASI Jaspal Singh, I.O., Police Station Bhawarna, took up the investigation. During the course of their investigation RFSL team visited the spot, photographs were clicked, spot map was prepared, post mortem on the corpse of the deceased was got conducted at Civil Hospital, Palampur, and post mortem report was procured. Police also effected relevant
3 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) recoveries from the spot and sample parcels were sent to RFSL, Dharamshala, for chemical analysis and report was procured. Statements of the witnesses were recorded and the accused was arrested. During the further case of the investigation, police took into possession the complaint lodged by the deceased under the Domestic Violence Act alongwith the relevant records. After completion of the investigation, police presented the charge-sheet before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of the offences punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 IPC.
3. The prosecution, in order to prove its case, examined nineteen witnesses. Statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded, wherein he claimed innocence and denied the prosecution case, however, in defence he did not lead any evidence.
4. The learned Trial Court, vide impugned judgment dated 20.08.2014 acquitted the accused for the commission of the offences punishable under Section 498-A and 306 IPC, hence the instant appeal preferred by the appellant/State.
5. The learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State contended that the impugned judgment is against the law and facts, based upon mis-appreciation of evidence, which 4 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) ultimately resulted into miscarriage of justice, as such the same is liable to set-aside. He has further contended that the learned Trial Court has appreciated the evidence in a slip-shod and perfunctory manner and the impugned judgment is based on hypothetical reasoning, surmises and conjectures. Lastly, he submitted that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be quashed and set-aside by allowing the instant appeal and the accused be convicted.
6. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent/accused contended that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is the result of proper appreciation of the material on record and the same was passed after appreciating the evidence and law in its right and true perspective. He has further contended that there was nothing against the accused and the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned Trial Court is a well reasoned judgment, which does not require any interference, thus the instant appeal, which sans merits, be dismissed.
7. We have heard the learned Senior Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, learned Counsel for the respondent/accused, and carefully examined the entire records.
8. It is well settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena 5 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) of decisions that an Appellate Court has full power to review, re- appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. Further, if two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court.
9. The scope of power of Appellate Court in case of appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Muralidhar alias Gidda & another vs. State of Karnatka reported in (2014) 5 SCC 730, which reads as under:
"10. Lord Russell in Sheo Swarup[1], highlighted the approach of the High Court as an appellate court hearing the appeal against acquittal. Lord Russell said, "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt;
6 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." The opinion of the Lord Russell has been followed over the years.
11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed:
"7...........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons."
12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu [3], Madan Mohan Singh [4], Atley [5] , Aher Raja Khima [6], Balbir Singh [7], M.G. Agarwal [8], Noor Khan [9], Khedu Mohton [10], Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade [11], Lekha Yadav [12], Khem Karan [13], Bishan Singh [14], Umedbhai Jadavbhai [15], K. Gopal Reddy [16], Tota Singh [17], Ram Kumar [18], Madan Lal [19], Sambasivan [20], Bhagwan Singh [21], Harijana Thirupala [22], C. Antony [23], K. Gopalakrishna [24], Sanjay Thakran [25] and Chandrappa [26]. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually. Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court,
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the appeal against acquittal,
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had 7 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and
(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-
appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court."
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajesh Prasad vs. State of Bihar & another, (2022) 3 SCC 471, observed as under:
"31. The circumstances under which an appeal would be entertained by this Court from an order of acquittal passed by a High Court may be summarized as follows:
31.1. Ordinarily, this Court is cautious in interfering with an order of acquittal, especially when the order of acquittal has been confirmed up to the High Court. It is only in rarest of rare cases, where the High Court, on an absolutely wrong process of reasoning and a legally erroneous and perverse approach to the facts of the case, ignoring some of the most vital facts, has acquitted the accused, that the same may be reversed by this Court, exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. [State of U.P. v. Sahai (1982) 1 SCC 352] Such fetters on the right to entertain an appeal are prompted by the reluctance to expose a person, who has been acquitted by a competent court of a criminal charge, to the anxiety and tension of a further examination of the case, even though it is held by a superior court. [Arunchalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297] An appeal cannot be entertained against an order of acquittal which has, after recording valid and weighty reasons, has arrived at an unassailable, logical 8 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) conclusion which justifies acquittal. [State of Haryana vs. Lakhbir] 31.2. However, this Court has on certain occasions, set aside the order of acquittal passed by a High Court. The circumstances under which this Court may entertain an appeal against an order of acquittal and pass an order of conviction, may be summarized as follows:
31.2.1. Where the approach or reasoning of the High Court is perverse;
(a) Where incontrovertible evidence has been rejected by the High Court based on suspicion and surmises, which are rather unrealistic. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393] For example, where direct, unanimous accounts of the eyewitnesses, were discounted without cogent reasoning. [State of U.P. vs. Shanker 1980 Supp SCC 489]
(b) Where the intrinsic merits of the testimony of relatives, living in the same house as the victim, were discounted on the ground that they were "interested" witnesses. [State of U.P. v. Hakim Singh (1980)
(c) Where testimony of witnesses had been disbelieved by the High Court, on an unrealistic conjecture of personal motive on the part of witnesses to implicate the accused, when in fact, the witnesses had no axe to grind in the said matter. [State of Rajasthan v. Sukhpal Singh (1983) 1 SCC 393]
(d) Where dying declaration of the deceased victim was rejected by the High Court on an irrelevant ground that they did not explain the injury found on one of the persons present at the site of occurrence of the crime. [Arunachalam vs. P.S.R. Sadhanantham (1979) 2 SCC 297]
(e) Where the High Court applied an unrealistic standard of "implicit proof" rather than that of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" and therefore evaluated the evidence in a flawed manner. [State of U.P. v. Ranjha Ram (1986) 4 SCC 99]
(f) Where the High Court rejected circumstantial evidence, based on an exaggerated and capricious theory, which were beyond the plea of the accused; [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]
(g) Where the High Court acquitted the accused on the ground that he had no adequate motive to commit the offence, although, in the said case, there was strong direct evidence establishing the guilt of the accused, thereby making it necessary on the part of 9 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) the prosecution to establish "motive". [State of A.P. v. Bogam Chandraiah (1990) 1 SCC 445] 31.2.2.Where acquittal would result is gross miscarriage of justice;
(a) Where the findings of the High Court, disconnecting the accused persons with the crime, were based on a perfunctory consideration of evidence, [State of U.P. v. Pheru Singh 1989 Supp (1) SCC] or based on extenuating circumstances which were purely based in imagination and fantasy [State of U.P. v. Pussu (1983) 3 SCC 502]
(b) Where the accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial, which delay was attributable not to the tardiness or indifference of the prosecuting agencies, but to the conduct of the accused himself; or where accused had been acquitted on ground of delay in conducting trial relating to an offence which is not of a trivial nature. [State of Maharashtra v. Champalal Punjaji Shah (1981) 3 SCC 610]."
11. In H.D. Sundara & others vs. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that the appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant portion of the above judgment is as under:
"8. In this appeal, were are called upon to consider the legality and validity of the impugned judgment rendered by the High Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short "CrPC"). The principles which govern the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC can be summarized as follows:
8.1.The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;
8.2.The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
10 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) 8.3.The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4.If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5.The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.
9. Normally, when an appellate court exercises appellate jurisdiction, the duty of the appellate court is to find out whether the verdict which is under challenge is correct or incorrect in law and on facts. The appellate court normally ascertains whether the decision under challenge is legal or illegal. But while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellate court cannot examine the impugned judgment only to find out whether the view taken was correct or incorrect. After re-appreciating the oral and documentary evidence, the appellate court must first decide whether the trial court's view was a possible view. The appellate court cannot overturn acquittal only on the ground that after re-
appreciating evidence, it is of the view that the guilt of the accused was established beyond a reasonable doubt. Only recording such a conclusion an order of acquittal cannot be reversed unless the appellate court also concludes that it was the only possible conclusion. Thus, the appellate court must see whether the view taken by the trial court while acquitting an accused can be reasonably taken on the basis of the evidence on record. If the view taken by the trial court is a possible view, the appellate court cannot interfere with the order of acquittal on the ground that another view could have been taken."
12. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of 11 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) acquittal. Further, if two views were possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court, merely, because the Appellate Court could have arrived at a different conclusion than that of the Trial Court.
13. The burden of proof in a criminal trial never shifts and it is always the burden of the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of acceptable evidence. In fact, it is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that the more serious the offence, the stricter the degree of proof required, since a higher degree of assurance is required to convict the accused.
14. In the instant case, the accused has been tried under Section 498-A and 306 IPC for cruelty and abetment of suicide. Section 306 incorporates the offence of abetment of suicide and the main ingredients of the offence are the suicidal death and abetment thereof. The suicide is an intentional killing of oneself. The relevant provisions, which are now required to be looked into, are reproduced herein below:-
Section 306 of Indian Penal Code reads as under :
"If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, thereby showing the commission of suicide must be pursuant to the abetment committed by any person. It is the case of the prosecution that the husband abetted the deceased wife to commit suicide.
12 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
15. Section 113A of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 relates to presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman, which reads as follows:-
"113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women.- When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.
Explanation- For the purposes of this section, "cruelty" shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Panel Code (45 of 1860)."
16. Explanation to Section 498-A IPC defines cruelty caused on wife by husband or his relatives as follows:-
1[Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "cruelty means"--
(a) any willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.]"
17. To substantiate the charges framed against the respondent/accused and to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution examined as many as 19 witnesses. However, the 13 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) case of the prosecution mainly rests upon the statements of PW-1, Shri Rumi Ram, father of the deceased (complainant), PW-2, Smt Malka Devi, mother of the deceased, PW-3, Miss Shikha, minor daughter of the deceased, PW-4, Shri Babu Ram, the then Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Arla, PW-11, Smt. Veena Devi, the then Supervisor-cum-Protection Officer in the CDPO Office Bhawarna, Palampur and PW-18, Dr. Anupama Singh, who had conducted postmortem on the corpse of the deceased.
18. Shri Rumi Ram (complainant), father of the deceased, who had appeared in the witness-box as PW-1, deposed that he had four daughters and out of them three were married and one unmarried. His daughter, Smt. Meena Kumari (deceased) was married with accused Shashi Kumar, as per the Hindu rites and customs about six years ago and out of their wedlock two daughters were born. This witness has further stated that after the marriage the accused started quarreling with the deceased and he used to beat her. As per this witness, the mental health of the deceased was good and she used to complain that accused used to beat her. The deceased also showed injury sustained by her on her back. She also complained to him that the accused, after confining the daughters in a room, used to consume liquor with his friends in the house. The accused also used to threaten the 14 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) deceased that he would kill both the daughters and thereafter get remarried with some lady. He has further deposed that the deceased narrated her story to her sister, who in turn, narrated the same to his wife and his wife ultimately disclose the same to him. The deceased left her matrimonial home and started living with them, but the accused telephonically asked her to come to his residence by intimidating her, so she went to her matrimonial house. He has also deposed that after four days the accused informed them that the deceased had committed suicide by hanging herself from ceiling fan. He along with other villagers visited the house of the accused and saw the deceased hanging from ceiling fan. He also saw that the deceased had kept clothes in a tub after washing and she was not wearing bangles. As per this witness, the deceased committed suicide, as the accused used to torture her mentally and physically. His statement was recorded by the police under Section 154 Cr.P.C.. He has further stated that police visited the spot and clicked photographs. As per this witness, the deceased had also reported the matter to Gram Panchayat Arla complaining that the accused used to torture her and the complaint was forwarded to CDPO for inquiry. This witness, in his cross-examination, denied that both the daughters were born in the house of the accused and self stated that they 15 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) were born in their house. He feigned ignorance about the date of birth of the daughters of the deceased. He has stated that the accused telephonically informed the deceased that if she wanted to come to his house, she should immediately return, else she might stay at the residence of her father. As per this witness, he had told this fact to the police, but he was confronted with his statements made under Section 154 Cr.P.C., Ex. PW-1/A, and under Section 161, wherein it was not so recorded. He has deposed that four days prior to the death of the deceased, he had noticed injury marks on her person and these injuries were sustained with shoe beatings caused by the accused, as it was told by the deceased to his younger daughter Asha.
19. PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, mother of the deceased, deposed that her daughter (the deceased) was married with the accused six years ago and out of their wedlock two daughters were born. As per this witness, the accused used to maltreat and beat the deceased and she was driven out of her matrimonial home many times by the accused. She has further stated that the deceased came to her residence and moved an application at Police Station Bhawarana, which was inquired by concerned CDPO. The accused inflicted injuries on neck, hip and other parts of the body of the deceased. During the month of May, the 16 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) deceased visited their house and the accused telephonically asked her to come to his house, on this the deceased told him that she would come next day, but the accused directed her to come immediately, as there was no one to cook food. This witness has further deposed that after five days, the deceased committed suicide on 02.07.2012 and they came to know about the incident pursuant to a telephonic message received from the accused from the house of Pardhan. She has stated that she alongwith her husband (PW-1) and relatives went to the house of the accused and saw her daughter hanging from the ceiling fan in her house. As per this witness, the accused used to threaten them with dire consequences and also to get divorce from the deceased. This witness, in her cross-examination, deposed that the deceased visited their house only four times within six years of marriage. She has further deposed that the complaint given by them to police and to the CDPO was being inquired into by the concerned officer and the deceased was advised to get her medically examined, but she was not interested to get herself medically examined and treated.
20. PW-3, Miss Shikha, minor daughter of the deceased, was also examined by the learned Trial Court, after ascertaining her maturity to give statement on oath. The child witness deposed 17 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) that her father (accused) applied electric current on her mother (deceased), he caught hold of her from her neck and hanged her with ceiling fan. Subsequently, the deceased became unconscious and her father asked them to leave the room where her mother was hanging. She further stated that her mother (deceased) used to cook food and her father (accused) used to give kick blows to her.
21. Shri Babu Ram, the then Pradhan, Gram Panchayat, Arla, appeared in the witness-box as PW-4, and he deposed that on 03.07.2012 he remained associated in the investigation of the case. He further deposed that Shri Suresh Kumar, the then Panchayat Pradhan was also present on the spot. As per this witness, he was telephonically requested by the accused to visit his house, as his wife (deceased) had hanged herself. He alongwith Ward Panch Sarwan Kumar immediately rushed to the house of the accused at 07:00 p.m. and he informed the police qua the occurrence and the police also visited the house of the accused immediately. He has deposed that he saw the deceased hanging with the ceiling of the room. The parents of the deceased did not allow the corpse to be removed from hanging position from the ceiling. Forensic experts also reached the spot on the subsequent day and only then the corpse of the deceased was got 18 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) down and it was sent to SDH, Palampur for postmortem examination. He has also stated that after conducting post mortem examination, the corpse was handed over to the uncle-in-law of the deceased, namely Shri Prem Chand. As per this witness, once the deceased made a complaint to him orally that the accused used to torture her and he visited the house of the accused and the matter was resolved amicably. Complaints, Ex. PW-4/A and Ex. PW-4/B which bear the seal of panchayat and his signatures and these applications were addressed to the Protection Officer alleging maltreatment by the deceased at the hands of the accused. The matter was compromised between the parties.
22. Smt. Veena Devi, the then Supervisor-cum-Protection Officer in the CDPO Office Bhawarna, Palampur, appeared in the witness-box as PW-11. She deposed that an application was received from Police Station, Bhawarna, copy of which is Ex. PW- 5/B, and she inquired the matter. She visited the spot on 29.05.2012 and the deceased told that earlier quarrel took place between her and the accused, but now their relations were cordial. Document to this effect was prepared, Ex. PW-4/B, which bears her signatures and the signatures of the deceased. She has further deposed that on 07.06.2012 she had visited the spot, where an application, Ex. PW-4/A, was given to her by the deceased for 19 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) withdrawal of her complaint, which was made against her husband. She remained associated in the investigation of the case and on 09.07.2012 she handed over the documents qua the inquiry to the police, vide memo, Ex. PW-5/A, which bears her and the signatures of Shri Babu Ram and Smt. Sushma.
23. Dr. Anupama Singh, who had conducted post mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, was examined as PW-18, and as per her opinion, no poison could be detected in the contents sent for chemical examination and the cause of death was asphyxia due to ante mortem hanging.
24. We have closely scrutinized the entire evidence on record led by the prosecution and from the closest scrutiny thereof, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to establish that the deceased had been abetted by the accused to commit suicide and that he had subjected her to cruelty in any manner.
25. Though PW-1, Shri Rumi Ram, father of the deceased, and PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, deposed that the accused used to take quarrels with his daughter and also used to beat her. However, their evidence is just hear say evidence, as PW-1 categorically deposed that the deceased used to complain about the alleged harassment and beatings by the accused to her sister 20 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) Asha, who further told the same to her mother, i.e., PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi and thereafter PW-2 told this to him. Meaning thereby that the deceased has not directly disclosed about the alleged harassment and beatings given to her by the accused to her father, PW-1 Shri Rumi Ram, who is the complainant and the complainant gathered this information from PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, who also gathered this information from her another daughter Asha. Thus, it has become clear that whatever PW 1 and PW-2 have deposed, that is hearsay, as they have gathered the information about the alleged harassment and beatings to the deceased from their another daughter Asha. Surprisingly, for the reasons best known to the prosecution Asha has neither been examined nor even cited as a witness by the prosecution.
26. PW-1 deposed that the accused used to beat the deceased and she had also shown an injury sustained by her on her back four days prior to her death. PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi deposed that there were injuries on the neck, hip and other parts of the body of the deceased. However, there is no corroborative evidence that the accused had inflicted injuries on the neck, hip and other parts of the body of the deceased. The deceased was not got medically examined when she was alive. PW-2, mother of the deceased had advised the deceased to get her medically 21 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) examined, but she was not willing to get herself medically examined. Had the accused inflicted the injuries on the deceased, then why she had not got herself medically examined, which creates doubt on the case of the prosecution. Even the complaint lodged by the deceased is silent about the injuries. There is no corroborative evidence to suggest that the deceased sustained any injury, as deposed by PW-1 as well as PW-2, i.e., father and mother of the deceased, respectively. PW-18, Dr. Anupama Singh, Medical Officer, who conducted the postmortem on the corpse of the deceased, specifically deposed during her cross-examination that except injury on the neck, i.e., ligature mark injury by the dupatta, there was no other injury on the dead body of the deceased.
27. PW-17, ASI Ram Swarup, who visited the spot immediately, also did not notice any injury on the dead body of the deceased except the ligature mark injury on her neck. Therefore, in the absence of any corroborative evidence qua the alleged injuries, the statements of PW-1 and PW-2 cannot be relied upon.
28. PW-3, Miss Sikha is the child witness, who is the daughter of the deceased and she had deposed that the accused firstly applied electric current on the deceased and thereafter he caught hold of her neck and hanged her with the ceiling fan.
22 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) However, this witness has introduced a totally different story altogether, whereas post mortem report is absolutely silent about this fact. During her cross-examination this witness has categorically stated that whatever she had stated in the Court was told to her by her matrimonial grand-mother. Thus, this child witness is a tutored witness and no credence can be attached to her statement being contrary to the medical evidence.
29. The prosecution has failed to lead any evidence on record that immediately before her death the deceased was physically assaulted by the accused. There is also no evidence on record that the deceased was mentally harassed by the accused in any manner. As per the evidence on record, the relationship between the deceased and the accused was cordial, as such she had withdrawn her complaint, which was lodged by her against the accused and she also made a statement before the Protection Officer.
30. PW-2, Smt. Malka Devi, mother of the deceased, has categorically deposed during her cross-examination that the deceased visited her parental house only four times within six years of her marriage, meaning thereby that the deceased was living happily in her matrimonial home. Admittedly, it is not the case of the prosecution that the accused had demanded dowry at 23 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) any point of time at the time of marriage or thereafter. Thus, the prosecution has failed to lead any cogent and satisfactory evidence on record to show that the deceased was compelled by the accused to commit suicide.
31. The mere fact that deceased had committed suicide within six years of her marriage and that she had been allegedly subjected to cruelty by her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband. There is no direct evidence that accused aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide or entered into any conspiracy to aid her in committing suicide.
32. In Ghulam Mustafa vs State of Uttarakhand, AIR 2015 SC 3101, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a casual remark or something said in a routine way or in usual conversation should not be construed or misunderstood to mean 'abetment.' A conviction on mere allegation of harassment without any positive action in proximity to the time of occurrence on the part of accused that led a person to commit suicide is not sustainable under section 306 IPC.
33. Again, in Gurucharan vs State of Punjab, AIR 2017 SC 74, it has been held that to constitute the offence under section 306 IPC, there should be a live link between abetment and suicide 24 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) and the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. So far as the grievance of dowry demand and consequential harassment is concerned, it should not be general in nature and there should be some specific incident and should have provocative capability to drive the deceased to such distressed state, mental and physical that she could elect to end her life.
34. In Nachhatter Singh vs State of Punjab, (2011) 11 SCC 542, the Court observed that in case of abetment of suicide by married woman, the cruelty and harassment meted out must be of nature to drive a person of common prudence to commit suicide. Every quarrel between husband and wife which results in suicide cannot be taken to abetment by husband. For abetment, standard of reasonable or practical woman as compared to headstrong and over sensitive one is to be applied.
35. In Sohan Raj Sharma Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2108, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held:-
"9. In State of West Bengal Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (AIR 1994 SC 1418) this Court has observed that the courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance discord and differences were not expected 25 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.
10. Section 107 IPC defines abetment of a thing. The offence of abetment is a separate and distinct offence provided in the Act as an offence. A person abets the doing of a thing when (1) he instigates any person to do that thing; or (2) engages with one or more other persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (3) intentionally aids, by act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. These things are essential to complete abetment as a crime. The word "instigate"
literally means to provide, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion to do any thing. The abetment may be by instigation, conspiracy or intentional aid, as provided in the three clauses of Section 107. Section 109 provides that if the act abetted is committed in consequence of abetment and there is no provision for the punishment of such abetment, then the offender is to be punished with the punishment provided for the original offence. 'Abetted' in Section 109 means the specific offence abetted. Therefore, the offence for the abetment of which a person is charged with the abetment is normally linked with the proved offence.
11. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide there must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement to the commission of suicide. The mere fact that the husband treated the deceased-wife with cruelty is not enough. [See Mahinder Singh Vs. State of M.P. (1955 AIR SCW 4570)]."
36. In Harjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 2006 Supreme Court 680, it is held as under:-
"26. Before invoking the provisions of Section 306 IPC, it is necessary to establish that : (1) the deceased committed suicide, and (ii) she had been subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498 A IPC.
27. Only in the event those facts are established, a presumption in terms of Section 113 A of the Indian Evidence Act could be raised. In the instant case, the prosecution has not been able to prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty within the meaning of Section 498 A, IPC. No case that the deceased committed suicide was also made out."
26 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB )
37. The legal position has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mariano Anto Bruno & another vs. Inspector of Police, AIR 2022 Supreme Court 4994, wherein it has been held as follows:-
" 25. The ingredients of Section 306 IPC have been extensively laid out in M. Arjunan Vs. State, represented by its Inspector of Police 7 which are as under:-
"The essential ingredients of the offence under Section 306 IPC are: (i) the abetment; (ii) the intention of the accused to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. The act of the accused, however, insulting the deceased by using abusive language will not, by itself, constitute the abetment of suicide. There should be evidence capable of suggesting that the accused intended by such act to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Unless the ingredients of instigation/abetment to commit suicide are satisfied, accused cannot be convicted under Section 306 IPC."
26. In order to convict an accused under Section 306 IPC, the state of mind to commit a particular crime must be visible with regard to determining the culpability. With regard to the same, a two-judge bench of this Court in Ude Singh & Ors. State of Haryana observed as under:-
"16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be a proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. It could hardly be disputed that the question of cause of a suicide, particularly in the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains a vexed one, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behavior and responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would not suffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused which compels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether a person has abetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only be gathered from the facts and circumstances of each case. 16.1. For the purpose of finding out if a person has abetted commission of suicide by another; the consideration would be if the accused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explained
27 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) and reiterated by this Court in the decisions above- referred, instigation means to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and the action of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce a similarly circumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold the accused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if the accused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates a situation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except to commit suicide, the case may fall within the four-corners of Section 306 IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self- esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be examined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accused intended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, a particular case may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, if the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words or deeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, a particular case may be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicate analysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on its own facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearing on the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased."
38. In Hans Raj Vs. State of Haryana, (2004) 12 SCC 257, the Supreme Court held that the nature of presumption under Section 113A is discretionary in the sense that from the mere fact that the wife committed suicide within 07 years of marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by the husband, there will be no automatic presumption that the suicide had been abetted by the husband.
39. Thus, in view of the aforesaid authoritative 28 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) pronouncements of Hon'ble Supreme Court, if the Court examines the allegations made in this case, there is no direct evidence of cruelty inflicted by the present accused against the deceased. The facts suggest that there may have some strained relationship between the accused and the deceased but that does not mean that he inflicted physical and mental torture upon the victim which led her to commit suicide. There is no principle of law that wherever wife commits suicide, the husband would bear the responsibility and would be held liable.
40. As per the evidence, the deceased moved an application/complaint, Ex.PW-5/B, which was forwarded to the Protection Officer in CDPO Office, Bhawarna. PW-11, Smt. Veena Devi, the then Protection Officer, specifically deposed that on this complaint of the deceased, she had inquired into the matter and she was told by the deceased that earlier a quarrel had taken place between her and her husband, but now their relations were cordial. She prepared document, Ex. PW-4/B, to this effect, which was also signed by the deceased. She further deposed that she again visited the spot where the deceased had given an application for withdrawal of the complaint made by her against her husband. As per Ex. PW-4/B, the deceased stated that her relations with her husband were cordial and she did not want to pursue her 29 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) complaint. Thus, as the matter was amicably settled between the parties and the deceased herself made a statement about her cordial relations with the accused, as such the story projected by the prosecution that the accused used to beat and harass the deceased does not appear to be plausible. The general allegations of harassment cannot be sufficient to hold the accused guilty for the offence of abetment of suicide. The prosecution has failed to establish positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or to compel the deceased to commit suicide. The allegations made by the prosecution witnesses are general in nature and no specific instance of the alleged maltreatment or cruelty has been given by the prosecution witnesses, which can be construed as cruelty or abetment to commit suicide on the part of the accused.
41. There is no satisfactory material on record to prove cruelty and harassment with the deceased before the incident or abetment in proximity of time for committing suicide. To attract the offence under Section 306 IPC, the alleged cruelty, instigation or encouragement by accused should not only be proved by prosecution but also be of such nature which leaves no option to the deceased except to commit suicide. There is no evidence led by prosecution that there was abetment of such grave nature which was likely to drive the deceased to commit suicide. The suicidal 30 Neutral Citation No. ( 2025:HHC:5038-DB ) death in this case cannot be due to any illegal act or illegal omission or instigation, by anybody else. It may be the deceased's own act, being of hyper sensitive nature, for which, the husband cannot be held guilty.
42. Thus, we are of the considered opinion that the view taken by the trial Court while acquitting the accused is a reasonable view based on the evidence on record and the same cannot be said to be perverse or contrary to the material on record.
43. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no interference in the judgment of acquittal dated 20.08.2014, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra, H.P., in Sessions Case No. 37- P/VII/13/12 is required as the same is the result of proper appreciation of evidence and law. The appeal, which is devoid of merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged.
Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
( Tarlok Singh Chauhan ) Judge ( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge 6th March, 2025 (virender)