Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
B.L. Kaul, Sr. Asstt. Director, P.R. ... vs Delhi Development Authority Through ... on 3 September, 2008
ORDER
M. Ramachandran, J. (Vice Chairman)
1. The three Transferred Applications initially had been filed before the Delhi High Court and in view of the Notification issued under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 stood transferred, by order dated 07.11.2007. The applicant in all the three cases is one and the same person, who at present is working as a Senior Assistant Director in the Delhi Development Authority. By the impugned orders, penalty has been inflicted on the applicant, whereby his pay has been reduced with cumulative effect. The different orders have been separately subjected to challenge.
2. In T.A.178 of 2007, an order had been passed, on 09.03.2005 by Finance Member imposing the penalty of reduction of pay by two stages for two years. In an appeal filed by him, the Vice Chairman had apparently taken a lenient view and had modified the punishment to reduction of pay for one year. A further review application, however, had been rejected. Similarly, in TA 185/2007, the Finance Member, DDA by proceedings dated 01.02.2006 (Annexure 'D') had imposed penalty of withholding of two increments for two years without cumulative effect. It is disclosed in the application that review petition filed by him had been rejected on 12.12.2006. During the relevant time, on the face of Memorandum dated 13.05.2003 (Annexure 'A' in TA 186/2007), proceedings have been initiated on similar lines, and after receiving the report of the Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority had imposed a punishment of reduction of pay by two stages for two years with cumulative effect, further holding that he would not earn any increment during the period concerned. Appeal filed therefrom has been rejected, on 24.03.2006 and a review application also had the same feet. These orders are also subjected to challenge.
3. We had heard Mr. Malaya Chand, appearing for the applicant and Mr. Rajeev Sharma, representing the DDA.
4. We do not think independent examination of the facts would be essential, so as to understand the case put forward by the parties. During the period concerned, the applicant had been working as Superintendent, in the DDA. The allegations pertain to certain lapses that had occurred at that point of time. Charges were of identical nature. As far as facts of TA 178 of 2007 are concerned, it had been alleged that without verification of the factual details, the applicant had issued lease deed papers presented before him during the year 1997. A plot measuring 90 Sq. Mtrs. had been allotted to one Mr. Y.R. Diwakar. The Demand-cum-Allotment letter had been issued to him in the year 1985. After remittance of the payment due, the plot had been allotted to him in the year 1989. After these proceedings, normally the person was expected to approach the DDA for execution of the lease deed. In fact, during 1996, one person posing himself as Mr. Y.R. Diwakar had come with a request for issuing the lease deed. The request had been dealt with by the Dealing Assistant in the process of issuing of lease deed papers. The proposal had been endorsed and recommended by the Superintendent (applicant herein) and lease deed papers were issued by hand. Applicant had verified the certificate and also recorded that the signatures of the allottee are similar to the signature on the application filed at the time of enrolment. On the basis of verification of the credentials, perpetual lease deed of the plot had been executed in favour of the impersonator. However, Mr. Diwakar (the real person), who had been allotted the lease in 1989, had later on approached the DDA, for issue of perpetual lease deed but when confronted with the proceedings which already had been completed, had lodged a formal complaint.
5. At that time, it came to be noted that there was an impersonation viz. that the perpetual lease deed in his name had been applied for and obtained by an unknown person.
6. The gist of the allegations is that precautionary measures so as to avoid such mistake were to be scrupulously followed. The allottee was to produce certificates showing his identity, his photograph had to be attested and the signature also verified. The person was expected to present himself before the issuing authority. The dealing assistant as has turned out was not careful in the matter and on his recommendation the verifying authority, namely, the applicant also had permitted the processing, and under his endorsement and verification the formalities had been completed. Resultantly the real owner was left at large; the documents in support of his properties were in the hands of unknown persons. This had been showed as a lapse on the part of the applicant.
7. Similar was the case in respect of the other charge sheet, issued to the applicant. In TA 185/207, an impersonation had been carried out as respects a person Smt. Seema Taneja and in TA 186/2007, as there was no proper verification, one Lalu Ram, who was the original allottee could not get the perpetual lease deed in his name but the one issued in his name had been lifted away by an unknown person, by an act of impersonation. In all the three cases, it should have been possible to prevent the mishap, had the applicant taken sufficient precautionary steps to ensure that no fraud has been played, and the processing work was at the instance of actual holder.
8. We see that independent witnesses have been examined. In addition to documentary evidence produced, it has come out that there were serious lapses on the part of the applicant in the discharge of his duties. The penalty orders came to be issued in the aforesaid circumstances.
9. Mr. Malaya Chand submits that the division of duties in the DDA did not require the applicant to function, as a verification officer and the dealing assistant, had perhaps been dishonest when the applications were dealt with. It is also brought to our notice that the Lease Administrative Officer who was in direct charge had accepted the responsibility, and he had been subjected to punishment. It is also brought to our notice that although the Upper Division Clerk concerned had been proceeded against, taking notice of his explanation, he had been exonerated. Therefore, the submission is that so long as there is nothing to indicate that verification and attestation was his duty, it should not have been possible to pin him down or subject applicant to penalty. Such aspects have not been noticed by the inquiry officer or the appellate authority. It is argued that in any case the punishment is disproportionate.
10. After hearing counsel for the respondents, who had invited our attention to the documentary evidence relied on, we do not think, interference in the matter will be in any way warranted. A copy of the lease deed had been produced along with the rejoinder affidavit in TA 178/2007 as Annexure 'G' and 'H'. The recital in Annexure 'G' shows that the dealing assistant had duly verified the Photostat copy of the ration card of the allottee, as well as the affidavit. The photographs duly attested and three specimen signatures of the assignee also were dutifully called for. These documents had been forwarded to the Allotment Officer under the signature of the applicant, with a specific endorsement that the allotment may be approved. It may not be possible for the applicant to wriggle out of the situation when ultimately it is shown that there was impersonation. This is the lapse that has been pointed out as against him in all the three cases. So long as he has not challenged the veracity of the inquiry or the report submitted by the Inquiry Officer, the findings tendered by the officer, would have been acceptable. The disciplinary authority had independently examined the matter, had accepted the reports and had prescribed the penalty. Appropriately when situation demanded, the appellate authority had modified the punishment. These prima facie indicate that there is due application of mind by all concerned.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Apparel Export Promotion Council v. A.K. Chopra have indicated the nature of jurisdiction that is to be exercised by the High Court in matters of judicial review. As found in the said judgment, Lord Haltom in Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans 1982 (3) All ER 141 had observed that the purpose of judicial review is to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment. The Court had observed that where there are some relevant materials which the authority has accepted and which materials may reasonably support the conclusion that the officer is guilty, it is not the function of the High Court exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 to review the materials and to arrive at an independent finding on the materials. The Court also referred to a judgment in UOI v. Sardar Bahadur , which highlighted the proposition.
12. In the background of the above, we do not think that interference, in any way, is justified or warranted. Routinely disciplinary proceedings under the rules have been initiated and finalized. We are told at the bar that this was not an isolated instance but there are hundreds of cases where similar fraud has been played. Whenever complaints had come, appropriate action had been taken by the DDA to ensure that at least in future, fraud is not practiced.
13. We agree with the proposition that stern measures will have to be employed as the situation might demand. The court is not expected to upset proceedings when it is evident that disciplinary proceedings are initiated for valid and justifiable reasons and the due procedure is followed. This appears to be one such case.
14. Original Applications are, therefore, dismissed. No costs.
15. Let a copy of this order be also placed in TA 185/2007 and TA 186/2007.