Jammu & Kashmir High Court
Ved Paul Gandotra vs Pran Nath And Ors. on 19 October, 2006
Equivalent citations: 2007(2)JKJ15
JUDGMENT Bashir A. Kirmani, J.
1. The parties are locked in litigation for more than two decades, subject matter being an old building situated at Gonikhan, Srinagar with two shops in the ground floor, stated to have been constructed somewhere in 1905 and 1910 on a parcel of land measuring three marlas originally belonging to one Bhagat Sahani who leased out the building and one shop in ground floor to the father and uncle of petitioners while other shop in the ground floor was under the lease hold rights of respondents 1 and 2. In 1969 the uncle of petitioner trans-ferred his lease hold rights to their father under a compromise decree purported to have been awarded by City judge, Srinagar in an eviction suit instituted by above said Bhagat Sahani against petitioners uncle Lala Tara Chand, as a result whereof his lease hold rights were transferred to petitioners father namely Kapoor Chand while proprietary rights of the erstwhile owner Bhagat Sahani were confirmed by this Court under a compromise decree in 1971. Thereafter the father of respondents 1 and 2 namely Chuni Lal and one Pran Nath who was holding the other shop, executed separate rent deeds with Bhagat Sahani and D.L. Sahani and were paying rent to them till 1986 when petitioners purchased the property under two different sale deeds and after doing so issued eviction notices upon both the tenants aforesaid on the ground of personal necessity. On failure of respondent No. 1 and the other tenant namely Madan Lal to vacate the premises under notice, the petitioner filed two civil suits for their eviction which are presently pending in the trial court. After prolonged pendency of said suits the officials of Revenue Department stepped in and declared the land underneath aforesaid building as Nazool land about which as per their stand the petitioners came to know in August, 2003 only when concerned revenue officials informed them of the same. They also learnt that mutations No. 1726 and 1727 of 1998 underwhich the land was mutated ir their favour had been cancelled without notice to them against which petitioners took legal recourse. However, after claiming the land underneath the building as being Nazool land, the department filed an application for their impleadment as party to the said suits pending in the matter, on the ground that they were a necessary party. This application was allowed by trial court vide order dated : 27. 6.2005, which is impugned in this revision petition.
2. Grounds pleaded to assail the order are that the trial court while allowing respondent No. 3 to become party to the suit acted beyond its jurisdiction and converted an eviction suit into a suit for title which could not be done in law particularly because whole issue before the trial court in the main suit was whether or not the petitioners are justified in seeking eviction of respondents from the aforementioned shops on the ground of personal necessity which could not be stretched to the extent of accommodating the claim of 3rd respondent to agitate his title over the suit property especially because the question whether or not the land underneath the aforesaid building is Nazool or private land was already subject matter of writ petition being OWP No. 621 of 2003 pending in this Court, alongwith the dispute regarding survey Number and exact location of the land claimed by Nazool Department.
3. During course of submissions the petitioners counsel while reiterating the contents of revision petition has also given a detailed history of litigation alongwith collateral developments and contended that in facts and circumstances of the case, the trial court erred in allowing the 3rd respondents implead-ment application under impugned order which if allowed to sustain is bound to subject the already prolonged litigation to further delay which would hamper the course of justice. In response Mr. Qayoom, learned Counsel for respondents while meeting the whole length and breadth of arguments put forth by petitioners counsel has contended in quite some detail that in first place the impugned order having been passed in exercise of pure discretionary power cannot be amenable to revisional jurisdiction, and secondly that after 3rd respondents claim of the land underneath aforesaid building belonging to Nazool Department, the said department would automatically assume the status of the paramount title holder and as such nobody could dispute their title to seek impleadment. The counsel for Nazool Department too has defended the impugned order by submitting that being title holders of the land underneath the building in question, the department were a necessary party to the suit and as such the trial court was not only justified but also obliged to implead them as such against which the petitioner had no ground to agitate.
4. I have heard learned Counsel and considered the matter. Without unnecessary hair splitting about the factual part of controversy as projected in the claims and counter claims the matter in issue simply is whether in given and admitted circumstances of the case, the 3rd respondents impleadment as party to the civil litigation ordered by the trial court is proper. For assessing that a reference may be made to Order 1 Rule 10(2) CPC which deals with the subject, which may for the sake of convenience be reproduced herein below:
10. Suit in the name of wrong plaintiff; (1) where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff, or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, if satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determina-tion of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the court thinks just.
(2) Court may strike out or add parties; The court may at any stage of proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the court effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.
(3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent.
(4) Where the defendant, plaint to be amended; where a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant.
(5) Subject to the provisions of the Limitation Act, Section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.
Perusal of above quoted rule reveals that, at any stage of proceedings in a civil suit the court may either itself or on asking of either of the parties add a necessary or proper party to the array of parties whose presence before the court may be necessary for effective adjudication or settlement of questions involved in the suit, etc. Thus for addition of a person as party to a civil suit, three elements must exist; first, that impleadment of the person required to be added as a party is necessary for disposal of the case in given circumstances; secondly, that without his presence court would not be able to determine the questions involved in the suit effectively and completely; and thirdly, that the questions so involved arise from the suit within its given frame.
5. Considered accordingly it transpires that essentially the suit is pending between present petitioners and first two respondents with controversy involved being the substance and veracity of petitioners claim and prayer of having the respondents, admittedly their tenants, evicted from the shops in ground floor of subject matter in question, on the ground of personal necessity. In other words within given frame of the suit, the pleadings of parties, and also the issues framed in the matter, the questions to be determined by the trial court were as to whether or not petitioners personal necessity to hold the shops, presently in possession of respondents, was substantial to the desired level for justifying the prayer for their eviction there from and whether on that count respondents 1 and 2 were liable to be evicted. In so far as the question of proprietorship/title of the building is concerned, there is no dispute between petitioners and respondents; nor regarding respective status vis-'-vis each other. It may be recalled that the first two respondents have, till induction of 3rd respondent been accepting petitioners as lawful owners of the building and the petitioners have continuously been admitting respondents 1 and 2 as tenants of the two shops, put in possession by their predecessor in interest. That being so, the questions falling for settlement did not include proprietorship of the building in question. As a matter of fact the dispute regarding title to the property has been introduced only with intervention of the respondents-Nazool departments claim of being the owners of land underneath the building and thereby its paramount proprietors, wherefrom the first two respondents automatically derive the defence of being tenants of paramount owner and not the petitioners. This appears to have changed the texture of litigation from that of a purely eviction suit into a suit for title with conflict of claims thereupon, as a result whereof the defence of first two respondents as tenants also assumed a slightly different colour by induction of the element of paramount ownership of 3rd respondent.
6. Thus after addition of 3rd respondent as defendant in the main suit, the nature and scope of questions involved in the suit, as between petitioners and first two respondents, got automatically changed and enlarged to the extent of including the dispute of title also, which prior to 3rd respondents impleadment was not there. That being so, petitioners plea that by impugned addition of 3rd respondent as party in the array of defendants has changed nature of the controversy as it existed in the suit prior to his addition, appears to be quite tangible, which ordinarily should have been given due weight by the trial court, particularly because of the two decades long pendency of the matter, during which the proceedings had suffered around half a dozen revision petitions, etc; only whereafter the suit had traveled to the ultimate stage of arguments.
7. Even otherwise also interest of 3rd respondent whatever it may turn to be, could and perhaps should have been agitated by them separately through an appropriate proceeding, rather than seeking their addition in the array of defendants in the suit; particularly because their immediate clash of interest with petitioners allegedly relates to the title of land underneath the building determination whereof in no way depends upon outcome of petitioners eviction plea /prayer against first two respondents. If they emerge successful on title they can treat the tenants the way they choose without in any manner getting prejudiced by petitioners failure or success in the suit against first two respondents. In given circumstances it would rather be perhaps in their own interest to initiate whatever proceedings they thought proper in the matter to agitate their interest against petitioners, on their own, rather than riding the wave initiated by them and that too after long period of around 17 years of pendency.
8. Other aspects agitated at bar travel too far into the factual province, running into such intricacies as would be better left to consideration by the trial court.
9. With that the revision petition is allowed and the impugned order passed by trial court on 27.6.2005 allowing impleadment of 3rd respondent is set aside, and the matter sent down with a direction for early disposal of the case. Parties through their counsel are directed to appear in court below on 04.11.2006. The matter stands accordingly disposed of. Copy of the order be communicated to court below.