Bombay High Court
Vinod Dulerai Mehta vs Kanak Vinod Mehta on 27 April, 1989
Equivalent citations: AIR1990BOM120, 1989(2)BOMCR217, (1989)91BOMLR279, I(1990)DMC372, 1989MHLJ600, AIR 1990 BOMBAY 120, (1989) 2 BOM CR 217, 1989 MAH LR 1522, 1989 MAH LJ 600
Author: P.B. Sawant
Bench: P.B. Sawant
ORDER
Sawant J.
1. This is an application for review of the order passed on April 24, 1989. Mr. Dwarkad as for the Respondents raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the review application, on the ground that sine the Appellant, i.e. the Review Applicant: had withdrawn the appeal no review lies. We are not inclined to accept this contention since as is evident from the order itself, the appeal was withdrawn because at that stage the appellant was advised that no appeal was maintainable against the impugned decision.
2. It is now contended, relying on the following judgments that a Letters Patent appeal is maintainable even against an order of interim maintence in a suit for maintenance. We do into see anything in the said judgment to support this contention. The first judgment relied on is of a Division Bench of this Court Dinesh Gijubhai Mehta v. Smt. Usha Dinesh Mehta. This was a petition under the Hindu Marriage. Act filed for restitution of conjugal rights. It is in this petition that an application for interim maintenance pendente lite was made under Section 24 of that Act. The learned trial Judge allowed the application and fixed the maintenance at Rs. 145/- per month. Against the said order, the wife filed an appeal to this court and the learned single Judge enhanced the said maintenance, to Rs. 350/- per month. Against the said order, a Letters Patent appeal was preferred. On the question of the maintainability of the Letters Patent appeal while observing that it was unnecessary to decide the question the Court indicated that the question as to the pendente lite maintenance had raised a controversy independently of the suit and the decision on that question concluded the controversy finally as far as the parties were concerned, and looked from that point of view, it would be difficult to hold that the Letters Patent appeal was not maintainable.
The second decision is Of the Madras High Court reported in 48 Mad LJ 395 : (AIR 1925 Mad 443) Syed Yusuf Saheb v. Subhan Bibi. In that case again the suit was filed by a Muslim widow to recover her share in the property of her deceased husband in the hands of the other sharers and residuaries of his estate. It is in this suit that an interim order for maintenance was passed in her favour. Relying on an observation made by Sir Arnold White, C.J. in Tuljaram Rao v.
Alagappa Chettiar [ILR (1912) 35 Mad 1] that "an order on an independent proceeding which is ancillary to the suit, not instituted as a step toward judgment, hut with a view to rendering the judgment effective if obtained, is a judgment within the meaning of clause 18 of the Letters Patent", the Court there held that the said order was appealable under clause 115 of the Letters Patent. It is thus obvious that an interim older which is not a step towards the final order or judgment but is made in an independent proceeding is a judgment within the meaning of the said clause. However where as in the present case the interim order is a step towards the final order of maintenance, the ratio of the said decision will not he applicable.
In Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania the principles for determining what is a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Lettrs Patent have been, with respect, succinctly summarised. These principles make it clear that every interlocutor) order cannot be regarded as a judgment but only those orders will be judgments which decide matters of moment or affect vital and valuable rights of the parties and which work serious injustice to the party concerned. In order to determine whether an order passed by the trial Judge can be said to be a judgment the following considerations must prevail with the Court :
"That the trial Judge being a senior Court with vast experience of various branches of law occupying a very high status should be trusted to pass discretionary or interlocutory orders wish due regard to the well settled principles of civil justice. Thus, any discretion exercised or routine orders passed by the trial Judge in the course of the suit which may cause some inconvenience or, to some extent, prejudice one party or the other cannot be treated as a judgment: otherwise the appellate Court (Division Bench) will be flooded with appeals from all kinds of orders passed by the trial Judge. The courts must give sufficient allowance to the trial Judge and raise a presumption that any discretionary order which he passed must be presumed to be correct unless it is ex facie legally erroneous or causes grave and substantial injustice. That the interlocutory order in order to be a judgment must contain the traits and trappings of finality either when the order decides the questions in controversy in an ancillary proceeding or in the suit itself or in a part of the proceedings."
It is thus obvious from this decision which has endorsed the view taken in 48 Mad LJ Report page 395 : (AIR 1925 Mad 443) (supra), that an interlocutory order which is passed as a step towards the final order is not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent.
3. We are therefore satisfied that the present interlocutory order which fixes the interim maintenance pending the suit which is itself tiled for permanent maintenance is a step towards the final order. Hence it does not conclude the rights and liabilities of the parties and is therefore not a judgment within the meaning of clause 15 of the Letters Patent. The review application is therefore liable to be dismissed on this ground alone.
4. Assuming that we are wrong in the view we have taken we will like to record our view on the merits of the case also and we do so with the consent of both the parties. The first at tack against the impugned order is that it has assessed the income of the Appellant-husband unrealistically and thereby cast an impossible burden on the husband. In particular, it was pointed out that the learned Judge had completely ignored the income-tax returns filed by the husband and has proceeded to pass an order on mere allegations of the wife.
5. The impugned judgment shows that the learned Judge has taken into consideration several factors as follows : The parties enjoy a lavish style of living. They are occupying a large flat admeasuring 3000 sq. ft. in a posh locality of Bombay, that they have three servants and both the husband and wife have the use of chauffer-driven cars provided from the car pool of Jyoti Wire Industries Private Limited, of which the husband is a Managing Director. The husband and his family members have substantial share-holdings in the company which has a large property at Andheri and also a factory plot at Aurangabad. The husband along with his father also has a shop and office premises at Kika Street at Tardeo Air-Conditioned Market and the husband's family is in control of other industrial concerns as well. The apartment of the parties further has various electrical household appliances and gadgets. The learned Judge has further taken into consideration the household expenses for some earlier months, the maintenance charges of the flat occupied by the wife and the tuition fees of the son. The learned Judge therefore has come to the conclusion that the income-tax returns filed by the husband are not conclusive of the true income of the husband and his income has to be assessed in the light of the said other consideration as well. We do not see anything wrong in this approach. As is common knowledge, income-tax returns do not reflect the true position of the income of a party for several reasons, and cannot be taken as the sole guide for determining it in proceedings such as the present one.
6. After taking into consideration the several factors the learned Judge has fixed the maintenance of Rs. 8,000/- per month from April 1989 for both wife and son who is aged 16 years. This amount is exclusive of the electricity charges, the lift maintenance charges, the society charges and the regular tuition fees. We see no reason to interfere with it.
7. However, by consent of the parties it is made clear that the Appellant will not be liable to pay special tuition fees when they are not payable. It further appears that while calculating the arrears of maintenance from March 1968 to 31st March, 1989, an error has inadvertently crept in which is also corrected by the consent of the parties. It appears from paragraph 11 of the order, that the learned Judge has directed the payment of monthly maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- from March to December 1988 on the basis that the husband had paid special tuition fees amounting to Rs.2,500/- per month only for that period. However, as the record shows, he has paid the special tuition fees upto the end of March, 1989. Hence the arrears will have to be paid at the rate of Rs. 5,500; - per month from March 1988 to 31st March, 1989. It is only from 1st April, 1989 that the wife would be entitled to Rs. 8,000/- per month. This is also on the basis that the special tuition fees are being paid by the wife from April, 1989 onwards. The result therefore is that the impugned order is modified by consent as follows :
The arrears of maintenance that the Appellant-husband will be liable to pay to the Respondent-wife would be Rs. 71,500/- from March 1988 upto 31st March, 1989 instead of Rs. 79,000/- the arrears being calculated for the period at the rate of Rs.5,500/- per month.
8. Shri Simhan states that it is not clear from the learned Judged's order whether the monthly maintenance of Rs. 8,000/- which is directed to be paid from 1st April, 1989, includes the special tuition fees paid by the wife and whether if they are not being paid by her, the husband is liable to pay the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 8,000/- per month or at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month. There is much substance in this contention. As we have pointed out above, the learned Judge has directed the husband to pay the maintenance at the rate of Rs. 5,000/- per month from March 1988 on the footing that it was the husband who was paying special tuition fees of Rs. 2,500/- per month. It therefore stands to reason and it will also be consistent with the earlier part of the order that if the wife is not paying the special tuition fees or if the husband continues to pay them for the further period, the monthly maintenance should be only Rs. 5,500/-. However since the Respondent-wife is not agreeable to the variation of the order (which is only in the nature of clarification) and since we are not entertaining the review petition, we cannot vary or clarify the direction as we have done with regard to the arrears by consent of the parties. We therefore direct the Appellant to approach the learned Judge for clarification and/or variation of the order on that point.
9. Review petition is disposed of accordingly. In the circumstances of the case there will be no order as to costs.
10. Order accordingly.