Himachal Pradesh High Court
State Of H.P vs Jai Krishan @ Nandu & Ors on 28 July, 2025
( 2025:HHC:24436 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No. 4067 of 2013 .
Reserved on : 15.07.2025
Date of Decision: 28.07.2025
State of H.P. .... Petitioner
Versus
Jai Krishan @ Nandu & Ors. .... Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes For the petitioner : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General.
For the complainant : Ms. Anita Kumari, Advocate.
For the respondents : Mr. N.K. Thakur, Senior Advocate, with Mr. Divya Raj Singh, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 11.01.2013 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned appellate Court) vide which the appeal filed 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 2( 2025:HHC:24436 ) by the petitioner/State against the judgment dated 27.06.2009 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class(I), Palampur, .
District Kangra (learned Trial Court) was dismissed. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 147, 148, 323, 325 & 506 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code (in short "IPC"). It was asserted that Nand Lal Ex-Pradhan of Gram Panchayat intimated the police on 18.04.2004 that a quarrel had taken place in village Nanahar. SI Ashok Parmar (PW-9), HHC Surender Pal and HHC Ajit Singh were sent to verify the correctness of the information. The informant, Santosh Kumar (PW-1), made a statement (Ex. PW1/A) that he was repairing the Kuhl on 16.04.2004 at 10.45 am with Dharam Chand (PW-5), when Jai Krishan @ Nand Lal came to the spot and inquired from him (Santosh Kumar) as to what he was doing. Santosh Kumar replied that he was repairing the Kuhl. Jai Krishan got infuriated and tried to remove the fence erected by the informant Santosh Kumar. Lata Devi (PW-2) also reached the spot. Informant and Lata Devi tried ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 3 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) to prevent Jai Krishan from uprooting the fence. However, Jai Krishan slapped Lata Devi. Kishori Lal, Ramesh Chand, Ravi .
Kumar, Mahinder Singh, Puno Devi, Gaitri Devi, Ravi Kumar, Mahindra Devi, Anju Devi, and Gudo Devi came to the spot armed with sticks. They gave beatings to the informant, Lata Devi and Dharam Chand. Partap Chand, Jagdish Chand (PW-4), and Khem Chand came to the spot after hearing the noise. The accused also gave beatings to Jagdish Chand and Khem Chand. The statement was sent to the Police Station, where FIR (Ex. PW9/A) was registered. SI Ashok Parmar filed an application (Ex. PW9/C) for conducting the medical examination of the injured. Dr. Nirdosh Gupta (PW-6) conducted the medical examination of Khem Chand and found that he had sustained injuries. X-ray was advised, and multiple small contusion and lecirated wound were detected. The nature of injuries sustained by Khem Chand was grievous, which could have been caused by a blunt weapon. MLC (Ex. PW6/A) was issued. Dr. Nirdosh Gupta examined Lata Devi and found that she had sustained simple injuries. He issued the MLC (Ex. PW6/B). He also examined Santosh Kumar and found that he had sustained simple injury. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW6/C). He also examined Dharam Chand and found that he had sustained grievous injury. He ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 4 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) issued the MLC (Ex.PW6/D). Dr. Arvind Bhan (PW-7) went through the X-ray and issued reports (Ex. PW-7/D to Ex. PW- 7/F). SI .
Ashok Parmar went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW9/E). Jai Krishan produced the sticks, which were seized vide memo (Ex. PW1/B). Santosh Kumar produced a T-shirt (Ex. P7), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). Khem Chand produced a shirt (Ex. P9), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW3/A).
Lata Devi produced a shirt (Ex. P8) which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW2/A). Jagdish Chand produced a shirt (Ex. P10), which was seized vide memo (Ex.PW4/A). These were sealed in different parcels with seal 'A', and the seal impression (Ex. PW9/F) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. Statements of witnesses were recorded as per their versions. The challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court after the completion of the investigation.
3. Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 148, 323, 325, and 506, read with Section 149 of IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
4. The prosecution examined 9 witnesses to prove its case.
Santosh Kumar (PW-1) is the informant. Lata Devi (PW-2), Khem ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 5 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) Chand (PW-3), Jagdish Chand (PW-4) and Dharam Chand (PW-5) are the eye-witnesses/victims. Nirdosh Gupta (PW-6) conducted .
the medical examination of the injured. Arvind Bhan (PW-7) went through the X-rays and issued a report. Ramna Devi (PW-8) is a witness to recovery. Ashok Parmar (PW-9) conducted the investigation.
5. The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety.
They stated that a false case was made by the complainant party due to old enmity. The witnesses were related to the informant.
They tendered the documents in evidence.
6. Learned Trial Court held that an FIR No. 114/2004 was registered against the informant party regarding the same incident. Houses of many people were located near the place of incident. No independent witness was cited by the prosecution.
House of Jagdish was located at a distance of 2 km from the place of incident, and House of Dharam Chand was located at a distance of 7 km. Their presence at the spot was doubtful. There were various contradictions in the statements of prosecution witnesses. All these circumstances made the prosecution's case highly suspect;
therefore, the accused were acquitted of the charged offences.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 6( 2025:HHC:24436 )
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State preferred an appeal which was decided by the .
learned Sessions Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the statements of prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material particulars. The accused had also sustained injuries, and no explanation was provided by the prosecution for those injuries. The learned Trial Court had rightly acquitted the accused. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.
8. Being aggrieved by the judgments passed by learned Courts below, the State has filed the present revision asserting that learned Courts below failed to properly appreciate the material placed before them. The evidence was not appreciated from the right perspective. The witnesses had sustained injuries and their presence on the spot could not be doubted. Minor contradictions were blown out of proportion. The prosecution was not obliged to explain minor/superficial injuries. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.
::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 7( 2025:HHC:24436 )
9. I have heard Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioner-State, Ms. Anita Kumari, .
learned vice counsel representing the complainant and Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Divya Raj Singh, learned counsel for respondents/accused.
10. Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the petitioner/State, submitted that the prosecution witnesses consistently deposed about the incident. Minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case. Learned Courts below erred in holding that the contradictions made the prosecution's case doubtful. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments passed by learned Courts below be set aside.
11. Ms. Anita Kumari, learned counsel representing the informant, adopted the submissions of Mr. Lokender Kutlehria learned Additional Advocate General.
12. Mr. N.K. Thakur, learned Senior Advocate, for the respondents/accused, submitted that learned Courts below had rightly appreciated the material placed before them. They had taken a reasonable view while deciding the matter, and this Court ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 8 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) should not interfere with the concurrent findings of the fact recorded by the learned Courts below; therefore, he prayed that the .
present revision be dismissed.
13. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the record carefully.
14. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that the revisional court does not exercise an appellate jurisdiction and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -
"10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short "CrPC") vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality, or propriety of any finding, sentence, or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 9 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
.
15. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 10 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own .
merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-
advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) "27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e., Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 11 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction .
under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection, and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.
If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
*** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 12 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
*** .
27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie."
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.
16. This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13) ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 13 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) "12. Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or .
order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13. Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much- advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC."
16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 14 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : (Amit .
Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27) "27. Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision.
At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:
27.1. Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
27.2. The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not.
If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 15 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.
27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere.
.
No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.
*** 27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with rthe allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.
*** 27.13. Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie."
17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.
17. It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda, (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 16 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169:
.
"12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275], while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5) "5. ... In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction.
Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. ..."
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 17 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123:
(2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19]. This Court held that the High .
Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-
consideration of any relevant material; the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135) "14. ... Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court,, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction."
14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 18 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.
18. This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh .
Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:
"16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-
analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457], it is a well- established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."
19. The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
20. The statement of Santosh Kumar (Ex.PW1/A) was recorded on 16.04.2004 at 4:15 pm at Sub-divisional Hospital, Palampur. SI Ashok Parmar had filed an application (Ex. PW9/C) for conducting the medical examination of Khem Chand, Lata Devi, Santosh Kumar, Dharam Chand and ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 19 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) Jagdish Chand. Medical examinations of Khem Chand, Lata Devi, Santosh Kumar and Dharam Chand were conducted .
between 1:20 to 1:50 pm, and the medical examination of Jagdish Chand was conducted on the same day at 5:30 pm. The application for medical examination (Ex. PW9/C) reads that Puno Devi had inflicted injuries with a stick to Khem Chand, Nand Lal inflicted injuries to Lata Devi with kicks and fist blows, Gurbaksh inflicted injuries to Santosh Kumar with sticks, and Mohinder inflicted injuries to Dharam Chand with a stick. Jagdish Chand sustained injuries from a stone. Khem Chand sustained injuries on the rear side of the head. Lata Devi sustained injuries on her back and both legs. Santosh Kumar sustained injuries on the rear side of his head. Dharam Chand sustained injuries on his face, and Jagdish Chand sustained injuries on his right ear.
21. The statement (Ex.PW1/A) is silent regarding the names of the persons who had inflicted injuries. The fact that the investigating officer knew about the names of the persons who had inflicted injuries and the part of the body where the injuries were inflicted before 1:20 pm shows that the information of a cognizable offence was disclosed to him ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 20 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) before recording the statement (Ex.PW1/A); therefore, the information received by the police before filing the .
application (Ex. PW9/C) would be the FIR and the statement (Ex. PW1/A) would be hit by Section 162 of the Cr.P.C.
22. It was laid down by this Court in Lachhman v.
State, 1972 SCC OnLine HP 55: 1973 Cri LJ 1658, that where the police had received the information of a cognisable offence, which was not reduced into writing, any subsequent information disclosed on the spot would be hit by section 162 of CrPC and cannot be treated as an FIR. It was observed at page 1660:
"6. The first point agitated by the learned counsel for the appellants is that the statement Exhibit P.A. recorded by the police at the spot was not the first information report. The same was hit by the provisions of Section 162 Cr. P.C. The F.I.R. in this case was that which was given by P.Ws 8 and 10, who immediately, on seeing the occurrence, went to the police station and informed the police about the commission of the offence. The answer of the learned Advocate-General to this contention of the appellants' learned counsel is that the information given by these two persons was quite vague and indefinite, and it was not reduced to writing and the F.I.R. was the one which was recorded by the S.H.O. when he went to the spot and found that a cognizable offence had been committed. It was therefore. Exhibit P.A., which was the F.I.R. and it was not hit by the provisions of Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and he has placed reliance on some authorities. The ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 21 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) contention of the learned Advocate-General does not appear to be correct, since the two persons, i.e. P.Ws 8 and 10, had seen that rape was committed, as is evident from their statements on the record. P.W. 8 .
has stated that he saw the accused Lachhman committing rape on the girl, and then he brought the bearer. Sukh Ram (P.W. 10) and he also saw the accused committing rape, and then they both went to the police post. Solan and informed the police of the occurrence. P.W. 10 stated that when he was awakened by P.W. 8, he also went and peeped in the verandah through the glass pane and saw the accused Lachhman, who had put the legs of the girl on his shoulders and had put a part of the quilt over her mouth. The girl was trying to get rid of the man by shaking her legs and herself, but the accused was not letting her free. The thekedar (P.W. 8) asked him that in case the girl died, even he and the witness will be in trouble and that the matter should be reported to the police. and they accordingly rushed to the police post, Solan and reported the matter to the Munshi present there. He telephoned to the S.H.O., who arrived in the police post along with two constables, and they came to the hotel. Hence the only conclusion that can be deduced from the testimony of these two witnesses is that there was no vagueness in the information about the commission of a cognizable offence by the two persons staying there in that hotel along with the girl and this information, as it appears, was conveyed to the incharge of the police post and therefore, this, in my opinion, was the first information in point of time about the commission of a cognizable case. The police proceeded to the spot in pursuance of the information imparted by the two witnesses, and therefore, investigation had already started the moment the investigating machinery was set in motion. It is a different thing that the police did not record the information which had been given to them, but it was their duty to reduce the same into writing, when it was brought to their notice that a cognizable offence had ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 22 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) taken place. Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab ((1970) 2 SCC 113: AIR 1970 SC 1566) is an authority relied upon by the learned Advocate-General to show that anonymous telephone message at police station that .
firing had taken place at a taxi stand although is information which is first in point of time will not by itself clothe it with character of first information report in the aforesaid case the person, giving the information on telephone, did not disclose his identity, nor did he give any further particulars and what he stated was that fire had taken place at a taxi stand, Ludhiana. This was recorded in the daily diary of the police station by the police officer responding to the telephone call, and it was in view of these facts that it was held that, prima facie this cryptic and anonymous oral message, which did not in terms dearly specify a cognizable offence, cannot be treated as a first information report. This authority, therefore, has got no application, because it was definitely a vague message that fire had taken place at the taxi stand without mentioning whether any cognizable offence had been committed. But in the instant case, it was quite explicit that rape had been committed on a girl. Vinayak Datt Durbhatkar v. State (AIR 1970 Goa 96) is also another authority relied on by him. In this case, the oral statement was made by the assaulted person at the police station, and then he was removed to the hospital where another Head Constable recorded his statement, and that statement was challenged by the defence on the ground that the same was hit by Section 162. It was held in that case that the latter statement, being the dying declaration made to a police officer during the course of investigation, is taken out of the purview of Section 162(1). In other words, the limitations imposed by Sec. 162(1) are not applicable to a dying declaration and that the oral statement made to the Head Constable earlier was not complete in itself. Therefore, this authority also has got no application to the facts of the present case, where everything was complete except about the ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 23 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) verification of the name of the girl and about the names of the accused, which the police could ascertain on going at the spot. Therefore, in my opinion, the first information report was the one which had been .
given by the two persons to the in-charge of the police post, and this document Exhibit P.A., recorded during the course of investigation, is definitely hit by the provisions of Sec. 162. In this behalf. I may also refer to State v. Jagdeo (AIR 1955 NUC (All) 1516), wherein it was held that it is not essential to mention in the information when exactly the offence was committed, nor is it essential to mention by whom it was committed or in what circumstances. The object behind the investigation itself is to ascertain these matters; it is for the station officer to find out by investigation whether the offence was committed at all and if it was by whom and in what circumstances. The informer may aid him by stating in the information by whom and in what circumstances the offences were committed, but the law does not impose upon him any obligation to do so. Nor there is any provision in the Code for any preliminary inquiry prior to investigation or prior to the lodging of the information within the meaning of Section 154. The question whether information given under Section 154 is complete or not is not relevant. So long as it is an information about the commission of a cognizable offence it is all the information that is required to be given under Section 154 and, there cannot arise any question of its being incomplete and the failure of the station officer to reduce the first information to writing does not mean that the information was not an information contemplated by Section 154. In the face of this, the argument of the learned Advocate- General has got no force, that the document Exhibit P.A. was the F.I.R. and that it was not hit by Section
162. The result, therefore, is that the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants carries weight. However, this point was not raised by ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 24 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) the appellants in the trial Court and, therefore. I do not attach much importance to this argument.
23. This position was reiterated in Vijai Singh v. State .
of Himachal Pradesh, 1994 SCC OnLine HP 67: 1995 Cri LJ 881:
(1994) 2 Ch LR 504, wherein it was observed at page 882:
"3. Before dealing with the other points raised by the learned counsel for the accused appellants, it is necessary to state that the First Information Report in this case is the report lodged by Nand Lal (Ex. PQ). It is the First Information Report disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence by the accused against the deceased. It cannot be held to be cryptic and vague. It was not, in these circumstances, appropriate for the police to record the statement of Smt. Veena Devi under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and register the First Information Report on that basis. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is clear about the recording of the First Information Report. It does not envisage holding of any kind of inquiry by the Police before registering the First Information Report, unless the report is cryptic and vague (See: (1970) 2 SCC 113: AIR 1970 SC 1566 : (1970 Cri LJ 1415), Tapinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1977 Cri LJ 107, Raberi Karsan Cova v. State of Gujarat, 1976 Cri LJ 132, Jagdish B. Rao v. Govt. of the Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu, AIR 1959 Cal 342 : (1959 Cri LJ 694), Kamal Kanto Das v. the State, 1989 Cri LJ 1350, Tehal Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1980 Cri LJ 1397, Randhir Singh v. the State, and 1994 (1) JT SC 33, Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhana v. State of West Bengal).
4. In 1972 SLJ 276 (HP): (1973 Cri LJ 1658), Lachhman v. State, it has been held that (at page 1661 of Cri LJ):
".....Nor there is any provision in the Code for any preliminary inquiry prior to investigation or prior ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 25 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) to the lodging of the information within the meaning of Section 154. The question whether information given under Section 154 is complete or not is not relevant. So long as it is an information .
about the commission of a cognizable offence it is all the information that is required to be given under Section 154 and, there cannot arise any question of its being incomplete and the failure of the station officer to reduce the first information to writing does not mean that the information was not an information contemplated by Section 154."
5. Thus, the view taken by this Court in this decision is quite apt and in tune with the tenor and spirit of Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure unless, as already recorded above, the information is vague or cryptic or does not disclose the commission of a cognizable case. This question need not detain us any further when the learned counsel for the parties did not assail the findings of the trial court on this question.
24. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar v. State of M.P., (1997) 10 SCC 570: 1997 SCC (Cri) 879 that definite information about the commission of a cognizable offence will constitute an FIR. It was observed at page 577:
"20. While on this point, we wish to mention, however, that the High Court erred in not treating the telephonic information that PW 3 gave to the police station as the FIR. It is not disputed that PW 3 did give information to the police station, wherein he stated that one person had been killed and another person had been dismembered, and it was recorded accordingly in the daily diary book (Ext. P-17). The same entry discloses, notwithstanding the absence of the names of the assailants therein, a cognizable ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 26 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) offence, and indeed it is on the basis thereof that PW 6 initially started the investigation. Ext. P-17 will therefore be the FIR, and the statement of Ramesh (Ext. P-2), which was recorded by him in the course of .
the investigation, is to be treated as one recorded under Section 161 CrPC.....:
25. A similar view was taken in Hem Raj v. State of Punjab, (2003) 12 SCC 241: 2003 SCC OnLine SC 979, wherein it was observed at page 247:
"21....The High Court, after noticing the evidence on record and the submissions advanced by the parties, firstly considered the correctness of the finding of the trial court as to whether the statement Ext. PC, made by PW 2, was the first information report; whether the report earlier made by Vicky, PW 3 to PW 6, in front of Society Cinema, must be treated to be the first information report. The High Court observed that the first information as to the manner in which the occurrence had taken place was given by PW 2 and not by Vicky, PW 3, and, therefore, the trial court was not justified in holding that the first information report was really the report made earlier by PW 3 to PW 6 as nothing had come on record to show that Vicky, PW 3, had told PW 6 about the manner in which the occurrence had taken place. In our view, since it is not clear from the record as to what was the nature of information given by PW 3 to PW 6, since the same was not recorded, it is not possible to hold categorically that the information given by PW 3 must be treated as the first information report. However, we must observe that the reasoning of the High Court in this regard cannot be accepted as correct, namely, that unless the manner in which the occurrence took place is stated in the report, the same cannot be treated as a first information report. The law is very clear and well settled that a report which discloses the commission of a cognizable offence must be treated as the first ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 27 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) information report under Section 154 CrPC. It does not matter whether the person lodging the report had witnessed the commission of the offence or not, nor is it necessary that all details should be mentioned in the .
report about the manner of occurrence, the participants in the crime, the time and place of occurrence, etc. The requirement of Section 154 CrPC is only this that the report must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence, and that is sufficient to set the investigating machinery into action. In this case, since the report to PW 6 made by PW 3 was not recorded, and the endorsement made by PW 6 indicates that PW 3 had told him that a quarrel had taken place a little earlier and that Toni, the injured, had been taken to C.M.C. Hospital, it is not possible to say in the absence of evidence on record, as to whether the report related facts disclosing the commission of a cognizable offence. We, however, do not attach much significance to this aspect of the case, and we shall proceed on the basis that the report made by Parshotam Lal, PW 2, is the first information report." (emphasis supplied)
26. Santosh Kumar (PW-1), Lata Devi (PW-2), Khem Chand (PW-3), and Jagdish Chand (PW-4) denied in their cross-examination that accused Jai Krishan, Bichho Devi, and Puno Devi were harvesting the wheat crop. Ramna Devi (PW-8), on the other hand, stated in her cross-examination that Jai Krishan, his wife and Gurmukh were harvesting wheat crop on 16.04.2004. She was put forward as a witness of truth by the prosecution, and her statement would be binding upon the prosecution. Her statement falsifies the testimonies of Santosh Kumar, Lata Devi, Khem Chand and ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 28 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) Jagdish Chand, and makes the genesis of the incident doubtful.
.
27. Santosh Kumar (PW-1) was declared hostile by the learned APP, and he was permitted to be cross-examined, which means that the prosecution does not consider him worthy of reliance, and the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting his testimony.
28. Santosh Kumar (PW-1) stated in his cross-
examination that houses of Nand Lal, Jahar Singh, Om Parkash, Prem Singh, Shri Ram, etc., are located near his house. Lata Devi (PW-2) stated in her cross-examination that the house of Jagdish is located at a distance of 2 km, house of Khem Chand is located at a distance of 3 km, house of Dharam Chand is located at a distance of 7 km, and the house of Pardhan is located at a distance of 20 feet from her house. Statements of these witnesses show that the houses of independent persons, including Pardhan, are located near the place of incident, whereas, the houses of the witnesses cited by the prosecution are located at a considerable distance.
Therefore, learned courts below were justified in doubting the prosecution's case because of non-examination of any ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 29 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) person from the vicinity and relying upon the statements of Jagdish, Dharma Chand and Khem Chand.
.
29. Khem Chand (PW-3) stated that Jagdish Chand and Partap were sitting inside the house of Santosh Kumar when they heard some noise and came out.
30. Jagdish Chand (PW-4) stated that he was going to Kandbari and went to the house of Santosh Kumar, where Khem Chand, Partap and Dharam Chand were sitting.
Dharam Chand, Partap Singh and Santosh Kumar were repairing the Kuhl. He was inside the house when he heard some noise.
31. It is apparent from his testimony that he has given two versions- one that Partap and Dharam Chand were sitting inside the house, and the second that Partap, Dharam Chand and Santosh were repairing the Kuhl, and both these versions cannot be correct.
32. The reason assigned by these witnesses for their presence is also not satisfactory. When Santosh was repairing the Kuhal, there was no justification for Khem Chand, Partap and Jagdish Chand to be present in his house. If they had gone to meet him, either Santosh should have been in the house, or ::: Downloaded on - 28/07/2025 21:24:38 :::CIS 30 ( 2025:HHC:24436 ) they should have been present with Santosh at the Kuhl, where the repair work was being carried out. This shows that .
they are not making correct statements regarding their presence.
33. Santosh Kumar admitted in his cross-
examination that Kishori Lal, son of Jai Krishan, is a witness against him in a case of theft. He admitted that Jagdish and Lata are accused in that case. He admitted that earlier a case was filed against Sansar Chand, Puni Devi, etc., in which Jagdish and Lata Devi were cited as witnesses. He admitted that Khem Chand and Lata Devi have filed a private complaint against accused Jagdish Chand, Partap, and Lata Devi. Savitri Devi, Himam Chand, and Dharam Chand are the witnesses.
He admitted that Savitri Devi is his sister-in-law, whereas Dharam Chand and Himam Chand are his brothers-in-law.
These admissions show that Dharam Chand, Partap, and Jagdish Chand are the convenient witnesses, who are shown to be present in every complaint instituted against the accused and learned Courts below were justified in discarding their testimonies.
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34. The cross-examination of the witnesses shows that litigations are pending between the parties; therefore, .
learned Courts below were justified in holding that the enmity would make it necessary to seek corroboration of their testimonies.
35. It is an admitted case that the accused had registered a complaint against the informant party, and the police had filed the charge-sheet. It is also not disputed that the accused had sustained injuries in the incident. However, no explanation was provided for those injuries. These circumstances will also make the prosecution's case suspect.
36. Therefore, the evidence on record was insufficient to prove the prosecution's case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Hence, the learned Trial Court was justified in recording the acquittal, and the learned Appellate Court was justified in upholding the judgment of the learned Trial Court. No interference is required with the judgments passed by the learned Courts below.
37. In view of the above, the present revision fails, and the same is dismissed.
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38. Registry is directed to sent down the records of the case to the learned Courts below.
.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
28th July, 2025
(Ritu)
r to
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