Kerala High Court
Shadanandhan vs State Of Kerala on 16 December, 2025
Author: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
Bench: A.K.Jayasankaran Nambiar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
TUESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025 / 25TH AGRAHAYANA,
1947
CRL.A NO. 1715 OF 2025
CRIME NO.578/2017 OF KOTTAYI POLICE STATION, PALAKKAD
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 21.05.2024 IN SC NO.18
OF 2018 OF SESSIONS COURT, PALAKKAD
APPELLANT/1ST ACCUSED:
SHADANANDHAN, AGED 61 YEARS
S/O VISWAMBARAN, CHOPPULLIVEEDU MANNAM POST,
VADAKKAN PARAVOOR, ERNAKULAM, PIN - 683522
BY ADVS.
SRI.M.P.MADHAVANKUTTY
SMT.DIVYADEVI V.G.
SMT.ANGEL GYLES LIKE
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA
REPRESENTED BYPUBIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF
KERALA, PIN - 682031
BY SMT.SHEEBA THOMAS, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON
05.12.2025, ALONG WITH CRL.A.1215/2024, THE COURT ON
16.12.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::2::
2025:KER:96555
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR
&
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE JOBIN SEBASTIAN
TUESDAY, THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2025 / 25TH AGRAHAYANA,
1947
CRL.A NO. 1215 OF 2024
CRIME NO.578/2017 OF KOTTAYI POLICE STATION, PALAKKAD
AGAINST THE ORDER/JUDGMENT DATED 21.05.2024 IN SC
NO.18 OF 2018 OF SESSIONS COURT, PALAKKAD
APPELLANT/2ND ACCUSED:
SHEEJA, AGED 43 YEARS, W/O PRADEEP KUMAR,
KUNNINMEL VEEDU, POOLAKKALPARAMBU, THOLANUR,
PALAKKAD, PIN - 678722
BY ADVS. SRI.K.ANAND
SHRI.BENNY ANTONY PAREL
SRI.N.RAJESH (PALAKKAD)
SHRI.AMEER SALIM
SRI.MATHEWS RAJU
SMT.GOWRI MENON
SHRI.R.K.JAYALAKSHMI
RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT:
STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY PUBLIC
PROSECUTOR,HIGH COURT OF KERALA, PIN - 682031
BY SMT.SHEEBA THOMAS, PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR HEARING ON
05.12.2025, ALONG WITH CRL.A.1715/2025, THE COURT ON
16.12.2025 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::3::
2025:KER:96555
C.R.
JUDGMENT
Jobin Sebastian, J.
Crl.Appeal No.1715/2025 and Crl.Appeal No.1215/2024 have been filed by the first and second accused respectively, in Sessions Case No. 18/2018 on the file of the Sessions Court, Palakkad, challenging the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed against them, for various offences under the Indian Penal Code in the said case.
2. In the above-said case, both the accused were found guilty of offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 380, 461, and 201 r/w 34 of the IPC. Apart from the above, the first accused was found guilty of offences punishable under Sections 302 and 449 of the IPC.
3. The prosecution case in brief is as follows:-
Sri. Swaminathan and Smt. Premakumari, the deceased in this case, were husband and wife residing in a house situated at Poolakkaparambu. Sri. Swaminathan was an ex-serviceman, and their elder son was employed in the military and was therefore away from home. During this period, the second accused, the wife of their elder son, developed an illicit relationship with the first Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::4::
2025:KER:96555 accused. Fearing that the aged in-laws would discover her relationship with the first accused and reveal it to her husband, and with an oblique motive to appoint the first accused as a karyasthan in her matrimonial home, the second accused hatched a criminal conspiracy with the first accused to murder the in-laws. In pursuance of this conspiracy and as planned earlier, the first accused waited outside the house of Sri. Swaminathan on 13.09.2017 between 12:30 a.m. and 4:00 a.m., while the second accused communicated information about the movements of Swaminathan and his wife through the windows of the house.
Thereafter, the second accused stealthily opened the kitchen door and facilitated the first accused's entry into the house. The first accused then murdered Swaminathan and Premakumari by stabbing them with a chopper and hitting them with a hammer. The first accused also committed theft of Rs. 23,000/- and gold ornaments kept in a jewel box. Both accused then attempted to destroy evidence by sprinkling chilli powder inside the house and on the dead bodies, and by disposing of the weapons and other related objects in a well. With the intent to derail the investigation, the second accused handed over her ornaments to the first accused and deliberately scattered the dress materials kept in the almirah inside the house, thereby creating a scene of disorder. Accordingly, the accused are alleged to have committed offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 109, 449, 302, 380, 461, and 201 Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::5::
2025:KER:96555 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
4. On completion of the investigation of this case, the final report was submitted before the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Palakkad. Being satisfied that the case was one triable exclusively by the Court of Session, the learned Magistrate, after complying with all the necessary formalities, committed the case to the Court of Session, Palakkad, under Section 209 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Sessions Judge, after taking cognizance of the offences, issued process to both the accused. The learned Sessions Judge, after hearing both sides under section 227 of Cr.P.C. and upon perusal of the records, framed a written charge against the accused for offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 109, 449, 380, 461, 302 and 201 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code. When the charge was read over and explained to the accused, both of them pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.
5. During the trial, from the side of the prosecution, PW1 to PW59 were examined and marked Exts.P1 to P102. The contradictions in the 161 statement of the prosecution witnesses brought out by the defence were marked as Exts.D1 to D8. MO1 to MO73 were exhibited and identified. After the completion of the prosecution evidence, the accused were questioned under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., during which both of them denied all the Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::6::
2025:KER:96555 incriminating materials brought out in evidence against them. Thereafter, both sides were heard under Section 232 of Cr.P.C., and as it was not a fit case to acquit under the said provision, the accused were directed to enter on their defence and to adduce any evidence that they may have in support thereof. From the side of the accused, DW1 to DW8 were examined and marked Exts.D9 to D15. Thereafter, both sides were heard in detail, and finally, the learned Sessions Judge found both the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B r/w 302, 380, 461, and 201 r/w 34 of the IPC and convicted them thereunder. In addition, the first accused was found guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 449 and 302 of the IPC, and convicted for the said offences also.
6. For offence punishable under section 302 IPC, the first accused was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he was ordered to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Likewise, for offence punishable under Section 449 of the IPC, the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/-, with a default clause to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Both the accused were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- each with a default clause to undergo rigorous Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::7::
2025:KER:96555 imprisonment for one year for offence punishable under Section 120-B r/w 302 IPC. For offence punishable under Section 380 r/w 34 IPC, both the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- each, with a default clause to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months. For offence punishable under Section 461 r/w 34 IPC, both the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Similarly, both the accused were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to pay a fine of Rs.25,000/- each, with a default clause to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months for the offence punishable under Section 201 r/w 34 IPC. The substantive sentences were ordered to be run concurrently. Challenging the findings of guilt, the conviction, and the order of sentence passed by the trial court, both accused have preferred these appeals.
7. We heard Sri. M.P. Madhavankutty, and Sri. N. Rajesh, the learned counsel, appeared for the appellants and Smt. Sheeba Thomas, the learned Public Prosecutor, appeared for the respondent.
8. As per the prosecution, Sri Swaminathan and Smt Premakumari, who were husband and wife, were brutally murdered inside their house situated at Poolakkaparambu Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::8::
2025:KER:96555 sometime between 12:30 a.m. and 4:30 a.m. on 13.09.2017. The incident came to light when a milk vendor, who used to supply milk daily to the deceased, arrived at their house in the early morning of 13.09.2017. When examined as PW6, the said milk vendor deposed that the deceased were her neighbours and that she routinely supplied milk to their house. She stated that on 13.09.2017, between 6:00 a.m. and 6:30 a.m., when she reached the house of Swaminathan to deliver milk, she did not find the milk vessel in its usual place. She then noticed that the vessel was lying in the courtyard. After picking up the vessel and proceeding towards the kitchen area, she found Sheeja (A2) lying on the doorstep of the kitchen. When she called out to Sheeja, she heard a groaning sound. PW6 further stated that she immediately rushed to the house of Chandran (PW3) and informed him of the incident.
Thereafter, she went to the house of one Kumari and informed her as well, and then hurried to her own house to inform her husband. She also deposed that, as a matter of routine, when she visited the house of Swaminathan in the morning to deliver milk, no one would usually be awake at that time.
9. The law was set in motion in this case on the strength of the statement given by the brother of the deceased, Swaminathan. When he was examined as PW3, he deposed that on the day of the incident of this case, at around 6:30 a.m., a milk Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::9::
2025:KER:96555 vendor named Rajalakshmi (PW6) came to his house and informed him that Sheeja (A2), the daughter-in-law of Swaminathan, was lying on the doorstep of the kitchen of the house of the deceased. PW3 further told that though she called Sheeja, she did not respond. He immediately rushed to his brother's house, located about 750 meters away. Upon arrival, he found A2 lying face down on the doorstep on the northern side of the house, unresponsive to his calls. He raised an alarm, which drew his relatives and neighbors to the scene. Sheeja's hands were found tied, and her mouth was gagged. He attempted to loosen the knots on her hands, which were found to be loose, and those who gathered then took Sheeja to a hospital. He rushed inside the house and discovered his brother lying dead in the drawing room with his intestines protruding from his stomach. Frightened by the sight, he ran out. Although he and the others attempted to open the front door of the house, it was locked from the inside, and their forceful attempt failed. Consequently, they broke the window glass of his brother's bedroom and saw his brother's wife lying dead on the bed, in a supine position. The police were immediately alerted, and shortly thereafter, they arrived and recorded his statement, which is Ext.P3.
10. During the chief examination, PW3 further deposed that his brother was an ex-serviceman. His brother's elder son, Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::10::
2025:KER:96555 Pradeep Kumar (PW57), was serving in the Army, and the second accused is Pradeep Kumar's wife. A2 has a son named Rohit, aged 18 years. During the period of occurrence in this case, Rohit was residing at A2's house at Thenur and was studying in Kendriya Vidyalaya, Ottapalam. A2 was also residing in the said house at Thenur with her son, for his convenience in attending school.
However, A2 occasionally stayed at the house of Pradeep Kumar. Earlier, on 31.08.2017, someone had attempted to electrocute PW3's brother, and with respect to that incident, his brother had lodged a complaint before the police. After the said incident, A2 used to stay with her in-laws' house during the night.
11. Undisputedly, this is a case in which there is no direct evidence to prove the occurrence. The prosecution mainly relies on circumstantial evidence to bring home the guilt of both accused, in addition to the scientific and recovery evidence adduced. Before delving into a detailed discussion of the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused, it is necessary to first consider whether the deaths of Swaminathan and his wife, Premakumari, were homicidal in nature. The evidence of the witnesses who gathered at the crime scene, as well as the inquest report prepared, clearly suggests that the deaths were homicidal. Nevertheless, the primary evidence that requires consideration in determining the nature and cause of Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::11::
2025:KER:96555 death is the testimony of the doctors who conducted the autopsy examinations of the deceased.
12. The doctors who conducted the autopsies of the deceased Swaminathan and Premakumari were examined as PW51 and PW37, respectively. During the examination before the Court, PW37 deposed that on 14.09.2017 at 10:05 a.m., while working as a Medical Officer in the Department of Forensic Medicine, Government Medical College, Thrissur, he had conducted the autopsy on the body of the deceased Premakumari. The post- mortem certificate issued by him was marked as Ext.P32. Referring to Ext.P32, PW37 stated that he had noted four antemortem injuries during the post-mortem examination. He further deposed that the deceased had died due to the incised penetrating wounds sustained on the chest and abdomen (injury Nos. 1 and 2). PW37 also opined that injuries Nos. 1 and 2 were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. When PW37 was confronted with a chopper (MO32), after examining it, he stated that the injuries noted by him could have been caused by a weapon like MO32.
13. When PW51, the doctor who conducted the autopsy of deceased Swaminathan, was examined, he deposed that it was on 14.09.2017 that he conducted the post-mortem examination. Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::12::
2025:KER:96555
According to him, altogether 20 ante-mortem injuries were noted in the post-mortem examination. The post-mortem certificate issued by him is marked as Ext.P46. Referring to Ext.P46 post- mortem certificate, PW51 opined that the death was due to the injuries to the head, chest and abdomen (injury nos.1, 16, 17 and
18) and those injuries are sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death. According to PW51, the incised wounds noted in the post-mortem examination can be produced with a weapon like MO32 chopper. According to PW51, injury nos.3 to 14 could be defensive wounds. During re-examination, when PW51 was confronted with MO1 hammer, after verifying the same, he deposed that injury no.1 (Contusion of full thickness of scalp 6x6 cm over the left temporal region with contusion of full thickness of left temporalis muscle and fissured fracture seen extending from left temporal bone into the left middle cranial fossa) can be inflicted by using a weapon like MO1.
14. A conjoint reading of the above-discussed medical evidence and the post-mortem certificates clearly indicates that the deaths of Swaminathan and his wife, Premakumari, were certainly and undoubtedly homicidal in nature.
15. As already stated, this is a case in which there is no direct evidence to prove the occurrence; instead, the prosecution Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::13::
2025:KER:96555 relies on circumstantial evidence to establish the guilt of the accused. Before delving into the details of the circumstantial evidence presented in this case, it is essential to examine the principles and guidelines governing the evaluation of such evidence.
16. In Sarad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [AIR 1984 SC 1622], the Apex Court discussed the nature, character, and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone and held as under:
(i) The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established;
(ii) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;
(iii) The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;
(iv) They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and
(v) There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused, and must show that, in all human probability, the act must have been Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::14::
2025:KER:96555 done by the accused.
17. A similar view has been reiterated by the Apex Court in Bodh Raj alias Bodha v. State of Jammu and Kashmir [AIR 2002 SC 3164], State of Uttarpradesh v. Satish [AIR 2005 SC 1000], and Subramaniam v. State of Tamilnadu [(2009) 14 SCC 415].
18. In cases built upon circumstantial evidence, a complete and unbroken chain of evidence is a requisite. This chain must inevitably lead to the conclusion that the accused, and none other than, could have committed the offence. In other words, to sustain a conviction, circumstantial evidence must be comprehensive and incapable of explanation of any hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. Thus, such evidence must not only be consistent with the accused's guilt but also inconsistent with his innocence.
19. In the present case, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused are mainly:
i) that the first accused was present near the place of occurrence before the incident in this case;
ii) that the first accused came to a tea shop situated near the place of occurrence at 5:00 a.m. on 13.09.2017, i.e., immediately after Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::15::
2025:KER:96555 the incident;
iii) the recovery of stolen gold ornaments pursuant to the disclosure statement made by the first accused;
iv) the recovery of the MO1 hammer, one of the weapons used in the offence, and other incriminating materials from inside a well, based on the disclosure statement made by the first accused;
v) the recovery of the MO32 chopper and the blood-stained clothes of the first accused from near an electric post situated about 100 metres from the place of occurrence, pursuant to the disclosure made by the first accused;
vi) the recovery of cash, the booty of the offence, from the body of the first accused at the time of his arrest;
vii) the conduct of the first accused in attempting to abscond after the commission of the offence;
viii) the conduct of the first accused in taking the MO32 chopper, one of the weapons of the offence, to have it sharpened, thereby indicating preparation for the alleged act;
ix) that the chance fingerprint lifted from a plastic cover found at the crime scene was found to match the fingerprint of the first accused during forensic examination;
x) that the first accused maintained an illicit relationship with the second accused, the daughter-in-law of the deceased, and that both of them had a strong motive to commit the murders of Swaminathan and Premakumari.Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::16::
2025:KER:96555
20. Now, the crucial question that requires consideration is whether the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the above-mentioned circumstances is sufficient to establish them fully and convincingly. For that purpose, it is necessary to examine each circumstance separately and assess whether the evidence relied upon by the prosecution is adequate. Additionally, the significance and impact of each circumstance in proving the guilt of the accused must also be evaluated.
21. As already stated, one of the main circumstances relied upon by the prosecution is the alleged presence of the first accused near the place of occurrence on the previous day of the incident. The prosecution relies on the oral testimony of PW32 to prove this fact. During examination before the Court, PW32 deposed that during the relevant period, he was working as a cleaner in a bus named Usha, which operated on the Valayar-
Tholannoor route. The bus trip usually started at 4:00 a.m. and ended between 7:45 and 8:00 p.m. at Tholannoor. PW32 unequivocally deposed that on the previous day of the alleged incident, the first accused boarded the bus from the Palakkad Municipal Bus Stand and alighted at Tholannoor. At that time, the first accused was carrying a black bag in his hand. According to PW32, after alighting from the bus, he saw the first accused Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::17::
2025:KER:96555 walking towards Poolakkaparambu. PW32 identified MO31 as the black bag he had seen in the hands of the first accused. He further stated that the bus was usually parked at night in the premises of a house situated near the house of the deceased in this case.
22. The above-discussed evidence of PW32 clearly indicates that on the night of 12.09.2017, the first accused reached Tholannoor by the bus in which PW32 was employed as a cleaner.
The evidence of PW31, another prosecution witness, further establishes that Tholannoor is situated approximately 1½ km away from Poolakkaparambu, the location where the incident in this case occurred. PW31's testimony regarding this proximity remained unchallenged during cross-examination. PW32's evidence that the first accused, after alighting from the bus, walked towards Poolakkaparambu Bhagom is also of significant importance in this case. While considering the reliability of PW32's testimony, it is noteworthy that the first accused does not contend that PW32 had any animosity or grudge against him that could have motivated him to falsely implicate the first accused in a case of this nature. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW32.
23. Another crucial circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that on 13.09.2017, at 5:00 a.m., i.e., immediately Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::18::
2025:KER:96555 after the incident, the first accused visited a tea shop situated near the place of occurrence. To prove this circumstance, the prosecution relies on the testimony of PW29. PW29 deposed that he runs a tea shop at a place called Nechur, which he usually opens at 5:00 a.m. According to him, he came to know about the incident in which Swaminathan and Premakumari died from television news. He further deposed that on the date of the incident, at around 5:00 a.m., the first accused came to his tea shop and had tea there. Several local people were also present at the shop at that time. After having tea, the first accused inquired about the bus timings to Kozhikode from one Rajan, who was present in the shop. Rajan informed the first accused that if he boarded the CMS bus that had arrived by that time, he could alight at Athipotta and from there catch another bus to Kozhikode. PW29 identified the first accused as the person who had visited his tea shop. It is now relevant to consider the evidence of PW30, the conductor of the CMS bus in which the accused travelled from Nechur. PW30 deposed that on 13.09.2017, when the bus reached Nechur, the first accused boarded the bus and purchased a ticket to Athipotta. According to PW30, after boarding the bus, the first accused inquired about the bus timings to Ottapalam Bhagom. When the bus reached Athipotta, the first accused alighted. PW30 identified the first accused before the Court. Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::19::
2025:KER:96555
24. A conjoint reading of the evidence of PW29 and PW30 reveals that immediately after the incident, the first accused visited the tea shop of PW29, had tea there, and subsequently boarded the bus in which PW30 was working as a conductor and alighted at Athipotta. Notably, PW30 deposed that the distance from Tholannoor to Nechur is only 3 km. Similarly, PW31 stated that the distance from Tholannoor to Poolakkaparambu is 1½ km.
From Ext.P22, the scene plan, it is evident that Poolakkaparambu is located between Nechur and Tholannoor. On a careful reading of the evidence, it is established that Nechur is situated only about 1½ km from Poolakkaparambu, the alleged place of occurrence in this case. Therefore, the fact that the first accused visited a tea shop, situated only 1½ km from the place of occurrence, in the early morning at 5:00 a.m., raises serious suspicion regarding his involvement in the commission of the offence. Furthermore, neither PW29, the tea shop owner, nor PW30, the bus conductor, had any apparent reason to give false testimony before the Court. Notably, although the said witnesses were subjected to rigorous cross-examination, they withstood the same successfully and their evidence is free from contradictions and omissions, even of a minor nature.
25. However, the evidence of PW29 and PW30 was primarily challenged by the appellant on the ground that the Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::20::
2025:KER:96555 identification of the first accused made by these witnesses before the Court cannot be relied upon, as it was not corroborated by an earlier test identification parade. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, since both witnesses were not previously acquainted with the first accused, it was imperative for the investigating officer to conduct a test identification parade during the course of the investigation. The counsel contended that, as the witnesses had no prior familiarity with the accused, their first-time identification of him before the Court is highly doubtful.
26. While considering this contention, it is pertinent to note that the substantive evidence regarding the identification of an accused is the identification made before the Court. If the identification made before the Court is convincing and reliable, there is no necessity to seek corroboration from an earlier test identification parade. Whether a court identification must invariably be corroborated by an earlier parade depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.
27. If the witnesses had a sufficient opportunity to observe the accused during the relevant period, there is no reason to doubt their subsequent identification of him before the Court, even in the absence of an earlier test identification parade. There is no rigid rule that the first time identification of an accused by Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::21::
2025:KER:96555 witnesses who had no prior acquaintance with him must be corroborated by an earlier identification parade.
28. In the present case, PW29 specifically deposed that the first accused came to his tea shop in Nechur in the early morning and had tea there, which he naturally would have paid for. PW29 further stated that he saw the first accused inquiring about bus timings from other customers present in the shop. This indicates that PW29 had sufficient opportunity to observe the first accused. Likewise, PW30, the conductor of the bus, deposed that on 13.09.2017, when the bus reached Nechur, the first accused entered and took a ticket to Athipotta. PW30 further stated that the first accused inquired about bus timings to Ottapalam Bhagom and alighted at Athipotta. This evidence shows that PW30 also had sufficient opportunity to observe the first accused. This is not a case where PW29 and PW30 saw the first accused only momentarily or for a fleeting instant. On the contrary, they had ample opportunity to observe his face and even interact with him in the course of their duties. Therefore, there is no reason to doubt the identification of the first accused made by these witnesses before the Court, even though it was not corroborated by an earlier test identification parade.
Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::22::
2025:KER:96555
29. The presence of the first accused near the place of occurrence, both prior to and immediately after the commission of the offence, assumes significant importance, particularly since he is not a resident of the area and had no apparent reason to be there. The fact that the first accused was found near the place of occurrence, despite residing in a rented house situated 25 km away, raises serious suspicion regarding his involvement in the crime. It is indeed noteworthy that he came to Nechur, a place situated far from his residence, in the early morning to have tea. The absence of any explanation from the first accused for his presence near the place of occurrence further strengthens the inference of his guilt.
30. Another material circumstance relied upon by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the first accused is the recovery of gold ornaments, the weapons used in the offence, and other incriminating materials, which were allegedly effected on the strength of a disclosure statement made by the first accused. Undisputedly, under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, if a fact is discovered as a consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence while in police custody, so much of that information as distinctly leads to the discovery of the fact is admissible in evidence against him. Such evidence is valuable and can be used to establish the accused's involvement in the offence. Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
& 1215/2024 ::23::
2025:KER:96555
The provision under Section 27 is an exception to the general rule that confessions made to a police officer are inadmissible. Significantly, the term "fact discovered" under Section 27 is not limited merely to the recovery of a physical object; it also encompasses the place from which the object is recovered and the accused's knowledge of its location. In other words, the discovered fact includes the object, its location, and the accused's awareness of it.
31. The rationale behind the partial lifting of the prohibition contained in sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act in respect of the confessions made to a Police officer is that the fact discovered affords the guarantee of truth of that portion of the statement. The admissibility of such a part of the confession is based on the doctrine of confirmation by subsequent events. This doctrine rests on the principle that if any fact is discovered on the strength of any information obtained from an accused, such discovery itself lends assurance to the truthfulness of that part of the information which distinctly relates to the discovered fact. In other words, if an accused in his confession discloses a fact, which is not in the knowledge of police earlier or from a prior source, but subsequently gets confirmed through discovery, so much of such information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved against the accused and can therefore be safely Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::24::
2025:KER:96555 allowed to be admitted in evidence as an incriminating circumstance against the accused. The information given by the accused, which was not known to the police earlier, exhibits the knowledge or mental awareness of the accused as to its existence. However, it is only when the materials on record clearly establish that the discovery was effected solely on the strength of the disclosure statement made by the accused, that the said statement, to the extent permissible under Section 27, can be used against him.
32. Keeping the above in mind, a consideration of the evidence of PW58, the investigating officer, reveals that the first accused was taken into custody in connection with this case from near a bus stop at Thenur in the early morning of 14.09.2017. His arrest was recorded on the same day at 05:00 p.m. According to PW58, during interrogation, the first accused made a disclosure statement, and on the strength of the said statement given by the first accused and as led by the first accused, he, along with the police party, reached the rented house of the first accused located at Thenur. Thereafter, the first accused took a key from the top of the wall of the said house and opened the door. The first accused then entered into the said house and took four gold bangles, one gold chain with a locket, and another gold chain from the drawer of an iron table found inside the said house and handed over the Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::25::
2025:KER:96555 same to the Investigating Officer. PW58 identified those gold ornaments as the gold ornaments so handed over to him by the first accused, which were marked as MO38, MO39 and MO40 series (three in number). According to PW58, the said gold ornaments were seized by him after describing in Ext.P18 seizure mahazar. The relevant portion of the confession statement recorded in Ext.P18 seizure mahazar and proved through PW58 was marked as Ext.P18(a).
33. PW19, an independent witness to the seizure, also supported the prosecution's case by deposing that he saw the first accused taking the gold ornaments from the drawer of the iron table and handing them over to the police. PW19 further stated that the house from which the recovery was effected originally belonged to one Raman and that the first accused was residing there on rent during the relevant period. According to PW19, he was previously acquainted with the first accused, as he resided in a house situated only 20 meters away from his house. Notably, when the daughter of the deceased was examined as PW20, she identified the chain with a locket (MO38) and three bangles (MO40, 40(a), 40(b)) as belonging to her deceased mother. She also identified the remaining chain (MO39) and the bangle (MO40(c)) as belonging to the second accused.
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34. It is obvious that the recovery of the stolen gold ornaments at the instance of the first accused made pursuant to the disclosure statement under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is a highly incriminating circumstance against the first accused. The fact that the stolen articles were recovered from a place known only to the first accused lends substantial assurance to the truth of the disclosure and provides a strong link in the chain of circumstantial evidence.
35. Similarly, the evidence establishes that, on the strength of another disclosure statement given by the first accused, on 14.09.2017, a hammer (MO1), alleged to be one of the weapons used in the offence, along with other incriminating materials, was recovered from inside a well located in the compound of the deceased's house. Ext.P16 is the mahazar documenting the recovery of the hammer, one lock and key, and a CFL bulb. Ext.P16(a) is the relevant portion of the disclosure statement made by the first accused and proved through PW58, the investigating officer. PW16, the independent witness to the recovery, corroborated the prosecution's case. Notably, PW20 identified the MO1 hammer as the hammer that her father used to keep under his cot for safety. She also identified the lock and key of the jewel box (MO2 and MO2(a)) as items usually kept by her mother beneath the bed. Further, when confronted with the CFL Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::27::
2025:KER:96555 bulb (MO3), PW20 deposed that it appeared to be the bulb removed from a portion of the house near the well.
36. Another recovery relied upon by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the first accused is the recovery of a black- colored bag, which contained MO32, the chopper allegedly used in the commission of the offence, along with other incriminating materials, including the dress worn by the first accused at the time of the offence. The evidence of PW58, the investigating officer, reveals that this recovery was effected on the strength of a disclosure statement made by the first accused. According to PW58, pursuant to the disclosure statement and as guided by the first accused, he, along with the police party, proceeded to Poolakkaparambu, where the first accused retrieved a black- colored bag from a bushy area near an electric post situated on the margin of the Nechur-Tholannoor public road and handed it over to PW58. The black bag produced by the first accused was marked as MO31. Upon inspection of the bag, a chopper, a half-sleeve shirt, one bermuda, one towel, two packets of chilli powder, and two gloves (MO32, MO33, MO34, MO35, MO36 series, and MO37 series, respectively) were found. These items were recovered in accordance with Ext.P17 mahazar. The relevant portion of the disclosure statement made by the first accused, recorded in Ext.P17 was proved through PW58 and marked as Ext.P17(a). At Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::28::
2025:KER:96555 this juncture, it is pertinent to note that PW32, the cleaner of the bus in which the first accused was present near the place of occurrence prior to the commission of the offence, also identified the aforementioned black bag (MO31) as the one held by the first accused when he saw him.
37. The recovery of the MO1 hammer and the MO32 chopper, the alleged weapons used in the offence, based on the disclosure statement given by the first accused, constitutes an important link in the chain of circumstances establishing the complicity of the first accused in the commission of the offence. Notably, when the doctor who conducted the autopsy on the body of Swaminathan was examined as PW51, he opined that injury No.1, i.e., the head injury observed on the deceased, could have been inflicted using a weapon such as the MO1 hammer. PW37, the forensic surgeon who conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Premakumari, deposed that the incised wounds noted during his examination could have been caused by a weapon like MO32 chopper. Likewise, the evidence of PW52, the Assistant Director of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Thrissur, shows that she examined the incriminating materials received in connection with this case and prepared Ext.P47 report. Referring to Ext.P47, PW52 deposed that when the MO1 hammer and MO32 chopper, shown as item Nos 11 and 12 in her report, were Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::29::
2025:KER:96555 examined, blood was detected on both items. PW52 further testified that the blood found on item No.12 was human in origin and, upon grouping, was identified as group 'A', which corresponds to the blood group of the deceased Swaminathan. However, the origin of the blood on item No.11 (the hammer) could not be determined due to the insufficient quantity of blood present. Moreover, PW52 further deposed that when the shirt and bermuda (MO33 and MO34), allegedly worn by the first accused, shown as item Nos. 13(a) and 13(b) in Ext.P47 were subjected to scientific examination, human blood belonging to group A was detected on these items also.
38. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is that, one week prior to the incident in this case, the first accused had strengthened and sharpened a chopper. To establish this, the prosecution relies on the evidence of PW40 and PW42, both smiths. PW40 deposed that in the year 2017, the first accused had approached his shop with a chopper, requesting that a handle be fitted to it. Accordingly, a handle was fixed to the chopper. Three days later, the first accused returned to have the chopper sharpened. However, PW40's colleague, Pramod (PW42), was not present in the shop on that day, and hence he asked the first accused to come on the following day. The first accused accordingly returned, and again came on the next day and Pramod Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::30::
2025:KER:96555 sharpened the chopper and handed it back to the first accused. When the said Pramod was examined as PW42, he deposed that he is a smith by profession and that his shop is situated at Parali, beside the Palakkad-Guruvayoor public road. PW40 assisted him in the shop. Two years prior to giving evidence in court, the first accused had brought a chopper to their smithy, and a handle was fitted to it as requested. After three or four days, the first accused returned with the same chopper for sharpening. PW42 was not present at that time, so PW40 received the chopper and handed it over to him the following day. PW42 then sharpened the chopper and returned it to the first accused. Both PW40 and PW42 identified MO32 as the chopper that had been brought by the first accused for sharpening.
39. The prosecution's case that the first accused used the MO32 chopper in the commission of the offence was challenged by the learned counsel for the appellant on the ground that, if the evidence of PW20 that MO32 was the chopper used by her father is believed, it would be improbable that the same chopper could have reached the hands of the first accused one week prior to the incident in this case. In order to consider whether this contention is sustainable, it is necessary to examine the evidence of PW20. PW20 deposed that on one occasion prior to the incident in this case, someone had attempted to electrocute Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::31::
2025:KER:96555 her father by inserting an electric wire through the window with the help of a stick. However, her father was fortunate to escape and came out of the house with a chopper, which PW20 identified as MO32. She further deposed that the chopper had been purchased by her father recently. Admittedly, if PW20's evidence in this regard were accepted, it would indeed raise a suspicion as to how the chopper could have reached the hands of the first accused, enabling him to take it to a smith for sharpening. However, we are of the considered view that PW20's evidence on this point cannot be relied upon. PW20 herself did not claim to have been present in the house at the time of the attempted electrocution. From the evidence on record, it is clear that several years prior to the incident, she had been married and was residing in her matrimonial home. Therefore, her statement that her father came out of the house with MO32 following the attempted electrocution cannot be accepted as credible, particularly since PW20 does not have a case that during the said incident she was present in her paternal house. That apart, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW40 and PW42 that the first accused had brought the MO32 chopper to their shop for strengthening and sharpening. Further, as already noted, scientific evidence establishes that MO32 contained human blood corresponding to the blood group of the deceased Swaminathan. Accordingly, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant in this regard Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::32::
2025:KER:96555 must fail. Moreover, the principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not applicable in India. Therefore, merely because PW20's evidence regarding the MO32 chopper is not credible, it is not legally permissible to discard her entire testimony or to doubt her identification of other MOs made before the court.
40. The evidence of PW58, the Investigating Officer, further reveals that during the inspection conducted after the arrest of the first accused, a purse containing currency notes of various denominations totalling Rs.23,230/- was recovered. The prosecution has a definite case that, out of the said amount, Rs.20,000/- was the money robbed from the house of the deceased, Swaminathan, which he had obtained by selling coconuts. To establish this fact, the prosecution examined PW23, who, on examination before the court, deposed that he is a coconut trader and that two days prior to the incident, he had purchased 670 kilograms of coconuts from the deceased Swaminathan and had paid him Rs.20,000/-. The recovery of this amount from the first accused at the time of his arrest thus lends support to the prosecution's case regarding the complicity of the first accused in the commission of the offence.
41. Furthermore, from the evidence of PW58, it is established that, apart from the said cash, the first accused was Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::33::
2025:KER:96555 found in possession of his Aadhaar card, an ATM card in the name of his wife, and four mobile phones with SIM cards and memory card at the time of his arrest. Likewise, the evidence establishes that the first accused was taken into custody from a bus stop near Thenur, where he was residing on a rental basis. The evidence of PW29 shows that immediately after the incident, the first accused had made inquiries regarding the timings of buses to Kozhikode. The fact that the first accused was found in possession of important documents, including his Aadhaar card and ATM card, as well as four mobile phones, at the time of his arrest from a bus stop, indicates his intention to abscond. Further, the conduct of the first accused in attempting to flee after the commission of the alleged crime is relevant under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove his guilt.
42. The evidence of PW58 further reveals that, on 13.09.2017, he took over the investigation in this case and conducted an inquest on the dead body of the deceased, Swaminathan, in the presence of a Scientific Officer, a photographer, and the relatives and neighbours of the deceased. Ext.P1 is the inquest report prepared by him. According to PW58, the Scientific Officer (PW4) had collected certain items and handed them over to him. Similarly, the Scientific Officer deposed that he had collected several items, including hairs found on the Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::34::
2025:KER:96555 male deceased, and handed them over to the Investigating Officer. The report of the examination of the crime scene prepared by PW4 is marked as Ext.P4. In Ext.P4, hair collected from the hands of the male deceased is shown as Item No.5. The evidence of PW33, the Scientific Officer, Biology Division, FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, shows that upon comparison, the hairs in Item No.1, i.e., those collected from the hands of the male body, were found to be similar to Item No.2(a), the scalp hairs of the first accused sent for comparison.
43. Another material relied upon by the prosecution to establish the presence of A1 in the deceased's house is that a chance print taken from a transparent plastic cover, which was seized as per the scene mahazar, was found to correspond with the fingerprint of the first accused. The evidence of the Investigating Officer shows that, contemporaneous with the preparation of Ext.P6 scene mahazar, he recovered the relevant material items from the crime scene, including the MO26 plastic cover. PW9, the photographer who accompanied the Investigating Officer during the preparation of Ext.P6 scene mahazar, deposed that he took photographs of the dead bodies and the crime scene as instructed by the Investigating Officer. PW28, the police department photographer, developed these photographs. The fingerprint expert, examined as PW27, deposed that out of the nine chance Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::35::
2025:KER:96555 prints collected from the crime scene, the chance prints found on the transparent plastic cover, marked as K8 and K9, were identical to the right thumb and left index fingerprints of the first accused.
44. One of the challenges raised against the fingerprint evidence is that, since the plastic cover from which the chance print was allegedly taken was a movable object, it could have been easily manipulated. Further, as the said plastic cover was produced before the Court only on 20.09.2017, the police allegedly had sufficient opportunity to stage-manage the scene or even to manipulate the fingerprint of the first accused on the cover.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, therefore, it is unsafe to rely upon the fingerprint evidence adduced in this case. While considering this contention, it is first to be noted that the presence of a fingerprint expert at the time of the preparation of Ext.P6 scene mahazar is specifically adverted to in the mahazar itself. Likewise, MO26, the plastic cover, was also recovered on 13.09.2017, i.e., prior to the arrest of the first accused. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the chance print was subsequently manipulated cannot be sustained. Curiously, the learned Sessions Judge discarded the evidence of the fingerprint expert on the ground that the sample fingerprints of the first accused were obtained without an order from a Magistrate. However, we cannot concur with this finding. The Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::36::
2025:KER:96555 collection of fingerprints from an accused arrested in a murder case does not require a Magistrate's order. Under the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022, the police are statutorily empowered to take such measurements from any arrested person. It is true that the collection of fingerprints of the first accused in this case occurred prior to the introduction of the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022. However, even under the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920, the police were authorised to take fingerprints of persons arrested for offences punishable with rigorous imprisonment of one year or more. Moreover, the process of collecting fingerprints from an accused does not amount to testimonial compulsion and is constitutionally permissible. Therefore, we find no reason to discard the fingerprint evidence adduced in this case outrightly. On the contrary, it certainly lends support to the prosecution case.
45. The prosecution's definite case regarding the motive for the alleged commission of the offence is that the first and second accused were involved in illicit relationship, and both apprehended that if the deceased, Swaminathan, and his wife came to know of this relationship, the family life of the second accused would be disrupted. Consequently, both of them allegedly conspired to eliminate Swaminathan and his wife. Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
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46. Undisputedly, the prosecution has adduced
convincing evidence regarding the prior acquaintance of both accused and the nature of their relationship. At this juncture, it is crucial to note that the paternal house of the second accused is at Thenur. There is uncontroverted evidence showing that the first accused was also residing in a rented house at Thenur. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the second accused usually resided at Thenur and only recently stayed at her husband's parents' house in the evenings. The evidence of PW15, who resides in Thenur near the paternal house of the second accused and the rented house of the first accused, shows that the first accused initially resided on a rented basis in his house for a short period, after which the first accused shifted to the portion of the paternal house of the second accused for a short period. There is evidence to show that subsequently, the first accused moved to the house of one Raman on a rental basis. PW15 also deposed that he had occasion to see both of them talking to each other.
47. Significantly, at the time of the arrest of the first accused, the police recovered four mobile phones, four SIM cards and a memory card from his possession. The evidence of PW35, the Assistant Director (Documents), Regional Forensic Laboratory, Thrissur, shows that he retrieved video files from the recovered memory card and mobile phones and compared them with two Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::38::
2025:KER:96555 photographs supplied to him for comparison, which were marked as S1 and S2 in the laboratory. The report of PW35 was marked as Ext.P29. Referring to Ext.P29, PW35 deposed that the retrieved video files depict sexual acts involving two persons, who correspond to the individuals in photographs S1 and S2. The evidence further shows that the DVDs produced by PW35, containing the videos retrieved from the memory card and mobile phones, were displayed in court, and the court got convinced that the first and second accused were engaged in sexual acts of various durations, including kissing on the lips and lying naked on a cot. From the evidence, it is further established that both accused shared a close acquaintance and engaged in sexual intercourse.
48. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that, in view of Section 45A of the Indian Evidence Act, when the Court forms an opinion on any matter relating to information transmitted or stored in any computer resource or in any other electronic or digital form, the opinion of an examiner of electronic evidence, as referred to in Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, alone is relevant. According to the learned counsel, PW35, Assistant Director of RFSL, Thrissur, is not an examiner of electronic evidence as contemplated under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and therefore, his evidence is Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::39::
2025:KER:96555 not legally admissible.
49. However, the learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that no notification has been issued by either the Central Government or the State Government in the Official Gazette declaring any person as an examiner of electronic evidence during the relevant period. In the absence of such a notification appointing an examiner of electronic evidence as contemplated under Section 79A of the Information Technology Act, 2000, the evidence of PW35, Assistant Director of RFSL, is admissible under Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. and Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is not in dispute that neither the Central Government nor the State Government issued any notification appointing any person as an examiner of electronic evidence during the relevant period.
50. It is also pertinent to note that even after the enactment of the Information Technology Act, 2000, there was no amendment to Section 293 of the Cr.P.C. It cannot be disputed that PW35, Assistant Director of RFSL, possesses expertise in the field of electronic evidence. Therefore, there is no reason to disagree with the finding of the trial court that the evidence of PW35 is admissible and relevant under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act. Moreover, the trial court itself viewed the videos Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::40::
2025:KER:96555 contained in the DVDs and, after a holistic consideration of the same along with the evidence of PW35, concluded that accused numbers 1 and 2 shared a close acquaintance and engaged in sexual intercourse.
51. Undisputedly, after the incident, the second accused was taken to the District Hospital, Palakkad, and from there, she was referred to the Medical College Hospital, Palakkad, for a detailed medical examination. PW14, Assistant Professor in Gynaecology at Medical College Hospital, collected the vaginal swab and vaginal smear of the second accused. Similarly, after the arrest of the first accused, PW13, a doctor at the District Hospital, Palakkad, collected his blood sample. When the Scientific Officer, FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, who examined the vaginal swab and smear of the second accused, was examined as PW49, she deposed that human spermatozoa were found in the vaginal swab and smear. Noteably, PW50, Scientific Officer (Biology), FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, deposed that she extracted DNA from the spermatozoa found in the vaginal smear and from the blood sample of the first accused, and the DNA in both was found to match. The above-discussed scientific evidence clearly establishes that the spermatozoa found in the vaginal smear of the second accused belonged to the first accused.Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
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52. Virtually no further proof is required to establish that there was close intimacy between the first and second accused, and that they engaged in sexual intercourse. However, it cannot be ignored that human spermatozoa may remain detectable for up to one week after sexual intercourse. Therefore, on purely abstract terms, it cannot be conclusively stated that the accused had sexual intercourse on the night immediately preceding the incident.
53. The above-discussed DNA evidence was challenged by the learned counsel for the appellants, contending that there was an inordinate delay in sending the vaginal swab and smear to the laboratory for examination, and therefore, there was a possibility of manipulation or contamination. However, this contention cannot be sustained. As already noted, on 13.09.2017, Dr. Anjali Prakash (PW14) collected the vaginal swab and smear of the second accused. Subsequently, she handed over the same to PW48, a woman police constable, for submission to the Chemical Analysis Laboratory, Kakkanad, Ernakulam. The evidence of PW48 shows that, as instructed by the Investigating Officer, she received the items from PW14 on 20.09.2017 and produced the sealed packets before the Chemical Analysis Laboratory, Ernakulam.
Thus, it is evident that until 20.09.2017, the items remained in the custody of PW14, the doctor. Moreover, there is evidence to show that there was no facility at the Chemical Lab to conduct DNA Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::42::
2025:KER:96555 profiling at that time, and hence, the vaginal swab and smear were returned to PW14. Thereafter, PW14 entrusted the items again to PW48 for production before the FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, along with Ext.P14 forwarding letter dated 21.11.2017. The Circle Inspector of Police, Kuzhalmannam, the Investigating Officer, seized the items as per Ext.P81 mahazar dated 21.11.2017 and produced them before the court on 22.11.2017, describing them in Ext.P82 property list along with Ext.P84 forwarding note. The evidence of PW49, Scientific Officer, FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, shows that she received the items on 23.11.2017, and the seals on the items were intact and consistent with the specimen seal impressions forwarded.
54. We agree that there was some delay in sending the vaginal swab and smear collected in this case for examination to the FSL, Thiruvananthapuram. However, the said delay is justifiable, particularly because the samples were initially forwarded to the Chemical Analysis Laboratory, Kakkanad, where facilities for DNA profiling were unavailable, necessitating their subsequent transmission to FSL, Thiruvananthapuram. Therefore, solely on account of this delay, it cannot be inferred that any manipulation or tampering occurred, especially since the prosecution successfully established an unbroken chain of custody from the time of collection until the samples reached the Scientific Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::43::
2025:KER:96555 Assistant at FSL, Thiruvananthapuram. The Scientific Assistant confirmed that the seals on the packets containing the material objects matched the specimen seal provided, ruling out the possibility of tampering.
55. Now, reverting to the motive attributed to the accused, it is to be noted that the prosecution's case is that the second accused apprehended that her relationship with the first accused would come to the knowledge of her aged in-laws, and that, in turn, would reach her husband. According to the prosecution, this apprehension motivated both the second accused and the first accused, who was her paramour, to murder the victims in this case. However, proof of an illicit relationship between the accused alone is not sufficient to establish the above-
stated motive. We are mindful that motive, intention, and knowledge are states of mind, and a court cannot directly probe into the mind of a person to ascertain the motive behind an action. Usually, motive is a matter of inference, which can be gathered from the attending circumstances. Unlike in cases supported by direct ocular evidence, in cases built upon circumstantial evidence, proof of motive can significantly aid in establishing the guilt of the accused and may form an important link in the chain of evidence. Nonetheless, there is no inflexible rule that proof of motive is a sine qua non for recording a conviction in a case that rests on Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::44::
2025:KER:96555 circumstantial evidence. When there are other compelling circumstances proving the guilt of the accused, the absence of motive by itself is not a ground for acquittal. In the present case, apart from establishing that the second accused maintained an illicit relationship with the first accused, the prosecution has failed to prove that the second accused had any motive to commit the alleged crime. On the other hand, the recovery of the proceeds of the crime from the first accused suggests that he had a strong motive to commit robbery after murdering the aged in-laws of the second accused.
56. Evidently, the second accused, the daughter-in-law of the deceased in this case, was primarily implicated on the allegation that the offence was committed pursuant to a conspiracy hatched between her and the first accused. The prosecution does not contend that the second accused committed any overt act or actively participated in the murder of the deceased. The main offence for which she is convicted is under Section 120-B read with Section 302 of the IPC. Undisputedly, the foundation of the offence of criminal conspiracy is an agreement to commit an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means.
57. The Supreme Court in K.R. Purushothaman v State of Kerala [(2005)12 SCC 631] observed that;Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025
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"To constitute a conspiracy, meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing an illegal act or an act by illegal means is the first and primary condition and it is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy. Neither it is necessary that every one of the conspirators takes active part in the commission of each and every conspiratorial acts. The agreement amongst the conspirators can be inferred by necessary implication. In most of the cases, the conspiracies are proved by the circumstantial evidence, as the conspiracy is seldom an open affair. The existence of conspiracy and its objects are usually deduced from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused involved in the conspiracy. While appreciating the evidence of the conspiracy, it is incumbent on the court to keep in mind the well known rule governing circumstantial evidence viz. each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly established by reliable evidence and the circumstances proved must form a chain of events from which the only irresistible conclusion about the guilt of the accused can be safely drawn, and no other hypothesis against the guilt is possible. The criminal conspiracy is an independent offence in the Penal Code.
The unlawful agreement is sine qua non for constituting Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::46::
2025:KER:96555 offence under the Penal Code and not an accomplishment. Conspiracy consists of the scheme or adjustment between two or more persons which may be express or implied or partly express and partly implied. Mere knowledge, even discussion, of the plan would not per se constitute conspiracy. The offence of conspiracy shall continue till the termination of agreement." Similarly, in Gurdeep Singh v State of Punjab (2025 SCC Online 1669), the Supreme Court held that the offence of criminal conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence, nor is it necessary that all conspirators participate in every stage of the commission of the offence. What is material is the existence of a prior agreement, express or implied, to commit an unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means. Once such an agreement is established, even by way of inference from circumstantial evidence, the legal consequences under S.120-B IPC follow".
58. Keeping the above in mind, while analyzing the evidence adduced in this case, it is apparent that the main piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution to establish the existence of a conspiracy and to implicate the second accused as a party to it is the illicit relationship that existed between the first and second accused. It is true that the prosecution has successfully proven Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::47::
2025:KER:96555 that such a relationship existed. However, this fact alone is insufficient to conclude that the second accused was also a party to the conspiracy alleged in this case. The evidence clearly shows that, apart from being the daughter-in-law of the deceased, the second accused was the daughter of the brother of Premakumari, one of the deceased in this case. The evidence further establishes that she was a dutiful daughter-in-law who acted responsibly and stood by her aged in-laws when they were hospitalised.
59. Another piece of evidence relied upon by the prosecution is that, after the incident, although the second accused was found lying on the doorstep of the kitchen, tied and gagged, the knots on her hands were allegedly loose. To establish this fact, the prosecution primarily relies on the evidence of PW3, who deposed that the knots on her hands were indeed loosened.
However, it is pertinent to note that during cross-examination, when PW3 was specifically asked whether he had communicated this fact to the investigating officer during the recording of his statement, he replied that he did not remember. However, no attempt is seen made by the defence counsel to prove the said omission while the investigation officer was in the box. Anyhow, if at all it is assumed that the knots found on the hands were indeed loosened, the same alone is not a reason to enter into a conclusion that the second accused was having privy to the conspiracy Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::48::
2025:KER:96555 hatched in this case.
60. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is the entry of the first accused into the house of the deceased without dismantling any lock or breaking open any door. According to the prosecution, this entry was facilitated by the second accused by removing the latches of the door. However, even if it is accepted that the second accused facilitated the first accused's entry into the house, this alone cannot justify a conclusion that it was done by the second accused for the purpose of committing the murder of the deceased. This is particularly so in light of the established fact that the first and second accused maintained a secret relationship and engaged in sexual activities.
61. The learned Public Prosecutor strenuously contended that, since the presence of the second accused at the time of the commission of the offence stands fully established, it was incumbent upon her to offer an explanation regarding the events that transpired, in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.
While considering this contention, it is to be noted that in her statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., she stated that in the night of 12.09.2017, she was assaulted and abused after her hands and legs were tied and her mouth was gagged. It is true that she has not specified who committed this criminal act. However, the Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::49::
2025:KER:96555 mere non-disclosure of the identity of the assailant cannot, by itself, lead to an inference that she participated in the conspiracy alleged in this case, or that the offence was committed in furtherance of the common intention of both the accused.
62. Moreover, as already noted, the second accused was in a precarious situation. If her illicit relationship with the first accused were to be revealed, it would undoubtedly jeopardise her marital life. The social stigma that would follow such a disclosure within the local community may also have prevented her from fully revealing all the facts relating to the incident. Therefore, unlike in other cases, in the present case, even if the second accused failed to explain all matters within her knowledge, such failure alone cannot constitute the basis for concluding that she was a party to the alleged conspiracy. Furthermore, in the absence of any other convincing circumstances establishing the guilt of the second accused, it would be unsafe to convict her solely on the ground that she failed to discharge the evidentiary burden contemplated under Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act.
63. From a legal perspective, it is well-settled that in cases founded on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances relied upon must be of such a nature that they unerringly point towards the guilt of the accused. More precisely, the proved Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::50::
2025:KER:96555 circumstances must be consistent solely with the hypothesis of the accused's guilt and incompatible with his or her innocence. In the present case, the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution against the second accused do not possess such a character, and it cannot be said that the circumstances proved against her are inconsistent with her innocence. Furthermore, the stolen articles recovered on the strength of the disclosure statement made by the first accused include gold bangles belonging to the second accused also. This fact reinforces that the innocence of the second accused cannot be ruled out. It is also a settled principle that where two reasonable views are possible, one favouring the accused and the other favouring the prosecution, the view favourable to the accused must be adopted. Applying these principles, we are of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to prove that both the accused entered into a criminal conspiracy as alleged by the prosecution.
64. However, as far as the first accused is concerned, the circumstances adduced against him in this case are convincing and reliable. The evidence clearly establishes that the first accused was found near the place of occurrence both before and after the commission of the offence. This fact assumes particular significance because the first accused is not a resident of that area and had no apparent reason to be present there. The absence of Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::51::
2025:KER:96555 any explanation from the first accused regarding his presence is also a significant incriminating circumstance. Similarly, the first accused's attempt to abscond following the commission of the offence is a fact relevant under Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act as conduct indicative of guilt.
65. The recovery of the stolen gold ornaments and cash at the instance of the first accused, pursuant to his disclosure statement, constitutes highly incriminating evidence under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. Likewise, under Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act, the court is entitled to draw a presumption that a person found in possession of stolen property soon after its theft is either the thief or has received it knowing it to be stolen, unless a satisfactory explanation is provided. It is a well-established principle under common law, repeatedly recognized in Indian jurisprudence, that when the prosecution establishes that an accused was found in conscious possession of the fruits of a robbery closely connected with a contemporaneous homicide, and the accused fails to offer a credible explanation, the court may legitimately infer that the person guilty of the robbery is also responsible for the homicide. Accordingly, the recovery of the stolen gold ornaments at the instance of the first accused supports the inference of the first accused's involvement not only in the robbery but also in the homicidal act forming part of the same Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::52::
2025:KER:96555 transaction.
66. Likewise, the recovery of the weapons of offence, together with the prior conduct of the first accused in sharpening and strengthening the weapon, demonstrates his preparation to commit the offence. The evidence of the fingerprint expert, along with other scientific evidence, further corroborates the prosecution's case. In view of the above discussion, we have no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has fully succeeded in proving the guilt of the first accused beyond a reasonable doubt, both by the circumstantial evidence and the scientific evidence adduced in this case.
67. In the result, Crl. Appeal No.1215/2024 is allowed, and the judgment of conviction as well as the order of sentence passed against the second accused for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B r/w 302, 380, 461, and 201 r/w 34 of the Indian Penal Code are hereby set aside, and she is acquitted. The Jail Superintendent concerned is directed to release the second accused forthwith, if her detention is not required in connection with any other case.
68. As the prosecution has failed to prove the offence of criminal conspiracy, the first accused is found not guilty of the Crl.Appeal Nos.1715/2025 & 1215/2024 ::53::
2025:KER:96555 offence punishable under Section 120-B r/w 302 of the Indian Penal Code and is accordingly acquitted of the said charge. The sentence imposed by the trial court for the said offence is also set aside. It is further established that the offences alleged in this case were not committed in furtherance of any common intention shared between the accused. Rather, the offences were committed independently by the first accused, as intended by him. Consequently, the finding of guilt, conviction, and sentence imposed upon him by the trial court for the offences punishable under Sections 302, 449, 380, 461, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code stand confirmed. With this affirmation and modification, the Crl.Appeal No.1715/2025 is allowed in part.
Sd/-
DR. A.K.JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR JUDGE Sd/-
JOBIN SEBASTIAN JUDGE vdv