Jharkhand High Court
H.E.C. Supply Mazdoor Sangharash ... vs The Union Of India on 12 January, 2026
2026:JHHC:721-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 736 of 2025
H.E.C. Supply Mazdoor Sangharash Samittee through its President
namely Dilip Kumar Singh, Son of Late Ram Swarup Singh, aged about
68 years, Resident of Quarter No. B/2/1 HEC Colony, Sector-I, Dhurwa,
P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi
... ... ... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
1. The Union of India
2. The Secretary, Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises,
office at Room No. 155, Udyog Bhawan, Rafi Marg, P.O., P.S. & Dist.
New Delhi-110011.
3. The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central), office at Shramev
Jayate Bhawan, G-4 Sector-10, P.O., P.S. & Dist.-Dwarka, Delhi-110075.
4. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, HEC Ltd. (A Govt of India
Enterprises), Plant Plaza Road, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi.
5. The Assistant Manager (P&A), HEC Ltd. (A Govt of India
Enterprises), Plant Plaza Road, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi.
6. The General Secretary, Hatia Project Workmen Union, A-II/129,
Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi.
7. The General Secretary, Hatia Kamgar Union, (ΑΤΑΚ), CD-542/3,
Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi.
8. The General Secretary, HEC Ltd., Shramik Karamchari Union,
B-3/437 (T), Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi.
9. The President, Hatia Mazdoor Union (CITU), B-44, Sector-II,
Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, Dist.-Ranchi.
... ... ... Respondents/Respondents
---------
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICESUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
---------
For the Appellant: Mr. Anuj Kumar, Advocate
For the UOI: Mr. Prashant Pallav, A.S.G.I.
---------
02/Dated: 12.01.2026
M.S. Sonak, C.J. (Oral)
1. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. This appeal is directed against the learned Single Judge's order dated 10thSeptember 2025 passed in W.P.(S) No. 4979 of 2025 dismissing the writ petition by directing the appellant-petitioner, if he so -1- 2026:JHHC:721-DB chooses, to avail of the alternate remedies before the Industrial Adjudicator under the provisions of the relevant Labor Legislations.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant-petitioner submits that more than 1600 contract labourers, whose interest the appellant represents, have been employed by the Heavy Engineering Corporation (HEC), which is incidentally a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution, for periods ranging between 10 and 20 years. He submitted that even the works that they discharge are of a perennial nature. He submitted that, despite these features, the workers are still employed only on a contract basis, thereby denying them the benefits of regularisation. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that this amounts to exploitation and therefore violates Articles 14 and 23 of the Constitution.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant relied upon paragraph 9 of the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited Vs. Their Workmen Represented By Engineering Mazdoor Panchayat Union, 2008 (4) JCR 195, to submit that this decision covers the issue now raised in this appeal.
5. Learned ASGI, defends the impugned order based on the reasoning reflected therein. He submitted that the matter would involve disputed questions of fact which may not be gone into by this Court in exercise of its summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. He relies on Steel Authority of India Limited and Ors. Vs. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors., (2001) 7 SCC 1 and Leelavathi and Ors. Etc. Vs. The State of Karnataka and Ors., SLP (Civil) No(s). 27984-27988 of 2023, decided on 16th October 2025, in support of his contentions.
6. We have considered the rival contentions, perused the record and the impugned judgment and order of 10th September 2025. Upon due -2- 2026:JHHC:721-DB consideration, however, we are satisfied that the impugned judgment and order warrant no interference for reasons set out briefly thereafter.
7. The appellant's main contention in the writ petition before the learned Single Judge and before this appellate court is that the contract under which contract workers are being continued is nothing but a sham or a non-genuine contract. In support thereof, the learned counsel has reiterated that the workers are employed for long periods of 10 to 20 years, even though the work is perennial. He reiterated that the only reason for their continued employment on a contract basis is to avoid granting them the benefits of regularisation.
8. Now, the adjudication of the issue of whether the contract between the employer and the contractors, in the context of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970, is a sham or non- genuine would involve highly disputed questions of fact. Such issues cannot typically be decided by this Court exercising its summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. That is precisely the reasoning adopted by the learned Single Judge, and we see no good reason to take a different view in this matter.
9. Besides, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited (supra) and in the specific context of the provisions of the Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 and the allegations of the contract between the employer and the contractors being sham or non-genuine has held as follows in paragraphs 125 and 126:-
"125. The upshot of the above discussion is outlined thus:
(1)(a) Before 28-1-1986, the determination of the question whether the Central Government or the State Government is the appropriate Government in relation to an establishment, will depend, in view of the definition of the expression "appropriate -3- 2026:JHHC:721-DB Government" as stood in the CLRA Act, on the answer to a further question, is the industry under consideration carried on by or under the authority of the Central Government or does it pertain to any specified controlled industry, or the establishment of any railway, cantonment board, major port, mine or oilfield or the establishment of banking or insurance company? If the answer is in the affirmative, the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment the Government of the State in which the establishment was situated, would be the appropriate Government;
(b) After the said date in view of the new definition of that expression, the answer to the question referred to above, has to be found in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Industrial Disputes Act; if (i) the Central Government company/undertaking concerned or any undertaking concerned is included therein eonomine, or (ii) any industry is carried on (a) by or under the authority of the Central Government, or (b) by a railway company; or (c) by a specified controlled industry, then the Central Government will be the appropriate Government; otherwise in relation to any other establishment, the Government of the State in which that other establishment is situated, will be the appropriate Government.
(2)(a) A notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work in any establishment has to be issued by the appropriate Government:
(1) after consulting with the Central Advisory Board or the State Advisory Board, as the case may be, and (2) having regard to
(i) conditions of work and benefits provided for the contract labour in the establishment in question, and
(ii) other relevant factors including those mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10;
(b) Inasmuch as the impugned notification issued by the Central Government on 9-12-1976 does not satisfy the aforesaid requirements of Section 10, it is quashed but we do so prospectively i.e. from the date of this judgment and subject to the clarification that on the basis of this judgment no order passed or no action taken giving effect to the said notification on or before the date of this judgment, shall be called in question in any tribunal or -4- 2026:JHHC:721-DB court including a High Court if it has otherwise attained finality and/or it has been implemented.
(3) Neither Section 10 of the CLRA Act nor any other provision in the Act, whether expressly or by necessary implication, provides for automatic absorption of contract labour on issuing a notification by the appropriate Government under sub-section (1) of Section 10, prohibiting employment of contract labour, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment.
Consequently the principal employer cannot be required to order absorption of the contract labour working in the establishment concerned.
(4) We overrule the judgment of this Court in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377: 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344] prospectively and declare that any direction issued by any industrial adjudicator/any court including the High Court, for absorption of contract labour following the judgment in Air India case [(1997) 9 SCC 377: 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344] shall hold good and that the same shall not be set aside, altered or modified on the basis of this judgment in cases where such a direction has been given effect to and it has become final.
(5) On issuance of prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act prohibiting employment of contract labour or otherwise, in an industrial dispute brought before it by any contract labour in regard to conditions of service, the industrial adjudicator will have to consider the question whether the contractor has been interposed either on the ground of having undertaken to produce any given result for the establishment or for supply of contract labour for work of the establishment under a genuine contract or is a mere ruse/camouflage to evade compliance with various beneficial legislations so as to deprive the workers of the benefit thereunder. If the contract is found to be not genuine but a mere camouflage, the so-called contract labour will have to be treated as employees of the principal employer who shall be directed to regularise the services of the contract labour in the establishment concerned subject to the conditions as may be specified by it for that purpose in the light of para 6 hereunder.
(6) If the contract is found to be genuine and prohibition notification under Section 10(1) of the CLRA Act in respect of the -5- 2026:JHHC:721-DB establishment concerned has been issued by the appropriate Government, prohibiting employment of contract labour in any process, operation or other work of any establishment and where in such process, operation or other work of the establishment the principal employer intends to employ regular workmen, he shall give preference to the erstwhile contract labour, if otherwise found suitable and, if necessary, by relaxing the condition as to maximum age appropriately, taking into consideration the age of the workers at the time of their initial employment by the contractor and also relaxing the condition as to academic qualifications other than technical qualifications.
126. We have used the expression "industrial adjudicator" by design as determination of the questions aforementioned requires enquiry into disputed questions of facts which cannot conveniently be made by High Courts in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, in such cases the appropriate authority to go into those issues will be the Industrial Tribunal/Court whose determination will be amenable to judicial review."
10. The above observations, which have been relied upon by the learned Single Judge, also hold that it is for the Industrial Adjudicator to adjudicate on allegations that the contract between the employer and the contractors is a sham or non-genuine. In paragraph 126 referred to above, it was clarified that the expression "Industrial Adjudicator" refers to the Industrial Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be and normally, such issues cannot be adjudicated by the High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
11. We have considered the decision of the learned Single Judge in Heavy Engineering Corporation Limited (supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. That was a case in which workmen approached the Tribunal, and the Tribunal awarded some relief, which was upheld by the learned Single Judge of this Court. Accordingly, based on the said decision, there is no question of this Court directly entertaining -6- 2026:JHHC:721-DB a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution and granting the appellant or the workman whom they represent any relief of automatic regularisation. The decision, in a sense, reiterates the position that, ordinarily, the workmen or the Union representing the workmen shall first approach the Industrial Adjudicators, such as the Tribunal or the Labour Courts, for adjudication of such issues.
12. Besides, we note that this is not a case where the appellant's case has been rejected on the merits. The appellant has only been granted an opportunity, if it so chooses, to avail itself of the alternate remedies provided by the statute. Therefore, if the appellant is able to establish before the Industrial Adjudicator that the contracts between the employer and the contractors, in the facts of the present case, are only sham and non-genuine, we see no reason why the appellant or the workers whom they represent will not get the relief they seek or any other appropriate relief that may be available under the law. The rejection of the petition was only on the ground that such issues, which involve adjudication of the disputed questions of fact, cannot be ordinarily gone into by this Court exercising its summary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
13. If the appellant indeed raises the appropriate dispute or institutes appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum, we are sure that the concerned decision-makers will decide such matters as expeditiously as possible, in accordance with law and on their own merits.
14. We have not examined the merits or demerits of the rival contentions of the parties and therefore, it will be open to the Industrial Adjudicators or the appropriate authorities to examine all such contentions on their own merits, without in any manner being influenced, -7- 2026:JHHC:721-DB either by the order of the learned Single Judge impugned in this appeal or this order by which, we have dismissed this appeal.
15. For the above reasons, we dismiss this Letters Patent Appeal but with the liberties already granted by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order and those now granted by us in this order.
16. No order for costs.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.) (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) 12.01.2026 N.A.F.R. APK/VK Uploaded on 16.01.2026 -8-