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[Cites 3, Cited by 15]

Delhi High Court

Cit vs Hero Auto Ltd on 12 March, 2012

Author: Sanjiv Khanna

Bench: Sanjiv Khanna, R.V. Easwar

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*              IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                             Date of Decision : 12th March, 2012.

+      ITA 146/2012

       CIT                                    ..... Appellant
                         Through Mr. Sanjeev Sabharwal, sr. standing
                         counsel
                   versus

   HERO AUTO LTD                ..... Respondent
                Through
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJIV KHANNA
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.V. EASWAR

SANJIV KHANNA,J: (ORAL)
1.     Ld. counsel for the Revenue at the outset states that Annexure

1 to this appeal is the assessment order passed pursuant to the order

under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 („Act‟, for short).

He prays for and is granted permission to place on record the original

assessment order dated 26.12.2006. This order was made subject

matter of an order under Section 263 of the Act dated 24th March,




ITA 146/2012                                        Page 1 of 11
 2009 by the Commissioner of Income Tax („CIT‟, for short). By the

impugned order dated 8th July, 2011, the Income Tax Appellate

Tribunal („Tribunal‟, for short) has allowed the appeal of the

respondent-assessee and has quashed the order dated 24.3.2009,

under Section 263 of the Act, passed by the CIT on two aspects :

(1) Claim for warranty; and

(2) Deduction under Section 35 DDA.

       With regard to the third aspect i.e. non-recurring items, the

Tribunal has upheld the order passed by the CIT. In this appeal, we

are therefore concerned only with the first two aspects.

2.     On the question of warranty claim, it is noticeable that this

issue was raised by the Assessing Officer during the course of

original assessment proceedings and the assessee had written a letter

dated 21.11.2006 giving complete details of the provision for

warranty and had relied upon decision of Delhi High Court in the

case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vinitec Corporation. Pvt.

Ltd., (2005) 278 ITR 337. The CIT in the order dated 24.3.2009 has



ITA 146/2012                                        Page 2 of 11
 not disputed the aforesaid factual position and has stated as under:

       "i) The assessee‟s claim that warranty issue is covered
       by Jurisdictional High Court decision in the case of CUT
       Vs Vinitec Corporation is not fully correct. The Hon‟ble
       High Court had held that if the provisions is made on
       scientific basis then only it is an allowable expenditure."
3.     Thereafter, he has referred to the second claim of the

respondent-assessee and has observed that there was lack of enquiry

and this vitiated the assessment order. Reference was made to the

decision of this Court in Gee Vee Enterprises Vs. Addl. CIT & Ors.

(1975) 99 ITR 375 (Del.). There is no discussion in the order of the

CIT as to how and in what manner the enquiry was lacking and what

was the fault and default committed by the Assessing Officer. The

Assessing Officer had examined the said aspect in the original

assessment proceedings and accepted the stand of the assessee.

There is no finding of CIT that the order passed by the Assessing

Officer was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue.

The question of "lack of enquiry" and "inadequate enquiry" has been

explained by this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v.



ITA 146/2012                                         Page 3 of 11
 Sunbeam Auto Ltd., (2011) 332 ITR 167 (Del.) and it has been

observed as under: -

       "We have considered the rival submissions of the
       counsel on the other side and have gone through the
       records. The first issue that arises for our consideration
       is about the exercise of power by the Commissioner of
       Income-tax under section 263 of the Income-tax Act. As
       noted above, the submission of learned counsel for the
       Revenue was that while passing the assessment order,
       the Assessing Officer did not consider this aspect
       specifically whether the expenditure in question was
       revenue or capital expenditure. This argument predicates
       on the assessment order, which apparently does not give
       any reasons while allowing the entire expenditure as
       revenue expenditure. However, that by itself would not
       be indicative of the fact that the Assessing Officer had
       not applied his mind on the issue. There are judgments
       galore laying down the principle that the Assessing
       Officer in the assessment order is not required to give
       detailed reason in respect of each and every item of
       deduction, etc. Therefore, one has to see         from the
       record as to whether there was application of mind
       before allowing the expenditure in question as revenue
       expenditure. Learned counsel for the assessee is right in
       his submission that one has to keep in mind the
       distinction between "lack of inquiry" and "inadequate
       inquiry". If there was any inquiry, even inadequate that
       would not by itself give occasion to the Commissioner to
       pass orders under section 263 of the Act, merely
       because he has a different opinion in the matter. It is only
       in cases of "lack of inquiry" that such a course of action



ITA 146/2012                                          Page 4 of 11
        would be open. In Gabriel India Ltd. [1993] 203 ITR
       108 (Bom), law on this aspect was discussed in the
       following manner (page 113) : " . . . From a rending of
       sub-section (1) of section 263, it is clear that the power
       of suo motu revision can be exercised by the
       Commissioner only if, on examination of the records of
       any proceedings under this Act, he considers that any
       order passed therein by the Income-tax Officer is „
       erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of
       the Revenue‟ . It is not an arbitrary or unchartered
       power, it can be exercised only on fulfilment of the
       requirements laid down in sub-section (1). The
       consideration of the Commissioner as to whether an
       order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the
       interests of the Revenue, must be based on materials on
       the record of the proceedings called for by him. If there
       are no materials on record on the basis of which it can
       be said that the Commissioner acting in a reasonable
       manner could have come to such a conclusion, the very
       initiation of proceedings by him will be illegal and
       without jurisdiction. The Commissioner cannot initiate
       proceedings with a view to starting fishing and roving
       enquiries in matters or orders which are already
       concluded. Such action will be against the well-accepted
       policy of law that there must be a point of finality in all
       legal     proceedings, that stale issues should not be
       reactivated beyond a particular stage and that lapse of
       time must induce repose in and set at rest judicial and
       quasi-judicial controversies as it must in other spheres
       of human activity. (See Parashuram Pottery Works Co.
       Ltd. v. ITO [1977] 106 ITR 1 (SC) at page 10) . . .
       From the aforesaid definitions it is clear that an order
       cannot be termed as erroneous unless it is not in



ITA 146/2012                                          Page 5 of 11
        accordance with law. If an Income-tax Officer acting in
       accordance with law makes a certain assessment, the
       same cannot be branded as erroneous by the
       Commissioner simply because, according to him, the
       order should have been written more elaborately. This
       section does not visualise a case of substitution of the
       judgment of the Commissioner for that of the Income-
       tax Officer, who passed the order unless the decision is
       held to be erroneous. Cases may be visualised where
       the Income-tax Officer while making an assessment
       examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind
       to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines
       the income either by accepting the accounts or by
       making some estimate himself. The Commissioner, on
       perusal of the records, may be of the opinion that the
       estimate made by the officer concerned was on the
       lower side and left to the Commissioner he would have
       estimated the income at a figure higher than the one
       determined by the Income-tax Officer. That would not
       vest the Com- missioner with power to re-examine the
       accounts and determine the income himself at a higher
       figure. It is because the Income-tax Officer has exercised
       the quasi-judicial power vested in him in accordance
       with law and arrived at a conclusion and such a
       conclusion cannot be formed to be erroneous simply
       because the Commissioner does not feel satisfied with
       the conclusion . . . There must be some prima facie
       material on record to show that tax which was lawfully
       exigible has not been imposed or that by the application
       of the relevant statute on an incorrect or incomplete
       interpretation a lesser tax than what was just has been
       imposed . . . We may now examine the facts of the
       present case in the light of the powers of the



ITA 146/2012                                         Page 6 of 11
        Commissioner set out above. The Income-tax Officer in
       this case had made enquiries in regard to the nature of
       the expenditure incurred by the assessee. The assessee
       had given detailed explanation in that regard by a letter
       in writing. All these are part of the record of the case.
       Evidently, the claim was allowed by the Income-tax
       Officer on being satisfied with the explanation of the
       assessee. Such decision of the Income-tax Officer cannot
       be held to be „erroneous‟ simply because in his order he
       did not make an elaborate discussion in that regard."

       After referring to the said, in the case of Income Tax Officer Vs.

DG Housing Projects Ltd. decided on 1st March, 2012 we have recently

observed and held as under :

       "16. Thus, in cases of wrong opinion or finding on merits,
       the CIT has to come to the conclusion and himself decide
       that the order is erroneous, by conducting necessary enquiry,
       if required and necessary, before the order under Section 263
       is passed. In such cases, the order of the Assessing Officer
       will be erroneous because the order passed is not sustainable
       in law and the said finding must be recorded. CIT cannot
       remand the matter to the Assessing Officer to decide whether
       the findings recorded are erroneous. In cases where there is
       inadequate enquiry but not lack of enquiry, again the CIT
       must give and record a finding that the order/inquiry made is
       erroneous. This can happen if an enquiry and verification is
       conducted by the CIT and he is able to establish and show
       the error or mistake made by the Assessing Officer, making
       the order unsustainable in Law. In some cases possibly
       though rarely, the CIT can also show and establish that the
       facts on record or inferences drawn from facts on record per



ITA 146/2012                                           Page 7 of 11
        se justified and mandated further enquiry or investigation but
       the Assessing Officer had erroneously not undertaken the
       same. However, the said finding must be clear, unambiguous
       and not debatable. The matter cannot be remitted for a fresh
       decision to the Assessing Officer to conduct further enquiries
       without a finding that the order is erroneous. Finding that the
       order is erroneous is a condition or requirement which must
       be satisfied for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263 of
       the Act. In such matters, to remand the matter/issue to the
       Assessing Officer would imply and mean the CIT has not
       examined and decided whether or not the order is erroneous
       but has directed the Assessing Officer to decide the
       aspect/question.

       17. This distinction must be kept in mind by the CIT while
       exercising jurisdiction under Section 263 of the Act and in
       the absence of the finding that the order is erroneous and
       prejudicial to the interest of Revenue, exercise of jurisdiction
       under the said section is not sustainable. In most cases of
       alleged "inadequate investigation", it will be difficult to hold
       that the order of the Assessing Officer, who had conducted
       enquiries and had acted as an investigator, is erroneous,
       without CIT conducting verification/inquiry. The order of the
       Assessing Officer may be or may not be wrong. CIT cannot
       direct reconsideration on this ground but only when the order
       is erroneous. An order of remit cannot be passed by the CIT
       to ask the Assessing Officer to decide whether the order was
       erroneous. This is not permissible. An order is not
       erroneous, unless the CIT hold and records reasons why it is
       erroneous. An order will not become erroneous because on
       remit, the Assessing Officer may decide that the order is
       erroneous. Therefore CIT must after recording reasons hold
       that the order is erroneous. The jurisdictional precondition
       stipulated is that the CIT must come to the conclusion that
       the order is erroneous and is unsustainable in law. We may




ITA 146/2012                                             Page 8 of 11
        notice that the material which the CIT can rely includes not
       only the record as it stands at the time when the order in
       question was passed by the Assessing Officer but also the
       record as it stands at the time of examination by the CIT [see
       CIT vs. Shree Manjunathesware Packing Products, 231
       ITR 53 (SC)]. Nothing bars/prohibits the CIT from collecting
       and relying upon new/additional material/evidence to show
       and state that the order of the Assessing Officer is
       erroneous."

4.     We may also observe that the question of warranty claim was

reopened in the assessment year 1999-2000 after an order u/s 263 of

the Act. The order passed under Section 263 of the Act, in the

assessment year 1999-2000, was struck down by the Tribunal and

this decision has been upheld by this Court in ITA No.536/2007

decided on 21st November, 2007.

5.     On the second aspect, it is noticed that the claim for deduction

under Section 35DDA was made by the assessee for the first time in

assessment year 2002-03. 1/5th of the amount payable under the

voluntary retirement was allowed as a deduction. In this year, the

Assessing Officer has followed the earlier assessment order. The

CIT in the order dated 24th March, 2009 has observed as under: -




ITA 146/2012                                            Page 9 of 11
        "iii) In respect of issue of deduction u/s 35DDA, the
       Note 2 in audit report does create doubt as to whether
       expenditure to ESS was actually incurred or not. The
       point that still remains is that while in audit report the
       allowable amount u/s 35DDA mentioned in Annexure-III
       is Rs.17,79,196, in computation of income the deduction
       claimed u/s 35DDA is of Rs.1,097,42,824/-. There is
       therefore clearly a mismatch which was never looked
       into by A.O. similarly issue of ESS was not examined at
       all by the Assessing Officer. The lack of inquiry renders
       the assessment order erroneous and prejudicial to interest
       of revenue as discussed in point (ii) itself."

6.     We may note that the assessee had stated before the CIT and
explained the position that an amount of `5,37,14,119/- was incurred
under Section 35DDA in the assessment year 2002-03 and 1/5th
thereof being `1,07,42,824/- was amortised and claimed and allowed
as a deduction. Thereafter, each year 1/5th of the said expenditure i.e.
`1,07,42,824/- had been claimed for the next four assessment years.
No part of it was precautionary and the note in the audit report has
been erroneously read by the CIT. The note in question reads as
under: -

       "The expenditure is ESS has been given on
       precautionary measure due to Introduction of new
       section 35DDA. However, this section has not been
       introduced in clause 15 of Form 3CD."




ITA 146/2012                                         Page 10 of 11
 7.     The assessee had clarified that the note was written by the

auditor as a precautionary measure for reporting that the amount had

been claimed under Section 35DDA. The CIT in the order did not

appreciate and deal with the said aspect. He has wrongly interpreted

and observed that the claim itself was made as a precautionary

measure. The Tribunal was therefore right in setting aside this part

of the order dated 24th March 2009 passed by CIT under Section 263

of the Act.

       The appeal is dismissed. No costs.



                                            SANJIV KHANNA, J.

R.V.EASWAR, J. MARCH 12, 2012 vld ITA 146/2012 Page 11 of 11