Punjab-Haryana High Court
Wada Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee vs Shri Piara Lal on 9 November, 2012
Author: Hemant Gupta
Bench: Hemant Gupta
(1)
RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
Date of decision: 9.11.2012
RSA No. 2513 of 1994
Wada Gurdwara Prabhandak Committee ......Appellant.
Versus
Shri Piara Lal .....Respondent
CORAM: - HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HEMANT GUPTA
Present: - Ms. Ishrat Kaur Pannu, Advocate for the appellant.
None for the respondent.
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
The plaintiff is in second appeal aggrieved against the judgment and decree dated 17.5.1994 passed by the learned first Appellate Court, dismissing the suit for possession of the shop in question.
The plaintiff-appellant filed a suit for possession on 3.5.1991 alleging that the defendant is in possession of the shop in question as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.60/-. Since, the defendant has not paid the rent, therefore, his tenancy was terminated by a notice dated 5.4.1991 sent through registered post, which was duly received by him. Since the defendant failed to hand over the vacant possession of the shop in question to the plaintiff, the present suit for possession and also for recovery of Rs.1800/- as arrears of rent along with interest @ 12% per annum was instituted.
The suit was contested by the defendant raising preliminary objection that the suit is not maintainable in the present form; that it has not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee (2) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) and jurisdiction and that the notice dated 5.4.1991 was not legal in the eyes of law and was not served through a competent person as Shivdev Singh was not the authorized person to do so.
Parties went to the trial on the following issues:-
"1. Whether plaintiff is entitled for recovery of the possession and arrears of rent Rs.1800/-? OPP.
2. Whether notice dated 5.4.1991 was not legal? OPD
3. Whether suit has been filed through a competent person? OPD.
4. Whether suit has not been properly valued for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction? OPD.
5. Whether plaintiff has got no cause of action? OPD.
6. Relief."
The learned trial Court decreed the suit holding that Shivdev Singh was competent to file a suit. Such finding was returned on the basis of the statement of defendant appearing as DW1 and also relying upon the statement of DW2-Satpal Singh. The Court also took into consideration the Resolution (Exhibit P.5) authorizing Shivdev Singh to file the suit for possession.
However, the learned first Appellate Court reversed the findings recorded by the learned trial court on Issue No.3 and dismissed the suit as filed by an incompetent person relying upon a judgment of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Duli Chand v. M/s Mahabir Parshad Tarlok Chand Charitable Trust, through its Secretary, 1984(1) RCR 422. The learned first Appellate Court recorded a finding that the plaintiff would be treated as an unregistered body and therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove as to who were the members of the unregistered body and that how such members are elected and who constituted the governing body. It also observed that no register has been produced in respect of the resolutions passed.
(3)RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M)
Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgment in Duli Chand's case (supra), is distinguishable as that was the case of a Trustee filing a suit for and on behalf of a private Trust, whereas in the present case, the defendant is proved to be tenant under the plaintiff, who is not a Private Trust, but a religious institution, the affairs of which are at best managed by a unregistered society. Such religious institution is a juristic entity, therefore, the defendant cannot be permitted to dispute the authority of Shivdev Singh to file the suit, who is a proved to be managing the affairs of such entity without any objection from any person. Reference is made to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shiromoni Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee v. Som Nath Dass, 2000(4) SCC 146, wherein it has been held that `Guru Granth Sahib' is a `Juristic Person' capable of holding property and its title and name, therefore, any worshipper would be competent to file a suit for the benefit of such `Juristic Person'.
I have heard learned counsel for the Plaintiff and is of the opinion that the following question of law arises for consideration in the resent second appeal:-
"Whether, Shivdev Singh could file suit for
possession as an undisputed manager and
representative of unregistered management of the Plaintiff?"
PW4-Gurmeet Singh has deposed that he is the member of Gurdwara Prabhandhak Committee and that Shivdev Singh is the President. He is the signatory to the Resolution Exhibit P.5, authorizing Shivdev Singh, to file the suit for possession. The said resolution is signed by four other residents of the village. PW1- Shivdev Singh has also deposed that vide the Resolution Exhibit P.5, he was authorized to file the suit. On the other hand, the defendant has not denied the title of the plaintiff over the suit property or the (4) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) fact that he was inducted as a tenant under the plaintiff. Defendant appearing as DW1 has admitted that rent was received by the Bhai of Gurdwara but he stated that Shivdev Singh is not the President of the Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee.
In view of the evidence on record and that the fact that there is no assertion that Shivdev Singh has any interest adverse to the plaintiff and that none else has claimed any interest in the affairs of the Plaintiff, Shivdev Singh, is proved to be a manger and a representative of the plaintiff. Shivdev Singh is representing an unregistered management of a juristic person. The question needs to be examined is whether such unregistered management of a juristic entity can be represented by Shivdev Singh.
The judgment relied upon by the Learned first Appellate Court is in the context of a private trust governed and regulated by the Trust Act 1882. The Plaintiff in the present case is a religious institution and that such institutions are not governed by the said Act, which is evident from the reading of Section 1 of the said Act itself. Such distinction has been noticed by a Full Bench of Madras High Court in a judgment reported as Sankaranarayanan Iyer v. Shri Poovananathaswami Temple Koilpatti through Executive Officer and others, AIR 1949 Madras 721. Hon'ble the Chief Justice while noticing distinction between a private trust and a public charitable and religious endowment trust, observed that a Charitable and Religious Trust or Endowment are explicitly excluded from the class of trusts to which the Trusts Act of 1882 has application. It was held as under:-
"4. At the outset, it must be made clear that the question which falls for decision in this case is concerned with charitable and religious trusts or endowments, which are explicitly excluded from the class of trusts to which the Trusts Act of 1882 has application. This fact must be borne in mind, because what little there is of (5) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) conflict is, in my opinion, almost entirely due to an attempt to apply rules governing private trusts to public charitable and religious endowments."
Therefore, the judgment relied upon has no application to the facts of the present case.
Section 3(42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines the person to include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. The Plaintiff is a juristic entity in view of the fact that it represents Guru Granth Sahib, which has been held to be a juristic person by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Nath Dass's case (supra). The question required to be examined is as to who can represent a juristic entity such as an idol including Guru Granth Sahib, has been raised before the Courts in India from time to time.
In one of the earlier judgments of the Division Bench of Madras High Court reported as Rangaswami Nayudu and another v. Krishnaswami Aiyar and others, 1923 (71) Indian Cases 463, it has been held that deity represented by the idol can own property, but the right to possess the property must be in some human being or beings, but if there is a Trustee or a Manager and that Trustee or Manager is the human being, who can sue for possession. But if there is none, it was held that the right to sue vested in the regular worshippers and not the casual worshippers. But in case of village temple, where no representative has been nominated, the right to possession would vest in the General Body and that rules have been framed such as Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code for such representation. The Court held that the Plaintiff without objection from the Court at the hearing, its sanction to represent the general body of the worshippers is in order. It was observed:-
"Ordinarily the application for such permission would be made at an earlier stage of the suit, but in this case, the plaintiff (6) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) without objection received from the Court at the hearing, its sanction to represent the numerous persons, namely, the general body of worshippers. In my judgment, that is in order, and if the general body are entitled to possession, these are proper representatives admitted by the Court under O.I Rule 8 and are entitled to an order for possession."
The Privy Council in the judgment reported as Babu Mahadeo Prasad Singh and others v. Karia Bharti, AIR 1935 Privy Council 44, has held that a person in actual possession of the Math is entitled to maintain a suit to recover the property appertaining to Math, not for his own benefit, but for the benefit of the Math. Considering the aforesaid judgment and also the judgment reported as Mahanth Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal, AIR 1933 PC 75, a Single Bench of Madras High Court in a judgment reported as Aravamudhu Aiyangar and others v. Ramanuja Aiyangar and others, 1938(2) MLJ 1982, held that a de-facto Trustee is competent to sue for recovery of Trust Property for the benefit of the Trust. It was held to following effect:-
".....The learned counsel for the appellants relied upon the decisions in Mahanth Ram Charan Das v. Naurangi Lal AIR 1933 P.C. 75, Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti AIR 1935 PC 44 and Rangaswami Naidu v. Krishnaswami Aiyar (1922) 44 M.L.J. 116. Those cases only recognize the right of a de- facto trustee to sue for recovery of possession of trust property for the benefit of the trust. It cannot be said on the allegations in the plaint in the present case that the plaintiffs are in de- facto management of the trust. The case falls within the principle of the decision in Ramaswami Goundan v. Singaperumal Kadavul, (1925) 50 MLJ 42, referred to by the learned District Judge."
A Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Gurupada Haldar v. Manmohan Mukherjee and others, AIR 1936 Calcutta 215, held that it is possible for a de-facto shebait or even a stranger to (7) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) bring a suit to recover possession of the idol's property. It was held as under:-
"No doubt it is possible for a de-facto shebait or even a stranger to bring a suit to recover possession of the idol's property. See the case of Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Karia Bharti, AIR 1935 PC 44 which affirmed the principle laid down in Ram Charan Das v. Munshi Naurangi Lal, AIR 1933 PC 75, namely that the plaintiff in actual possession as Mohunt is entitled to maintain a suit to recover property not for his own benefit but for the benefit of the math."
The Full Bench of the Madras High Court in a judgment reported as Sankaranarayanan Iyer (supra), has considered the question as to who can represent a religious or charitable institution. All the members (i.e. Rajamannar, C.J., Viswanatha Sastri and Raghava Rao, JJ.) of the Full Bench have given separate, but concurring opinion. Considering the right of an idol, juristic entity, it was observed that the idol can act and assert its right only by a recognized human agency known as shebait, or dharmakarta and sometimes called trustee. It was observed as under:-
"5. In the case of a Hindu temple, the property vests in the idol, which is a juristic entity. From its very nature, the idol can act and assert its right only by a recognized human agency known as a shebait, or dharmakarta, and sometimes called trustee. (See Jagadindranath Roy v. Hemanta Kumari Debi, 32 Cal. 129 (31 I.A. 203 P.C.) and Pramathanath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 Cal. 809 (AIR (12) 1925 P.C. 139). But such a manager, by whatever term he is designated, is not the person in whom the legal title vests as in a trustee. Likewise, the head of a mutt, even though he may have the right to a part of the usufruct of the properties belonging to the mutt, is not a trustee in the English sense of the term, although in view of the obligations and duties resting on him, he is answerable as a trustee in the general sense, for maladministration.
"Called by whatever name, he is only the manager and custodian of the idol or the institution," vide Vidyavaruthi v. Balusami Aiyar, 44 Mad. 831 : (AIR (9) (8) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) 1922 P.C. 123). The same conception obtains even in respect of Muhammadan religious endowments, and neither the Sajjadanaashin nor the mutavalli is a trustee in the technical sense, (See Vidyavaruthi v. Balusami Aiyar, 44 Mad. 831 : (AIR (9) 1922 P.C. 123). As their Lordships of the Judicial Committee, point out:
"It was in view of this fundamental difference, between the judicial conceptions on which the English law relating to trusts is based and those which form the foundations of the Hindu and the Muhammadan systems, that the Indian Legislature in enacting the Indian Trusts Act (II [2] of 1882) deliberately exempted from its scope the rules of law applicable to Wakf and Hindu religious endowments."
It is because of this peculiarity that the worshippers, the Advocate General, a prospective shebait and any person interested in the temple or mutt, are allowed to institute a suit for the enforcement of the rights of the temple or the mutt. They are allowed to bring a suit for declaration that an alienation by a shebait or a manager is not valid, though if course actual possession of the properties may not be recovered by any of them." The Court also noticed that a de-facto trustee, a person other than the Manager or the Head of an institution, could maintain a suit to recover properties belonging to the idols or the institution on behalf of the idol or the institution, provided that such person is able to prove that he is in exclusive possession of the office of Manager or Head of the Institution though he may not able to establish his legal title to it. It was held as under:-
"In several cases decided by Courts in India, including this Court, it was held or assumed as the basis of the decision that, "a de facto trustee", that is, a person other than a manager or the head of an institution who could establish a legal title to his office, could maintain a suit to recover properties belonging to the idol or the institution, on behalf of the idol or institution, provided that such a person was able to prove that he was in exclusive possession of the office of manager or head of (9) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) the institution, though he may not be able to establish his legal title to it."
xx xx xx "....... How inapplicable and foreign this conception is to the case of Hindu and Muhammadan religious endowments, will be apparent if the nature of such endowments is borne in mind. In the case of these endowments the so called trustee is not really a trustee, in the technical sense, in whom the property is vested. He is really a manager (even in cases where he also has a beneficial interest in the usufruct) and the title always is vested in the idol or the institution. In either case, the analogy is to that of an individual having a manager to carry on the administration of his affairs and properties.
Viewed in this light, the position reduces itself to this. In some cases, the manager has a rightful claim to the office of manager; in other cases, his only claim is that he is in actual possession of the office. "De facto"
means, "by the title of possession," in antithesis to "de jure" i.e. "by the title of right". So long as an action is for the benefit of the real owner, namely, the idol or the mutt, and the person bringing the action is the only person who is in management of the affairs of the idol or the mutt for the time being there is no reason why such person should not be allowed to maintain the action on behalf of the idol or the mutt."
While recording a separate, but concurring opinion, Vishwanatha Sastri, J, observed as under:-
"In Premathanath Mullick v. Pradyumna Kumar Mullick, 52 Cal. 809 at p. 815 (A.I.R. (12) 1925 P.C. 139), the Judicial Committee reiterated what they had previously said:-
"A Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious customs of the Hindu, and the recognition thereof by Courts of law, as `juristic entity'. It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its manager with all the powers which would, in (10) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) such circumstances, on analogy, be given to the manger of the estate of an infant heir. It is unnecessary to quote the authorities; for this doctrine, thus simply stated, is firmly established."
The position of the idol, therefore, is that of a legal owner and the position of the so-called trustee of a Hindu temple or other religious or charitable endowment is that of a mere manager, Venkateshwara v. Venkatesa, I.LR (1941) Mad. 599 : (AIR (28) 1941 Mad. 499 F.B.).
17. The guardian of a Hindu minor, the manager of a Hindu religious endowment and the manager of a joint Hindu family, all occupy a position of trust and confidence towards the minor or the idol or the junior members of the family as the case may be. Their power to deal with the property of the minor or the idol or the joint family, is a limited power which can rightly be exercised only in case of necessity or for the benefit of the infant, idol or the family as the case may be." Pointing out the distinction between de jure guardian, de- jure trustee and de-jure manager, it was observed as under:-
"......When, however, the de jure guardian, de jure trustee or de jure manager of the family, ceases to function for one reason or another, or when there is no such de jure guardian or manager available, the affairs of the infant or the idol or the joint family, as the case may be, are usually attended to by a near relation of the minor, or a person interested in the idol either as a member of the founder's family or the trustee's family or a junior member of the joint Hindu family respectively. The persons who step in and assume the management in such circumstances with a view to protect the interests of the estate without a strict legal title or valid appointment are styled de facto guardians, de facto trustees and de facto managers or a joint family."
"18. ............As the position of a guardian or manager of a Hindi minor's estate has been held by the Privy Council to be similar to that of the manager of a religious endowment, the following passage from the (11) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) judgment of the Judicial Committee in Hanuman Prasad's case, 6 M.I.A. 393: (18 W.R. 81 P.C.) may usefully be cited:-
"Under the Hindu Law, the right of a bona fide encumbrancer who has taken from a de facto manager a charge on lands created honestly, for the purpose of saving the estate or for the benefit of the estate, is not (provided the circumstances would support the charge had it emanated from a de facto and de jure manager) affected by the want of union of the de facto with the de jure title."
I am constrained to refer at length to this aspect of the matter for two reasons. In my opinion, there is a close analogy between the position of the de facto guardian of a minor's estate and that of the de facto trustee of a Hindu religious endowment."
xx xx xx "20. ........The decisions of the Privy Council have now firmly established that the idol is a juridical person capable as such of owning and holding property. The legal title or property is vested in the idol and the so called trustee or dharmakarta is only the manager of the religious endowment. The position of the dharmakarta or manager of a temple in relation to debutter property is by no means similar to that of a trustee towards the trust property under the English law. The only resemblance is that he has certain duties to perform which are analogous to those of trustees."
The aforesaid judgment of the Full Bench of Madras High Court, has been followed in a judgment reported as Ganesamuthuriar and another v. The Idols of Sri Sappani Karuppuswami and others, AIR 1975 Madras 23. In Sarangadeva Peria Matam and Another v. Ramaswamy Goundar (Dead) by Legal Represenatives, AIR 1966 SC 1603, the period of limitation to file a suit for possession by Mathadhipathi of a Math, was examined. It was held that a juristic entity such as idol must of necessity act in relation to its temporal affairs through human agency. It was held that in the absence of a de- (12) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) jure Mathadhipathi, relying upon Mahadeo Prasad Singh (Supra), that a disciple or other beneficiary of the math may take steps for vindicating its legal rights by the appointment of a receiver having authority to sue on its behalf, or by the institution of a suit in its name by a next friend appointed by the Court. It was held to the following effect:-
"If the math while in possession of its property is dispossessed or if the possession of a stranger becomes adverse, it suffers an injury and has the right to sue for the recovery of the property. If there is a legally appointed mathadhipathi, he may institute the suit on its behalf; if not, the de facto mathadhipathi may do so, see Mahadeo Prasad Singh v. Koria Bharti, AIR 1935 PC 44; and where, necessary, a disciple or other beneficiary of the math may take steps for vindicating its legal rights by the appointment of a receiver having authority to sue on its behalf, or by the institution of a suit in its name by a next friend appointed by the Court. With due diligence, the math or those interested in it may avoid the running of time. The running of limitation against the math under Article 144 is not suspended by the absence of a legally appointed mathadhipathi; clearly, limitation would run against it where it is managed by a de facto mathadhipathi. See Vithalbowa v. Narayan Daji, (1893) ILR 18 Bombay 507, 511, and we think it would run equally if there is neither a de jure nor a de facto mathadhipathi.
7. A mathadhipathi is the manager and custodian of the institution. See Vidya Varuthi Thirtha v. Balusami Ayyar, AIR 1922 PC 123. The office carries with it the right to manage and possess the endowed properties on behalf of the math and the right to sue on its behalf for 'the protection of those properties."
Relying upon the aforesaid judgment, a learned Single Bench of this Court in a judgment reported as Shri Guru Granth Sahib Khoje Majra v. Nagar Panchayat Khoje Majra, 1969 PLR 844, has held the following:
"4. Shri Gurugranth Sahib is accepted by the Sikhs as being the spiritual incarnation of all the ten Gurus because the (13) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) preachings and sayings of the Gurus as well as certain other saints accepted by the Gurus are incorporated therein. A Gurdwara therefore, in which Shri Gurugranth Sahib is established for worship would amount to an institution having the same character as a temple or a Mutt and would be a juristic person and its manager would be in the same position as the manager of a temple or any other debutter property. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that a Gurdwara is juristic person which can own property and can bring a suit in its name to protect the property owned by it through its manager. In view of this, it is not necessary to go into the further question whether Shri Gurugranth Sahib is also a juristic person. Shri Gurugranth Sahib can exist only in a Gurdwara and as Gurdwara is a juristic person, the suit can always be brought in the name of Gurdwara."
In Puran Singh v. Ajaib Singh, ILR (1991)2 P&H 63, this court has set aside the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court that the Gurdwara, a juristic person could bring a suit in its own name and the worshippers had no right to file a suit in their own names. This court held that the plaintiffs have not come to the Court for enforcing some personal right but the same does not exclude the rights of others who are interested in the property of the idol in their own right to bring a suit relating to the matter. It was held to the following effect:-
"7........The plaintiffs had not come to the Court for enforcing some personal right. Gurdwara is a juristic person as held by this Court in Piara Singh v. Gurugranth Sahib Madhipur. It is open to the idol to bring a suit to defend its own interest. However, it does not exclude the rights of others who are interested in the property of the idol in their own right to bring a suit relating to the matter. The rights of the plaintiff as a worshipper is not a right through the idol. It is, no doubt, a right which is inseparably bound to an idol and appertains to it the right of the worshipper to maintain a suit against the person who commits an injury to property which belonged to the idol. Reference may usefully be made to Muhammad Umar v. Ram Chand, wherein it was held thus:-(14) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M)
"The suit would lie. Every Muhammadan who has a right to use a mosque is competent to maintain a suit against any one who interferes with the exercise of his such right to use; and by the same analogy every Muhammadan has a right to maintain a suit against persons who commit an injury upon property which has been devoted to the support of a mosque."
In Ram Chand (dead) by his legal representatives v. Thakur Janki Ballabhji Maharaj and another, the Apex held thus:-
"A person, who has made large donations for the maintenance of the temple, has clearly a substantial interest to maintain a suit for possession of the temple and its properties against the pujari or manager, on behalf of the deity to protect the property from mismanagement and misappropriation."
In Som Nath Dass's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that Shri Gurugranth Sahib is a juristic person. After holding so, it was held that no endowment or a juristic person depends on the appointment of a Manager. It was held that if Manager is not appointed, it would be managed by the Court as representing the sovereign. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the object of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court. So if entrustment is to any juristic person, mere absence of manager would not negate the existence of a juristic person. It was held as under:-
"24. Now, we proceed to examine the judgment of the High Court which had held to the contrary. There was difference of opinion between the two Judges and finally the third Judge agreed with one of the differing Judges, who held Guru Granth Sahib to be not a Juristic Person. Now, we proceed to examine the reasonings for their holding so. They first erred, in holding that such an endowment is void as there could not be such a juristic person without appointment of a Manager. In other words, they held that a juristic person could only act through some one, a human agency and as in the case of an Idol, the (15) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) Guru Granth Sahib also could not act without a manager. In our view, no endowment or a juristic person depends on the appointment of a Manager. It may be proper or advisable to appoint such a manager while making any endowment but in its absence, it may be done either by the trustees or courts in accordance with law. Mere absence of a manager negative the existence of a juristic person. As pointed out in Manohar Ganesh Vs. Lakshmiram, ILR 12 Bom 247, (approved in Yogendra Nath Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) referred to above, if no manager is appointed by the founder, the ruler would give effect to the bounty. As pointed in Vidyapurna Tirtha Wwami Vs. Vidyanidhi Tirtha Swami & Ors., ILR 27 Mad. 435 (at 457), by Bhashyam Ayyangar, J. (approved in Yogendra Nath Naskars case, 1969 (1) SCC 555) the property given in trust becomes irrevocable and is none was appointed to manage, it will be managed by the court as representing the sovereign. This can be done by the Court in several ways under Section 92, CPC or by handing over management to any specific body recognised by law. But the trust will not be allowed by the Court to fail. Endowment is when donor parts with his property for it being used for a public purpose and its entrustment is to a person or group of person in trust for carrying out the objective of such entrustment. Once endowment is made, it is final and it is irrevocable. It is the onerous duty of the persons entrusted with such endowment, to carry out the objectives of this entrustment. They may appoint a manager in the absence of any indication in the trust or get it appointed through Court. So, if entrustment is to any juristic person, mere absence of manager would not negate the existence a juristic person."
A juristic person need not be incorporated either as a company or a society or such like institution. A juristic person is competent to sue and be sued in its own name. but in case of idol or for that Guru Granth Sahib, it needs to be represented by a human agency. Since the plaintiff has led evidence to prove that Shivdev Singh is a person competent to represent the juristic entity, the reasoning given by the learned first appellate Court that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove as to who were the members of (16) RSA No. 2513 of 1994 (O&M) the unregistered body, the manner of their election or who constituted the governing body, are not relevant considerations, to determine the right of Shivdev Singh to file a suit for possession. The decree in a suit for possession will enure for the benefit of the plaintiff-Wada Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee. Thus, the findings recorded are not in tune with the judgments of this Court in Shri Guru Granth Sahib Khoje Majra and Puran Singh's cases (supra), and the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Som Nath Dass's case (supra).
In view of the above, the suit is proved to have been filed by a competent and authorized person, namely, Shivdev Singh and that the tenancy of the defendant has been rightly terminated. Therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court suffers from patent illegality.
Consequently, while allowing the present appeal, the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned first Appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.
(Hemant Gupta) Judge 9.11.2012 ds