Supreme Court of India
Punjab National Bank And Ors. vs Jagdish Singh on 11 September, 1997
Equivalent citations: AIR1999SC1577, [1998(80)FLR888], JT1998(7)SC388, (1999)ILLJ945SC, (1998)9SCC265, AIR 1999 SUPREME COURT 1577, 1998 (9) SCC 265, 1998 AIR SCW 4067, (1999) 1 CURLR 35, (1999) 1 LABLJ 945, (1998) 80 FACLR 888, (1998) 7 JT 388 (SC), 1998 SCC (L&S) 1180
Bench: Sujata V. Manohar, D.P. Wadhwa
ORDER
1. The respondent was holding the post of Clerk-cum-Cashier in the petitioner-Bank at the material time. On 27-4-1988 an FIR was lodged against the respondent in connection with an alleged criminal offence under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code and the case was registered against the respondent. The criminal prosecution is still pending.
2. On 4-6-1988 the petitioner-Bank suspended the respondent in view of his detention for an offence under Section 304 of the Indian Penal Code. In August 1988 the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 6036 of 1988 challenging the order of suspension dated 4-6-1988 before the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 8-9-1988 quashed the order of suspension on the ground that there is no provision in the bipartite settlement empowering the petitioner-Bank to suspend an employee in these circumstances. Hence the present appeal is filed by the appellant-Bank.
3. Before the High Court it was not disputed that the terms of the bipartite settlements between the Banking Companies and their workmen govern the present case. Under these settlements, Clauses 19.2, 19.3(a), 19.12(6) are as follows:
"19.2 By the expression 'offence' shall be meant any offence . involving moral turpitude for which an employee is liable to conviction and sentence under any provision of law.
19.3(a) When in the opinion of the management an employee has committed an offence, unless he be otherwise prosecuted, the bank may take steps to prosecute him or get him prosecuted and, in such a case he may also be suspended.
* * * 19.12(b) Pending such inquiry he may be suspended, but if on the conclusion of the enquiry it is decided to take no action against him he shall be deemed to have been on duty and shall be entitled to the full wages and allowances and to all other privileges for the period of suspension; and if some punishment other than dismissal is inflicted the whole or a part of the period of suspension, may, at the discretion of the management, be treated as on duty with the right to a corresponding portion of the wages, allowance, etc."
4. The High Court has referred only to Clause 19.12(b) which gives power to the Bank to suspend an employee pending departmental inquiry against him. In addition, however, there is also Clause 19.3(a) under which when in the opinion of the management an employee has committed an offence and he is being prosecuted, the Bank has the power to suspend the employee. Clause 19.3(a) also further provides that if the employee is not otherwise prosecuted the Bank may take steps to prosecute him or get him prosecuted also. In all these circumstances the Bank has the power to suspend an employee. The High Court is clearly wrong in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner-Bank did not have any power to suspend the respondent when a criminal prosecution is pending against him. The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside and the writ petition before the High Court is dismissed.