Bombay High Court
S. Kantilal And Co. Pvt. Ltd. vs Rajaram Bandekar. (Sirigao) Mines Pvt. ... on 20 November, 1992
Equivalent citations: [1993]76COMPCAS800(BOM)
JUDGMENT G.D. Kamat, J.
1. This is a petition under sections 433 and 434 of the Companies Act, 1956, for winding up Messrs. Rajarain Bandekar (Sirigao) Mines Private Limited, for short" the company", on the ground that the company is insolvent and is unable to pay its debts.
2. Messrs. S. Kantilal and Co. Pvt. Ltd. (for short" the petitioners claim that a confiri-ned debt of Rs. 66 lakhs together with compound interest calculated thercon at the rate of 19.25 per cent. per annum with quarterly rests from August 14, 1989, till the date of payment or realization is not paid despite notice under section 434(1)(a) of the Companies Act, 1956.
3. The petitioners as holders of the mining concession known as Doro, situated at Nanora Village of Bicholim Taluka, entered into an agreement on August 4, 1987, by virtue of which Messrs. Narayan R. Bandekar and Sons Pvt. Ltd. (for short" Bandekar Sons"), were permitted to carry out the work of extracting, raising, processing, loading and delivering iron ore into trucks employed by and on behalf of the petitioners at the mines on conditions that Bandekar Sons are to extract a minimum quantity of one lakh wet tonnes (WMT) of iron ore to be delivered to the petitioners; that in case of any shortfall in the extraction quantity, Bandekar Sons are liable to pay a compensation of Rs. 10.35 per WMT of quantity short-raised; that Bandekar Sons were to be paid by the petitioners a remuneration of Rs. 24.65 per WMT of iron ore delivered; that upon determination of this agreement the petitioners were given option to purchase lands, buildings, structures, all or in part at a fair value, valuation to be made by a qualified third person, in the event no agreement or fair value is reached by and between the parties, an interim ad hoe determination of value to be paid for obtaining vacant possession thereof.
4. Subsequently, the said agreement dated August, 4, 1987, was modified and altered to the extent that Bandekar Sons would extract 3 lakhs WMT of iron ore instead of one lakh WMT upon condition that the petitioners would provide Bandekar Sons a short-term interest free loan in an amount of Rs. 21 lakhs. This was obviously done to enable Bandekar Sons to increase the production of iron ore from the said mining concession. Thereupon an agreement dated August 18, 1987, came into being. It is not disputed that soon after this agreement of August 18, 1987, the petitioners rendered further financial assistance in the amount of Rs. 20 lakhs on two occasions in November, 1987. The interest-free loan of Rs. @l lakhs was agreed and undertaken to be returned on or before April 10, 1988, and in any event not beyond May 31, 1988. The agreement of August 18, 1987, was countersigned by Narayan Bandekar and his wife, Mrs. Manda Narayan Bandekar, in their individual capacity that they shall be personally responsible for the repayment of the loan. Bandekar Sons forwarded a cheque dated April 3, 1989, drawn on Syndicate Bank in favour of the petitioners in the sum of Rs. 41 lakhs along with their letter dated April 3, 1989. On the same date, that is, April 3, 1989, the company also forwarded its cheque for Rs. 41 takhs drawn on Canara Bank in favour of the petitioners towards the repayment of the loan advanced by the petitioners to Baiidekar Sons in their capacity as guarantors. In that letter, it was mentioned :
"We further confirm that we are a sister concern of Narayan Bandekar and Sons Pvt. Ltd. with identity of interest in their venture of extraction and operation of your mining concession 'Doro' under the agreement dated August 4, 1987, and also a full participant in the various advantages provided by way of monetary assistance under the agreement dated August 18, 1987. As guarantors our cheque for Rs. 41,00,000 (Rupees forty-one lakhs only) dated April 3, 1989, drawn on Canara Bank, Vasco da Gama, is being issued in your favour with full authority not only to present the same for realization but also to recover the entire amount in the event of the cheque issued by Narayaii Bandekar and Sons Pvt. Ltd. being returned dishonoured.
5. The cheque issued by Bandekar Sons was returned unpaid by the Syndicate Bank to the petitioners on May 23, 1989, with a remark "refer to drawer". The cheque issued by the company when presented for payment was also returned unpaid by the Canara Bank on May 24, 1989, with the same remark.
6. The further story is that Bandekar Sons was unable to fulfil their obligation to extract the minimum quantity of 3 lakhs WMT under the agreement dated August 4, 1987, read with the further agreement dated August 18, 1987, or to repay the short-term loan of Rs. 41 lakhs. In or about May, 1989, Bandekar Sons approached the petitioners, expressed their inability to extract the minimum quantity of iron ore and on admitting difficulties in fulfilling the obligations cast under the agreement dated August 4, 1987, as modified by the agreement dated August 18, 1987, the petitioners were requested to treat the contract as rescinded forthwith and agreed to return the amount of Rs. 41 lakhs, which was advanced by way of financial assistance, as also to pay to the petitioners a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs towards liquidated damages for failure to perform their obligations under the said agreement dated August 4, 1987, as amended by the agreement dated August 18, 1987. It is the case of the petitioners that they agreed to rescind the agreements and to accept Rs. 25 lakhs by way of full and final settlement provided the company guaranteed the repayment of the sum of Rs. 25 lakhs. Upon agreement between the parties, Bandekar Sons by its letter dated May 19, 1989, admitted its failure and accepted ts liability to pay Rs. 25 lakhs by way of liquidated damages in full and final settlement and along with that letter sent its cheque for Rs. 25 lakhs drawn on the Syndicate Bank. By another letter of the same date, May 19, 1989, the company also forwarded its cheque for Rs. 25 lakhs in their capacity as guarantors. The cheque issued by Bandekar Sons was again dishonoured. Upon that event the petitioners presented cheque issued by the company for payment, which was again dishonoured and returned by the bankers, Canara Bank, on May 24, 1989, to the petitioners. On May 26, 1989, the fact that these cheques, namely, for Rs. 41 lakhs and Rs. 25 lakhs, were dishonoured was informed to Bandekar Sons as well as Narayan Bandekar and his wife, Mrs. Manda Bandekar. These two directors it appears pleaded with the petitioners to forbear for some time from taking any action against them and they assured and undertook to make immediate payment of Rs. 66 lakhs. An agreement was drawn up on August 14, 1989, between the petitioners as creditors, Bandekar Sons as debtor No. 1, respondent company as surety No. 1 along with the two directors, Narayan Bandekar and Mrs. Manda Bandekar, as surety No. 2 and surety No. 3, respectively, by which it was held out that they are jointly and severally liable to pay the outstanding amount of Rs. 66 lakhs along with compound interest at the rate of 19.25 per cent. per annum with quarterly rests. Clauses 1 to 3, inter alia, recorded are to this effect :
"(1) In consideration of the debtor No. 1 and surety No. 1 having each issued fresh cheques bearing No. 618765, dated August 14, 1989, drawn on the Syndicate Bank, Margao, for Rs. 66,00,000 and bearing No. 471954, dated August 14, 1989, for Rs. 66,00,000 drawn on Canara Bank, Vasco da Gama, in their capacities as directors as well as personal capacity also and in further consideration of the guarantee of realisation offered by the, sureties who are the parties of the fourth and the fifth part respectively, the creditors upon the realisation of Rs. 66,00,000 (rupees sixty-six lakhs only) covered by both the above referred fresh cheques, do hereby agree, to give to the parties of the second, third, fourth and fifth parts full discharge of their liabilities for the repayment of the said total amount of Rs. 66,00,000 for the repayment of which all the said parties bind themselves jointly and severally, with further agreement with the creditors who shall be'entitled to immediate recovery of the said amount or part thereof remaining unrecovered from the parties of the aforesaid parts.
(2) Debtor No. 1, viz., the party of the second part herein have relinquished the possession of the said mining concession 'Doro' in favour of the creditors with whatever machineries, ores, utensils, sheds, and/or other accessories lying within the said mining area in order that the creditors may be at liberty to deal with the same in the manner deemed fit by them.
(3) It is further also expressly agreed that in the event of the cheques being returned dishonoured, for whatever reasons attributable to any or all the parties of the second, third, fourth and fifth parts the debtors together with parties of the third, fourth and fifth parts shall be liable for criminal prosecution in addition to civil action against all the parties of the second, third, fourth and fifth parts to entitle the creditors to make recovery of their amount with compound interest at the rate of Rs. 19.25 per cent. per annum with yearly rests."
7. At the instance of Bandekar Sons and the company the cheques were presented to their respective bankers but the same were again dishonoured and returned to the petitioners along with memos dated October 23, 24, 1989. The company was accordingly informed by letter dated November 4, 1989, and a demand for payment of Rs. 66 lakhs within 15 days from receipt of the notice was made. At the same time the company was threatened that action will be taken against them. As and by way of reply dated December 5, 1989, the company alleged that there were certain discussions between the managing director of the company, Shri Narayan Bandekar, and Anil Salgaonkar, director of the petitioners, that too at the instance of one M. S. Prabhu from Margao, at which it was purported to have been agreed that the petitioners were to settle the issues of payments, machinery, ore, shed, etc., lying in the area of the Mining Concession Doro, possession of which had been handed over to the petitioners by surety No. 1. It was also alleged that the petitioners were supposed to withhold the cheque given by the company for Rs. 66 lakhs until the settlement of issues by and between the parties. The cheque had been presented by the petitioners contrary to the understanding and without settlement of the issues. By advocate's notice dated November 30, 1989, the petitioners called upon the company to pay the sum of Rs. 66 lakhs along with interest at the rate of 19.25 per cent. per annum from May 30, 1989, till realisation within 21 days from the receipt of the notice, failing which the petitioners would proceed against the company including winding up. It appears that the petitioners filed a criminal case against the company and its two directors mentioned above under section 138 read with section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the Court of the judicial Magistrate, First Class, Margao. On February 16, 1991, allegations contained in the letter of the company dated December 5, 1989, were repelled and once again a demand for payment of Rs. 66 lakhs together with interest was made, threatening the company with proceedings against them. On March 4, 1991, the company by its advocate's letter stated that on account of the family dispute being under settlement, the company had been preoccupied and was not in a position to send a comprehensive reply and that it would be sent subsequently. However, no further reply was made nor have the petitioners received payment of Rs. 66 lakhs along with compound interest and that is how this company petition was subsequently lodged.
8. A reference has been made that there are several winding up petitions filed in this court against the company and the company is in financial difficulties. The liabilities of the company are more than its assets and it is also just and equitable that the company be ordered to be wound up under the orders and directions of this court. It is also averred that the company has become commercially insolvent and that on a search being taken of the file lying with the Registrar of Companies it is noticed that no returns are filed for the periods ending March 31, 1989, and March 31, 1990, and that the cash losses suffered by the company for the year ending June 30, 1986, June 30, 1987, and June 30, 1988, are more than the net worth of the company in the amounts of Rs. 167.11, Rs. 290.69 and Rs. 381.34 crores respectively. Relying upon the balance-sheets, these averments are sought to be supported.
9. It may be mentioned that the petitioners had presented the pdtltion on March 14, 1991, on the same cause of action but, however, by mistake through inadvertence, it was based upon a draft of the petition which had not been corrected and settled by counsel as well as the senior counsel; the result was that the petitioners were advised to file the present petition and liberty was sought to withdraw the earlier petition bearing No. 3-R of 1991, and proceed with the present petition. That leave was granted. The maintainability of the present petition was put in challenge but, however, this court by its order negatived the same and that order I believe was put in challenge but the company did not succeed even up to the Supreme Court.
10. The petition has been vehemently opposed by the company. Affidavits have been filed by Narayan Bandekar. On behalf of the company it has been mentioned that the company has a good defence on the merits of the claim made in the petition and that the said claim is bona fide disputed as set out in the reply.to the statutory notice dated March 22, 1991, and in the earlier denial of the claim over a year ago by the company's letter dated December 5, 1989. Secondly, the winding up is of guarantors under the agreement dated August 14, 1989, though the guarantee is given for a sister concern inasmuch as it is not enuring to the benefit of the company and in the absence of guarantee having been signed after resolution, the same is not binding on the company. The affidavit then speaks about there being an understanding subject to which the agreement was signed and cheques given and regard being had to these circumstances, the petition cannot be maintained for it would amount to allowing the summary procedure to finish a company, nor could the company be pressurised into making payments which are not legitimately due. The cheque for Rs. 66 lakhs tendered was by way of security pending finalisation, if any, found due and payable by the company for receiving credits for the security mentioned as well as credit for payment received by the petitioners through M. S. Prabhu. It is alleged that from time to time under receipts payments have been made to M. S. Prabhu, who is a confidant of the managing director of the petitioners. That, out of the sum of Rs. 66 lakhs the purported claim for liquidated dama@es of Rs. 25 lakhs, according to the company, is not based upon factual assessment of damages and in-fact such damages are required to be proved by the petitioners, that too, after leading appropriate evidence that the loss suffered was on account of non-extraction of ore by Bandekar Sons. It is then said that the said sum of Rs. 25 lakhs is not a penalty under the agreement dated August 14, 1989, and cannot be recovered unless the actual amount of damages suffered by the petitioners is shown and the petitioners satisfy this court that they had taken all steps to mitigate the loss, if any, suffered by them as they were obliged to do by law. At any rate the. question as to how damages are to be calculated on the basis of any alleged breach of contract is one of law on the basis of given facts.
11. Another defence is that the iron ore lying at the mines on the date the Mining Concession Doro was handed over to the petitioners is of a value exceeding Rs. 25 lakhs and in that context Bandekar Sons would not be liable to pay anything and, therefore, as guarantors there is no liability for the company. Thereafter, several circumstances are set out to show that Bandekar Sons had taken this mine initially from the petitioners but at which time a different group of shareholders were in charge of the company and the present managing director was not involved; that Bandekar Sons were extracting the ore but it was being sold to Messrs. Rashmi Exports and Rashmi Exports were doing export business through the Minerals and Metals Trading Corporation of India Ltd. (MMTC). It is then averred that Anil Salgaonkar of the petitioners worked some pressure on the MMTC as a result of which finally Bandekar Sons had perforce to enter into an agreement with the petitioners after Anil Salgaonkar took over the major shareholding; that the situation reached such a peak that Bandekar Sons were left with no alternative but to borrow from Anil Salgaonkar on his terms and that is how the agree- ment came into being including the amount of Rs. 21 lakhs advanced. It was mentioned that though the interest free loan was an independent contract, that contract guaranteed raising of ore, the minimum production raised from one lakh WMT to three lakhs WMT; that on the relevant date large quantities of iron ore lying at the Doro mines were in fact hypothecated to the Punjab National Bank along with its mining heavy capital equipment; that though the agreement was executed on August 14, 1989, and the cheque was handed over for Rs. 66 lakhs, it was on an oral understanding between Anil Salgaonkar on the one hand, Narayan Bandekar on the other and M. S. Prabhu as intermediary that due credit would be given to the company for such amount as actually found due; that after the dishonour of the cheque was made known Bandekar did remind Anil Salgaonkar and M. S. Prabhu of that understanding subject to which the agreement of August 14, 1989, had been signed and he was assured that everything would, be looked into and taken care of but, however, Rs. 15 lakhs were to be paid in cash to Anil Salgaonkar. It was agreed that payment should be routed through M. S. Prabhu with a clear understanding that all credit should be given to the company for the payment of Rs. 15 lakhs as also for earlier cheques and cash transactions made through M. 8. Prabhu. Accordingly on November 15, 1989, a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs in cash was paid to M. S..Prabhu towards the loan repayable to the petitioners. If all this is taken into consideration and credit given, it is averred that nothing will be found due and payable by the company to the petitioners. The credit for Rs. 10 lakhs is also required to be adjusted, which was payable by the petitioners to Messrs. Rashmi Exports and this liability is known to Anil Salgaonkar when he obtained a controlling interest from the earlier group of shareholders based on business principles and moralities with the machinery left on the mining site after handing over the concession pursuant to the agreement dated August 14, 1989, is worth more than Rs. 10 lakhs and which is finally left deterio- rating in the Mines. The screening plant is itself valued at Rs. 10,06,100. 63,000 tonnes of iron ore is of the value of Rs. 20,83,946.80. Anil Salgaonkar has been paid through the hands of M. S. Prabhu a sum of Rs. 26,44,500 for which credit is liable to be given to the company. On proper accounts, it is the petitioners that are required to pay substantial amounts to the company. That these companies are only wearing corporate facade and if the corporate veil is lifted they are nothing but concerns of one and the same family.
12. Shri Chagla, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has contended that on the facts and regard being had to the unambiguous and well intended agreement,dated August 14, 1989, the company cannot bail out from the present proceedings, for its inability to pay the debts is complete in all respects and the order is liable to be made ex debito justitiae. According to him, the company is now making various attempts to wriggle out of the situation by all sorts of ways and for that matter whatever has been urged today is some new case de hors whatever has been pleaded or for that matter what is pleaded is not sustainable on facts. He has relied upon the decision of Madhusudan Gordhandas and Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries Pvt. Ltd. . Undoubtedly, it is well-settled by this authority that the principles on which the company court acts are first that the defence of the company is in good faith and one of substance, secondly, the defence is likely to succeed in point of law and, thirdly, the company adduces prima facie proof of the facts on which the defence depends. According to him, the sole question to ask is whether the claim made by the petitioners is bona fide disputed by the company and if it is not the winding up must follow. He next relies upon the decision of Cine Industries and Recording Co. Ltd. [1942] 44 BLR 387 to point out the test laid down for determining when a company is commercially insolvent. Reference thereafter is made to the decision of State Bank of India v. Hegde and Golay Ltd. [1987] 62 Comp Cas 239 (Kar), 'to suggest that pendency of proceedings in the civil court has nothing to do with the matter of deciding petitions for winding up, for these are two independent proceedings.
13. A profuse reference has been made to M. S. Prabhu by the company. In the first place, that he has received large amounts of money on behalf of the managing director of the petitioners and, secondly, he has acted as an intermediary and even brought about a meeting and was a party to the meetings held between the parties in the controversy of enforcement of the various agreements.
14. It must be noted in the first place that M. S. Prabhu has filed affidavits in these proceedings on two different occasions, in the first place categorically denying any meeting after the agreement of August 14, 1989, in respect of any understanding and, secondly, in the matter of presentation of the cheques for encashment. He has equally denied the receipts of payments from the company for and on behalf of Anil Salgaonkar of the petitioners.
15. It must be noted that under various receipts M. S. Prabhu has received Rs. 26,44,500 and this is the case set up by the company. The receipts are alleged to be signed by M. S. Prabhu, who has, however, denied them. Out of this amount of Rs. 26,44,500, the last payment is alleged to be Rs. 15 lakhs in cash and there is no receipt admittedly given by M. S. Prabhu. The receipts so called are prior to July 26, 1989. This latter date has a bearing because the last agreement under which the Mines Doro was relinquished by Bandekar Sons is dated August 14, 1989. In other words as on August 14, 1989, the company and its sister concern were aware of the transactions as to what payments are made to M. S. Prabhu. It is inconceivable that a cash payment of Rs. 15 lakhs could be made on November 15, 1989, without obtaining a receipt from M. S. Prabhu when earlier payments, even a small sum of Rs. 10,000, are covered by receipts. The story, therefore, becomes highly doubtful.
16. An attempt made by Shri Zaiwalla is that the company made its stand clear as early as December 5, 1989, some tinie after the dishonour of the cheques and the petitioners' reaction to that came about only on February 16, 1991. According to him, one must look to the entire circumstances of the matter as to how one agreement after the other has come into being and if all these facts and circumstances are taken into consideration, the company's story as set out in the correspondence prior to this petition is that, firstly, the cheques for Rs. 66 lakhs were given by way of security and not for encashment and, secondly, based upon an oral understanding between the managing directors of the petitioners and the company, M. S. Prabhu as intermediary cannot be given a go by. Referring to the background, he says, look at the agreement of August 4, 1987, and then to the agreement of finance dated August 18, 1987, the emphasis or priority was on ore, therefore, when the agreement came into being on August 14, 1989, all these agreements must be held to have connection with one another. They are corollary to each other and by no stretch of imagination is the agreement of August 14, 1989, in supersession of the other agreements. According to him, it is impossible to accept that there has been in fact rescission of the earlier agreements.
17. He then says that on a plain construction of the agreement of August 14, 1989, taken up together with the surrounding circumstances, it is just not possible to hold that the company would give tip huge quantities of ore extracted by them and subject to hypothecation to the Punjab National Bank, largely valued mining machinery, equipment and screening plant as agreed to be given up, along with the possession of the Mines Doro. If at all such a thing is given up, according to him, it is for some consideration and what is that consideration is required to be found out.
18. He, therefore, says that there are grey areas in tlils matter trid these grey areas cannot be determined in summary proceedings in a company petition, therefore, the petitioners must be relegated to a suit. Aid to construction is available to interpret contracts and this has been recognized in the decision of K. P. Varghese v. ITO . Reliance has been placed on the decision of Reardon Smith Line Ltd. v. lian@en Tangen (H. L.) (E) [1976] 1 WLR 989, a decision of the House of Lords, to suggest that the parties are not confined to the four corners of a document and, therefore, it is permissible to look at the background 'of the matters.
19. Shri Zaiwalla says that in the agreement of August 4, 1987, clause 12 specifically states that on determination of that agreement the petitioners shall have the option to purchase the land, buildings, structures, all or in part at a fair value and if the parties do not reach any fair valuation, it can be got done by an acceptable and qualified expert. To the same effect more or less is what is stated in the agreement dated Axiglilst 18, 1987, that the petitioners shall have a right over the ore extracted and the machinery employed within the Doro Mines. In the background of these stipulations Shri Zaiwalla says that clause (2) of the agreement dated August 14, 1989, will have to be viewed in its proper construction and perspective. Clause (2) of this agreement reads :
"Debtor No. 1, viz., the party of the second part herein have relinquished the possession of the said Mining Concession' Doro 'in favour of the creditors with whatever machineries, ores, utensils, sheds and/or other accessories lying within the said mining area in order that the creditors may be at liberty to deal with the same in the manner deemed fit by them.
20. I do not think that much effort is needed to view that aspect though indeed it is true that in the agreement of August 4, 1987, the petitioners had to purchase the land, building, structures at a fair value and in the agreement dated August 18, 1987, the petitioners were given the option to exercise priority over the ore, material extracted and machinery employed, yet the agreement of August 14, 1989, leaves no ambiguity in so far as clause (2) is concerned. What is more on acknowledging the confirmed debt of Rs. 41 lakhs the principal debtor and the company clearly agreed to relinquish possession of the mining concession Doro with whatever machineries, ores, utensils, sheds and other accessories were lying within the said mining area further clarifying that the petitioners are at liberty to deal with the same as they deem fit and further quantified the sum of Rs. 25 lakhs payable to the petitioners. I have not been able to appreciate what is the grey area in the last agreement and in what manner further construction is necessary. The further fact remains that the rights under the agreement were relinquished and possession handed over and with that whatever ore, machineries, utensils, sheds and other accessories were lying there. Businessmen are shrewd and they are shrewder today. Is it ever possible to consider that the directors of the company, when signing the agreement dated August 14, 1989, did not know what they had on the mining concession ? It is, therefore, clear that the company is trying to wriggle out of the agreement dated August 14, 1989, by saying that there could not have been relinquishment of the machineries, ores, utensils, shed and other accessories lying in the mining concession. It is difficult to accept that the company could have agreed to such an unambiguous clause in the background of some additional oral agreement or understanding and I must hold that the so called oral agreement or understanding is now focussed only to somehow defend the present petition.
21. The ore is said to be belonging to Messrs. Rashmi Exports, another sister company, and what is more the ore is hypothecated to Punjab National Bank. Shri Chagla is right in pointing out that this is an after-thought. It must be seen that Messrs. Rashmi Exports is the sister company and it is not understood as to why Rashmi Exports have not reacted if its ore has been taken away by the petitioners under the agreement dated August 14, 1989. An attempt is sought to be made to suggest and some analysis reports are also relied upon that the ore left behind is of exportable quality with 57 per cent. Fe content and, therefore, it could not have been surrendered for a song. The petitioners have in fact relied upon some documents annexed to the valuation report that Rashmi Exports itself had, as late as October 31, 1990, valued its ore at Rs. 32,58,900 for 63,900 tonnes; it is not disputed but it is contended that its value is more than one crore. If Rashmi Exports has itself made its valuation as on October 31, 1990, at Rs. 32,58,900, it is difficult to accept that its value has now been enhanced to such a high proportion.
22. A point has been made by Shri Zaiwalla that there are inter se transactions between the other sister companies to which amounts are due from the petitioners and upon taking all the accounts in the end it is the petitioners who will be found owing to the company sought to be wound up or the other sister companies. Shri Zalwalla says that finally it must be seen by this court whether it is permissible. for the court to lift the corporate veil. All these companies are nothing but the family concerns of Narayan Bandekar and viewed in that angle the totality of the liabilities and credits of these various corporate bodies has to be taken into account. Lifting of the corporate veil is possible and it is recognized, according to Shri Zalwalla, in the decision of Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd. , and in the decision of State of U. P. v. Renusagar Power Co. . It is true that the corporate veil can be lifted but, then, it will depend on so many facts.
23. I would presently mention only this that a sum of Rs. 41 lakhs is a confirmed debt and admitted liability and that was taken by way of financial assistance, that too interest free. Rs. 25 lakhs was agreed as and by way of compensation at the time of relinquishment under the rights for extracting and delivering ore. Can there be any defence against a confirmed debt ?
24. Indeed it is true that Shri Zaiwalla argued that a sum of Rs. 25 lakhs was agreed to be given by way of compensation under the agreement dated August 14, 1989, but as long as it was not a penalty but a compensation, it is necessary for the petitioners to prove that evidence. Damages must correspond to loss suffered says Shri Zalwalla. He, therefore, says that it is not possible for the company court to go into this aspect of the matter. On the aspect of the measure of compensation vis-a-vis loss suffered Shri Zalwalla relied upon the decisions of Dhulipudi Namayya v. Union of India, AIR 1958 AP 533; Bhoi Panna Singh v. Bhai Arjun Singh, AIR 1929 PC 179 and Moula Bux v. Union of India, .
25. The difficulty in appreciating Shri Zaiwalla's contention is that this was a business transaction. On the assumption that there were credits and liabilities inter se between the parties, the parties determined between themselves the sum of Rs. 25 lakhs as and by way of damages and pursuant to which the company and the principal debtor, namely, Bandekar Sons handed over cheques for Rs. 66 lakhs and what is more the agreement was put into force and the mine Doro was surrendered. It is, there ore, difficult to accept in "the first place that the liability of the company to pay Rs. 25 lakhs by way of compensation can be permitted to be split up from the rest of the quantity and more particularly when the agreement has been partly acted upon. On the aspect of impermissibility of splitting of the contract Shri Chagla has rightly placed reliance on the decision of Radhakissen Chantaria v. Durgaprasad Chamaria, AIR 1932 Cal 328.
26. Shri Zaiwalla does not seem to be right when he contends that merely because the company had adopted a clear cut stand in its letter of December 5, 1989, that there were personal discussions between the managing, director of the petitioners and Narayan Bandekar and that it was agreed that in terms of clause (2) of the agreement dated August 14, 1989. the issue of payments made, machinery, ore, shed, etc., and/or other accessories would be amicably settled and to withhold the cheque for Rs. 66 lakhs subject to the settlement of that issue. This defence taken that there was some other oral agreement, is not permissible to be looked into. Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, in my view, is a clear bar to this argument. What is sought to be contended is there were discussions as a result of which it was agreed that matters relating to payments made, machinery, ore, shed, etc., and/or other accessories would be settled pursuant to clause (2) of the agreement dated August 14, 1989, and, secondly, that the cheque for Rs. 66 lakhs shall be withheld until that settlement. In reality the agreement dated August 14, 1989, has come into existence as a result of settlement between the parties where clear cut rights and obligations were established. As to how clause (2) which is beyond the pale of any different interpretation or otherwise unambiguous, is now said to be subject to some extraneous understanding. 1 think proviso (1) is an answer to learned counsel for the company. The question does arise whether proviso (3) is for the existence of any separate oral agreement which constitutes a condition precedent attached to the obligation and is at all available to the company. In my view, the answer is no, because, under the agreement, some performance has been already made and pursuant to which, possession has been obtained, therefore, the relinquishment is complete. Some authorities have been relied upon by learned counsel for both the sides to show that oral evidence is permissible to show the existence of a separate oral agreement. Even assuming that the bar of section 92 is not attracted, I find no difficulty in recording that the agreement dated August 14, 1989, hardly leaves any scope for some other agreement. The liability in respect of interest-free financial assistance in the sum of Rs. 41 lakhs is an admitted liability and a confirmed debt. This is clear not only from the agreement of August 14, 1989, but some of the letters written by the managing directors, Narayan Bandekar and his wife, Mrs. Manda Bandekar, in that respect, vide letter dated April 3, 1989. Similar is the case in relation to the other sum of Rs. 25 lakhs by virtue of the letter of May 19, 1989. These letters in terms state that apart from the sum of Rs. 25 lakhs coming into being after re-negotiations, the same is in full and final settlement and at the same time authorising the petitioners to present the same for realisation and recovery thereof. What else is required in the matter ? Merely because at some later stage, with a view to have a defence, some other oral agreement is invoked, which directly destroys the effect of the written agreement, must be termed as a concocted defence.
27. In the decision of Roivland Ady v. Administrator-General of Burnia, Administrator to the Estate of Hosain Hamadanee, AIR 1938 PC 198, it was held that an oral agreement which alters the effect of a written contract is hit by proviso (3) to section 92 of the Evidence Act.
28. Admittedly, the petitioners are armed with a cheque for Rs. 66 lakhs. Shri Chagla is right when he places reliance on Chhaganlal Kalyandas Shah v. jagiwandas Gulabdos [1939] 41 BLR 1263, that proviso 3 to section 92 of the Evidence Act presupposes that the contract, grant or disposition of property itself remains intact but the condition precedent pleaded must in its very nature be extraneous to the contract, grant or disposition itself and as agreed must come into existence before the obligation attaches thereunder. A suit on a promissory note passed by one partner to another as a result of adjustment of a part of the partnership account is held maintainable without bringing a general suit for taking accounts of the partnership. In the decision of Shivlal Bhurabhai Vora v. Bai Sankli, AIR 1931 Bom 297, it was observed that where the condition precedent is a condition without fulfilment of which there is in effect no written agreement at all, then the same shall be hit by proviso 3 of section 99.
29. Shri Zaiwalla has indeed pointed out that oral evidence is permissible to prove the existence of a separate oral contract. He, therefore, says that the decision of Ahmed Saheb Bapu Saheb Kafre v. Ubhaiya Harsi [1923] 25 BLR 867 clearly distinguishes the decision of Vishnu Ramchandra Joshi v. Ganesh Krishna Sathe [1921] 23 BLR 488.
30. I do not think that, on the facts and circumstances of this case, the company can be permitted to urge that they are entitled to invoke a separate oral agreement or can be permitted to adduce oral evidence. In my view, the present facts of the case also do not come within the ambit and scope of Narandas Morardas Gajiwala v. S. P. A. M. Papammal, .
31. Shri Zaiwalla's attempt now is to rely upon some valuation reports, etc., to the effect that the machinery existing in the mining concession is worth Rs. 10 lakhs; that the screening plant is also valuable and worth more than Rs. 10 lakhs and, therefore, could not be relinquished, equally, seems to be an afterthought for I have already mentioned earlier that the agreement arrived at on August 14, 1989, had come about as a settlement of a business transaction and that too between business people. Admittedly, on that date there had been no litigation pending between the parties and it is impossible to accept that the company was coerced into such an agreement. On the contrary the correspondence indicated that at all times the company was thankful to the petitioners for having rendered financial assistance at a time when the company was in trouble.
32. A reference was made that a suit has been filed by Bandekar Sons in the Court Of the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Bicholim being Special Civil Suit No. 90 of 1931. A copy of the order dismissing the application for interim relief and dismissing the suit was shown to me on behalf of the petitioners. It appears that Bandekar Sons filed that suit for a permanent injunction some time after the institution of the present company petition. Shri Zaiwalla has pointed out that an appeal has been filed against the order dismissing that civil suit, which is pending before this court. I am not influenced by the dismissal of that suit nor can I confuse myself, as rightly pointed out by Shri Zaiwalla, that there can be a finding that the rest is concluded inasmuch as the appeal is pending, but, what is, however, relevant to note is that the stand taken by Bandekar Sons in that suit is not only inconsistent with but also de hors the present defences.
33. Shri Chagla pointed out several inconsistencies in the stand of the company. I need not dilate on this matter and say that Bandekar Sons as principal debtors under the agreement dated August 14, 1989, have not reacted and it is the company, as guarantor, which is trying to wriggle out of the situation. The construction of clause (2) of the agreement dated August 14, 1989, was never challenged in that suit and the basis of the suit for seeking relief of permanent injunction was the parole agreement. What is not less worthy to be seen is that when that suit was instituted and when the case of the company is on lifting the corporate veil, a sum more than what is claimed by the petitioners is liable to be paid, yet no leave was sought under Order II, rule 2, for making a claim at a later date against the petitioners. The agreement itself was not challenged on the ground that there was no consideration. Therefore, the story of the company has to be rejected and it must be held that the defence lacks bona fides.
34. In the context of the findings and conclusions that I have reached, I find nothing to distinguish from the cases cited by learned counsel for the company. For instance in the decision of Federal Chemical Works Ltd. [1964] 34 Comp Cas 963, the existence of a bona fide counter-claim is held to be a reasonable excuse for non-payment. In C. A. Galiakotwala acid Co. Pvt. Ltd. [1984] 55 Comp Cas 746, a learned single judge held that mere omission to pay is not sufficient and omission to pay without reasonable excuse must be established. Naveen General Store v. Stepan Chemicals Ltd. [1988] 63 Comp Cas 147, is again a case on set off and counter-claim. The decision of J. N. Roy Chowdhury (Traders) P. Ltd. v. Jainti Enterprises [1987] 61 Comp Cas 504, held that where there are claims and cross-claims between the creditor seeking the winding up and the company sought to be wound up, the debt can be said to be bona fide disputed and the court will not order the winding up of the company and further that the winding up proceedings are not intended to be exploited as a normal alternative of the ordinary mode of debt realisation. Reliance was equally placed on Bharat Vegetable Products [1952] 22 Comp Cas 62 to see how the matters are viewed by the company courts. In Punjab Ceramics Ltd. v. Punjab State Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. [1991] 70 Comp Cas 415, it was again reiterated that when the petition is mala fide filed solely to pressurise the company to pay and when a bona fide dispute exists and there is production of prima facie evidence of its defence, the company court must hold that it is not a fit case for winding up.
35. Shri Zaiwalla urged that investigation by a company court is of a summary nature and on facts the petitioning party is required to be relegated to a suit in the ordinary civil court. In this connection he has placed reliance on T. Srinivasa v. Flemming (India) Apotheke Private Ltd. [1990] 68 Comp Cas 506. This decision, it must be stated, is rendered on the facts of the case.
36. An averment has been made in the petition that there are several company petitions filed and pending in this court for winding up of the company. In answer to this averment, on behalf of the company, it is averred that indeed some petitions had been filed for winding up, but some have ended with consent decrees. This fact is true, but there are some petitions still pending in this court for winding up of the company.
37. Shri Chagla, learned counsel for the petitioners, says that on November 19, 1990, a learned single judge of this court had directed winding up of the company in Company Petition No. 13R of 1990. In answer it has been brought to my notice that the order of the learned single judge was challenged in appeal and the matter was thereafter compromised.
38. In the case of Madhusudan Gordhandas and Co. v. Madhu Woollen Industries Private Ltd., , it was held that when a debt is undisputed, the court will not act upon a defence that the company has the ability to pay the debt but the company chooses not to pay that particular debt. The authority further lays down that the principles on which the company court acts are, firstly, that the defence of the company is in good faith and one of substance, secondly, the defence is likely to succeed in point of law and, thirdly, that the company adduces prima facie proof of the facts on which the defence depends.
39. Applying these principles it is clear that the debt in so far as the agreement of August 14, 1989, is concerned is undisputed and the company cannot be heard to dispute that undisputed and confirmed debt. I have already highlighted that there is no defence for the company which can be styled as one of substance. Taking every circumstance of this case, it must be also held that the defence of the company is also not in good faith. No prima facie proof is available nor is the defence of the company worth examination. A learned single judge of this court in the case of Federal Chemical Works Ltd. [1964] 34 Comp Cas 963, laid down that when a company fails to comply with a notice under section 434(1)(a) for payment of a debt, the court has no discretion but to make a winding order. Ii further observed that that sub-clause does not merely lay down a presumption of inability to pay but the word "shall" is of great significance that the creditor is entitled to a winding up order ex debito justitiae and in such a matter a creditor is not required to establish that the company is commercially insolvent at the same time laying down that the creditor has an alternative means of filing a,suit to recover the debt is irrelevant. Therefore, taking any view of the matter there is nothing for the company to dispute the claim of the petitioners, which is a confirmed debt and, therefore, as a matter of course, the petitioners are entitled to a winding up order.
40. Shri Chagla did argue on the basis of the balance-sheets and other documents that the company is commercially insolvent. I feel that I should not go into this question as I have already held that the company is unable to pay the debt without any defence. Shri Chagla may be right that commercial insolvency will not depend on the assets of the company but the question is one of liquidity to pay the debt.
41. The petition is admitted and the company be wound up under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. The official liquidator is appointed to take charge of the property and effects of the company. Advertisement to follow.