State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
Smt. Nongmeirakpam Sanatombi Devi vs Director.Rims on 22 February, 2017
BEFORE THE MANIPUR STATE CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL
COMMISSION
(STATE COMMISSION)
IMPHAL
MANIPUR
Revision Petition No. RP/2/2017
(Arisen out of Order Dated 16/11/2016 in Case No. CC/9/2016 of District Imphal)
Smt. Nongmeirakpam Vs. Director.RIMS and Others
Sanatombi Devi
BEFORE:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.Nandakumar PRESIDENT
HON'BLE MR. M.Padmeshwor Singh JUDICIAL MEMBER
HON'BLE MRS. A.Nibedita Devi MEMBER
For the Mr. L. Seityandra, Advocate
Petitioner:
For the
Mr. Ch. Premananda Singh, Advocate
Respondent:
Mr. Tapan Sharma, Advocate
Dated : 22 Feb 2017
ORDER
Forum, the District Forum may either dismiss the complaint for default or decide it on merits."
7. This Commission by invoking its jurisdiction under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 could interfere with the These two Revision Petitions, Revision Petition No. 1 of 2017 and Revision Petition No. 2 of 2017 filed against the impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2016 for allowing to file written statement/written objection of the opposite parties/respondents in the same Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016 on the similar question of fact of law was jointly heard for being disposed of by common judgment and order, accordingly by this common judgment and order, two Revision Petitions are disposed of for the reasons mentioned in the foregoing paras.
2. Heard Mr. L. Seityandra, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in both the Revision Petitions and also heard Mr. A. Golly, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, Mr. Ch. Premananda Singh, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 and Mr. Tapan Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No. 3.
3. For deciding these two Revision Petitions fact in details leading to the filing of Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016 before the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal is not required to be discussed in length; accordingly the concise fact of the case of the respective parties sufficient for deciding theses two Revision Petitions are noted. The Revision Petitioner who filed -1- the Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016 alleged that there were deficiency of negligence of service on the part of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as a result the petitioner deliverd a death baby through Caesarian Section performed by the respondent No. 3, Dr. R.K. Praneshwari Devi on 25.11.2014 at RIMS, Imphal. The petitioner categorically alleged in the complaint case that CS (Caesarian Section) was done on 25.11.2014 without giving any prior information to the petitioner/complaint on the said day i.e. 25.11.2014 and when the petitioner/complainant was taken inside the Operation Theater of RIMS at around 9 a.m. of 25.11.2014, the petitioner did not see the respondent No. 3, Dr. R.K. Praneshwari Devi and as such she asked the attendant where was the respondent No. 3. The attendant replied that the respondent No. 3 was coming after changing her dress and thereafter the complainant lost her consciousness as she was administered anesthesia. Respondent No. 3 who was ought to be present in the Operation Theater for the surgery came to the hospital around 9:30 a.m. of 25.11.2014 only after the husband of the petitioner/complainant went to the residence of the respondent No. 3 and gave some amount of money to her to pay some care and attention to the CS surgery of the petitioner. It is further alleged that the investigation report and clinical finding of the petitioner prior to the Caesarian Section on 25.11.2014 was found normal except that the petitioner was associated with Diabetes Mellitus. However, blood glucose level was controlled and found normal at the time of delivery according to the Investigation reports of RIMS hospital and Mona Laboratory but amazingly it was declared that she delivered a dead baby by EmLSCS under SA. Placenta and membrane expelled completely. No intra and post operative complication. Both mother and baby are stable at the time of discharge. Blood glucose level is controlled . For the said deficiency and negligence of service of the respondents, the petitioner filed the complaint case being Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016 for a direction to the respondents to:
"i) pay a sum of 18,00,000/- (Rupees eighteen lakhs) only towards the physical strain, mental agony, trauma and hazards suffered by the complainant;
ii) pay a sum of Rs. 10,000/- towards cost of this petition
(cost);
iii) any other reliefs or reliefs as the Hon'ble Forum may
consider deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case."
4. The complaint Case No. 9 of 2016 was admitted by the leanred District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal on 21.04.2016. The learned counsel for the respondents appeared before the leanred District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal on 10.05.2016 and the said complaint case was fixed on 31.05.2016 for filing written statement. On 31.05.2016, the learned counsel for the respondents pray for time for filing written statement and it was not objected by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, accordingly, again fixed on 21.06.2016 for filing written statement. On 21.06.2016, the learned counsel for the respondents pray for further time for filing written statement/written objection and the prayer was granted subject to payment of Rs. 500/- each by all the respondents i.e. opposite parties and fixed on 07.07.2016 for filing written statement/written objection.
5. On 07.07.2016, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed a joint application being Judicial Misc Case No. 29 of 2016 for allowing to file their enclosed written statement beyond 30 days but within 90 days for reasons beyond their control and power and also the respondent No. 1 filed a -2- similar application being Judicial Misc. Case No. 30 of 2016 for allowing to file the enclosed written statement beyond 30 days but within 90 days for the reasons beyond his control and power. The reason for the delay which were beyond their control of the respondents in their respective Misc. Applications are mentioned in detail in the para Nos. 3, 4 and 5 of the Misc. Application. This Commission had given its anxious consideration of the said paras of the Misc. Application, it appears that in spite of due diligence on the part of the respondents for drafting their written statement there were some delay because of the difficulty in finding out the record for briefing their respective counsels. The leanred District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal by the common judgment and order dated 16.11.2016 had granted the respondents to file their written statements with the observation and finding that "Since, the period of filing of written statement by the Opp. Parties are apparently shown not much time and therefore, the delay caused are excusable considering the submission of the applicants of the Opp. Parties. For the reasons given, we are of the view that filing of written statements at this stage are acceptable giving opportunity of being heard of ( SIC to) both the sides and therefore, the prayer for filing of written statements beyond the specified days are allowed on payment of Rs. 500/- as costs. Accordingly, this misc matter stands disposed of".
Hence, these present Revision Petitions.
6. Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 provides the procedure on admission of complaint. Section 13(2) which would be pertinent for deciding the Revision Petition is reproduced hereunder :
"13. Procedure on admission of complaint.
(2) The District Forum shall, if the complaints admitted by it under section 12 relates to goods in respect of which the procedure specified in sub-section (1) cannot be followed, or if the complaint relates to any services, -
(a) refer a copy of such complaint to the opposite party directing him to give his version of the case within a period of thirty days or such extended period not exceeding fifteen days as may be granted by the District Forum ;
(b) where the opposite party, on receipt of a copy of the complaint, referred to him under clause (a) denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the District Forum, the District Forum shall proceed to settle the consumer disputes, -
(i) on the basis of evidence brought to its notice by the complainant and the opposite party, where the opposite party denies or disputes the allegations contained in the complaint, or -3-
(ii) [ex parte on the basis of evidence] brought to its notice by the complainant where the opposite party omits or fails to take any action to represent his case within the time given by the Forum ;
(c) where the complainant fails to appear on the date of hearing before the District impugned order dated 30.06.2016 only on jurisdictional matter. Section 17 (1) (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 clearly provides that the State Commission in exercise of its Revisional jurisdiction can interfere the order of the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal only when : (i) District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction not vested in by law, or (ii) has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (iii) has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. Section 17 (1) (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is parimateria with section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Civil Court similarly, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 can interfere with the order of the Subordinate Court if :- (a) have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or (b) have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or (c) have acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity. No doubt, it is no more res integra that the revisional court can interfere with the order of the Subordinate Court on jurisdictional matters.
8. For reading, Section 17 (1) (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 at juxtaposition; Section 17 (1) (b) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 and Section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 are reproduced hereunder :
Section 17 (1) (b) of Consumer Protection Act, Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1986 1980
15. Revision. - [(1)] The High Court may call for the record of any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies thereto, and if such subordinate Court appears -
17. Jurisdiction of the State Commission. - (a) to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or [(1)] Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the State Commission shall have jurisdiction - (b) to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or
(a) .......
(c) to have acted in the exercise of its
(b) to call for the records and pass appropriate jurisdiction illegally or with material orders in any consumer dispute which is pending irregularity , before or has been decided by any District Forum within the State, where it appears to the the High Court may make such order in the case State Commission that such District Forum has as it thinks fit :
exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested or -4- has acted in exercise of its jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity . [Provided that the High Court shall not, under this section, vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue, in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceedings.
9. There is basic difference between Appellate and Revisional jurisdiction. Appellate jurisdiction confers right upon the aggrieved persons to complaint in the prescribed manner to a higher forum whereas, revisional power has a different object and purpose altogether as it confers the right and responsibility upon the higher forum to keep the subordinate tribunals/court within the limits of the law. Such revisional power have to be exercised sparingly, only as a discretion in order to prevent gross injustice and the same cannot not be claimed, as a matter of right by any party . [reference State of Gujarat and Another Vs. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal bar Association and Another (2012) 10 SCC 353 ].
It is clear the ratio decendi of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal bar Association case (supra) that revisional power could be exercised in order to prevent gross injustice to the party. In the present case, if the respondents are not permitted to file their written objection/written statement a gross injustice shall cause to the respondents.
10. The scope of revisional power of the Court and appellate power of the Court has been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Dilbahar Singh (2014) 9 SCC 78 and held that there is distinctive difference between the appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction. Para 28, 29, 30 and 31 of the SCC in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited Vs. Dilbahar Singh (supra) read as follows :
"28. Before we consider the matter further to find out the scope and extent of revisional jurisdiction under the above three Rent Control Acts, a quick observation about the "appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction" is necessary. Conceptually, revisional jurisdiction is a part of appellate jurisdiction but it is not vice versa. Both, appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction are creatures of statutes. No party to the proceedings has an inherent right to appeal or revision. An appeal is continuation of suit or original proceeding, as the case may be. The power of the appellate court is coextensive with that of the trial court. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction rehearing on facts and law but such jurisdiction may be limited by the statute itself that provides for the appellate jurisdiction. On the other hand, revisional jurisdiction, though, is a part of appellate jurisdiction but ordinarily it cannot be equated with that of a full-fledged appeal. In other words, revision is not continuation of suit or of original proceeding. When the aid of Revisional Court is invoked on the revisional side, it can interfere within the permissible parameters provided in the statute. It goes without saying that if a revision is provided against an order passed by the Tribunal/appellate authority, the -5- decision of the Revisional Court is the operative decision in law. In our view, as regards the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, much would, however, depend on the language employed by the statute conferring appellate jurisdiction and revisional jurisdiction .
29. With the above general observation, we shall now endeavour to determine the extent, scope, ambit and meaning of the terms "legality or propriety"; "regularity, correctness, legality or propriety"; and "legality, regularity or propriety" which are used in the three Rent Control Acts under consideration:
29.1. The ordinary meaning of the word "legality" is lawfulness. It refers to strict adherence to law, prescription, or doctrine; the quality of being legal .
29.2 The term "propriety" means fitness; appropriateness, aptitude;
suitability; appropriateness to the circumstances or condition conformity with requirement; rules or principle, rightness, correctness, justness, accuracy.
29.3 The terms "correctness" and "propriety" ordinarily convey the same meaning, that is, something which is legal and proper. In its ordinary meaning and substance, "correctness" is compounded of "legality" and "propriety" and that which is legal and proper is "correct" .
29.4. The expression "regularity" with reference to an order ordinarily relates to the procedure being followed in accord with the principles of natural justice and fair play.
30. We have already noted in the earlier part of the judgment that although there is some difference in the language employed by the three Rent Control Acts under consideration which provide for revisional jurisdiction but, in our view, the revisional power of the High Court under these Acts is substantially similar and broadly such power has the same scope save and except the power to invoke revisional jurisdiction suo motu unless so provided expressly. None of these statutes confer on revisional authority the power as wide as that of the appellate court or appellate authority despite such power being wider than that provided in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision under consideration does not permit High Court to invoke the revisional jurisdiction as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. Revision does not lie under these provisions to bring the orders of the trial court/rent Controller and the appellate court/appellate authority for rehearing of the issues raised in the original proceedings .
31. We are in full agreement with the view expressed in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works that where both expressions "appeal" and "revision" are employed in a statute, obviously, the expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of a much narrower jurisdiction that that conveyed by the expression "appeal". The use of two expressions "appeal" and "revision" when used in one statute conferring appellate power and revisional power, we think, is not -6- without purpose and significance. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing while it is not so in the case of revisional jurisdiction when the same statute provides the remedy by way of an "appeal" and so also of a "revision". If that were so, the revisional power would become coextensive with that of the trial court or the subordinate tribunal which is never the case. The classic statement in Dattonpant that revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the Code but, at the same time, it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal, commends to us and we approve the same. We are of the view that in the garb of revisional jurisdiction under the above three rent control statutes, the High Court is not conferred a status of second court of first appeal and the High Court should not enlarge the scope of revisional jurisdiction to that extent.
11. Marginal note of Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 clearly speak on unequivocal terms that it is a procedure only . The Hon'ble Supreme Court (3 Judges) in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. Vs. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344 held that "20. The use of the word "shall" in Order 8 Rule 1 by itself is not conclusive to determine whether the provision is mandatory or directory. We have to ascertain the object which is required to be served by this provision and its design and context in which it is enacted. The use of the word "shall" is ordinarily indicative of mandatory nature of the provision but having regard to the context in which it is used or having regard to the intention of the legislation, the same can be construed as directory. The rule in question has to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. The rules of procedure are made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it. Construction of the rule or procedure which promotes justice and prevents miscarriage has to be preferred. The rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice and not its mistress. In the present context, the strict interpretation would defeat justice ."
12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court (Constitution Bench) in Rupa Ashok Hurra Vs. Ashok Hurra and Another (2002) 4 SCC 388 held that "69. ... Manifest injustice is curable in nature rather than incurable and this Court would lose its sanctity and thus would belie the expectations of the founding fathers that justice is above all. There is no manner of doubt that procedural law/procedural justice cannot overreach the concept of justice and in the event an order stands out to create manifest injustice, would the same be allowed to remain in silentio so as to affect the parties perpetually or the concept of justice ought to activate the Court to find a way out to resolve the erroneous approach to the problem? Mr. Attorney-General, with all the emphasis in his command, though principally agreed that justice of the situation needs to be looked into and relief be granted if so required but in the same breath submitted that the Court ought to be careful enough to tread on the path, otherwise the same will open up a Pandora's box and thus, if at all, in rarest of the rare case, further scrutiny may be made. While it is true that -7- law courts have overburdened themselves with the litigation and delay in disposal of matters in the subcontinent is not unknown and in the of any further appraisal of the matter by this Court, it would brook no further delay resulting in consequences which are not far to see but that would by itself not in my view deter this Court from further appraisal of the matter in the event the same, however, deserves such an additional appraisal - the note of caution sounded by Mr. Attorney-General as regards opening up of a Pandora's Box, strictly speaking, however, though may be very practical in nature but the same apparently does not seem to go well with the concept of justice as adumbrated in our Constitution. True it is, that practicability of the situation needs a serious consideration more so when this Court could do without it for more than 50 years, which by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a period not so short. I feel it necessary, however, to add that it is not that we are not concerned with the consequences of reopening of the issue but the redeeming feature of our justice delivery system, as is prevalent in the country, is adherence to proper and effective administration of justice in strict. In the event there is any affectation of such administration of justice either by way of infraction of natural justice or an order being passed wholly without jurisdiction or affectation of public confidence as regards the doctrine of integrity in the justice delivery system, technicality ought not to outweigh the course of justice - the same being the true effect of the doctrine of ex debito justitiae . The oft-quoted statement of law of Lord Hewart, C.J. in R. v. Sussex Justices , ex p McCarthy that it is of fundamental importance that justice should not only be done, should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done, had this doctrine underlined and administered therein . ......"
13. Ratio decendi of Ashok Hurra' case (supra) was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ashiq Hussain Faktoo Vs. Union of India & Anr. (2016) 9 SCC 739 . The Hon'ble Supreme Court (3 Judges) in Kailash Vs. Nanhku & Ors. (2005) 4 SCC 480 held that "42. Ordinarily, the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 has to be honoured. The defendant should be vigilant. No sooner the writ of summons is served on him he should take steps fro drafting his defence and filing the written statement on the appointed date of hearing without waiting for the arrival of the date appointed in the summons for his appearance in the Court. The extension of time sought for by the defendant from the court whether within 30 days or 90 days, as the case may be, should not be granted just as a matter of routine and merely for the asking, more so, when the period of 90 days has expired. The extension can be only by way of an exception and for reasons assigned by the defendant and also recorded in writing by the court to its satisfaction. It must be spelled out that a departure from the time schedule prescribed by Order 8 Rule 1 of the Code was being allowed to be made because the circumstances were exceptional, occasioned by reasons beyond the control of the defendant and such extension was required in the interest of justice, and grave injustice would be occasioned if the time was not extended ."
-8-14. It was so happened that the Hon'ble Supreme Court without considering the decisions of the Constitution Bench and also the 3 (three) Judges Bench of the Supreme Court in Ashok Hurra and Another's case (supra) and in Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N.'s case (supra) respectively that procedure is a handmaid and not the Mistress of justice and it is made to advance the cause of justice and not to defeat it in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Pvt. Ltd. AIR 2016 SC 86 held that "17. We are, therefore, of the view that the judgment delivered in the case of Dr. J.J. Merchant (AIR 2002 SC 2931 : 2002 AIR SCW 3424) (supra) holds the field and therefore, we reiterate the view that the District Forum can grant a further period of 15 days to the opposite party for filing his version or reply and not beyond that."
15. Very recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed an order dated 10.02.2017 in Civil Appeal No. ..... of 2017 (D. No. 2365 of 2017) Reliance General Insurance Co Ltd. & Anr Vs. M/s Mampee Timbers and hardwares Pvt. Ltd. & Anr that "Heard.
Delay condoned.
The question involved in this appeal is whether the time stipulated under Section 13 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for fling written statement is mandatory and whether no flexibility is availably with the Court in the interest justice.
This question has been answered in the affirmative in New India Assurance Company Limited Vs. Hilli Multipurpose Cold Storage Private Limited in Civil Appeal No. D. 35086 of 2013 etc. (2015) 16 SCC 20 , reiterating the view in J.J. Merchant and Ors. Vs. Shrinath Chaturvedi (2002) 6 SCC 635 .
Thereafter, the matter has been referred to a larger bench in view of contra views in the judgments of this Court in Topline Shoes Limited Vs. Corporation bank (2002) (6) SCC 83; Kailash Vs. Nankhu (2005) 4 SCC 480 and Salem Advocate bar Association Vs. Union of India (2005) 6 SCC 344.
It has been brought to our notice that in view of uncertainty in law, proceedings in number of cases is held up before the Consumer Fora.
This Court has passed interim order dated 11.02.2016 in M/s Bhasin Infotech and Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Venezia Buyers Association (Regd.) in C.A. Nos. 1083-1084/2016, to the following effect :
"The proper course in our opinion is to permit the appellant-company to file the response, which was delayed by just about one day. We accordingly permit the appellant to file its reply before the National Commission within -9- two weeks from today subject to payment of Rs. 50,000/- as costs to be paid to the opposite party. The Commission can upon deposit of costs proceed with the trial of the complainant on merits after receiving the reply filed by the respondent. The pendency of present proceedings shall not be an impediment for the Commission to do so. This however is subject to the condition that complainant -respondent is ready and willing to take the proceedings forward on the conditions aforementioned. In case the complainant-respondents have any objection to the continuance of the proceedings before the Commission they shall be free to seek stay of such proceedings pending disposal of these appeals in which event the proceedings shall remain stayed till disposal of the present appeal".
We consider it appropriate to direct that pending decision of the larger bench, it will be open to the concerned Fora to accept the written statement filed beyond the stipulated time of 45 days in an appropriate case, on suitable terms, including the payments of costs, and to proceed with the matter .
The appeal is disposed of in above terms.
It will be open to the respondents to move this Court if they are aggrieved by this order."
16. In the given case, this Commission, in view of the recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Reliance General Insurance Co Ltd.'s case (supra) had given the anxious consideration as to whether this Commission requires to invoke its Revisional Power as provided under Section 17 (1) (b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to interfere with the common impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2016 and also as to whether a gross injustice will be done to the respondents, if the respondents are not allowed to file their written statement in the complaint case? After such consideration, we are of the considered view that a gross injustice will be done to the respondents, if the respondents are not allowed to file their written statement only on hyper-technical view that the 45 days' period mentioned in Section 13 (2) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Our view is supported by the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Reliance General Insurance Co Ltd.'s case (supra).
17. For the foregoing reasons, we are not interfering with the common impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2016 passed by the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal in Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016, except the amount of cost mentioned in the common impugned judgment and order dated 16.11.2016. Considering the wastage of valuable time of the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal in waiting the written statement/written objection of the respondents in the Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016, we are of the considered view that each respondent have to pay a cost of Rs. 2000/- (Rupees two thousand) only each for filing their written statement/written objection. Accordingly, only the cost mentioned in the common judgment and order dated 16.11.2016 is modified to the extent that the written statement beyond the specified days are allowed on payment of Rs. 2000/- (Rupees two thousand) only each by the respondents. The learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal shall accept the written statement/written objection of the respondents after payment of the cost mentioned above.
18. The present Revision Petitions are disposed of accordingly.
-10-19. Registry is directed to send back the record of the Complaint Case No. 9 of 2016 to the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal immediately.
20. Parties are directed to appear before the learned District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Imphal on 10.03.2017.
[HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T.Nandakumar] PRESIDENT [HON'BLE MR. M.Padmeshwor Singh] JUDICIAL MEMBER [HON'BLE MRS. A.Nibedita Devi] MEMBER -11-