Delhi District Court
Minakshi vs Shri Subal Mandal on 7 September, 2021
IN THE COURT OF SH. SANJAY SHARMA-II : ADDL. SESSIONS JUDGE-03,
(CENTRAL): TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
Criminal Appeal No. 492/2019
CNR No.: DLCT01-017173-2019
Minakshi
D/o Sh. Budh Singh
R/o. T-650 D-5, Baljeet Nagar,
near Gurudwara, New Delhi
Also at:
Shikshaali I.S. Well Public School,
T-A-2, Prem Nagar Road, New Delhi-110008
..... Appellant
VERSUS
Shri Subal Mandal
S/o Sh. Nafar Mandal
R/o T-116, Baljeet Nagar,
near Sanatan Dharam Mandir,
New Delhi-110008
..... Respondent
Date of Institution : 23.12.2019
Date of Arguments : 06.09.2021
Date of Judgement : 07.09.2021
JUDGEMENT
1. The criminal appeal under Section 374 of 'The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973' ('the Cr.P.C.') is directed against the judgement dated 19.08.2019 and order on sentence dated 03.10.2019 in CC No. 522636/2016 titled as 'Subal Mandal vs. Minakshi' under Section 138 of 'The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881' ('NI Act') whereby the appellant was convicted for committing offence under Section 138 NI Act and directed to pay compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the respondent and in default thereof, she was sentenced to simple imprisonment for a period of one month.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 1/19FACTS:
2. Facts preceding to the institution of the appeal are that the respondent (Hereinafter referred to as 'the complainant') instituted a complaint case under Section 138 NI Act against the appellant on the averments that the complainant advanced a friendly loan of Rs. 1,30,000/- to the appellant on 10.02.2012. The appellant had agreed to repay the said loan amount in the end of April, 2013 and in that regard, she had issued Cheque No. 639731 dated 29.04.2013 in the sum of Rs. 1,30,000/- drawn on 'The Kangra Co-Operative Bank Ltd., Chunamandi, Paharganj, New Delhi-110055' in favour of the complainant. On presentation, the said cheque was returned unpaid by the banker of the appellant with the remarks 'Funds Insufficient' vide cheque returning memo dated 05.06.2013. The complainant sent demand notice dated 01.07.2013 to the appellant through courier and registered post. The demand notice was received by the appellant. However, the appellant did not make the payment of the cheque amount. The complainant filed the complaint case under section 138 NI Act.
3. Substance of accusations were explained to the appellant as required under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., as under:
"Q. Whether you have drawn the above-said cheque(s)?
A. Yes, cheque(s) in question belongs to me and bears my signatures, however, same was provided as blank signed cheque and other particulars are not filled by me.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 2/19
Q. Whether the cheque(s) was / were dishonoured vide above-said returned memo(s)?
A. Yes, it was so dishonoured, but since nothing was due against me so I was not obliged to maintain amount in my account.
Q. Have you received the legal demand notice? A. I had not received any legal demand notice, however, addresses mentioned on legal demand notice were my correct address.
Q. What is your plea of defence?
A. I had taken only Rs. 30,000/- from the complainant, the complainant has taken one blank signed security cheque for repayment, I repaid the whole amount, asked for return of my cheque, the complainant told me that she would return the cheque only after conclusion of committee, the complainant has misused the cheque after filling amount and other particulars, I have no liability towards the complainant.
THE COMPLAINANT'S EVIDENCE:
4. The complainant appeared as CW-1. He filed his examination-in-chief by way of affidavit Ex.CW1/A. He relied on the said cheque Ex.CW1/1, cheque returning memo Ex.CW1/2, demand notice dated 01.07.2013 Ex.CW1/3, courier receipts Ex.CW1/4 and Ex.CW1/5, postal receipts Ex.CW1/6 and Ex.CW1/7 and acknowledgement card Ex.CW1/8. EXAMINATION UNDER SECTION 313 OF THE CR.P.C.:
5. Incriminating circumstances appearing in evidence were explained to the appellant as required under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. She replied, as under:
"I had borrowed only Rs. 30,000/- and has returned the same. The cheque in question was provided at the time of borrowing said loan which has not been returned despite payment of all amount."
THE APPELLANT'S EVIDENCE:
6. The appellant examined herself as DW-1.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 3/19IMPUGNED JUDGEMENT:
7. Ld. trial Court, vide judgement dated 19.08.2019, convicted the appellant for committing offence under Section 138 NI Act and directed her to pay compensation in the sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- within 30 days and in the event of default, the appellant was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month.
GROUNDS OF APPEAL:
8. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgement, the appellant preferred the appeal on the following grounds:
(a) The trial Court has not considered that the appellant never entered into any agreement with the complainant pertaining to the loan of Rs. 1,30,000/-;
(b) The appellant was one of the members of the committee managed by the complainant;
(c) The trial Court has not considered that the appellant had taken Rs. 30,000/- from the complainant and the complainant had obtained a blank signed cheque from the appellant as a security cheque in December, 2011.
(d) The trial Court has not considered that the appellant returned an amount of Rs. 60,000/-
comprising amount Rs. 30,000/- alongwith Rs. 30,000/- as interest and asked the complainant to return the security cheque on conclusion of committee in the year 2013, the complainant did not return the security cheque;
(e) The appellant demanded the security cheque from the complainant several times but he started demanding more amount and refused to return the cheque;
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 4/19(f) The complainant filled the particulars except the signature of the appellant in the said cheque;
(g) The trial Court has not considered that the blank signed cheque was misused by the complainant and the said cheque was not issued towards repayment of the loan amount;
(h) The trial Court has not considered that no witness was present at the time of advancement of loan of Rs. 1,30,000/- and the complainant has not filed any statement of account in that regard;
(i) The appellant did not receive any demand notice;
(j) The trial Court has not considered that the complainant has not proved the date and month of advancement of loan to the appellant; and
(k) The trial Court has not considered that the appellant repaid the said loan amount to the complainant by way of cash.
APPEARANCE:
9. I have heard arguments of Mr. Hari Om Mishra, Advocate for the appellant and Mr. Vijay Kumar Babbar, Advocate for the complainant and carefully examined the trial Court record.
THE CONTENTIONS OF THE APPELLANT:
10. Mr. Hari Om Mishra, Advocate for the appellant contended that the appellant was a member of the committee managed by the complainant. He contended that the appellant had taken an amount of Rs. 30,000/- from the complainant in the month of December, 2011 and the complainant had obtained a blank signed cheque from the appellant as a security cheque.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 5/19
11. Mr. Hari Om Mishra, Advocate for the appellant contended that the appellant returned an amount of Rs.
60,000/- comprising the said amount of Rs. 30,000/- and Rs. 30,000/- as interest to the complainant on conclusion of the committee in the year 2013. He contended that the appellant had asked the complainant to return the security cheque but he had not returned the said cheque. He contended that the appellant made several requests to return the said cheque but the complainant started demanding more amount and refused to return the said cheque. He contended that the complainant made material alteration in the said cheque by filling the particulars therein. He contended that the complainant has not mentioned the date, month and year of the advancement of the loan amount. He contended that there is no agreement regarding advancement of loan of Rs. 1,30,000/-. He contended that the complainant has not examined any witness to prove advancement of loan of Rs. 1,30,000/-. He contended that the complainant has not filed any statement of account in respect of the said amount of Rs. 1,30,000/-. He contended that the appellant was not liable to make payment of any amount to the complainant. He contended that the complainant has failed to prove that he had advanced an amount of Rs. 1,30,000/- to the appellant. He contended that this is a case of misuse of a blank signed cheque issued as a security cheque. He contended that the appellant discharged the onus cast upon her under Section 139 NI Act. He prayed for setting-aside of impugned judgement.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 6/19THE CONTENTIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:
12. Mr. Vijay Kumar Babbar, Advocate for the respondent contended that there is no legal infirmity, illegality or perversity in the impugned judgement. He contended that the appellant has not raised any legal contention warranting any interference in the impugned judgement. He contended that the trial Court on consideration of the defence and the evidence led by the parties rightly concluded that the appellant failed to rebut the presumption mandated under Section 139 NI Act. He contended that mere assertion that the appellant paid the amount in the absence of any evidence would not be sufficient to discharge the reverse burden. He contended that the defence raised by the appellant is not only contradictory but it also remained not proved. He contended that the defence raised by the appellant is not bonafide. He contended that there is no material alteration in the said cheque. He contended that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT:
13. On careful examination of the impugned judgement, it is evident that the trial Court returned the finding of the conviction under Section 138 NI Act on the following grounds:
(a) The appellant admitted her signature on the cheque;
(b) There is no legal requirement that all the columns of the cheque must be filled by the drawer and if signature on the cheque is admitted, it will be sufficient;Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 7/19
(c) The cheque was presented for encashment within its validity period and it was returned unpaid by the banker of the appellant;
(d) The appellant failed to make payment of the cheque amount within 15 days of the receipt of the demand notice;
(e) The complaint was filed within period of limitation;
and
(f) The appellant failed to rebut the presumption under Section 139 NI Act.
POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION:
(A) Whether the complainant made material alteration in the blank signed cheque by filling the particulars?
14. The appellant has admitted her signature on the said cheque. According to her, the said cheque was given as a blank signed cheque and other particulars were not filled by her. The case of the appellant is that the complainant misused the cheque after filling amount and other particulars. She has stated so in reply to substance of accusations under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C. on 07.02.2018. She has deposed to this effect, in her deposition recorded on 28.06.2019, that the complainant had taken a blank cheque with signature from her as a security in December, 2011. It may be relevant to note that the complainant appeared as CW-1. In his cross-examination, he denied the suggestion that he procured a blank signed cheque from the appellant and misused it for filing the complaint. He stated that the date and another particulars of the cheque were filled by him in the presence of the appellant and thereafter, the appellant signed the said cheque.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 8/1915. Therefore, the defence that the complainant made material alteration in the said cheque by filling the date and other particulars in his handwriting is not tenable as the complainant categorically stated that he filled the date and other particulars of the cheque in the presence of the appellant and thereafter, the appellant signed it. This testimony of the complainant remained unchallenged.
16. Moreover, the appellant admitted that she had issued the said cheque. She admitted that the said cheque bears her signature. The said cheque was presented for encashment on 04.06.2013. The said cheque was returned unpaid by the banker of the appellant with the remarks 'Funds Insufficient' vide cheque returning memo dated 05.06.2013 Ex.CW1/2. The complainant sent demand notice dated 01.07.2013 Ex.CW1/3 vide receipts Ex.CW1/4 and Ex.CW1/5, and postal receipts Ex.CW1/6 and Ex.PW1/7. The demand notice was duly received by the appellant vide AD card Ex.CW1/8. She did not make payment of the cheque amount. In these facts and circumstances, presumption under Section 139 NI Act can be drawn. In Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as under:
"33. A meaningful reading of the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act including, in particular, Sections 20, 87 and 139, makes it amply clear that a person who signs a cheque and makes it over to the payee remains liable unless he adduces evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 9/19
It is immaterial that the cheque may have been filled in by any person other than the drawer, if the cheque is duly signed by the drawer. If the cheque is otherwise valid, the penal provisions of Section 138 would be attracted.
36. Even a blank cheque leaf, voluntarily signed and handed over by the accused, which is towards some payment, would attract presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the absence of any cogent evidence to show that the cheque was not issued in discharge of a debt."
17. Therefore, the complainant has not made any material alteration by filling the particulars in the blank signed cheque.
(B) Whether the appellant established to probable defence so as to rebut presumption under Section 139 NI Act?
18. As already noted above, the appellant has admitted that she had drawn the said cheque and the said cheque bears her signature. In that view, the presumption under Section 139 NI Act is drawn against the appellant. The issue before the Court is whether the appellant has rebutted the said presumption. In Rohit Bhai Jivanlal Patel vs. State of Gujarat, (2019) 18 SCC 106, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India held as under:
"15. So far the question of existence of basic ingredients for drawing of presumption under Section 118 and 139 of the NI Act is concerned, apparent it is that the appellant-accused could not deny his signatures on the cheques in question that had been drawn in favour of the complainant on a bank account maintained by the accused for a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs each. The said cheques were presented to the bank concerned within the period of their validity and were returned unpaid for the reason of either the balance being insufficient or the account being closed.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 10/19
All the basic ingredients of Section 138 as also of Sections 118 and 139 are apparent on the face of the record. The trial Court had also consciously taken note of these facts and had drawn the requisite presumption. Therefore, it is required to be presumed that the cheques in question were drawn for consideration and the holder of the cheques i.e. the complainant received the same in discharge of an existing debt. The onus, therefore, shifts on the appellant-accused to establish a probable defence so as to rebut such a presumption.
17. On the aspects relating to preponderance of probabilities, the accused has to bring on record such facts and such circumstances which may lead the Court to conclude either that the consideration did not exist or that its non-existence was so probable that a prudent man would, under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that the consideration did not exist. This Court has, time and again, emphasised that though there may not be sufficient negative evidence which could be brought on record by the accused to discharge his burden, yet mere denial would not fulfil the requirements of rebuttal as envisaged under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. This Court stated the principles in Kumar Exports [Kumar Exports vs. Sharma Carpets, (2009) 2 SCC 513] as follows : (SCC pp. 520-521, paras 20-21)
20. The accused in a trial under Section 138 of the Act has two options. He can either show that consideration and debt did not exist or that under the particular circumstances of the case the non- existence of consideration and debt is so probable that a prudent man ought to suppose that no consideration and debt existed. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration and that there was no debt or liability to be discharged by him. However, the Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 11/19
At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of the consideration and existence of debt, apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. To disprove the presumptions, the accused should bring on record such facts and circumstances, upon consideration of which, the Court may either believe that the consideration and debt did not exist or their non- existence was so probable that a prudent man would under the circumstances of the case, act upon the plea that they did not exist. Apart from adducing direct evidence to prove that the note in question was not supported by consideration or that he had not incurred any debt or liability, the accused may also rely upon circumstantial evidence and if the circumstances so relied upon are compelling, the burden may likewise shift again on to the complainant. The accused may also rely upon presumptions of fact, for instance, those mentioned in Section 114 of the Evidence Act to rebut the presumptions arising under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act.
21. The accused has also an option to prove the non- existence of consideration and debt or liability either by letting in evidence or in some clear and exceptional cases, from the case set out by the complainant, that is, the averments in the complaint, the case set out in the statutory notice and evidence adduced by the complainant during the trial. Once such rebuttal evidence is adduced and accepted by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances of the case and the preponderance of probabilities, the evidential burden shifts back to the complainant and, therefore, the presumptions under Section 118 and 139 of the Act will not again come to the complainant's rescue."
19. In Sumeti Viz vs. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201, Hon'ble Supreme Court of India has enumerated the standard of proof for rebutting the presumption under Section 139 NI Act, as under:
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 12/19"13. The object of introducing Section 138 and other provisions of Chapter XVII in the Act appears to be to enhance the acceptability of cheques in the settlement of liabilities. The drawer of the cheque be held liable to prosecution on dishonour of cheque with safeguards provided to prevent harassment of honest drawers. Section 138 primarily relates to a civil wrong and the amendment made in the year 2000 specifically made it compoundable. The burden of proof was on the accused in view of presumption under Section 139 of the Act and the standard of proof was of "preponderance of probabilities".....
14. There is a mandate of presumption of consideration in terms of the provisions of the Act and the onus shifts to the accused on proof of issuance of cheque to rebut the presumption that the cheque was issued not for discharge of any debt or liability in terms of Section 138 of the Act.....
15. The scope of Section 139 of the Act is that when an accused has to rebut the presumption, the standard of proof for doing so is that of "preponderance or probabilities" which has been examined by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan, which reads as under:-
"26. In light of these extracts, we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section 139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To that extent, the impugned observations in Krishna Janardhan Bhat [(2008) 4 SCC 54] may not be correct. However, this does not in any way cast doubt on the correctness of the decision in that case since it was based on the specific facts and circumstances therein. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 13/19
27. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While Section 138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by Section 138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the defendant-accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof"
16. It is well settled that the proceedings under Section 138 of the Act are quasi-criminal in nature, and the principles which apply to acquittal in another criminal cases are not applicable in the cases instituted under the Act.
17. Likewise, under Section 139 of the Act, a presumption is raised that the holder of a cheque received the cheque for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. To rebut this presumption, facts must be adduced by the accused which on a preponderance of probability (not beyond reasonable doubt as in the case of criminal offences), must then be proved....."
20. The appellant has taken the defence that she had taken an amount of Rs. 30,000/- from the complainant and issued a blank signed cheque as a security in December, 2011.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 14/1921. Therefore, it is evident that the appellant and the complainant were known to each other and had financial transactions. The complainant is not a stranger to the appellant. The case of the appellant is that she had returned an amount of Rs. 30,000/- to the complainant in October, 2012 and paid an amount of Rs. 30,000/- as interest for 10 months. It is relevant to note that in reply to the accusations under Section 251 of the Cr.P.C., she stated that she had taken Rs. 30,000/- only from the complainant and she had repaid the whole amount. She did not make mention of any particular of the said transactions including the date, month and year of the loan and payment of the loan amount alongwith interest. It is further relevant to note that the complainant categorically denied that the appellant returned the said amount of Rs. 30,000/- and she paid interest @ 10% per month on the said amount. The appellant made mention of a receipt with signature on postal stamp issued by the complainant at the time of receiving payment of Rs. 30,000/-. However, she has not produced the said receipt. The appellant made mention of a committee regarding which the said amount of Rs. 30,000/- was due. She has not given any particular of the said committee. She has not taken any defence of the said committee in her statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. instead she stated that the said cheque was issued at the time of borrowing the loan. The defence with regard to the committee and payment of the said amount of Rs. 30,000/- with interest is inconsistent and unsubstantiated.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 15/1922. As regards the defence that the said cheque was a security cheque, it can be noted that the appellant stated that she had returned the amount of Rs. 30,000/- alongwith interest amount of Rs. 30,000/- in the month of October, 2012. She stated that she made several requests to return the said cheque but the complainant did not return the said cheque. There is no written communication or letter regarding demand of the said cheque. It is pertinent to note that the said cheque was not returned unpaid on the ground of 'stop payment' but on the ground of 'Funds Insufficient'. The appellant never given any instruction to her banker to stop the payment of the said cheque amount. The appellant never sent any intimation to the complainant that she had issued instruction to her banker to stop payment of the said cheque. The appellant was duly served with the demand notice as evident from her signature on acknowledgement card Ex.CW1/8. She has not challenged the testimony of the complainant regarding due service of the demand notice through registered AD post vide acknowledgement card Ex.CW1/8. She has not disputed the correctness of the addresses mentioned on the postal receipts and acknowledgement card Ex.CW1/8. The appellant did not reply the demand notice Ex.CW1/3. Mere statement that the said cheque was a security cheque is not sufficient. The appellant has failed to rebut the presumption that the cheque had been issued for payment of a debt or in discharge of a liability.
Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 16/1923. Mere denial would not fulfil the requirement of rebuttal as mandated under Section 139 NI Act. Bare denial of the consideration and existence of debt would not serve the purpose of the appellant. The appellant has not brought anything for shifting the burden of proof to the complainant. The appellant has failed to adduce probable evidence to prove that she had taken an amount of Rs. 30,000/- from the complainant and she had repaid the said amount to the complainant alongwith interest and the blank signed cheque was issued as a security cheque. Mere absence of a witness at the time of advancement of loan would not cut the ice. It is not a rule of law that a loan can only be granted in the presence of a witness.
24. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the appellant has failed to rebut the presumption envisaged under Section 139 NI Act.
CONCLUSION:
25. In the opinion of this Court, there is no legal infirmity or apparent error or perversity in the impugned judgement. The appellant was rightly convicted under Section 138 NI Act. Accordingly, the impugned judgement is maintained. SENTENCE:
26. The appellant has already undergone 20 days of incarceration out of 30 days imposed by the trial Court. The complainant has received an amount of Rs. 25,000/- as full and final settlement of his claim qua the compensation in respect of the said cheque vide separate statement recorded today.Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 17/19
27. Accordingly, the sentence of the appellant is modified to the period of imprisonment already undergone by her and compensation of Rs. 25,000/- to the complainant, already paid before the Court today. Bail bond stands discharged. The trial Court shall return the FDR or any other security furnished to the appellant. A copy of the order be sent to the trial Court alongwith trial Court record. Appeal file be consigned to record room.Digitally signed
SANJAY by SANJAY SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2021.09.10 11:05:12 +0530 Announced in the open Court SANJAY SHARMA-II on this 07th September, 2021 Addl. Sessions Judge-03 (Central) Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 18/19 Crl. Appeal No. 492/2019 CNR No.: DLCT010171732019 07.09.2021
Present : Mr. Hari Om Mishra, Advocate with the appellant.
The respondent is present.
It is 05.00 p.m. Vide separate judgement, the conviction of the appellant is maintained and the sentence is modified to the period of imprisonment already undergone and compensation of Rs. 25,000/ to the complainant, already paid before the Court today. Appeal file be consigned to record room.
Digitally signedSANJAY by SANJAY SHARMA SHARMA Date: 2021.09.10 11:06:07 +0530 Sanjay SharmaII ASJ03, Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi 07.09.2021 Cr. Appeal No. 492/2019 Minakshi vs. Subal Mandal Page No. 19/19