Telangana High Court
S. Srinivasa Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 18 July, 2023
THE HON'BLE SMT JUSTICE G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY
CRIMINAL PETITION NO.7987 OF 2022
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by the petitioner/accused seeking to quash the proceedings in C.C.No.120 of 2020 on the file of the X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Secunderabad, for the offences under Sections 354-D, 506 and 509 I.P.C.
2. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the respondent No.2- de facto complainant has lodged a complaint on 02.12.2019 alleging that the petitioner is the Director of two companies, which has a client company viz., M/s. Square Yards, having its registered office at Hi-tech City; she worked in the said company till June, 2018, and then resigned; thereafter, she along with petitioner started real estate business; since eight to ten months, the petitioner started expressing his love and forced her to accept his love; as she ignored him, he started torturing her in all possible ways through e-mails, text messages etc., and forced to marry him; and if she does not want to marry him, she should 2 agree his sexual demands and in exchange he offered an amount of Rs.10.00 Crores and various other businesses. As the respondent No.2 refused, the petitioner abused her and threatened to cause harm to her and her parents. Basing on the said complaint, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Marredpally Police Station, has registered a crime vide FIR No.195 of 2019 against the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 354D, 506 and 507 I.P.C.
3. The grievance of the petitioner is that though no prima facie case is made out against him, the Sub-Inspector of Police, Marredpally Police Station, has filed the charge sheet for the aforesaid offences on the basis of the vague and false allegations levelled by respondent No.2 and that the present complaint has been lodged by respondent No.2 only to harass him.
4. Respondent No.2 filed a detailed counter denying the allegations made by the petitioner, contending that the averments made by her in the complaint are true and correct and that the Investigating Officer has laid charge sheet only after issuing Notice dated 08.09.2019 under Section 91 Cr.P.C. to produce the 3 documents, if any. It is also stated that she is a victim of gruesome crime committed by the petitioner and that the petitioner deliberately and intentionally has not filed the documents submitted by her to the Investigating Officer. It is further stated that the petitioner has told her that he will deposit Rs.10.00 Crores and also messaged her in obscene language (asking for NSA i.e., No Strings Attached, the meaning of which is some relationship in which there is no emotional/mental attachment but only physical relations). It is further stated that she worked with the petitioner on his promise to give business in various pending projects of Tepsol Projects Private Limited and in acquisition of the land at Arsekiri, Rannibenure and Kadur, where the value of the land is Rs.25,000/- per acre (the value of the total land of 240 acres being Rs.60,00,000/- (Rs.25,000/- x 240 acres). The payments as alleged by the petitioner was towards acquisition of the land and she has returned various amounts to the petitioner and that she has also made several payments to different companies. It is also stated that the petitioner has concocted a false story that the alleged amount was paid by him towards the sale of the property of her relatives at Kokapet. It is 4 further stated that the FIR is not an encyclopedia of the entire case. Therefore, it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this juncture.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that though no prima facie case is made out against the petitioner, the police have filed the charge sheet against him for the aforesaid offences. Further, the complaint does not disclose the material particulars such as date of incident, phone number through which the text and Whatsapp messages were sent to respondent No.2 in order to attract the provisions of Sections 354-D, 506 and 509 I.P.C. It is also contended that upon the request of respondent No.2, the petitioner has transferred huge amounts from his account vide No.00801101012020 of Axis Bank to her account on various dates towards advance sale consideration in respect of a property. Learned counsel for the petitioner further contended that though the petitioner has requested several times to complete the sale transaction, she failed to complete the same. Moreover, respondent No.2 is habitual cheater in sale of properties. He further stated that respondent No.2 has repaid a sum of 5 Rs.16,00,000/- on various dates to the account of the petitioner and when the petitioner demanded for repayment of the balance amount, she threatened him and filed the present complaint by making false allegations. Therefore, he contended that the relationship between the petitioner and respondent No.2 is a business relationship and he never harassed or tortured respondent No.2 in any manner and prays to quash the impugned proceedings.
6. The details of the amounts transferred form the account of the petitioner to the account of respondent No.2 are as under:
Date Amount
17.12.2018 Rs.18,00,000/-
24.12.2018 Rs.4,00,000/-
05.01.2019 Rs.25,00,000/-
Total Rs.47,00,000/-
7. The details of the repayment made by respondent No.2 to the petitioner are as under:
Date Amount
10.01.2019 Rs.10,00,000/-
18.02.2019 Rs.2,00,000/-
18.02.2019 Rs.1,00,000/-
19.02.2019 Rs.1,00,000/-
6
16.05.2019 Rs.2,00,000/-
Total Rs.16,00,000/-
8. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supeme Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and others1, State of Haryana v. Ch.Bhajan Lal2, Pepsi Foods Ltd. V. Special Judicial Magistrate3, Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal4, Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary & Others5, Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala6, Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque7 and Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd.8
9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for respondent No.2
- de facto complainant contended that it is not a fit case to quash the proceedings at this juncture. If at all the petitioner has prima facie case, he has to file a petition seeking to discharge him from the case. In support of the said contentions, he relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka 1 (1997) 2 SCC 699 2 AIR 1992 SC 604 3 (1998) 5 Supreme Court Cases 749 4 (2007) 12 SCC 1 5 (1992) 4 SCC 305 66 (2000) 8 SCC 590 7 (2005) 1 SCC 122 8 (2006) 6 SCC 736 7 v. M. Devendrappa9, Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor10; Deputy Inspector General v. Samuthiram11, Veeda Menezez v. Yusuf Khan12 and Prudhvi Nallamanikaluva v. State of Telangana13.
10. Now, let us have a glance at the various judgments of the Supreme Court relied upon by the petitioner:
In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy (1 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature.
In the exercise of this whole some power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed.
Considerations justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as wholesome as the one conferred by 9 (2002) 3 SCC 89 10 (2013) 3 SCC 330 11 (2013) 1 SCC 598 12 AIR 1966 SCC 1733 13 2020 SCC OnLine TS 1291 8 Section 482 ought not to be encased within the strait-jacket of a rigid formula."
In Pepsi Foods Ltd. V. Special Judicial Magistrate (3 supra), the Apex Court held as under:
"It is settled that the High Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters. Under Article 227 the power of superintendence by the High Court is not only of administrative nature but is also of judicial nature. This article confers vast powers on the High Court to prevent the abuse of process of law by the inferior courts and to see that the stream of administration of justice remains clean and pure. The power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and under Section 482 of the Code have no limits but more the power more due care and caution is to be exercised while invoking these powers. When the exercise of powers could be under Article 227 or Section 482 of the Code it may not always be necessary to invoke the provisions of Article 226."
The Apex Court has further held as under:
"No doubt the Magistrate can discharge the accused at any stage of the trial if he considers the charge to be groundless, but that does not mean that the accused cannot approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code or Article 227 of the Constitution to have the proceeding quashed against him when the complaint does not make out any case against him and still he must undergo the agony of a criminal trial."
In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal (4 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles."9
In State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal (2 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"In the following categories of cases, the High Court may in exercise of powers under Article 226 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. may interfere in proceedings relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. However, power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of rare cases.
(1) Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific 10 provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (5 supra) observed thus:
"The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plentitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles."
In Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala (6 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus:-
"18. It is well settled that the power under section 482 Cr.P.C has to be exercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are initiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per se illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material but also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it cannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not quashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court resulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our 11 opinion, exercise of power under section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings in a case like the one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice."
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (7 supra) observed thus:-
".........It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."
In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. (8 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court again cautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Hon'ble Supreme Court noticed the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed as under:
"......Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged."12
11. Though the facts of the aforesaid judgments are different, the precedents laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said judgments are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.
12. Coming to the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the respondent No.2, they are as follows:
In State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa (9 supra), a three-Judge of the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely, (i) to give effect to an order under the Code,
(ii) to prevent abuse of process of Court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of High Courts. All Courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quande lex aliquid aliqui concedit, concedere videtur in sine que ipsa, esse non potest" (when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the Section, the Court does not function as a Court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically 13 laid down in the Section itself. It is to be exercised exdebite justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone Courts exist. Authority of the Court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the Court has power to prevent abuse. It would be an abuse of process of Court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers Court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of process of Court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the Court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto (emphasis supplied)."
In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor (10 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
22. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well.
The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection."
In Deputy Inspector General v. Samuthiram (11 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"....... Sexual harassment like eve-teasing of women amounts to violation of rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 as well. We notice in the absence of effective legislation to contain eve-teasing, 14 normally, complaints are registered under Section 294 or Section 509 IPC. ............... Eve teasing today has become pernicious, horrid and disgusting practice....................... More and more girl students, women etc. go to educational institutions, work places etc. and their protection is of extreme importance to a civilized and cultured society."
In Veeda Menezez v. Yusuf Khan (12 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that act of affront to the decency and dignity of a woman cannot be considered as trivial in nature.
In Prudhvi Nallamanikaluva v. State of Telangana (13 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:
"17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent decision in Sau. Kamal Shivaji Pokarnekar v. State of Maharashtra1, categorically held that quashing of criminal proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence, or is frivolous, vexatious, or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same. It is not necessary that a meticulous analysis of the case should be done before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. If it appears on a reading of the complaint and consideration of the allegations therein, in the light of the statement made on oath that the ingredients of the offence disclose, there would be no justification for the High Court to interfere. The defences that may be available, or facts/aspects which when established during trial, may lead to acquittal, are not grounds for quashing the complaint at the threshold. At that stage, the only question relevant is whether the AIR 2019 SC 847 8 KL,J Crl.P. No.2687 of 2020 averments in the complaint spell out the ingredients of a criminal offence or not. It was further held in the very same judgment that on perusal of the complaint, if discloses prima facie offences that are alleged against the 15 respondents, it is sufficient. The correctness or otherwise of the said allegations has to be decided only in the trial. At the initial stage of issuance of process, it is not open to the Courts to stifle the proceedings by entering into the merits of the contentions made on behalf of the accused. Criminal complaints cannot be quashed only on the ground that the allegations made therein appear to be of a civil nature. If the ingredients of the offence alleged against the accused are prima facie made out in the complaint, the criminal proceedings shall not be interdicted.
18. In view of the above settled legal proposition, coming to the facts on hand, as discussed supra, there are specific allegations/overt-acts against the petitioners herein. The contents of the complaint dated 09.06.2020 would prima facie disclose commission of offences. There are several factual matrix to be investigated by the investigating officer."
13. The above judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent No.2 are not applicable to the facts of the present case.
14. In view of the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel for respondent No.2, the question that arises for consideration in this case before this Court is whether the case of the petitioner comes under any of the categories enumerated in Bhajan Lal's case? Is it a case where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in entirety, do not make out a case against the petitioner for the alleged offences? In order to determine the 16 question it becomes relevant to note the nature of the offences alleged against the petitioner, the ingredients of the offences and the averments made in the FIR/complaint.
15. In the instant case, the First Information Report has been registered against the petitioner for the offences Sections 354(D), 506 and 509 IPC.
Section 354 (D) IPC defines as follows:
"(1) Any man who--
(a) follows a woman and contacts, or attempts to contact such woman to foster personal interaction repeatedly despite a clear indication of disinterest by such woman; or
(b) monitors the use by a woman of the internet, email or any other form of electronic communication, commits the offence of stalking".
16. A perusal of the FIR discloses that respondent No.2- de facto has alleged that the petitioner has committed the offence under Section 354D IPC - stalking, which speaks about a sexual intent of a male person towards a woman.
17. But, a perusal of the Whatsapp, text and E-mail messages filed by the respondent No.2 clearly discloses that the petitioner herein expressed his love towards respondent No.2, but he never 17 expressed any sexual intent towards respondent No.2. If respondent No.2 was really not interested to communicate with the petitioner, she ought to have avoided him or blocked his number. But, the material on record clearly discloses that the petitioner and respondent No.2 were continuously chatting. Moreover, there are civil disputes between the petitioner and respondent No.2 and the petitioner has demanded for repayment of the amounts.
18. Therefore, this Court is of the considerable view that the ingredients of the offence under Section 354 D IPC do not attract the petitioner.
19. Insofar as the offence under Section 506 of IPC alleged against the petitioner is concerned, the said Section deals with punishment for criminal intimidation.
20. As per the contents of complaint, the ingredients of criminal intimidation are also not attracted against the petitioners, as there is no question of threatening or injuring respondent No.2 in any manner.
18
21. Insofar as the offence under Section 509 of IPC alleged against the petitioner is concerned, the said Section deals with word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman.
22. As per contents of charge sheet, it can be clearly understood that petitioner has not outraged the modesty of the woman in any manner except the civil disputes between petitioner and respondent No.2. Therefore, the ingredients of Sections 506 and 509 IPC also do not attract against the petitioner.
23. Furthermore, a bare reading of the charge sheet discloses that it is nothing but the replica of the complaint of the respondent No.2. The charge sheet does not disclose about the collection of evidence with respect to sexual demands made by the petitioner. On the other hand, the contents of the Whatsapp, Email and text messages disclose that respondent No.2 confronted the petitioner whether he is interested in sleeping with her.
24. On a perusal of the messages, it is quite evident that respondent No.2 herself has been asking whether the petitioner had any sexual interest over her, but, the same was denied by the 19 petitioner. Further, respondent No.2 herself searched for the meaning of NSA (no strings attached) to connect it with a sexual abuse. Though there is no such meaning of sexual content, as stated supra, there are civil disputes between the petitioner and respondent No.2.
25. Furthermore, the bank account statements of both the petitioner and respondent No.2 disclose that payments were made by respondent No.2 to the petitioner. Further, the Emails also disclose that the petitioner has demanded for settling the accounts, for which, there is every possibility for respondent No.2 to foist a case against the petitioner. Moreover, the Investigating Officer has not collected any material as to the call data of the alleged messages and without there being any material, the question of making the petitioner to suffer with the trial does not arise.
26. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai v. The State of Gujarat14 laid down broad principles 14 (2017) 9 SCC 641 20 that emerge from the precedents on the subject, which may be summarised in the following propositions:
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly 21 speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice;
and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and
(ix) Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.
16 Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down in the decisions of this Court, we are of the view that the High Court was justified in declining to entertain the application for quashing the First Information Report in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The High Court has adverted to two significant circumstances. Each of them has a bearing on whether the exercise of the jurisdiction under Section 482 to quash the FIR would subserve or secure 22 the ends of justice or prevent an abuse of the process of the court.
27. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in view of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, this Court deems it appropriate that it is a fit case to quash the proceedings against the petitioner.
28. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is allowed and the proceedings against the petitioner in C.C.No.120 of 2020 on the file of Court of X Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Secunderabad, for the offences under Sections 354-D, 506 and 509 I.P.C. are hereby quashed.
Pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed.
__________________________________ G.ANUPAMA CHAKRAVARTHY, J Date:18.07.2023 va