Meghalaya High Court
Shri Derek Randall Jyrwa vs . State Of Meghalaya & Anr on 19 August, 2019
Author: Ajay Kumar Mittal
Bench: Ajay Kumar Mittal
Serial No.27
Regular List
HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA
AT SHILLONG
Crl.Petn.No.23/2019
Date of Order: 19.08.2019
Shri Derek Randall Jyrwa Vs. State of Meghalaya & anr
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ajay Kumar Mittal, Chief Justice
Appearance:
For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Mr. N Mozika, Sr.Adv with
Mr. Philemon Nongbri, Adv
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. L Khyriem, Adv for R/2
i) Whether approved for reporting in Yes/No Law journals etc.:
ii) Whether approved for publication in press: Yes/No ORAL:
1. This is an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) for quashing of criminal proceedings in G.R. Case No.217 (A) of 2017 in Sadar P.S. Case No.95(4) 2017 registered under Sections 493/506/354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class at Shillong.
2. Brief facts may be noticed.
3. According to the petitioner on 30.04.2017 the respondent No.2 had lodged an FIR against him before the Officer-in-Charge, Sadar Police Station alleging that on 29.04.2017 at around 8:00 PM in Khliehshnong Golflink, the petitioner had threatened respondent No.2 along with her current boyfriend in front of his family; his wife; his wife's family and relative. In the FIR, the complainant/respondent No.2 had alleged that she was in relationship with him from 23.09.2014 till December 2016 during which the petitioner was also in relationship with his present wife. Further, as per complainant/respondent No.2, she was 1 assaulted by the petitioner on several occasions which resulted in lodging an FIR which was registered as Shillong Sadar P.S. Case No.95(4) 2017 under Sections 493/506 IPC. The Investigating Officer examined and recorded the statement of the complainant/respondent No.2 along with other witnesses who were present at the time of the occurrence under Section 161 CrPC.
4. The petitioner asserts that notice was issued under Section 41A CrPC dated 23.05.2017 by the Investigating Officer directing him to appear within three days from the date of receipt of the notice failing which necessary legal action would be initiated against him. According to the petitioner upon receipt of the notice dated 23.05.2017, he had appeared before the Investigating Officer and had wholly cooperated with the investigating agency and his statement was also recorded by the Investigating Officer.
5. The petitioner claims that the FIR dated 30.04.2017 was lodged by the respondent No.2/complainant and thereafter Charge Sheet No.76/2017 dated 30.06.2017 was submitted along with the list of witnesses before the Court of Judicial Magistrate 1st Class where the case was numbered as G.R. (A) Case No.156 of 2017. After appearance before the trial Magistrate, he along with his family members approached the respondent No.2/complainant to settle the matter amicably and also to clarify the misunderstanding/misconception which arose between them. After much deliberation with the respondent No.2/complainant beside intervention of the family members from both sides, the respondent No.2/complainant agreed to voluntarily compromise the matter and as of now, the petitioner and the respondent No.2/complainant are on peaceful terms and no untoward incident arose in any manner. A compromise deed dated 12.07.2019 has been executed between him and the respondent No.2/complainant.
6. According to the petitioner since the matter has been amicably settled between them and also the respondent No.2/complainant does not 2 want to pursue with the matter any further as such continuance of G.R. Case No.217 (A) of 2017 in Sadar P.S. Case No.95(4) 2017 under Sections 493/506/354 IPC would not serve any purpose. Hence, the present petition for quashing the FIR under Section 493/506/354 IPC dated 30.04.2017 and also G.R. Case No.217 (A) of 2017.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the statement of the petitioner and respondent No.2/complainant on oath has been recorded by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.08.2019 and forwarded to this Court. The same are taken on record.
8. In the case of of Narinder Singh & ors v. State of Punjab & anr:
(2014) 6 SCC 466, the Apex Court therein has laid down broad principles and guidelines for quashing of FIR on the basis of settlement between the parties. It has also laid down that quashment of the proceedings depends on facts and circumstances of each case.
9. The broad principles enumerated in Narinder Singh's case (supra) are as under:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with caution. 29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.3
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives. 29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases. 29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delicate part of the body, nature of weapon used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept the plea compounding the offence based on complete settlement 4 between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between them which may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timing of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge- sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to a conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
10. In the present case, the respondent No.2/complainant had lodged an FIR for threatening her along with her current boyfriend in front of his family, his wife and her family/relatives. The contents of FIR read thus:-
"To, The Officer-in-Charge, Lawmali Police Station, 793001 Meghalaya, Shillong 5 Subject: FIR Sir, I would like to file a complaint against Derek Randall Jyrwa for threatening me today the 29th April, 2017 at around 8:00 PM in Khliehshnong, Golflink in front of his family, his wife and her family and relatives. He threatened to something bad to me and my current boyfriend (Herodian Nongrum).
I was in a relationship with him from 23rd September 2014 to December 2016 while he was also in relation with his present wife. He assaulted me several times and the last time was on December 2016. I went to his place earlier along with his wife, her family and relatives and my boyfriend to confront him about cheating on his wife and me his ex-girlfriend. That is when he threatened me and my boyfriend to do something to us. Please register my FIR, I will remain thankful to you if you take actions immediately.
Thanking You, Yours faithfully, Abby Lincy Diengdoh Mawlai Umshing 793022 8257967397 D/o B. Resparly Imong"
11. The nature of offence in the present case would not be termed to be of the category of heinous crime. Moreover, as recorded in the statement on oath by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 13.08.2019, the respondent No.2/complainant does not want to pursue with the case any further. For ready reference, the statements of the petitioner and respondent No.2/complainant recorded on 13.08.2019 by the Chief Judicial Magistrate read as under:-
Statement of the petitioner "In the Court of: The Chief Judicial Magistrate/ADC (Judicial), Shillong.
Present: Shri D.S. Marbaniang. Case No.: G.R. 217(A)2017, Sadar P.S. C/No.95(4)2017 U/s 493/506/354 IPC Deposition of Petitioner/Appellant for recorded on oath or solemn affirmation under provision of OATHS ACT, 1969 (Act 44 of 1969) on this 13th day of August 2019.6
Name - Shri Derek Randall Jyrwa S/o - Shri. Borkynsai Diengdoh Age - 32 years, R/o Golflink, Shillong Police Station
- Sadar District - East Khasi Hills Occupation - Government Service.
On Oath I have produced my voter identity card for identification before this Hon'ble Court.
I am aware of the Crl.Petn.No.23 of 2019 Shri Derek Randall Jyrwa versus State of Meghalaya and Anothers. I am the petitioner in this Crl.Petn.No.23 of 2019. I am aware of the order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Meghalaya in Crl.Petn.No.23 of 2019. I have recently entered into an amicable settlement and compromise with respondent No.2 Miss. Abby Lincy Diengdoh. That I have entered into a compromise Deed with respondent No.2 on 12.07.2019 and I have also put my signature on the Compromise Deed and the same was done voluntarily. I have nothing against the respondent No.2 and I have no grudge against her.
That is all I have to say."
Statement of the Respondent No.2 In the Court of: The Chief Judicial Magistrate/ADC (Judicial), Shillong.
Present: Shri D.S. Marbaniang.
Case No.: G.R. 217(A)2017, Sadar P.S. C/No.95(4)2017 U/s 493/506/354 IPC Deposition of Respondent No.2 for recorded on oath or solemn affirmation under provision of OATHS ACT, 1969 (Act 44 of 1969) on this 13th day of August 2019.
Name - Miss. Abby Lincy Diengdoh D/o - Shri. Resparly Imiong Age - 25 years, R/o Pariong Village Police Station - Nongstoin District - West Khasi Hills Occupation - Student. On Oath I have produced my voter identity card for identification before this Hon'ble Court.
I am aware of the Crl.Petn.No.23 of 2019 Shri Derek Randall Jyrwa versus State of Meghalaya and Anothers.
7I am the Respondent No.2 in this Crl.Petn.No.23 of 2019 which relates to the FIR dated 30.04.2017 of which I am the complainant.
I am aware of the order dated 09.08.2019 passed by the Hon'ble High Court of Meghalaya in Crl.Petn.No.23 of 2019. I have recently entered into an amicable settlement and compromise with the petitioner Shri Derek Randall Jyrwa. That I have executed into a compromise Deed with petitioner on 12.07.2019 and I have also put my signature on the Compromise Deed and the same was done voluntarily.
I have nothing against the petitioner and I have no grudge against him.
That is all I have to say."
12. In the analysis and keeping in view of the guidelines as laid down by the Apex Court in Narinder Singh's case (supra) and examining the facts of the present case, I am of the opinion that it is fit case for quashing the FIR. Accordingly, G.R. Case No.217 (A) of 2017 in Sadar P.S. Case No.95(4) 2017 under Sections 493/506/354 IPC registered on 30.04.2017 by Sadar Police Station, Shillong and consequential Charge Sheet No.76/2017 dated 30.06.2017 and case renumbered as G.R. (A) Case No.156 of 2017 by the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class are hereby quashed.
13. Criminal petition stands disposed of as above.
(Ajay Kumar Mittal) Chief Justice Meghalaya 19.08.2019 "Lam AR-PS"
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