Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Dr.Chiranjeevi Kolluri, And Two Others vs K.Chandra Mohan Reddy on 24 January, 2014
Author: G.Rohini
Bench: G.Rohini
THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE G.ROHINI
S.A. No.777 OF 2013
24-01-2014
Dr.Chiranjeevi Kolluri, and two others.Appellants
K.Chandra Mohan Reddy.Respondent
Counsel for the petitioners:Sri S.Srinivas Reddy
Counsel for the Respondent:Sri K.Raghuveer Reddy
<Gist :
>Head Note:
? Cases referred:
1.ILR (7) Allahabad 899
2.AIR 1960 Allahabad 544
3.AIR 1963 Allahabad 581
4.AIR 1972 Allahabad 155
5.2003 (12) SCC 551
6.AIR 1918 PC 102
THE HONOURABLE Ms. JUSTICE G. ROHINI
SECOND APPEAL No.777 OF 2013
Date: 24.01.2014
JUDGMENT:
This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree dated 14.06.2013 in A.S. No.141/2011 on the file of the Court of X Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, confirming the judgment and decree dated 11.02.2011 passed by the Court of the V Junior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in O.S.No.3093/2009.
The defendants are the appellants. The respondent herein/plaintiff filed O.S.No.3093/2009 for recovery of vacant possession of the suit schedule property i.e., plinth area of 1250 square feet in 2nd floor of the Commercial Complex premises bearing No.6-1-1060 (6-1-1060/3/A), Hafeez Complex, Saifabad, Hyderabad, together with arrears of rent of Rs.38,500/- for the period from November 2008 to May 2009 at the rate of Rs.5,500/- per month. The suit was decreed in part directing the defendants to vacate and handover the vacant possession of the suit schedule property by 30.04.2011. So far as the relief of recovery of arrears of rent is concerned, the suit was dismissed as infructuous. Against the said judgment and decree though the defendants filed A.S.No.141/2011, the same was dismissed by the judgment under Appeal. Hence, this Second Appeal.
I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. As could be seen from the material available on record, the case of the plaintiff/respondent herein is that the defendant No.1 took the suit schedule premises on lease in the year 1995 on a monthly rent of Rs.1800/- under a lease deed dated 15.07.1996. He continued as lessee even after the expiry of lease period of eleven months on payment of rent enhanced from time to time. According to the plaintiff by the year 2009 the rent payable was Rs.5500/- per month. Alleging that the defendant No.1 committed default in payment of rents, the plaintiff got issued a notice dated 18.03.2009 demanding the defendants to vacate and handover the vacant possession of the schedule property within one month and also to pay arrears of rent of Rs.27,500/- apart from water charges and electricity charges. Having received the said notice the defendants got issued a reply dated 12.05.2009 with false allegations. Hence, the suit for eviction and recovery of arrears of rent.
The defendants in their written statement denied the allegation of default in payment of rents and contended that though the defendants had been paying the rents regularly, the plaintiff himself avoided to receive the same. It was also contended that the notice dated 18.03.2009 was issued calling upon the defendants to vacate the suit schedule premises without there being any just cause or reason.
On the basis of the said pleadings the trial Court framed the following issues for trial:
1) Whether the defendant is liable for eviction from the suit property?
2) Whether the defendant is liable to pay the arrears of rent as prayed for?
3) Whether the plaintiff has no cause of action to file this suit?
4) To what relief?
The plaintiff got himself examined as P.W.1 and Exhibits A.1 and A.2 documents were marked on his behalf to substantiate the suit claim. On behalf of the defendants D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exhibits B.1 to B.19 documents were marked. On appreciation of the said evidence the trial Court recorded a finding that the tenancy was validly terminated by issuing Ex.A.1 quit notice dated 18.03.2009 and that the plaintiff was entitled for recovery of the vacant possession of the suit schedule premises.
So far as the issue No.2 with regard to arrears of rent is concerned, it was held that the relief for recovery of arrears of rent became infructuous since the P.W.1 himself in his evidence stated that there were no arrears of rent. On issue No.3 the trial Court held that there was cause of action in the light of the Ex.A.1 quit notice which was found to be valid. Accordingly, the suit was decreed so far as recovery of possession is concerned.
Against the said judgment and decree the defendants filed A.S. No.141/2011 contending interalia that Ex.A.1 quit notice did not fulfill the mandatory requirement as contemplated under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It was alleged that under the said notice the tenancy was not terminated but the defendants were merely called upon to vacate the suit schedule premises. The said contention was negatived by the lower appellate Court holding that though the notice did not expressly mention that the tenancy was terminated, there was a clear intimation of termination of lease and that Ex.A.1 quit notice sufficiently signified the intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy. Thus, the lower appellate Court confirmed the decree granted by the trial Court for recovery of possession.
The said judgment is assailed before this Court on the very same ground that Ex.A.1 quit notice was not valid since the plaintiff did not expressly terminate the tenancy.
In support of the said contention the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon Bradly Vs. Atkinson , Sunder Lal Vs. Ram Krishan and another , Ahmad Ali Vs. Mohd. Jamal Uddin and Farooq Ahmed Vs. Muneshwar Bux Singh .
On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent while supporting the judgments of the Courts below submitted that the interference by this Court is not warranted on any ground whatsoever.
This is a case where the title claimed by the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule premises is not in dispute. The fact that the said premises was let out to the defendant No.1 and that the defendants are in possession as lessees is also not in dispute. The suit was filed on the basis of Ex.A.1 quit notice dated 18.03.2009 which was admittedly served on the defendants. In the written statement the defendants did not raise any objection as to the validity of the Ex.A.1 notice, but it was only contended that the allegation that the defendants committed default in payment of rents was false. The further contention was that there was no cause of action to file the suit for eviction of the defendants.
Even in the reply notice got issued by the defendants which was marked as Ex.A.2, the defendants had taken the same stand that the plaintiffs claim for recovery of possession is untenable.
Thus, it is clear that the defendants had understood that Ex.A.1 notice is intended to terminate the tenancy in their favour. That being so, the question that requires consideration is whether the absence of specific expression in Ex.A.1 notice that the tenancy is terminated had rendered the said notice invalid.
At the outset, it is to be noticed that the defendants in Ex.A.2 reply notice failed to raise any objection as to the validity of Ex.A.1 quit notice. As held in Parwati Bai Vs. Radhika an objection as to invalidity or infirmity of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act should be raised specifically and at the earliest; else it will be deemed to have been waived even if there exists one. Therefore, Ex.A.1 quit notice in the present case cannot be held to have suffered from infirmity merely on the ground that it did not expressly mention that the tenancy is terminated.
It is also relevant to note that it was argued before the trial Court on behalf of the defendants that Ex.A.1 quit notice was invalid since it did not contain any date of termination of tenancy and therefore it was not in compliance with the mandatory requirements of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The said contention was negatived by the trial Court holding that Ex.A.1 notice had clearly reflected the intention of the plaintiff that he did not want the defendants to continue in the suit schedule premises any longer and accordingly he had required them to vacate the premises within one month from the date of receipt of the said notice. Thus it was concluded by the trial Court that Ex.A.1 quit notice cannot be held to be illegal merely on the ground that it did not mention the date of termination of tenancy. The said finding was confirmed by the lower appellate Court observing that there was a clear intimation of termination made by the plaintiff demanding the defendants to vacate and handover vacant possession within thirty days and it sufficiently signified the intention to terminate the tenancy.
As noticed above, not only that the defendants failed to plead either in Ex.A.2 reply notice or in the written statement that there was no valid termination of tenancy on the ground that Ex.A.1 notice did not expressly mention the same, but even before the Courts below the arguments on behalf of the defendants was that Ex.A.1 quit notice was not valid since it did not contain any specific date of termination. The stand taken by the defendants before the Courts below makes it abundantly clear that it was understood by them that under Ex.A.1 notice the plaintiff had terminated the tenancy, but the only objection was that the notice was invalid since the plaintiff failed to mention the specific date of termination of tenancy.
It is no doubt true that the Full Bench of the High Court of Allahabad in Bradly Vs. Atkinson (1 supra) held that there must be a clear and explicit intimation to the tenant as to the date after which he will, if remains in occupation of the premises, becomes a trespasser and that the said ratio was followed by the High Court of Allahabad in later decisions in Sunder Lal Vs. Ram Krishan and another (2 supra) and Ahmad Ali Vs. Mohd. Jamal Uddin (3 supra), however Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was amended by Act 3 of 2003 with effect from 31.12.2002. In the light of the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property as it stood after the amendment, the above said decisions of the Allahabad High Court do not hold the field any longer. At any rate, as held by the Privy Council in Harihar Banerji Vs. Ram Shashee Roy no hard and fast rule or technical formulae can be laid down about the language of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The precise words are immaterial provided the notice expresses a clear and unequivocal intention to terminate the tenancy. All the surrounding circumstances have to be taken into consideration while deciding whether the quit notice had expressed clearly the intention to terminate the tenancy or not.
In the case on hand, as rightly held by the Courts below Ex.A.1 quit notice had clearly conveyed the intention of the plaintiff to terminate the tenancy. Therefore, in my considered opinion Ex.A.1 quit notice was rightly held to be valid by both the Courts below.
For the aforesaid reasons, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that there was no valid termination of tenancy is untenable.
Accordingly, the judgments and decrees of the Courts below cannot be held to be erroneous and therefore the Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No costs. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case the appellants are hereby granted time till 31.05.2014 for vacating the suit schedule premises and handing over the vacant possession to the plaintiff subject to the condition of filing an undertaking to that effect before the trial Court on or before 31.01.2014.
Consequently, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Second Appeal shall stand closed.
___________ G.ROHINI, J Date: 24.01.2014