Lrs Of Satyanarayan vs Lrs Of Ram Prasad S/O Nathmal Bang ... on 23 September, 2025

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Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Lrs Of Satyanarayan vs Lrs Of Ram Prasad S/O Nathmal Bang ... on 23 September, 2025

1. A civil suit came to be decided by learned trial court on the compromise produced by the parties. The petitioner moved an application making challenge to the compromise decree. The said (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (3 of 16) [CR-178/2025] application has been dismissed by learned trial court hence this petition.

2. An identical situation has been dealt with by this Court vide order dated 07.08.2025 in the case of Jitendra Singh Deora Vs. Paras Kanwar & Ors., in S.B. Civil Revision Petition No. 51/2025 for ready reference, the same is reproduced herein-below:-

"6. Before proceeding with the discussion, it is pertinent to first examine Order XXIII Rule 3 and Rule 3A of the Code of Civil Procedure. For ease of reference, the provisions are reproduced herein below:

"3. Compromise of suit.--Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise [in writing and signed by the parties]or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject- matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:] [Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.] [Explanation.-- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not he deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.]"

"3A. Bar to suit.--No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful."

7. A perusal of the provision reproduced above makes it abundantly clear that a suit challenging a compromise decree is wholly barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A of the CPC, read conjointly with the Explanation to Rule 3 thereof.

(Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (4 of 16) [CR-178/2025] The said Explanation speaks of the examination of the lawfulness of the agreement, settlement, or compromise placed before the Court by way of a compromise application. Whenever such a suit is instituted, the Explanation to Rule 3 and Rule 3A are to be read together in their proper perspective. For the purposes of the said Explanation, an application for recalling the compromise decree shall be examined. Upon such an application being moved, the Trial Court shall, in the first instance, satisfy itself as to the validity of the compromise. The voidability or otherwise of such an agreement shall be tested on the touchstone of free consent, for if it is demonstrated that the same was procured by coercion, fraud, misrepresentation, or threat, the compromise would be rendered void or voidable in accordance with the principles embodied in the Contract Act. It is thus imperative that every compromise, whatever its nature, must withstand scrutiny under the law of contracts; only those agreements which are neither void nor voidable in the eyes of law can culminate into a valid compromise decree. The law is clear on the point that an appeal against a compromise decree is not maintainable as it is envisaged under Section 96(3) of the CPC. In such eventuality, the only mode available to a party to assail the compromise is to invoke the proviso to Rule 3 of Order XXIII CPC, whereby the lawfulness of the compromise may be examined by the Presiding Judge upon a recall application, and the issue whereafter shall be adjudicated upon by the same Court after satisfying with the material placed before him in that regard.

8. The controversy involved in the present case is squarely covered by the judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Sree Surya Developers and Promoters Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad and Ors. and Raja Pushpa Properties Pvt. Ltd. Vs. N. Sailesh Prasad and Ors. reported in (2022) 5 SCC 736 decided on 09.02.2022.

(Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (5 of 16) [CR-178/2025] The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced below:--

"6. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present case, the Trial Court rejected the plaint of O.S. No.537 of 2018 in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 on the ground that the said suit would not be maintainable in view of specific bar under Order XXIII Rule 3A. The High Court by the impugned judgment and order has set aside the said order and has remanded the matter to the Trial Court by observing that while passing the order rejecting the plaint, the Trial Court had not considered the provisions of Order XXXII Rules 1 to 7 CPC. However, it is required to be noted that while passing the impugned judgment and order, the High Court has not at all dealt with and considered the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3A and has not considered at all whether in fact the suit challenging the Compromise Decree and/or for the reliefs sought in the suit would be maintainable or not. What was required to be considered by the High Court was whether the independent suit questioning the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not. The aforesaid crucial aspect has not been dealt with by the High Court at all and High Court has gone into the validity of the Compromise Decree in view of Order XXXIII Rule 7. At the stage of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11, the only thing which was required to be considered by the High Court was whether the suit would be maintainable or not and that the suit challenging the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and at this stage, the High Court / Court was not required to consider on merits the validity of the Compromise Decree.

7. Now, so far as the main issue whether the Trial Court rightly rejected the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11 on the ground that an independent suit challenging the Compromise Decree would be barred in view of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC is concerned, on plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint. Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, which has been inserted by amendment in 1976 reads as under:-

"3A. Bar to suit. -- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful."

8. Therefore, on plain reading of Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC , no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. Identical question came to be considered by this Court in the case of R. Janakiammal(supra). It is observed and held by this Court that Rule 3A of Order XXIII bars the suit to set aside the decree on the ground that the (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (6 of 16) [CR-178/2025] compromise on which decree was passed was not lawful. It is further observed and held that an agreement or compromise which is clearly void or voidable shall not be deemed to be lawful and the bar under Rule 3A shall be attracted if compromise on the basis of which the decree was passed was void or voidable. In this case, this Court had occasion to consider in detail Order XXIII Rule 3 as well as Rule 3A. The earlier decisions of this Court have also been dealt with by this Court in paragraphs 53 to 57 as under:-

"53. Order 23 Rule 3 as well as Rule 3-A came for consideration before this Court in large number of cases and we need to refer to a few of them to find out the ratio of judgments of this Court in context of Rule 3 and Rule 3- A. In Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581, this Court considered Rule 3 as well as Rule 3-A of Order 23. This Court held that the object of the Amendment Act, 1976 is to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the court which has recorded the compromise. In paras 6 and 7, the following was laid down: (SCC pp. 584-85) "6. The experience of the courts has been that on many occasions parties having filed petitions of compromise on basis of which decrees are prepared, later for one reason or other challenge the validity of such compromise. For setting aside such decrees suits used to be filed which dragged on for years including appeals to different courts. Keeping in view the predicament of the courts and the public, several amendments have been introduced in Order 23 of the Code which contain provisions relating to withdrawal and adjustment of suit by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1976. Rule 1 Order 23 of the Code prescribes that at any time after the institution of the suit, the plaintiff may abandon his suit or abandon a part of his claim. Rule 1(3) provides that where the Court is satisfied: (a) that a suit must fail by reason of some formal defect, or (b) that there are sufficient grounds for allowing the plaintiff to institute a fresh suit for the subject-matter of a suit or part of a claim, it may, on such terms as it thinks fit, grant the plaintiff permission to withdraw such suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit. In view of Rule 1(4) if the plaintiff abandons his suit or withdraws such suit without permission referred to above, he shall be precluded from instituting any such suit in respect of such subject- matter. Rule 3 Order 23 which contained the procedure regarding compromise of the suit was (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (7 of 16) [CR-178/2025] also amended to curtail vexatious and tiring litigation while challenging a compromise decree. Not only in Rule 3 some special requirements were introduced before a compromise is recorded by the court including that the lawful agreement or a compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties, a proviso with an Explanation was also added which is as follows:

'Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

Explanation. -- An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this Rule.'

7. By adding the proviso along with an Explanation the purpose and the object of the amending Act appears to be to compel the party challenging the compromise to question the same before the court which had recorded the compromise in question. That court was enjoined to decide the controversy whether the parties have arrived at an adjustment in a lawful manner. The Explanation made it clear that an agreement or a compromise which is void or voidable under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule. Having introduced the proviso along with the Explanation in Rule 3 in order to avoid multiplicity of suit and prolonged litigation, a specific bar was prescribed by Rule 3-A in respect of institution of a separate suit for setting aside a decree on the basis of a compromise saying:

'3-A. Bar to suit. -- No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.'

54. The next judgment to be noted is Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566, R.V. Raveendran, J. speaking for the Court noted the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A and recorded his conclusions in para 17 in the following words: (SCC p. 576) "17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:

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(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order

(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.

(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.

Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. Significantly, none of the other defendants challenged the consent decree. For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code."

55. The next judgment is R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkatswamy, (2014) 15 SCC 471 in which the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 and Rule 3-A were again considered. After extracting the aforesaid provisions, (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (9 of 16) [CR-178/2025] the following was held by this Court in para 11: (SCC p.

474) "11. It is manifest from a plain reading of the above that in terms of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 where one party alleges and the other denies adjustment or satisfaction of any suit by a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the Court before whom such question is raised, shall decide the same. What is important is that in terms of Explanation to Order 23 Rule 3, the agreement or compromise shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of the said Rule if the same is void or voidable under the Contract Act, 1872. It follows that in every case where the question arises whether or not there has been a lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, the question whether the agreement or compromise is lawful has to be determined by the court concerned. What is lawful will in turn depend upon whether the allegations suggest any infirmity in the compromise and the decree that would make the same void or voidable under the Contract Act. More importantly, Order 23 Rule 3-A clearly bars a suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. This implies that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone who can examine and determine that question. The court cannot direct the parties to file a separate suit on the subject for no such suit will lie in view of the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. That is precisely what has happened in the case at hand. When the appellant filed OS No. 5326 of 2005 to challenge the validity of the compromise decree, the court before whom the suit came up rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 on the application made by the respondents holding that such a suit was barred by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3-A CPC. Having thus got the plaint rejected, the defendants (the respondents herein) could hardly be heard to argue that the plaintiff (the appellant herein) ought to pursue his remedy against the compromise decree in pursuance of OS No. 5326 of 2005 and if the plaint in the suit has (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (10 of 16) [CR-178/2025] been rejected to pursue his remedy against such rejection before a higher court."

56. The judgments of Pushpa Devi [Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566] as well as Banwari Lal [Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi, (1993) 1 SCC 581] were referred to and relied on by this Court. This Court held that no sooner a question relating to lawfulness of the agreement or compromise is raised before the court that passed the decree on the basis of any such agreement or compromise, it is that court and that court alone which can examine and determine that question.

57. In subsequent judgment, Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh, (2020) 6 SCC 629, this Court again referring to earlier judgments reiterated the same proposition i.e. the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and separate suit is not maintainable. In paras 17 and 18, the following has been laid down: (SCC p. 638) "17. By introducing the amendment to the Civil Procedure Code (Amndment Act, 1976 w.e.f. 1-2- 1977, the legislature has brought into force Order 23 Rule 3-A, which creates bar to institute the suit to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which decree is based was not lawful. The purpose of effecting a compromise between the parties is to put an end to the various disputes pending before the court of competent jurisdiction once and for all.

18. Finality of decisions is an underlying principle of all adjudicating forums. Thus, creation of further litigation should never be the basis of a compromise between the parties. Rule 3-A Order 23 CPC put a specific bar that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. The scheme of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and permit parties to amicably come to a settlement which is lawful, is in writing and a voluntary act on the part of the parties. The court can be instrumental in having an agreed compromise effected and finality attached to the same. The court should never be party to imposition of a compromise upon an unwilling party, still open to be questioned on an (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (11 of 16) [CR-178/2025] application under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 CPC before the court."

That thereafter it is specifically observed and held that a party to a consent decree based on a compromise to challenge the compromise decree on the ground that the decree was not lawful i.e., it was void or voidable has to approach the same court, which recorded the compromise and a separate suit challenging the consent decree has been held to be not maintainable.

9. In view of the above decisions of this Court, the Trial Court was absolutely justified in rejecting the plaint on the ground that the suit for the reliefs sought challenging the Compromise Decree would not be maintainable.

10. Now, so far as the submission on behalf of the plaintiff that in the suit the plaintiff has not specifically prayed for setting aside the Compromise Decree and what is prayed is to declare that the Compromise Decree is not binding on him and that for the other reliefs sought, the suit would not be barred and still the suit would be maintainable is concerned, the aforesaid cannot be accepted.

10.1 As held by this Court in a catena of decisions right from 1977 that a mere clever drafting would not permit the plaintiff to make the suit maintainable which otherwise would not be maintainable and/or barred by law. It has been consistently held by this Court that if clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier stage.

10.2 In the case of T. Arivandandam Vs. T.V. Satypal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, it is observed and held as under;-

"5. We have not the slightest hesitation in condemning the petitioner for the gross abuse of the process of the court repeatedly and unrepentantly resorted to. From the statement of the facts found in the judgment of the High Court, it is perfectly plain that the suit now pending before the First Munsif's Court, Bangalore, is a flagrant misuse of the mercies of the law in receiving plaints. The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful -- not formal -- reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (12 of 16) [CR-178/2025] nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits."

10.3 In the case of Ram Singh v. Gram Panchayat Mehal Kalan, (1986) 4 SCC 364, this Court has observed and held that when the suit is barred by any law, the plaintiff cannot be allowed to circumvent that provision by means of clever drafting so as to avoid mention of those circumstances, by which the suit is barred by law of limitation.

11. If we consider the reliefs of declaration of title, recovery of possession, cancellation of revocation of Gift Deed, declaration for DGPA and Deed of Assignment-cum- DGPA, the said reliefs can be granted only if the Compromise Decree dated 13.01.2016 passed in O.S. No.1750 of 2015 is set aside. Therefore, by asking such multiple reliefs, the plaintiff by clever drafting wants to get his suit maintainable, which otherwise would not be maintainable questioning the Compromise Decree. All the aforesaid reliefs were subject matter of earlier suits and thereafter also subject matter of O.S. No.1750 of 2015 in which the Compromise Decree has been passed. Therefore, it is rightly held by the Trial Court that the suit in the present form and for the reliefs sought would be barred under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC and therefore the Trial Court rightly rejected the plaint in exercise of powers under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The High Court has erred in setting aside the said order by entering into the merits of the validity of the Compromise Decree on the ground that the same was hit by Order XXXII Rule 7 CPC, which was not permissible at this stage of deciding the application under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC and the only issue which was required to be considered by the High Court was whether the suit challenging the Compromise Decree would be maintainable or not.

12. As observed hereinabove and it is not in dispute that as such the respondent No.1 - original plaintiff has already moved an appropriate application before the concerned Court, which passed the decree setting aside the compromise Decree by submitting an application under Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC therefore the said application will have to be decided and disposed of in accordance with law in which all the defences / contentions which may have been available to the respective parties on the validity of the Compromise Decree would have to be gone into by the concerned court in accordance with law and on its own merits."

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9. Shri Jog Singh Bhati, learned counsel appearing for the respondents, places reliance on the judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Horil Vs. Keshav and Ors. (2012) 5 SCC 525.

10. To bolster his plea that the issue raised by the plaintiff with regard to the validity and existence of adoption, based on which the partition decree was passed, cannot be effectively adjudicated by a Revenue Court in light of the express provision contained under Section 207 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, he urges that only a Civil Court is competent to effectively adjudicate the issue raised by the plaintiff in the suit, seeking cancellation of the decree with the plea of mere existence of adoption and legality of adoption and it is therefore, even if the plaintiff moves an application for recalling the compromise decree, the same would not fetch or cater to the purpose owing to the reason of incompetence of the Revenue Court to adjudicate the issue involved.

11. I have pondered over the issue respectfully and gone through the provisions of law and the judgment cited above. My consideration would be that essentially the civil suit for cancellation of decree was filed by the respondent-plaintiff with the express pleading that the compromise to which she was a party was signed by her under misconception because the opponent misrepresented the facts to her before filing the same in the Revenue Court. The issue, whether the Revenue Court is competent or not to effectively adjudicate the issue of adoption and for that purpose examining its legality, or its existence would not be a question here. The core question would be, whether the plaintiff was a party to the compromise agreement, and she appended her signature on the compromise agreement under misconception or upon misrepresentation, or fraud or to make a further examination of lawfulness of the compromise and the above issue, can only be adjudicated by the court before whom it was submitted, verified and accordingly the case was decided.

(Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (14 of 16) [CR-178/2025] Once it is satisfied to the same Court who passed the decree that the compromise agreement was not lawful because of keeping the party in the dark or making her agreeable to put her signature through deceitful means or under coercion is a question that can only be examined by the same Court before whom the compromise agreement was submitted.

12. The essential factual matrix is that the suit has been instituted by the respondent-plaintiff with a categorical assertion that the compromise, to which she was ostensibly a party, came to bear her signature under a misconception, the same having been induced by misrepresentation of facts by the opponent prior to its submission before the Revenue Court and therefore she sought cancellation of the decree. 12.1 I am of the considered view that the issue whether the Revenue Court was competent to adjudicate upon the question of adoption and to examine its legality or existence, does not arise for determination at this stage. The crux of the matter would be whether the plaintiff voluntarily became a party to the compromise agreement and appended her signature thereto, or whether such signature was procured under misconception, misrepresentation, under deceit, or coercion. The plaintiff would also be at liberty to raise the question of lawfulness of the compromise by invoking to explanation given under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. The issue above can only be examined by the very Court before whom the compromise agreement was presented and based upon which the decree came to be passed.

12.2 It is pertinent to note that by virtue of Section 96(3) of the CPC, no appeal shall lie from a decree passed with the consent of the parties. Further, by reason of the express bar contained in Order XXIII Rule 3A CPC, a separate suit to challenge such a compromise decree is completely barred. Perhaps, as has been observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and certain High Courts, this legal position has been evolved to ensure that a litigant be not left in a state of absolute remedilessness. Where the compromise agreement, (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (15 of 16) [CR-178/2025] within the meaning of the Indian Contract Act, is tainted with fraud, coercion, undue influence, misrepresentation, or misconception or that the compromise or agreement is not lawful in the eyes of "The Indian Contract Act"; the law contemplates that one opportunity must be afforded to examine its lawfulness. The scope of recall, therefore, extends only to the limited enquiry into the validity of the compromise, and that too because neither a fresh suit can be instituted nor an appeal can be preferred. To deny such an opportunity would be to perpetuate a wrong through the authority of the Court, a course which is wholly antithetical to the ends of justice. It is in this spirit as a measure of caution and as a legal safeguard that the proviso/explanation to Rule 3 of Order XXIII operates.

12.3 It necessarily follows that the adjudication of such a question must be undertaken by the very Court which passed the decree, since it alone is competent to examine whether the compromise was lawful in its inception. This principle stands fortified by the dictum of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sree Surya Developers (supra), wherein it was held that the Court passing the compromise decree retains the jurisdiction to scrutinise its lawfulness upon challenge."

3. The governing principles related to present controversy have been made to discussion in the judgment referred supra. The petitioner may make a challenge to the impugned order by moving a writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India wherein distinct from appellate or revisional jurisdiction, this Court can exercise its supervisory power by invoking Article 227 of Constitution of India which includes its powers to call for records and to intervene in case of manifest injustice of jurisdictional over reach. The powers under Article 227 of Constitution of India are meant to be exercised to ensure the purity of the judicial process (Uploaded on 26/09/2025 at 12:22:16 PM) (Downloaded on 27/09/2025 at 12:51:42 AM) [2025:RJ-JD:42648] (16 of 16) [CR-178/2025] and maintain judicial discipline and to see that the Court subordinate to it are acting within their legal authority; if he desires to do so.

4. In this view of the matter, the instant revision petition is disposed of with a liberty to the petitioner that he would be able to file a writ petition as aforesaid, making a challenge to order under assail of this petition.

5. Pending applications, if any, are also disposed of.

(FARJAND ALI),J 7-chhavi/-

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Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur