Madhya Pradesh High Court
Sewa Bharti Madhya Bharat Society vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 18 March, 2020
Author: Atul Sreedharan
Bench: Atul Sreedharan
THE HIGH COURT OF MADHYA PRADESH
Writ Petition No.6560/2020
Jabalpur, dated 18/3/2020
Shri Rahul Deshmukh, learned counsel for the petitioner.
Shri Amitabh Gupta, learned Government Advocate for the
respondents-State.
The present petition has been filed by the petitioner herein by which he is challenging the order dated 12.2.2020 (Annexure P/7) whereby the respondent no.4 has taken the charge of District Programme Officer, Women and Child Development Department at Gairatganj, district Raisen, from the petitioner-society.
2. It is a case of the petitioner that it is a self-service organization, which was handed over the Child Development Scheme at Gairatganj under the Integrated Child Development Services (ICDS) programme and has been performing for the last 16 years. The petitioner-society is stated to be discharging its duties with utmost satisfaction of the authority and that no complaints, whatsoever, were made against the petitioner-society and every year the society has completed its target on the basis of satisfaction recorded by the authority. The petitioner is aggrieved by the sudden withdrawal of the work under the ICDS programme from the petitioner by the State without giving any justifiable reasons.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has based his "so called"
right to continue discharging functions as a self-service organization under the ICDS programme on the basis of the policy of the State Government dated 28.1.1997. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said policy creates a right in the petitioner to continue working as a self-service organization under the ICDS programme. He has drawn the attention of this court to Clause (4) of the policy, which provides for the period of engagement in the ICDS programme. Clause (4) starts with the words "generally any project, which is given to an organization shall be given at its inception for a period of three years".
However, at the end of each year, the work of the organization would mandatorily be assessed. If upon assessment, the work being discharged by the self-service organization is found to be unsatisfactory, then the engagement can be terminated even before the end of three years. However, before terminating the engagement before three years, an opportunity of hearing shall be accorded to the organization and only thereafter can the order of termination be passed. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon this to show that the impugned order does not record any finding of unsatisfactory performance by the petitioner. He has also drawn the attention of this court to Annexure P-5, which is notice dated 1.2.2020 that has been issued by the Collector, district Raisen (respondent no.3) asking why the engagement of the petitioner shall not be terminated on account of unsatisfactory performance under the ICDS programme. A brief reply to the notice was given by the petitioner on 10.2.2020. It is pertinent to mention here that the said notice has also pointed out the instances of deficiencies in the performance of the task by the petitioner.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order is bad and deserves to be set aside as the reply given by the petitioner has not been taken into consideration in the impugned order and neither it has been briefly reflected that the authority has even seen the reply given by the petitioner before passing the impugned order.
5. Learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, has submitted that the petitioner cannot claim a right on the basis of a policy or guidelines. He has also submitted that a right would accrue only on the basis of it being carved out by a statute or such other subordinate legislation having the force of law. He further submits that the guidelines have been issued only for the purpose of directing the manner in which the State shall allocate works to the self-service organizations/Non-Government Organizations (NGOs) and the same is not binding. Further, he has submitted that the impugned order is not stigmatic as it does not level any kind of allegations against the petitioner and neither does it state that the petitioner's work was unsatisfactory.
6. Learned counsel for the State has forcefully submitted that the task under the ICDS programme is primarily that of the State. He has taken this court through the relevant portions of the policy, which reflects that the State has only involved the NGOs in passing on the benefits under the ICDS programme only after taking into account that there are places where the State does not have its infrastructure or the approach to such places being difficult and where the NGOs were willing to go and, therefore, were put in place only to assist the State in the discharge of a function that was primarily the responsibility of the State.
7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents filed along with the petition.
8. This court has gone through the policy of 28.1.1997 in detail. The same are in the nature of a guideline. The policy clearly reflects that the primary duty is of the State to take the benefit under the ICDS programme to its target end-users. The policy also clearly reflects that the requirement for involving the said self-service organizations was not to take over the task from the State but to assist it by taking the benefits under the ICDS programme to such areas which were outside the reach of the State on account of lack of infrastructure, like poor roads or absence of Government offices and Government employees who could take the benefits of the ICDS programme to the people.
9. Clause (4), which has been impressed upon this court by the learned counsel for the petitioner, with much force and vehemence, also does not come to his assistance, even assuming that the same has the force of law and generates a right in favour of the petitioner. The said clause only requires a finding of unsatisfactory discharge of responsibility by the NGO/self-service organization for the first time that it is invested with the responsibility for a period of three years. The clause very clearly reveals that if the assessment of the work of the organization is found to be unsatisfactory during the first three years of its engagement, only then is there a requirement for a finding of unsatisfactory discharge of functions where the State proposes to terminate the engagement before the end of three years, which is only the period in the first term of engagement. In the subsequent extensions for a year thereafter, there is no requirement at all under the said clause for a finding of unsatisfactory discharge or functions by the NGO. Undisputedly, even the petitioner has stated that after the end of the first three years, the term has been extended repeatedly for a period of one year at a time. Even otherwise, a reading of the said policy clearly reflects that it does not create or generate any justiciable right in the petitioner and the same are merely guidelines to guide the State in the involvement of the NGOs in dispensing the benefits under the ICDS programme, which otherwise primarily rests with the State. The impugned order dated 12.2.2020 clearly reflects that the State has not terminated the engagement of the petitioner but has now taken over the responsibility under the ICDS programme for those areas where the petitioner has been dispensing the benefits of the ICDS programme, as the State Government now feels that it has the capacity and the infrastructure to do so. Under the circumstances, as nothing negative has been observed in the said order, the same is not stigmatic. The order was also not required to refer to the reply of the petitioner dated 10.2.2020.
10. Under the circumstances, this petition being devoid of merits is dismissed.
(ATUL SREEDHARAN) JUDGE ps PRASHANT SHRIVASTAVA 2020.03.19 10:12:19 +05'30'