Legal Document View

Unlock Advanced Research with PRISMAI

- Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc - ...
Upgrade to Premium
[Cites 6, Cited by 2]

Karnataka High Court

Sri Pawan Kumar Surana vs Smt M S Nagalakshmi on 30 October, 2012

Author: N.Ananda

Bench: N. Ananda

                           1


  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE

     DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF OCTOBER 2012

                        BEFORE

         THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE N. ANANDA

                   C.R.P.No.414/2012
BETWEEN:
Sri Pawan Kumar Surana
S/o Sri Bhawar Lall Surana
No.81-A, 4th Cross, 9th Main
RPC Layout, Vijayanagar
Bangalore - 560 040
Also at
Proprietor : M/s.P.K.Trading Company
No.5, Ground Floor, (Premises No.5)
Santhappa Lane, S J P Road Cross
Bangalore - 560 002.                         ...Petitioner

(By Sri/Smt. Ujwala Walwadikar, Advocate for M/s.Agrani
Associates, Advocates & Solicitors)

AND:
1. Smt.M.S.Nagalakshmi
   W/o Sri M.Sadguru Murthy
   Aged about 54 Years

2. Sri M.S.Srinath
   S/o Sri M.Sadguru Murthy
   Aged about 32 Years

Both are r/at No.417, 13th Main
Srinivasanagar, SBM Colony
Bangalore - 560 050.                      ...Respondents
(By Sri V.B.Shiva Kumar, Advocate for C/R1 & R2)
                                2


      This revision petition is filed under section 18 of the
Karnataka Small Causes Courts Act, to set aside the
judgment and decree dated 15.06.2012, passed in
S.C.No.1279/2011, on the file of XIX Additional Judge,
Court of Small Causes, Bangalore, decreeing the suit for
ejectment and etc.

      This revision petition coming on for admission this
day, the court made the following:

                          ORDER

The only point that arises for consideration in this revision petition is whether the trial court does not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit.

2. I have heard the learned counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondents.

3. The learned counsel for petitioner would submit that petitioner-tenant was paying monthly rent of Rs.5,500/- and he had paid advance of a sum of Rs.50,000/-. Thus in all, valuation of suit for the purpose of jurisdiction was a sum of Rs.1,16,000/-.

4. The learned counsel for petitioner would also submit that trial court had not given an opportunity to learned 3 counsel for petitioner-tenant to address arguments on merits of the case.

5. The learned counsel for respondents-landlords would submit that for the purpose of valuation, suit has to be valued on the basis of annual rental value in terms of section 41(2) of the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 (for short, 'the Act').

6. The learned counsel for respondents-landlords has also relied on a judgment of this court, reported in ILR 2006 KAR 2561 (in the case of Sri K. Ramachandra Rao & Others Vs. K.G.Ramamohana Gupta & Others), wherein this court has held that the word "premium" used in sub-section (2) of Section 41 would not partake the character of security deposit.

7. The learned counsel for petitioner-tenant would submit that judgment of this court, reported in ILR 2006 KAR 2561 (in the case of Sri K. Ramachandra Rao & Others 4 Vs. K.G.Ramamohana Gupta & Others) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case.

8. The learned counsel for petitioner-tenant would further submit that the provisions of the Act are only meant for determination of court fee and not for determination of pecuniary jurisdiction, which I am not persuaded to accept because the Karnataka Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1958 was enacted not only for the purpose of determination of court fee but also for determination of value of suit for the purpose of jurisdiction.

9. In order to repel the submission made by learned counsel for petitioner-tenant, it has become necessary to state that there is no separate enactment for valuation of suit for the purpose of jurisdiction. Under section 41(2) of the Act, in a suit between landlord and tenant, both for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fee, valuation has to be computed on the basis of annual rental value. Under section 41(2) of the Act, in a suit for recovery of immoveable property 5 from a tenant, including a tenant holding over after the termination of a tenancy, fee shall be computed on the premium, if any, and on the rent payable for the year next before the date of presenting the plaint.

In the case on hand, security deposit paid by petitioner-tenant to respondents-landlords cannot be equated to premium.

10. Under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 'lease' is defined as:-

"S.105. Lease defined.-- A lease of immoveable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of money, a share of crops, service or any other thing of value, to be rendered periodically or on specified occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who accepts the transfer on such terms.
Lessor, lessee, premium and rent defined.--The transferor is called the lessor, the 6 transferee is called the lessee, the price is called the premium, and the money, share, service or other thing to be so rendered is called the rent."

11. It is manifest the concept of 'rent' and 'premium' is distinctive. The security deposit paid by petitioner-tenant cannot be termed as 'premium' as defined under section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act. Therefore, submission of learned counsel for petitioner-tenant that trial court did not have pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit cannot be accepted.

12. The learned counsel for petitioner-tenant would submit that petitioner-tenant had filed revision petition, therefore, learned counsel for petitioner-tenant did not argue the case on merits before the court below.

13. It is needless to state that pendency of revision petition before this court would not operate as stay of the proceedings before court below. In the circumstances, if learned counsel for petitioner-tenant has not addressed the 7 arguments before court below, that cannot be a ground to invoke section 115 C.P.C. Therefore, there are no grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment.

14. The revision petition is accordingly dismissed. However, time granted by the trial court is extended. The petitioner-tenant is granted six months time from today to vacate and deliver vacant possession of suit schedule premises to respondents-landlords, without driving respondents-landlords to execution proceedings. The petitioner-tenant shall not create third party interest. The petitioner-tenant shall not induct third party into suit schedule premises. The petitioner-tenant shall continue to pay rent regularly. If petitioner-tenant commits default in payment of rent, the benefit of time granted in terms of this order stands revoked.

Sd/-

JUDGE SNN