Jharkhand High Court
Central Coalfields Limited vs Sri Suresh Kumar Singh on 22 July, 2025
Author: Rajesh Kumar
Bench: Rajesh Kumar
2025:JHHC:20125-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.504 of 2024
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1. Central Coalfields Limited, a Subsidiary of Coal India Limited, through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, having its office at Darbhanga House, PO-GPO, PS-Kotwali, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand), and also through its H.O.D. (Legal) Sri Jobe V.P., aged about 53 years, S/o. Late V.V. Philip, residing at 396/B, Road No.4- C, Ashok Nagar, PO-Doranda, PS-Argora, District-Ranchi (Jharkhand), who is also representing the other appellants herein.
2. Director (Personnel), Central Coalfields Limited having office at Darbhanga House, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District-Ranchi
3. General Manager, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
4. Project Officer/Disciplinary Authority, AADOCM, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
5. Manager (Personnel), AADOCM, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
6. Project Officer, Amlo Project, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro.
7. Chief Manager (Civil), Central Coalfields Limited/Enquiry Officer, Dhori Area, Central Coalfields Limited, P.O. Dhori, P.S. Bermo, District-Bokaro. .... .... Respondents/Appellants Versus Sri Suresh Kumar Singh, aged about 55 years, son of late Rameshwar Singh, Resident of Quarter No.B-161, Central Colony, P.O. Makoli, P.S. Chandrapur, District Bokaro (Jharkhand) .... .... Writ Petitioner/Respondent CORAM : HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
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For the Appellants : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Atanu Banerjee, Advocate
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C.A.V. on 01.07.2025 Pronounced on 22.07.2025 1 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J. Prayer The instant appeal preferred by the C.C.L. under Clause-10 of Letters Patent is directed against the judgment/order dated 08.04.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.177 of 2023, whereby and whereunder, while allowing the writ petition, the learned Single Judge has passed an order with a direction that "the petitioner is directed to be reinstated with continuity of service and with 25 % back wages within 3 months from the date of communication of the judgment."
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under:
3. It is the case of the writ petitioner that one Rameshwar Singh was appointed on the post of Security Guard with the appellant company on 10.11.1973. Rameshwar Singh was issue less and as such the writ petitioner was adopted. The deed of adoption was registered subsequently on 25.01.1985 and the ex-employee of the respondent-CCL, i.e., Rameshwar Singh declared the petitioner as his dependent in his service excerpts also. Sometime in the year 1988, Rameshwar Singh applied for voluntary retirement on account of medical unfitness and as 2 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB per the provision of the National Coal Wage Agreement, the petitioner was offered employment. The petitioner had taken his Class-X examination in the year 1985 and all formalities for taking the exams were completed before adoption wherein he had declared the name of his biological father.
4. The application for the appointment of the petitioner in terms of NCWA on account of the voluntary retirement of Rameshwar Singh on medical grounds was filed by the petitioner on 03.05.1989 and ultimately the petitioner was granted appointment and by this time the petitioner had attained the age of 18 years. The petitioner passed Class-X examination in the year 1985, Class- XII examination in the year 1987, and passed his Bachelor of Arts in the year 1989. In the year 1993, the petitioner was issued the College Leaving Certificate. As per Class-X certificate, the date of birth of the petitioner is 05.12.1969.
5. The writ petitioner continued to work and on 8/9.06.2016, the petitioner was issued a show cause as contained in Annexure-4 to which the petitioner responded and ultimately charge-sheet dated 1/2.02.2017 as contained in Annexure-5 was issued to the petitioner wherein two allegations were made against the petitioner; (i) the deed of adoption as son by Shri Rameshwar Singh was signed on 25.01.1985 and on that date the petitioner had already crossed the legal age (fifteen years) 3 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB for valid adoption, which makes the writ petitioner's adoption void as per Clause 10(iv) of the Adoption Act 1956; (b) The educational certificates obtained by the petitioner in the year 1987, 1989 and 1993 after the adoption bears the name of the biological father of the petitioner, namely, Ram Lakhan Singh.
6. With these allegations, it was alleged that the available records established that the petitioner cheated the company and managed to get employment in CCL through an invalid and pseudo-adoption deed. The petitioner responded to the same vide Annexure-6 dated 09.02.2017 and denied the charges.
7. The show cause reply has been submitted wherein, the reason for maintaining the name of the biological father in the certificates of educational qualification has been given in the show cause reply by stating that the petitioner was registered for appearing in Class-X before the date of adoption and as such the name of biological father appeared in his certificates.
8. The plea of the petitioner was not accepted by the inquiry officer and the inquiry officer recorded a finding that the petitioner continued to maintain dual identity as son of his biological father also. The authorities have recorded that any adoption made in contravention of the provision of the Adoption Act is null and void ab initio and that the petitioner could not prove any custom or usage applicable to him that permitted adoption beyond 15 years of age. Thereafter, 2nd show cause 4 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB notice was issued to the petitioner and ultimately the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order of dismissal of the writ petitioner.
9. The writ petitioner, being aggrieved with the aforesaid order of dismissal, has preferred a writ application being W.P.(S) No.177 of 2023 challenging the order of dismissal. The learned Single Judge, after taking into consideration aforesaid aspects of the matter, has allowed the writ petition by quashing and setting aside the impugned order of dismissal, against which, the instant appeal has been preferred. Arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant-CCL
10. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel for the appellant has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge that: -
(i) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact that the claim which has been made on the basis of the adoption deed dated 25.01.1985, which cannot be treated to be valid and on consideration of the aforesaid aspect of the matter, the departmental proceeding has been initiated in which the charge pertaining to validity of the adoption deed has been answered against the respondent/writ petitioner. The said part of the finding recorded by the inquiry officer has not been taken into consideration in right perspective, rather, the writ petition has been allowed 5 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB with a direction to appoint the writ petitioner on based upon the adoption deed.
(ii) The writ petitioner has been given ample opportunity to defend his case before the inquiry officer but the inquiry officer has found the charge proved which has been accepted by the disciplinary authority and based upon that the order of punishment of dismissal from service has been passed.
(iii) The learned Single Judge has not appreciated the fact about jurisdiction conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by way of exercising the power of judicial review which mandates the least interference in the decision taken by the administrative disciplinary authority.
(iv) The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact that the writ petitioner even after his adoption by the adoptive father, namely, Sri Rameshwar Singh, the former employee, has taken care of his own mother which suggests that he cannot be said to be actual adopted son of the adoptive father, the former employee (now deceased).
(v) The learned Single Judge has also not appreciated the fact that the said adoption deed has solely been created for the purpose of getting appointment on the medical unfitness ground of the deceased employee. 6 LPA No.504/2024
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(vi) Learned counsel for the appellants, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned passed by the learned Single Judge therefore suffers from an error, hence, it is fit to be set aside. Arguments of the learned counsel for the Respondent
11. Per Contra, Mr. Atanu Banerjee, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-writ petitioner has defended the impugned judgment by taking the following grounds: -
(i) The learned Single Judge, while allowing the writ petition has not committed any error, reason being that, the appointment was made sometime in the year, 1989, based upon the adoption deed dated 25.01.1985. The said appointment was made after being satisfied in all corner by verifying the documents. The writ petitioner was allowed to continue in service for about more than 30 years and all of a sudden, sometime in the year, 2017 the departmental proceeding has been initiated for the purpose of initiating disciplinary proceeding as to why the writ petitioner be not dispensed with the service since the service has been obtained on the basis of invalid adoption deed.
(ii) The contention has been raised that the said adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985 and hence, questioning the validity of the said deed after lapse of more than 30 years is per-se illegal.7 LPA No.504/2024
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(iii) The learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the aforesaid aspects of the matter and hence interfered with the impugned order of dismissal from service.
(vi) Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that if in these pretexts, the learned Single Judge since has passed the impugned judgment, the same requires no interference and accordingly, the present appeal is fit to be dismissed.
Analysis
12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order as also gone through the pleadings made on their behalf.
13. The admitted facts in the present case are that the writ petitioner was adopted by the former employee by virtue of adoption deed dated 25.01.1985. The recital of said deed speaks that prior to execution of the said adoption deed under the Registration Act, the adoption process had been conducted by way of ceremony and thereafter, the legal shape has been given by virtue of the adoption deed dated 25.01.1985 by the adoptive father and the biological father.
14. The writ petitioner has claimed appointment on the medical unfitness ground of his adoptive father on the basis of 8 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB adoption deed dated 25.01.1985. All the other relevant documents including the documents pertaining to birth certificate has been submitted before the appointing authority. The writ petitioner was appointed under the provision of clause- 9.4.2. of the National Coal Wage Agreement (in short 'N.C.W.A.') which provides that on the ground of medical unfitness of the employee, the service is to be provided to the dependent of the medically unfit employee, for ready reference, clause-9.4.2 of the N.C.W.A. is being quoted as under: -
"९.४.२ सेवा अवधि में मरने वाले श्रममकों के एक आधश्रत को नौकरी:
(१) इसके लिये आश्रितों की िेणी में fuEufyf[kr आवेंगे :-
पत्नी/पतत जो भी हो, अवववाहहत पुत्री, पुत्र तथा कानूनी दत्तक पुत्र । यहद नौकरी के लिये उपरोक्त आश्रित उपिब्ध नहीीं हो तो मत ृ क का छोटा भाई, ववधवा पुत्री/ववधवा पुत्र-वधू अथवा दामाद जो मत ृ क के साथ रहता आ रहा हो तथा उसी की आमदनी पर पूणरू ण पेण परवररश के लिये आश्रित हो, तो उन्हें मत ृ क के आश्रित के रूप में ववचार ककया जा सकता है।
(२) जो शारीररक रूप से दक्ष हो तथा ३५ वर्ण से अश्रधक का नहीीं हो वैसे आश्रित को काम दे ने का ववचार ककया जायगा । आश्रित में पत्नी अथवा पतत होने से उम्र सीमा की कोई पाबन्दी नहीीं रहे गी।"
15. The appellant-CCL, on consideration of all the relevant documents, has provided appointment in favour of the respondent-writ petitioner on 03.05.1989. The respondent-writ petitioner has started discharging his duty without any complaint from any quarter. He has been allowed to continue in 9 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB service for about more than 30 years but all of a sudden, a memorandum of charge has been issued against the writ petitioner making the irregularities by inflicting the following charges, which reads as under: -
"CHARGE SHEET After Shri Rameshwar Singh, Security Guard, Kalyani Project, Dhori Area, CCL was declared medically unfit, you as his adopted son applied and were appointed in the year 1989 in CCL as a Typing Trainee, Cat. I under the provisions of clause 9.4.2. of National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA). On scrutiny of the records, it is seen that: -
i) The deed of your adoption as son by Shri Rameshwar Singh was signed on 25.01.1985 and on this date you had already crossed the legal age (fifteen years) for valid adoption, which makes your adoption void as per Clause 10 (iv) of the Adoption Act 1956.
ii) The educational certificates obtained by you in 1987, 1989 and 1993, after the adoption bears the name of your biological father, Shri Ram Lakhan Singh.
The available records establish that you cheated the company and managed to get employment in CCL through invalid and pseudo adoption deed. Hence the Charge:
The above omissions and commissions on your part, if proved, would tantamount to misconduct in terms of Clause 26.22, 26.41 of the certified standing order of CCL as applicable to you. The details of which are as follows: -
26.22: Any wilful and deliberate act which is subversive of discipline or which may be detrimental to the interest of the company. 26.41: Violation of any clause of this standing order.
You are, therefore directed to submit your explanation in writing within a week of receipt hereof stating as to why appropriate disciplinary action should not be taken against you for the aforesaid misconducts.
Should you fail to submit your explanation within the time stipulated above, it will be presumed that you have no explanation to offer in your defence and thereafter the Management will 10 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB initiate further appropriate action as it may deem fit without any further reference to you.
Receipt of this charge-sheet should be acknowledged."
16. The writ petitioner was asked to participate in the inquiry proceeding before the duly appointed inquiry officer. He has put his defence by negating the charge as has been alleged against the writ petitioner as per memorandum of charge by taking the ground that adoption deed cannot be said to be invalid and appointment has been made on the basis of the adoption deed.
17. It has also been contended that the issue of age, i.e., more than 15 years is also not fit to be accepted, although, the adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985 but as would be evident from its recital, the ceremony of adoption had already taken placed, which would be evident from the relevant part of the recital, which is being referred hereinbelow: -
"नाम मोकिर :- श्री रामेश्वर क िंह वल्द श्री राम कि ुन क िंह स्वर्गवा िौम ब्रह्मन भुकमहार ाकिन ग्राम जैतपुर थाना ह पुरा कजला औरिं र्ाबाद पे ा िास्तिारी वो नौिरी।
नाम मोकिरअलेहः - श्री ूरेश िुमार क िंह पे र नावालीर् श्री ररामलखन क िंह बव लायत वो र्ार जीपन श्री राम लखन क िंह कपता िायम िौम ब्रह्मन भुकमहार कनवा ग्राम जैतपुर थाना ह पुरा प्रर्ना अनछा कजला औरे र्ाबाद ऐ ा िास्तािरी।
ि ीम वीिा :- र्ोदनामा
तायदाद मालीयत :-
रायत े र्ोदनामा :-
यह िे मन मोकिन िी स्त्री िो स्वर्गवा िर र्यी वो उम्र िरीब 48 ाल िा होरहा है वो आज ति अपना तन े िोई औलाद लड़िा, पोता इया परपोता नहीिं है वो नहीिं आईन्दा िोई उमीद है हाला िे कि ी प्रिार िा कबमारी मान ीि इया शारीरीि नहीिं है किन्तु अपना आईन्दा कजवन वो 11 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB आिवद िो बनाने िे बारे में हमेशा ोचा िरते हैं वो आईन्दा धाकमगि िंस्कार वो आत्मा िे शान्तन्त बनाने वास्ते पीिंड दानि बारे में अपना कनजी पुत्र िा होना जरुरी है इ बात िो अपना होदर भाई राम लखन क िंह तथा उनिे पत्नी अपनी भौजाई े लाह किया कि अपना बड़ा लड़िा याने मोकिर अलेह िो मुझे र्ोद िे रुप में दे दीजये कि हमरा भी अिवद बन जाये इ बात िो दोनोिं माता वो कपता मोकिर अलेह िे िबुल वो मिंजुर किये।
यह िे मान मोकिर वहालात ेहत जात वो वाल अिल वदु रुस्तर्ी हो वो हवा बोला डराने वो धमिाने वो फु लाने वोदने दावा नाजायज कि ी र्ैर िे अपना नफा व नुि ान िो बखूबी मझ वो बुझिर खु ी वो राजी िे ाथ मोकिर अलेह िो र्ोद लीया वो अपना पुत्र बनाया वो र्ोदनामा लीखने िो आये।
यह िे मोकिरअलेह िे अलावो और कि ी दू रे लड़िे िो आज ति र्ोद नहीिं लीया हूँ।
यह िे मोकिर अलेह हम ा मन मोकिर िे फरमावरदारी वो ेवा टहल में लर्े रहते हैं वो उकमद है हि आईन्दा भी इ ी तरह े ेवा टहल तथा वाद मरने िे दाह िंस्कार, श्राद्ध इया पीिंडदान िर दें र्ें वो अकधिारी होिंर्ें चुिे कबना इ िायग िे हुये कहन्दु शास्त्र िे मुताबीि आत्मा िी शािंन्तन्त नहीिं मीलती है। यह ोच कवचार िर धाकमगि िंस्कार रुप े र्ोद िा िायग पहले ही हो चुिा है इ में कि ी प्रिार िा नहीिं है चुिे इ बात िो बहुत े लोिंर्ोिं िो जानिारी है।
यह िे मोकिर अलेह िा उम्र िरीब 14 ाल िा है किन्तु अभी ति अकववाहीत तथा कबना जर्ो पवीत िा हूँ ता हम मोकिर अलेह िे माता कपता ने धाकमगि िंस्कार द्वारा अपनी अपनी राजी खु ी े अपने लड़िे िो र्ोद में कदये वो इ िायग िो िबुल मिंजुरी किये। वाज रहे िे मोकिर वो मोकिर अलेह िे कपता आप में होदर भाई हैं तथा एि ही जाती िे हैं कि ी दू रे द्वारा र्ोद नहीिं लीया जा रहा है।
यह िे र्ोदनामा िा अ र धाकमगि िंस्कार द्वारा र्ोद लेने िे कदन े ही है।
यह िे अब र्ोद िंस्कार धाकमगि रुप े म्पन्न हो जाने िे बाद मोकिर अलेह मन मोकिर िा खा लड़िा हो चुिा वो उनिे िुल म्पती चल अचल जो हा ील है इया आइन्दा हा ील होर्ा। वह िुल म्पकत वजीन ाहु कपता िे मोकिर अलेह िो हुवा तथा उनिे मरने िे बाद पुत्र िे ऐ ा अकधिार हा ील हुवा वो रहेर्ा वो बाद मरने मनमोकिर उनिा दाह िंस्कार श्राद्ध वो कपिंडदान िा अकधिारी मोकिर अलेह िा हुवा वो जब मन िोकिर अपना नौिरी े रीटायर िर जायेंर्ें तो उ स्थान पर मोकिर अलेह िो पुरा अकधिार प्राप्त है िे वजीन ाहु पुत्र िे मुताबीि बहाल होिर िाम िरें । वो मोकिर अलेह मन मोकिर िे पुत्र िे नाम े पुिारा जायेर्ा। वे कहन्दु मीटाि रा िानुन िे अनु ार मोिर जायदाद में मोकिर आलेह िा हि हाक ल हुआ।
इ वास्ते यह र्ोदनामा ाथ नेि कनयती िे कलख दीया िे मय पर िाम आवे।
आज तारीख 25-01-1985 ई०"
18. Hence, the ground has been taken that the adoption deed 12 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB cannot be said to be invalid and since the appointment has been made on the basis of said adoption deed, hence, there is no mis-representation or suppression of new fact, rather, he has been provided appointment on the basis of all disclosure of certificates during the time of appointment but the inquiry officer has found the charge proved and forwarded it to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has inflicted the punishment for dismissal from service.
19. The writ petitioner has approached to this Court by filing writ petition being W.P.(S) No.177 of 2023 challenging the order of dismissal from service.
20. The learned Single Judge, on consideration of the adoption deed, its veracity and other documents as also the decision of the dismissal, being taken after lapse of more than 30 years, has interfered with the impugned order of dismissal from service and directed the writ petitioner to be reinstated in service, which is the subject matter of the present appeal.
21. This Court, before appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties, is of the view that since the case is totally based upon the issue as has been taken by raising the issue of validity of adoption deed, therefore, thought it proper to refer the certain provisions bearing in the said issue as provided under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, for ready reference, Sections 7, 10 & 16 of the Act, 1956 are being 13 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB referred as under:-
"7. Capacity of a male Hindu to take in adoption. ―Any male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to takes on or a daughter in adoption:
Provided that, if he has a wife living, he shall not adopt except with the consent of his wife unless the wife has completely and finally renounced the word or has ceased to be a Hindu or has been declared by a court of competent jurisdiction to be of unsound mind.
Explanation.―If a person has more than one wife living at the time of adoption, the consent of all the wives is necessary unless the consent of any one of them is unnecessary for any of the reasons specified in the preceding proviso.
10. Persons who may be adopted.―No person shall be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely:―
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption.
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16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.―Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved."
22. It is evident from the provision of Section 16 of the Act, 1956 that the presumption under the law is that once the adoption deed has been signed by the nature of guardian of adopted son as well as other persons, it is to be treated to be valid, subject to conditions as stipulated under Section 10(i),
(ii), (iii) & (iv).
23. The issue of validity of the adoption deed based upon the presumption of law as provided under Section 16 has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bijendra and Anr. Vrs. Ramesh Chand and Ors., reported in (2016) 12 SCC 483, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court while taking into consideration the ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, (2013) 4 SCC 97 has observed as under: -
"7. The High Court while construing the said adoption deed has taken the view that the persons who had given the appellant-15 LPA No.504/2024
2025:JHHC:20125-DB defendant in adoption to Nanuwa had not signed the adoption deed as executants thereof and had appended their signatures thereto as attesting witnesses. The said finding of fact does not appear to be correct on a perusal of the copy of the adoption deed which is on record. We have noticed from a perusal of the adoption deed that apart from the natural guardians of the appellant-defendant who had given the appellant-defendant in adoption to Nanuwa there were other persons who had signed the deed. Even otherwise, the view taken by the High Court with regard to the deed in question and the provisions of Section 16 of the Act appears to be contrary to what has been said by this Court in Laxmibai v. Bhagwantbuva, (2013) 4 SCC 97, particularly what has been recorded in paras 31 and 34 of the Report which may be reproduced as under: (SCC pp.
111 & 112) "31. Mere technicalities therefore, cannot defeat the purpose of adoption, particularly when the respondent-defendants have not made any attempt to disprove the said document.
No reference was ever made either by them, or by their witnesses, to this document i.e. registered adoption deed.
Undoubtedly, the natural parents had signed along with 7 witnesses and not at the place where the executants could sign. But it is not a case where there were no witnesses except the executants. Instead of two witnesses, seven attesting witnesses put their signatures.
***
34. The trial court in this regard has held that the fact that 16 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB the natural parents of the adoptive child had signed along with seven other witnesses as attestants to the deed, and not as its executors, would not create any doubt regarding the validity of the adoption, or render the said registered document invalid, as they possessed sufficient knowledge with regard to the nature of the document that they were executing, and that additionally, no challenge was made to the registration of the document, immediately after its execution. The first appellate court took note of the deposition of Shri Vasant Bhagwantrao Pandav (PW 1), who had deposed that the adoption deed had been scribed, and that the signatures of the parties and witnesses to the deed had been taken on the same, only after the contents of the said documents had been read over to Smt Laxmibai, the adoptive mother, and then to all parties present, Smt Laxmibai, appellant-plaintiff was in good health, both physically and mentally, at the time of the adoption. The validity of the adoption deed, however, was being challenged on the basis of the mere technicality, that only interested witnesses had been examined and the court finally rejected the authenticity of the said document, observing that witnesses who wanted to give weight to their own case, could not be relied upon."
24. It is evident from the quoted part of the aforesaid paragraphs as referred hereinabove that mere technicalities therefore, cannot defeat the purpose of adoption, particularly when the respondent-defendants have not made any attempt to disprove the said document. No reference was ever made either 17 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB by them, or by their witnesses, to this document i.e. registered adoption deed. Undoubtedly, the natural parents had signed along with 7 witnesses and not at the place where the executants could sign. But it is not a case where there were no witnesses except the executants. Thus, subject to compliance of the condition of signature having been there in the adoption deed or the biological father and the person who is to adopt, the presumption under the law in view of the provision of Section 16 would be that the adoption deed is valid.
25. Further, the presumption of validity is there under the statutory command as provided under Section 16 of the Act, 1956 and as such, the issue of validity if it is being doubted by a party, the onus is upon the said party to question the adoption deed by filing the suit before the competent court of civil jurisdiction.
26. The aforesaid requirement is mandatory to have the declaration by the competent court of civil jurisdiction for the purpose of giving declaration of invalidity of the adoption deed so as to the competent court of civil jurisdiction may arrive to the conclusion on appreciation of the evidence which will be led by the parties.
27. This Court has also considered the issue of validity of the aforesaid adoption deed on the touchstone of the provision of Section 90 of the Evidence Act wherein, the other presumption 18 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB is there that if the document is more than 30 years old then the presumption would be the validity of the said document.
28. Here, the reference of Section 90 of the Evidence Act is required, since, it is the admitted case of the appellants, CCL that the adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985 but the issue of invalidity has been raised after lapse of more than 30 years.
29. Further, Schedule 57 of the Limitation Act is also required to be referred herein which provides the period of limitation of three years to obtain a declaration that an alleged adoption is invalid, or never, in fact, took place.
30. Further as per schedule 56 of the Limitation Act the period of limitation is of three years to declare the forgery of an instrument issued or registered from the date when the issue or registration becomes known to the plaintiff.
31. Further, the issue of validity cannot be allowed to be arrived at by the executing authority or by the quasi-judicial functionary, rather, it is under the exclusive domain of the competent court of civil jurisdiction so as to come to the issue of validity/invalidity of the deed on the basis of the evidence which will be laid by the parties concerned.
32. It needs to refer herein that the giving and receiving are absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption. They are the operative part of the ceremony, being that part of it which transfers the boy from one family to another but the Hindu Law 19 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB does not require that there shall be any particular form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned. For a valid adoption all that the law requires is that the natural father shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption, and that the boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose, reference in this regard may be made to the Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677. For ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
"8. That is also the view expressed in Mayne's Hindu Law wherein it is observed that the giving and receiving are absolutely necessary to the validity of an adoption; they are the operative part of the ceremony, being that part of it which transfers the boy from one family to another; but the Hindu Law does not require that there shall be any particular form so far as giving and acceptance are concerned;
for a valid adoption all that the law requires is that the natural father shall be asked by the adoptive parent to give his son in adoption, and that the boy shall be handed over and taken for this purpose."
33. The words in Section 11 (vi) of the Act 1956 "with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth to the family of its adoption" are merely indicative of the result of actual giving and taking by the parents and guardians concerned. Where an 20 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB adoption ceremony is gone through and the giving and taking takes place there cannot be any other intention. The very ceremony of giving and taking is in itself symbolic of transplanting the adopted son from the family of his birth to the adoptive family, reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kartar Singh v. Surjan Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 559.
34. Further, as discussed hereinabove that under Section 16 of the Act, 1956 presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption has been stipulated wherein it has been stated that whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.
35. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Kamla Rani v. Ram Lalit Rai, (2018) 9 SCC 663 has observed that though the factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly proved and formal ceremony of giving and taking is an essential ingredient for a valid adoption, long duration of time during which a person is treated as adopted cannot be ignored and by itself may in the circumstances carry a presumption in favour 21 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB of adoption. The relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
"6. We cannot lose sight of the principle that though the factum of adoption and its validity has to be duly proved and formal ceremony of giving and taking is an essential ingredient for a valid adoption, long duration of time during which a person is treated as adopted cannot be ignored and by itself may in the circumstances carry a presumption in favour of adoption. In this regard, we may refer to the observations of this Court in L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi [L. Debi Prasad v. Tribeni Devi, (1970) 1 SCC 677] : (SCC pp. 681-82, para 9) "9. There is no doubt that the burden of proving satisfactorily that he was given by his natural father and received by Gopal Das as his adoptive son is on Shyam Behari Lal. But as observed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Rajendro Nath Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee [Rajendro Nath Holdar v. Jogendro Nath Banerjee, 1871 SCC OnLine PC 11 : (1871-72) 14 Moo IA 67] ; that although the person who pleads that he had been adopted is bound to prove his title as adopted son, as a fact yet from the long period during which he had been received as an adopted son, every allowance for the absence of evidence to prove such fact was to be favourably entertained, and that the case was analogous to that in which the legitimacy of a person in possession had been acquiesced in for a considerable time, and afterwards impeached by a party, who had a right to question the legitimacy, where the defendant, in order to defend his status, is allowed to invoke against the claimant every presumption which arises from long recognition of his legitimacy by members of his family; that in the case 22 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB of a Hindu, long recognition as an adopted son, raised even a stronger presumption in favour of the validity of his adoption, arising from the possibility of the loss of his rights in his own family by being adopted in another family. In Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi [Rup Narain v. Gopal Devi, 1909 SCC OnLine PC 3 : (1908-09) 36 IA 103] the Judicial Committee observed that in the absence of direct evidence much value has to be attached to the fact that the alleged adopted son had without controversy succeeded to his adoptive father's estate and enjoyed till his death and that documents during his life and after his death were framed upon the basis of the adoption. A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court in Balinki Padhano v. Gopakrishna Padhano [Balinki Padhano v. Gopakrishna Padhano, 1963 SCC OnLine Ori 33 : AIR 1964 Ori 117] ; held that in the case of an ancient adoption evidence showing that the boy was treated for a long time as the adopted son at a time when there was no controversy is sufficient to prove the adoption although evidence of actual giving and taking is not forthcoming. We are in agreement with the views expressed in the decisions referred to above."
36. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, admittedly herein, the adoption deed is dated 25.01.1985. It is evident from the recital of the adoption deed that there is reference of ceremony took place prior to execution of the adoption deed, the relevant paragraph of the said recital has already been referred hereinabove.
37. The ceremony of adoption was held prior to execution of the adoption deed and it is also evident from the adoption deed 23 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB that effect of adoption has been from the date of adoption itself.
38. The law is well settled that if any agreement has been arrived at in between the parties for sale or an agreement for adoption also and subsequent thereto, if the deed is being executed under the Indian Registration Act, then the subject matter of the registered deed will date back to the date of agreement in between the parties.
39. It needs to refer herein that as under Section 16 of the Act 1956, whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the persons mentioned therein, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the said Act unless and until it is disproved and if anyone want to disprove it then In view of Section 16 of the Act 1956 it is open to him to disprove such deed of adoption but for that he has to take independent proceeding, reference in this regard be made to the Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Deu v. Laxmi Narayan, (1998) 8 SCC 701. For ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
"3. In view of Section 16 aforesaid whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the persons mentioned therein, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with 24 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB the provisions of the said Act unless and until it is disproved. According to us, it was not open to the defendants of the said suit for partition to collaterally challenge the said registered deed of partition. In view of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act it was open to them to disprove such deed of adoption but for that they had to take independent proceeding. The High Court was fully justified in directing that the respondent be substituted in place of Smt Phulla on the basis of the registered deed of adoption produced before the court."
40. It is also evident from the deed of adoption that the same has been made in between the biological father, namely, Ramlakhan Singh and the adoptive father, namely, Rameshwar Singh (now deceased) in presence of the witnesses, as would be evident from the face of the said registered deed, appended as Annexure-1 to the paper book.
41. Therefore, the requirement which is to be there for the purpose of presumption of the deed to be valid as required to be there under Section 10 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 is available herein, i.e., the adoption deed is in between the adoptive father and the biological father made in presence of the witnesses, hence, the principle of presumption of the deed to be valid is being attracted herein.
42. The ground has been taken by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the applicability of Section 10 of the Act, 1956, for ready reference the Section 10 of the Act, 1956 is being reiterated as under:
"10. Persons who may be adopted.--No person shall 25 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB be capable of being taken in adoption unless the following conditions are fulfilled, namely--
(i) he or she is a Hindu;
(ii) he or she has not already been adopted;
(iii) he or she has not been married, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who are married being taken in adoption;
(iv) he or she has not completed the age of fifteen years, unless there is a custom or usage applicable to the parties which permits persons who have completed the age of fifteen years being taken in adoption."
43. We, on consideration of the aforesaid issue, have found that the law provides that there cannot be any adoption beyond/above the age of 15 years as provided under Section 10 of the Act, 1956.
44. But, this Court after going through the recital wherein, the specific reference has been made of the adoption ceremony taken place prior to execution of the deed with the further recital that the adoption will be from the date of adoption itself.
45. Therefore, the applicability of Section 10 of the Act, 1956 in view of the recital having been there in the adoption deed of the adoption ceremony which is beyond the age of 15 years of the writ petitioner, hence, it is not a case where Section 10 of the Act 1956 is applicable.
46. The writ petitioner, after getting the appointment on the basis of said adoption deed, based upon the scrutiny of all relevant documents way back on the date of appointment, had 26 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB been done by the appellants-CCL. The writ petitioner, thereafter, was provided appointment. The writ petitioner started discharging his duty and after completion of service of more than 30 years, the doubt has been created by the appellants-CCL regarding the issue of validity of the adoption deed after lapse of 30 years.
47. The Evidence Act provides a provision under Section 90 thereof that a document if is more than 30 years old, there will be presumption in the law of validity of the said document. No such declaration can even be taken by filing a suit due to the period of limitation as provided under Schedule 57 of the Limitation Act.
48. It is also settled position of law that a document which is to be declared to be valid or invalid is exclusive domain of the competent court of civil jurisdiction and as such, it is not available for the quasi-judicial authority while discharging his duty as an inquiry officer in the departmental proceeding to give a finding by holding that the adoption deed is invalid as has been given by the inquiry officer in the present case.
49. The inquiry officer can only give a finding regarding genuineness of the document or commission of element of fraud but he has got no authority to hold a deed created by way of instrument under the statutory provision herein under the Indian Registration Act, 1908 to come out with a finding of 27 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB invalidity of the said instrument created under the statutory provision, rather, the same is only to be assessed by the competent court of civil jurisdiction by giving a finding to that effect by way of declaration.
50. The appellants-CCL since is raising the doubt about the issue of invalidity of the adoption deed and as such, it is onus upon the appellants-CCL to get a declaration to that effect by filing a suit before the competent court of civil jurisdiction but of course not after lapse of the period of 30 years in view of the issue of limitation as provided under schedule item 57 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
51. This Court, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove, is of the view that the issue which has been formulated hereinabove is being answered.
52. This Court, after having answered the issue, has gone through the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge and found therefrom that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration of jurisdiction of the inquiry officer to come out with the finding by holding the adoption deed to be invalid and the same led to interfere with the impugned order.
53. The learned Single Judge has also considered the issue of applicability of the provision of Section 10 of the Act, 1956.
54. The learned Single Judge has come out with the finding that since it has been referred in recital of the adoption 28 LPA No.504/2024 2025:JHHC:20125-DB ceremony having been taken place prior to date of execution of deed when he was age of less than 15 years, hence, the plea of applicability of Section 10 of the Act, 1956 has been negated.
55. The learned Single Judge has also taken into consideration by taking the adverse view due to non-production of the appointment file, due to which, serious prejudice has been said to be caused to the appellant.
56. This Court, based upon the aforesaid consideration and based upon the discussion made by this Court, is of the view that the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge requires no interference.
57. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is, dismissed.
58. In consequent to dismissal of the instant appeal, pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.) I agree (Rajesh Kumar, J.) (Rajesh Kumar, J.) Rohit/-A.F.R. 29 LPA No.504/2024