Gujarat High Court
Taraben D/O Nanubhai vs Shaileshbhai Rangilbhai on 26 February, 2013
Author: Rajesh H.Shukla
Bench: Rajesh H.Shukla
TARABEN D/O NANUBHAI KASANBHAI PATEL AND W/O NAVINKUMAR PATEV/SSHAILESHBHAI RANGILBHAI PATEL C/AO/199/2012 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 199 of 2012 With CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6470 of 2012 With APPEAL FROM ORDER NO. 200 of 2012 With CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 6471 of 2012 FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE RAJESH H.SHUKLA ================================================================ 1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? 3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? 4 Whether this case involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order made thereunder ? 5 Whether it is to be circulated to the civil judge ? ================================================================ TARABEN D/O NANUBHAI KASANBHAI PATEL AND W/O NAVINKUMAR PATE & 1....Appellant(s) Versus SHAILESHBHAI RANGILBHAI PATEL & 4....Respondent(s) ================================================================ Appearance: APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 199 of 2012 with CIVIL APPLICATION No. 6470 of 2012 MR AJ PATEL, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) No. 1 - 2 MR SN SOPARKAR, SR. ADVOCATE, with MR ASPI M KAPADIA, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 1 3 MR MIHIR THAKORE, SR. ADVOCATE, WITH MR AB MUNSHI, ADVOCATE for the Respondent(s) No. 4 - 5 APPEAL FROM ORDER No. 200 of 2012 with CIVIL APPLICATION No. 6471 of 2012 MR MIHIR THAKORE, SR. ADVOCATE, with MR AB MUNSHI, ADVOCATE for the Appellant(s) 1-2 MR BOMI SHETHNA for Respondent(s) 1-3 MR AJ PATEL for Respondent(s) 4-5 ================================================================ CORAM: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE RAJESH H.SHUKLA Date : 26/02/2013 ORAL JUDGMENT
Appeal from Order No. 199 of 2012 with Civil Application No. 6470 of 2012 has been filed by the appellants-original defendants Nos. 3-4 being aggrieved with the impugned order passed below Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 288/2011 by the 5th Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Surat, dated 2.3.2012 on the grounds stated in the said Appeal from Order.
2. Appeal from Order No. 200 of 2012 with Civil Application No. 6471 of 2012 has been filed by the appellants-original defendants Nos. 1-2 being aggrieved by the impugned order passed below Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 288/2011 by the 5th Addl. Sr. Civil Judge, Surat, dated 2.3.2012 on the grounds stated in the said Appeal from Order.
3. Before recording the rival submissions, a brief background of the facts is required to be stated that the aforesaid Special Civil Suit No. 288/2011 came to be filed by the plaintiffs against original defendants Nos.1-2, the appellants in Appeal from Order No. 200 of 2012, and against original defendants Nos. 3 & 4 who are the the appellants in Appeal from Order No. 199 of 2012, for specific performance of the writing/banachitti dated 18.11.2010 on the grounds set out in the Appeal from Orders. The said writing/banachitti is stated to have been executed pursuant to an oral understanding or an agreement between the parties for sale of land in question situated at Surat.
4. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore appearing with learned advocate Shri AB Munshi appearing for the appellants in Appeal from Order No. 200 of 2012 has stated that there is no agreement to sell entered into by and between the parties for which a specific performance of the contract can be claimed Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that the property in question has been a joint property of one Balubhai Kasanji and Nanubhai Kasanji in the year 1986. Nanubhai expired and respondent No. 1 is the widow of Nanubhai. He submitted that as per the agreement of samyik the two daughters consented. Nanubhai expired in 1994 and on his death the share in the property would go as per the devolution in favour of Dhanuben, Nareshbhai and the two daughters. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that in any case the two daughters will have a share in the joint family property and the so-called agreement or sodachitti dated 18.11.2010 (mark 3/10) produced at p. 43 and 44 cannot be said to be a valid agreement inasmuch as the two daughters have not signed having interest in the property. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore further submitted that a close look at the said agreement/writing/banachitti dated 18.11.2010 would make it clear that it has been signed by only two persons and it does not bear the signature of the sisters or it is not stated that the mother Dhanuben has signed as the power-of-attorney holder of the sisters, defendants Nos. 3-4. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore also submitted that there is a sodachitti produced on record which clearly suggests that only two persons have signed (mother and son) and it does not bear the signature of the sisters who were having a share in the property.
5. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that the sequence of events which have taken place are also required to be considered. He submitted that on 12.11.2011 a public notice (Mark 3/12) has been issued and a criminal complaint has been filed which is produced at Mark 3/13. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that the attitude or the conduct of the party is required to be noted. He emphasised and submitted that Rs. 40 crores are required to be paid. Again he referred to the public notice (mark 3/22) and submitted that what was provided was that 10% was to be paid by 10.2.2011, whereas only 1% was paid. He submitted that still the suit is not filed till June, 2011. He emphasised and submitted that the bona fides of the appellants-plaintiffs to show that they were ready and willing to perform their part of the obligations is required to be considered. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that though the power-of-attorney is issued by the sisters in favour of the mother, the alleged banakhat/writing is not signed by the sisters themselves, defendants Nos. 3-4, nor it is stated by defendant No. 1 mother that she has signed as power-of-attorney holder of defendants Nos. 3-4 (sisters).
6. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that by such conduct and lip service, the plaintiffs are not entitled for any injunction.
7. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore also submitted that a broad understanding arrived at between the parties cannot be termed as an agreement to sell for which a specific performance can be claimed. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore therefore submitted that no enforceable agreement in law can be said to have been entered into as there are no stipulations made in the writing produced at Mark 3/10, p. 43 &
44. referred to as banachitti.
8. In support of his submissions, he has referred to and relied upon the judgments of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of H.G. Krishna Reddy and Co. v. M.M. Thimmiah and anr., reported in AIR 1983 Madras 169 (para 9,
19), in the case of Punit Beriwala v. Suva Sanyal and anr., reported in AIR 1998 Calcutta 44 (para 17), in the case of Rajni Kumar Mahto v. Smt. Uma Devi Budhia and ors., reported in AIR 2005 JHARKHAND (para 14) and in the case of Dresser Rand S.A. v. M/s. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. And anr., reported in , AIR 2006 SC 871 (para 31, 33).
9. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore also referred to the paper-book of Appeal from Order No. 200 of 2012 for emphasising the stand of the plaintiffs and pointedly emphasised the words, tmam p/itvadIAO wega m5I krI Aapxe
10. Therefore, it was a contingent contract which cannot be specifically enforced. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that a contact which is dependent upon an event or consent of the party cannot be said to be an agreement, but it is a contingent contract. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore submitted that as per sec. 31 of the Contract Act contingent contract cannot be enforced as it is dependent upon a future event. In the facts and circumstances, the future event was the consent of the sisters based on which a formal agreement was required to be executed and therefore this writing/banachitti cannot be said to be a concluded contract which can be specifically enforced.
11. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar appearing with learned advocate Shri AM Kapadia on caveat for respondents Nos. 1-3 original plaintiffs submitted that the court may consider the changed stand adopted by the appellants-original defendants from time to time. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar submitted that initially they had raised an issue with regard to the power-of-attorney under the impression that it may not be possible for the defendants to establish that mother, defendant No. 1, had the power-of-attorney of the sisters. When it has been pointed out, now a contention is raised that the alleged banakhat/writing is not signed by defendant No. 1-mother as power-of-attorney holder of the two sisters. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar submitted that once the sisters have given the power-of-attorney and the power-of-attorney holder has signed the document, it implies that the document is signed for herself as well as for the two sisters as a power-of-attorney holder. He submitted that merely because it is not stated would not make much difference and the events which have been referred to clearly suggest that it was an oral understanding which was reduced to writing in the form of banachitti/banakhat dated 18.11.2010 which contains all the necessary particulars and details. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar therefore submitted that it is not open for the appellants to challenge the writing/banachitti dated 18.11.2010 on the ground that it is merely an understanding or any intention to enter into a banakhat and it is not a banakhat in itself. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar submitted that merely because a formal banakhat with all terms and conditions stipulated in detail is not executed would not make much difference when the banachitti/banakhat/writing executed dated 18.11.2010 contains all particulars, namely, the consideration, the property as well as the signatures and therefore it can be said that the parties are ad idem.
12. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar submitted that the submission that merely a writing or intention or desire to enter into an agreement/contract cannot be specifically enforced is one thing and on the basis of oral understanding when it has been culminated into a writing/banachitti dated 18.11.2010 is a different thing and it is an agreement/contract which can be specifically enforced. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar submitted that as per the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, there is no specific form in which a contract is required to be made and an agreement/contract could be in any form and it has to meet with the requirements for the valid agreement/contract. He submitted that the banachitti dated 18.11.2010 fulfills all the requirements of a valid agreement/contract which could be specifically enforced.
13. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar therefore submitted that in order to get out of the commitment, the first issue has been raised that the daughters have not signed, though they were having share in the property and silence has been kept qua the power-of-attorney. However, when it has been pointed out that respondent No. 1 mother is having the power-of-attorney and has signed, the contention is raised that respondent No. 1 mother has signed for herself and not as a power-of-attorney holder of the daughters. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar, therefore, submitted that whether it was signed for all or not could be a matter of appreciation of evidence and therefore when a plausible view is expressed by the court below, it does not require re-consideration or re-appreciation of the material and evidence.
14. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar, again, referred to the written statements of defendants Nos. 1-2 at p. 17 in Appeal from Order No. 200 of 2012 which is also produced at Exh. 12 and he has also submitted that initially it was contended that there is no power-of-attorney, now it has been shifted that there is a power-of-attorney, but the mother has not signed as a power-of-attorney holder. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar again referred to the document at Mark 17/6 (p. 90) and submitted that there is nothing unusual that the mother may act on the basis of the power-of-attorney since the daughters are in USA and it was desired to sell the property and in fact the adjoining property is sold in this manner.
15. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar, therefore, submitted that in the present Appeal from Order the court is required to consider that on appreciation of evidence and material, whether prima facie case, balance of convenience, etc. is made out and whether the order passed by the court below is erroneous. He submitted that the court may also consider that the appellate court in the present Appeal from Order could upturn a discretionary order even if the other view is possible. He emphasised and submitted that assuming that this court on its own appreciation of material may have a different conclusion, but, if on the basis of the material and evidence, the view taken by the court below is also a plausible view, then it may not be disturbed.
16. In support of his submissions, he has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Wander Ltd. and anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd., reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727. He pointedly referred to the observations made in para 14. He submitted that it has been focused as to when interference is called for and merely because a different view is possible is by itself not sufficient. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar submitted that the parameters for grant of injunction are required to be considered as per O.39 R. 1-2. He referred to O.30 R.1-2 and submitted that in view of the background of the facts hereinabove, the impugned order cannot be said to be erroneous and therefore the present Appeal from Orders may not be entertained. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Julien Educational Trust v. Sourendra Kumar Roy and ors., reported in (2010) 1 SCC 379.
17. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar also referred to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and referred to the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2009 SC 1527 in the case of Aloka Bose v. Parmatma Devi and ors., to support his submission that when the power-of-attorney has been given to mother by original defendants Nos. 3-4 sisters, the contract could be specifically enforced and any such argument raised relying upon the writing/agreement to sell dated 18.11.2010 that it is not an agreement/contract which could be specifically enforced is misconceived. He submitted that when the writing/banakhat dated 18.11.2010 is containing all the material particulars it is sufficient to fall in the definition of agreement which can be specifically enforced and even if there is no formal agreement, it cannot be said that such an agreement is not enforceable. He submitted that it is well accepted that even an oral agreement can be specifically enforced and therefore pursuant to an oral agreement or understanding when the things have been reduced to writing in the form of banachitty dated 18.11.2010, with all material particulars, there is no reason that it could not be specifically enforced. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar has also referred to the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of S. Kaladevi v. V.R. Somasundaram & ors., reported in AIR 2010 SC 1654, and pointedly referred to the observations, The main provision in S. 49 provides that any document which is required to be registered, if not registered, shall not affect any immovable property comprised therein nor such document shall be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property. Proviso, however, would show that an unregistered document affecting immovable property and required by 1908 Act or the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 to be registered may be received as an evidence to the contract in a suit for specific performance or as evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered instrument. By virtue of proviso, therefore, an unregistered sale deed of an immovable property of the value of Rs. 100/- and more could be admitted in evidence as evidence of a contract in a suit for specific performance of the contract. Such an unregistered sale deed can also be admitted in evidence as an evidence of any collateral transaction not required to be effected by registered document. When an unregistered sale deed is tendered in evidence, not as evidence of a completed sale, but as proof of an oral agreement of sale, the deed can be received in evidence making an endorsement that it is received only as evidence of an oral agreement of sale under the proviso to S.
49.
18. He, therefore, submitted that in such a situation where respective claims would be considered on the basis of evidence at the trial and prima facie the trial court having examined the material has granted the injunction, the same may not be disturbed. He submitted that the approach, normally, is to maintain the status-quo to avoid further litigation. In support of his submissions, he has referred to and relied upon the judgments of the Hon ble Apex Court reported in AIR 2005 SC 104. He has also referred to and relied upon the judgment in the case of Ibrahim Shah Mohamad and ors. v. Noor Ahmed Noor Mohamed and ors., reported in 1983(2) GLR 961, and the judgment in the case of Adani Exports Ltd. v. Hindustan Organic Chemicals Ltd., reported in 2000(3) GLR 2759. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar, therefore, submitted that the present Appeal from Orders may not be entertained.
19. Learned counsel Shri AJ Patel appearing for the appellants in Appeal from Order No. 199 of 2012 has submitted that whether the writing/banachitti dated 18.11.2010 can be said to be a valid contract is required to be considered. He submitted that admittedly there is no formal written agreement or a contract with all details as to who will bear the registration fee and the expenses. The agreement is also not registered and therefore as per sec. 49 of the Registration Act, it may not be admissible in evidence. He further submitted that even considering the banachitti dated 18.11.2010 it is silent on some of the relevant aspects that time is not the essence of the contract. It does not say that mother has signed on behalf of the sisters. Learned counsel Shri Patel has therefore submitted that the document has to be read as it is, and assuming that is an agreement, the same is not signed by the sisters themselves, nor the mother has signed as a power-of-attorney holder which is necessary. He therefore submitted that the banachitti dated 18.11.2010 therefore cannot be given the status of a document. Learned counsel Shri Patel submitted that the terms and conditions of the agreement/contract are also not stated and the writing/banachitti is incomplete and therefore it cannot be termed as an agreement or a contract, but it is merely a writing with regard to the intention to enter into a banakhat or agreement to sell.
20. Learned counsel Shri Patel pointedly referred to the recitals and submitted that it has been specifically stated that an agreement to sell shall be entered into and a document shall be executed as per the jantri, meaning thereby, it was agreed to enter into an agreement to sell and execute a sale deed as per the jantri. Learned counsel Shri Patel submitted that is an agreement to enter into an agreement to sell which cannot be enforced. He submitted that mere intention or desire to enter into an agreement to sell would fructify only when it has culminated into a formal agreement to sell which would contain all details and terms and conditions with regard to material aspects. He submitted that who will bear the cost, what would be the value for which the document will be executed etc. is not mentioned and therefore at the most the satachitti/writing could be an agreement to enter into an agreement. He again submitted that it is nowhere clear from the writing/banachitti that the sisters who are having right, title, interest in the property have agreed for any such transaction. Learned counsel Shri Patel has also referred to sec. 44 of the Transfer of Property Act and submitted that unless the formal document is executed, such a writing cannot be specifically enforced as it is incomplete and it cannot be termed as an agreement or a contract which can be specifically enforced.
21. In rejoinder, learned Sr. Counsel Shri Mihir Thakore has submitted that the banachitty dated 18.11.2010 cannot be said to be an agreement, but it is an understanding to enter into an agreement. He emphasised and submitted that it cannot be said to bean agreement for two reasons,
(a) the sisters were not party to it, and (b) there is no clarification or specific details with regard to taxation, that is, the stamp duty, who will bear it, etc. He, therefore, submitted that this sodachitti was never meant to be implemented as it was merely an understanding. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore therefore submitted that a mere understanding or intention to enter into an agreement/contract cannot be enforced and it is not an agreement itself.
22. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore pointedly referred to the papers, particularly the sodachitti (Mark 3/10) dated 18.11.2010 and submitted that it has been specifically stated that the agreement to sell (satakhat) should be made, meaning thereby, the sodachitti is not an agreement to sell as understood. He also referred to Mark 3/12, an advertisement published in the newspaper. He also referred to the complaint given to the Commissioner of Police, Surat, for the alleged offences under the IPC and submitted that as stated in this complaint given by defendant No. 1, it refers to the fact that the sodachitti was made which is not an agreement to sell. He submitted that the statement recorded by the police also suggests that it was merely an understanding. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore has also referred to the public notice at Mark 3/22 which refers to the sodachitti as the understanding and it was not an agreement. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore, therefore, submitted that the intention to enter into an agreement cannot be said to be an agreement in itself and is not enforceable in law. Alternatively, it was submitted that in any case even if it is treated as an agreement or contract, it was a contingent contract dependent upon consent of the sisters.
23. Learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore has referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Speech and Software Technologies (India) Private Limited v. Neos Interactive Limited, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 475 and emphasised the observations made in para 22 that an agreement to enter into an agreement is not enforceable. Similarly, he has also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Vimlesh Kumari Kulshrestha v. Sambhajirao and anr., reported in (2008) 5 SCC 58, and referred to the observations made in para 18 and 24 which reads as under:
It is no doubt true that ordinarily an endeavour should be made by the court to give effect to the terms of the agreement but it is also a well-settled principle of law that an agreement is to be read as a whole so as to enable the court to ascertain the true intention of the parties....
He emphasised the observations and submitted that there is uncertainty in the share of the sisters and their consent. Therefore, if there is no clarity, then, it would be merely an intention to enter into an agreement on fulfillment of such condition. Therefore, learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore submitted that the present Appeal from Order may be allowed. He ha also referred to and relied upon the judgment of the Hon ble Apex Court in the case of Mayawanti v. Kaushalya Devi, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 1, and referring to the observations in para 17 submitted that the approach of the court has been discussed for the purpose of grant of injunction.
24. In view of these rival submissions, it is required to be considered whether the present Appeals from Orders can be entertained or not and whether the impugned order passed by the court below Exh. 5 in Special Civil Suit No. 298/2011 dated 2.3.2012 calls for any interference.
25. As it is evident from the rival submissions which have been made at length and recorded hereinabove, the focus is on the banachitti dated 18.11.2010. Whether this banachitti can be termed as an agreement or a contract or there was merely an understanding or intention to enter into an agreement or banakhat is required to be considered.
26. As could be seen from the record referred to by both the sides, the understanding or the oral agreement has been arrived at which has been reduced to writing by the parties in the form of banachitti dated 18.11.2010. The said banachitti has been entered into or reduced to writing reflecting the intention of the parties for the transaction. Further, it is also revealed that there was an issue with regard to the consent of the sisters and defendant No. 1-mother and brother are said to have promised to get the consent of the sisters coupled with the fact that the power-of-attorney of the sisters is with the mother who has signed the aforesaid banachitti.
27. Therefore, one is required to consider a situation where the parties have agreed for a transaction with the major aspects like the price/consideration, the property, the schedule of payment and the parties who could execute the necessary documents. It is in this background when sizable consideration has been paid in part performance of such writing or the agreement, can it be said that in spite of such further steps in furtherance of the transaction, it was only at the stage of negotiation or understanding and what the parties intended was to enter into an agreement to sell at a later stage? If that argument is accepted, there is no explanation for payment of substantial consideration and the aspect of assurance for the consent of the sisters. At the same time, what has been pleaded in the reply by respondents about the conduct of the appellants that due to escalation in the prices there was a demand for higher price resulting in this dispute though substantial part of the consideration has been accepted. In other words, having accepted part of the consideration in part performance of the agreement to sell or the transaction, there is a second thought with regard to the price already agreed and contentions are sought to be raised about the very document/banachitti itself that it is not an agreement to sell and it was merely an understanding, which is misconceived. In fact, the understanding which has been arrived at has been reduced to writing in the form of banachitti and in part performance thereof, part payment of the consideration has been received.
28. It is well accepted that an agreement/contract need not be in any particular form unless it is so provided like in case of government organizations where the bid is invited and the offer and willingness is expressed and thereafter a formal contract is entered into. Therefore, in case of such transaction with the government even if the formal agreement or contract is necessary, a reference is always made to the terms and conditions forming part of the tender document. In the same way, the understanding arrived at between the parties reduced to writing in the form of banachitti would always have a bearing on the transaction even though the agreement to sell or banakhat with further stipulations may not have been made. In other words, the banachitti itself would be an agreement as there is no specific format or form is provided for an agreement or contract under the law. Therefore, when the banachitti itself provides the relevant aspects as stated above which has also been acted upon, and in part performance thereof, substantial payment has been made, it cannot be said that it was merely a desire or intention of the parties to enter into an agreement/contract or enter into a transaction at a later stage subject to fulfillment of some conditions. If that be so, like the consent of the sisters was necessary and was required to be obtained, then, the banachitti itself would not have been made after the understanding is arrived at between the parties since the sisters were not available or their consent was not there. In that case, the consideration or part payment which is substantial could not have been accepted. It reflects, therefore, that the parties having arrived at an understanding, reduced to writing in the form of banachitti, and it was an assurance based on the power-of-attorney of the sisters to sell substantial consideration has been paid.
29. Therefore, by conduct of the parties and the manner in which the transaction has taken place, it could not be disputed that the parties were not ad idem or there was no contract. Therefore, the first limb of the submission that mere desire or intention to enter into an agreement cannot be termed as an agreement to sell and it cannot be specifically enforced cannot be accepted. The submission made by learned counsel Shri Patel that the banachitti dated 18.11.2010 cannot be elevated to the status of an agreement to sell also cannot be accepted.
30. Another aspect which has been emphasised by learned Sr. Counsel Shri Thakore that as the sisters had not consented it was dependent upon their consent and therefore it would be a contingent contract which cannot be enforced is also misconceived. As discussed hereinabove, at the time of writing the banachitti the power-of-attorney was with the mother. Substantial amount of consideration in part performance of the said banachitti has been accepted. It is at the later stage that it is now contended that it is dependent upon the consent of the sisters. If that was so, the banachitti itself could not have been made, nor acceptance of substantial consideration as per the banachitti could have been made. In other words, the contention raised with regard to the agreement as a contingent contract is required to be considered in background of the facts coupled with the fact that principles of promissory estoppel would also apply in such cases. One party having held out to the other side on the relevant aspects and the other party having acted on it, cannot be allowed to back out.
31. For the purpose of appreciating the rival submissions in a situation like the one where the dispute has been raised with regard to the agreement itself, the conduct of the parties and the material like the execution of writing/banachitti dated 18.11.2010 is required to be considered to focus whether that writing/banachitti itself can be termed as an agreement or not. However, as discussed above, the court has in such a situation to gather the intention of the parties where they had consented for the deal/transaction or not. Further, it may also require that if the party has held out to the other side on the basis of which the other side has acted to the knowledge of the party who has made the promise, the principle of estoppel would be attracted. In the present case, when the respondents have by conduct assured about the consent of all concerned and having allowed the appellants to act upon them by making part payment, now cannot be permitted to back out.
32. It may be noted that the Law of Contracts in India does not require such contract to be in writing like in England where some contracts are required to be made in the form of a contract made by deed. The statutory provision prevailing there like the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1989 refer to the scheme of contract for dispossession of interest in land. It is not applicable in India and therefore the contracts are governed by Law of Contracts and the courts have considered the other aspects like principle of estoppel and also equitable principles of fair play or the doctrine of part performance while considering and interpreting the contracts. Therefore, as discussed above, when it is evident that a writing has been executed containing all essential requirements of agreement, it cannot be said that merely because a formal agreement has not been executed or entered into between the parties, there is no binding or concluded contract.
33. Halsbury s Laws of England, Fourth Edition (Volume 9(1)), para 702 provide,
702. Estoppel. Where there is a dispute between the parties as to the terms of an offer and a party has so conducted himself that a reasonable person would believe that he was assenting to the terms as proposed by the other party, the person who has so conducted himself, whatever his real intention may have been, is bound by the contract as if he had intended to agree to the other party s terms. A person will not in general be permitted to deny his assent to a contract where he has been guilty of carelessness and has thereby misled the other party, and inducted him to believe that he assented, as where he signed a document in blank. Where a person (P) clothes another (A) with the appearance of authority to contract on behalf of P with a third party, P will be estopped from denying A s authority to contract on his behalf. Whilst the courts frequently describe the above-mentioned rules in terms of estoppel , it may be that they are not true cases of estoppel, because the representor may be bound by acceptance of any such unintended offer even before the representee acts upon it.
34. Another facet of the argument that a contract or a formal agreement or banakhat is not entered into with specific details with regard to the exact stamp duty, who will bear the proportion and other details are not made, is again a matter which can be said to be not going to the root of the matter. As rightly submitted by learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar that, normally, it would be governed by the provisions of the Stamp Duty Act and it is provided for the same inasmuch as when the document is silent, the act would apply and it would not make such agreement or contract illegal or void for want of such details. Therefore, if the banachitti is fulfilling all the requirements of the agreement or contract with material aspects clarified and stated therein which have been accepted by both the sides, it has to be honoured and accepted. If the defendants are permitted to back out by raising such contentions about the consent of the sisters and therefore the contract is contingent or there is no specific details in the form of a formal agreement to sell, it would mean that one can take the advantage of one s own lapses. The law of promissory estoppel also would be attracted based on the respective conduct of the parties particularly the appellants having arrived at the understanding entered into an agreement like the banachitti, having accepted substantial consideration and also such consideration are paid on assurance that the sisters consent would be obtained. Therefore, as an afterthought such contentions are raised which are not permissible on the ground of justice, equity and fair play.
35. A useful reference can also be made to the observations made by the Hon ble Apex Court in a judgment in the case of Aloka Bose (supra) referred to by learned Sr. Counsel Shri Soparkar wherein it has been observed, All agreements of sale are bilateral contracts as promises are made by both - the vendor agreeing to sell and the purchaser agreeing to purchase. On the other hand, the observation in S.M. Gopal Chetty (supra) that unless agreement is signed both by the vendor and purchaser, it is not a valid contract is also not sound. An agreement of sale comes into existence when the vendor agrees to sell and the purchaser agrees to purchase, for an agreed consideration on agreed terms. It can be oral. It can be by exchange of communications which may or may not be signed. It may be by a single document signed by both parties. It can also be by a document in two parts, each party signing one copy and then exchanging the signed copy as a consequence of which the purchaser has the copy signed by the vendor and a vendor has a copy signed by the purchaser... (emphasis supplied)
36. The reliance placed by both the sides with regard to the approach of the appellate court while dealing with the discretionary orders passed by the court below also has to be considered in light of the broad guidelines laid down by the Hon ble Apex Court. Normally, the discretionary orders are not to be disturbed and it is well-accepted that the discretionary orders passed by the court below, unless are perverse or misdirected, do not call for any interference. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in the case of Wander Ltd. And anr. v. Antox India P. Ltd., reported in 1990 (Supp) SCC 727 has observed, The appellate court will not interfere with the exercise of discretion of the court of first instance and substitute its own discretion except where the discretion has been shown to have been exercised arbitrarily, or capriciously or perversely or where the court had ignored the settled principles of law regulating grant or refusal of interlocutory injunctions. An appeal against exercise of discretion is said to be an appeal on principle. Appellate court will not reassess the material and seek to reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the court below solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion.
37. Therefore, even if the other view is plausible based on the material and evidence, it would not justify interference in the discretionary order. The Division Bench of the High Court in a judgment reported in 2009(4) GLR 3213 in the case of Jasoda Indralal Vadhva v. Hemendrabhai Kakulal Vyas & ors. has also made the observations, Granting of injunction is a matter of discretion. Balance of convenience and irreparable injury are triable issues and are required to be examined and positively found. It is settled law that while hearing appeal against discretionary exercise of powers by the trial Judge, while deciding the application under O.39 R. 1&2 of CPC, the appellate court is not expected to interfere with the discretion, unless it is shown that power has been exercised arbitrarily, capriciously or in perversity and against the settled principles of law. Appellate Court is not expected to re-assess the material and to reach a conclusion different than the one reached by the Court below....
38. Thus, what is required to be considered is whether the trial court while considering such an application has considered the relevant criteria for grant of injunction based on the material and evidence or not. If the broad principles with regard to grant of injunction provided under O.39 R.1-2 are considered, the discretionary order does not call for any interference. In the facts of the present case, the impugned order refers to these relevant aspects including the criteria for grant of injunction, the conduct of the parties and also the aspect of prima facie case, balance of convenience etc. Therefore, it does not call for any interference in the present Appeals from Orders and both the Appeals from Orders deserve to be dismissed and accordingly stand dismissed.
39. In view of dismissal of the Appeals from Orders, the Civil Applications do not survive and the same are accordingly disposed of.
(RAJESH H.SHUKLA, J.) (hn) Page 28 of 28