Allahabad High Court
U.P. State Electricity Board And 03 ... vs Raghuraj Singh on 21 April, 2020
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 ALL 1863
Author: Biswanath Somadder
Bench: Biswanath Somadder, Yogendra Kumar Srivastava
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD AFR Reserved In Chamber Case :- SPECIAL APPEAL No. - 75 of 2020 Appellants :- U.P. State Electricity Board, Lucknow and 03 others Respondent :- Raghuraj Singh s/o Sri Lekhraj Singh, r/o A-14, New Colony, Kasimpur, House, District Aligarh Counsel for Appellants :- Amit Saxena (Senior Advocate) assisted by Abhishek Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- Ajit Kumar, Punit Khare Hon'ble Biswanath Somadder,J.
Hon'ble Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.
(Per : Dr. Yogendra Kumar Srivastava,J.)
1. The present special appeal seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated 17.04.2019 passed in Writ-A No. 17360 of 1995 (Raghuraj Singh Vs. U.P.S.E.B. Lucknow and others) whereby the writ petition, which was directed against an order of compulsory retirement dated 23.12.1994 passed in exercise of powers under Regulation 2 (c) of the U.P. State Electricity Board (Employees' Retirement) Regulations, 19751 against the respondent-writ petitioner, has been allowed and the order of compulsory retirement has been set aside.
2. The Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board, Lucknow2 and its authorities, who were respondents in the writ petition, are the appellants before us.
3. It is sought to be contended on behalf of the appellants that the learned Single Judge has proceeded to allow the writ petition principally on the basis of a finding that there existed no material on record which could support the opinion that the continuance of the petitioner in service was not in public interest and nothing to this effect had been detailed in the counter affidavit.
4. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that the aforementioned finding recorded by the learned Single Judge is contrary to the facts on record, inasmuch as the order of compulsory retirement dated 23.12.1994 was in terms of the Board's order dated 22.2.1991 and as per the recommendation made by the Screening Committee on 07.10.1994, and on the basis of adverse reports, gross negligence in performance of duties and indiscipline on the part of the respondent-petitioner. It has been pointed out that the aforementioned fact was brought on record by a counter affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants/respondents, and the learned Single Judge having proceeded to allow the writ petition without taking into consideration the facts on record, the judgment cannot be legally sustained.
5. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-petitioner, on the other hand, has supported the judgment of the writ court by submitting that there was no material whatsoever which could have justified passing of the order of compulsory retirement which was founded on no material and was a result of non-application of mind and has rightly been set aside by the learned Single Judge.
6. Rival contentions now fall for consideration.
7. The order of compulsory retirement dated 23.12.1994, in the present case, has been passed in exercise of powers under Regulation 2 (b) of the Regulations 1975, as amended in terms of the UPSEB (Employees' Retirement) (Second Amendment) Regulations, 1993. For ease of reference, Regulation 2 (b) and Regulation 2 (c) are being extracted below :-
"2. (a) x x x x x
(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), the appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate, may, at any time, by notice to Board's employee (whether permanent or temporary), without assigning any reason, require him to retire, in public interest, provided that such employee has completed 20 years of qualifying service and has attained the age of 50 years. Any employee of the Board, also, may, by giving three months' notice to the appointing authority, seek voluntary retirement at any time, after attaining the age of 45 years, provided that he has completed minimum qualifying service of 20 years.
(c) The period of such notice shall be three months :
Provided that--
(i) any such Board's employee may, by order of the appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate, without such notice or by a shorter notice be retired forthwith and on such retirement the Board's employee shall be entitled to claim a sum equivalent to the amount of his pay plus allowances, if any, for the period of the notice or, as the case may be, for the period by which such notice falls short of three months, at the same rates at which he was drawing immediately before his retirement.
(ii) It shall be open to the appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate to allow a Board's employee to retire without any notice or by a shorter notice without requiring the Board's employee to pay any penalty in lieu of notice :
Provided further that such notice given by the Board's employee against whom disciplinary proceedings are pending or contemplated, shall be effective only if it is accepted by the appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate, provided that in the case of contemplated disciplinary proceedings the Board's employee shall be informed before the expiry of his notice that it has not been accepted :
Provided also that the notice once given by a Board's employee under clause (b) seeks voluntary retirement shall not be withdrawn by him except with the permission of the appointing authority or any authority to which the appointing authority is subordinate;"
8. The provisions with regard to compulsory retirement under the aforementioned Regulations 1975 are somewhat similar in terms to the Fundamental Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules and also Fundamental Rule 56 (c) of the U.P. Fundamental Rules.
9. The principal ground canvassed by the petitioner to assail the order of compulsory retirement before the writ court was by submitting that there was no material whatsoever to justify that the petitioner had become a "dead wood", and that the order was founded on no material and was a result of non-application of mind. This was controverted by the appellants/respondent by filing a counter affidavit wherein it was specifically averred that the order of compulsory retirement dated 23.12.1994 was passed in terms of Board Order dated 22.02.1991 and as per the Screening Committee recommendation dated 7.10.1994 on the basis of adverse reports, gross negligence of duties and indiscipline on part of the respondent-petitioner. It was stated in paragraph 20 of the counter affidavit as follows:-
"20. That the contents of paragraph No.23 of the affidavit is not admitted and it is submitted that petitioner was retired vide Order No. 1729-E-8, dated 23.12.1994 in terms of B.O.No.100-Kavini-RVP/29/12-Kavini, dated 22.2.1991- as per screening committees recommendations O.M.No.2891-E-V/V-Karya Chamta, dated 07.10.1994 only on the basis of adverse reports, gross negligence of duties and sufficient indiscipline on the part of the petitioner."
10. Attention of this Court has also been drawn to the proceedings of the Screening Committee and its recommendations dated 07.10.1994, which are on record as part of an affidavit filed on behalf of the appellants in the instant appeal, wherein the service records of the respondent-petitioner have been referred to.
11. The recommendation made by the screening committee which forms the basis of the order of compulsory retirement clearly shows that the petitioner was given adverse entries in his character roll for the period 03.12.1993 to 31.03.1984 and thereafter for the period 01.04.1985 to 31.03.1986 again he was given adverse entry in his character roll and his integrity was also withheld. Subsequently, for the period 5/1982 to 01.12.1983, on the basis of a departmental inquiry, an order of punishment of reduction of his pay scale by two stages was given and also a censure entry was awarded. The Screening Committee also has taken notice of the fact that a domestic enquiry was pending against the petitioner for the reason that the petitioner had not complied with an order of transfer dated 19.07.1988 and had not joined the place of his transfer within the stipulated time period.
12. In order to appreciate the rival contentions, the principles, evolved in terms of judicial precedents, governing compulsory retirement, may be adverted to.
13. The question as to whether before passing of an order of compulsory retirement there is any requirement of providing opportunity to show cause and whether application of rules of natural justice are necessary were considered in the decision in Union of India Vs. Col. J.N. Sinha and others3, and it was held that an order of compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences and that the government servant does not lose any of the rights acquired by him before retirement. Referring to Fundamental Rule 56 (j), it was held that the appropriate authority has an absolute right to retire a government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The power could be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which was that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so, and accordingly if the authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of the same cannot be challenged. The observations made in the judgment, in this regard, are as follows :-
"9. Now coming to the express words of Fundamental Rule 56(j) it says that the appropriate authority has the absolute right to retire a Government servant if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so. The right conferred on the appropriate authority is an absolute one. That power can be exercised subject to the conditions mentioned in the rule, one of which is that the concerned authority must be of the opinion that it is in public interest to do so. If that authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness of that opinion cannot be challenged before courts. It is open to an aggrieved party to contend that the requisite opinion has not been formed or the decision is based on collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision.
The 1st respondent challenged the opinion formed by the Government on the ground of mala fide. But that ground has failed. The High Court did not accept that plea. The same was not pressed before us. The impugned order was not attacked on the ground that the required opinion was not formed or that the opinion formed was an arbitrary one. One of the conditions of the 1st respondent's service is that the Government can choose to retire him any time after he completes fifty years if it thinks that it is in public interest to do so. Because of his compulsory retirement he does not lose any of the rights acquired by him before retirement. Compulsory retirement involves no civil consequences. The aforementioned Rule 56(j) is not intended for taking any penal action against the Government servants. That rule merely embodies one of the facets of the pleasure doctrine embodied in Article 310 of the Constitution. Various considerations may weigh with the appropriate authority while exercising the power conferred under the rule. In some cases, the Government may feel that a particular post may be more usefully held in public interest by an officer more competent than the one who is holding. It may be that the officer who is holding the post is not inefficient but the appropriate authority may prefer to have a more efficient officer. It may further be that in certain key posts public interest may require that a person of undoubted ability and integrity should be there. There is no denying the fact that in all organizations and more so in Government organizations, there is good deal of dead wood, it is in public interest to chop off the same. Fundamental Rule 56(j) holds the balance between the rights of the individual Government servant and the interests of the public. While a minimum service is guaranteed to the Government servant, the Government is given power to energise its machinery and make it more efficient by compulsorily retiring those who in its opinion should not be there in public interest.
x x x
11. In our opinion the High Court erred in thinking that the compulsory retirement involves civil consequences. Such a retirement does not take away any of the rights that have accrued to the Government servant because of his past service. It cannot be said that if the retiring age of all or a section of the government servants is fixed at 50 years, the same would involve civil consequences. Under the existing system there is no uniform retirement age for all Government servants. The retirement age is fixed not merely on the basis of the interest of the Government servant but also depending on the requirements of the society. "
14. In The State of Gujarat and another Vs. Suryakant Chunilal Shah4, it was held that while passing of an order of compulsory retirement, public interest, is the primary consideration, the purpose being to retain only efficient persons in service and to dispense with the services of the "dead wood". The assessment of efficiency is required to be made on the basis of material on record, of which confidential reports are an important input and an employee with doubtful integrity could not be considered to be efficient. It was stated thus :-
"23. In order, therefore, to find out whether any government servant has outlived his utility and is to be compulsorily retired in public interest for maintaining an efficient administration, an objective view of overall performance of that government servant has to be taken before deciding, after he has attained the age of 50 years, either to retain him further in service or to dispense with his services in public interest, by giving him three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof.
24. The performance of a government servant is reflected in the annual character roll entries and, therefore, one of the methods of discerning the efficiency, honesty or integrity of a government servant is to look at his character roll entries for the whole tenure from the inception to the date on which decision for his compulsory retirement is taken. It is obvious that if the character roll is studded with adverse entries or the overall categorisation of the employee is poor and there is material also to cast doubts upon his integrity, such a government servant cannot be said to be efficient. Efficiency is a bundle of sticks of personal assets, thickest of which is the stick of "integrity". If this is missing, the whole bundle would disperse. A government servant has, therefore, to keep his belt tight.
25. Purpose of adverse entries is primarily to forewarn the government servant to mend his ways and to improve his performance. That is why, it is required to communicate the adverse entries so that the government servant to whom the adverse entry is given, may have either opportunity to explain his conduct so as to show that the adverse entry was wholly uncalled for, or to silently brood over the matter and on being convinced that his previous conduct justified such an entry, to improve his performance."
15. Taking a similar view in Union of India Vs. M.E. Reddy and another5, it was reiterated that the object of compulsory retirement is to weed out the "dead wood" in order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and initiative in service. The object being public interest, the order of compulsory retirement can neither be held to be punitive nor stigmatory and hence the principles of natural justice are not attracted. The observations made in the judgment are as follows :-
"8. An analysis of this rule clearly shows that the following essential ingredients of the rule must be satisfied before an order compulsorily retiring a government servant is passed:
(1) That the member of the Service must have completed 30 years of qualifying service or the age of 50 years (as modified by notification dated July 16, 1969);
(2) That the government has an absolute right to retire the government servant concerned because the word "require" clearly confers an unqualified right on the Central Government;
(3) That the order must be passed in public interest;
(4) That three months' previous notice in writing shall be given to the government servant concerned before the order is passed.
It may be noted here that the provision gives an absolute right to the government and not merely a discretion, and, therefore, impliedly it excludes the rules of natural justice. It is also not disputed in the present case that all the conditions mentioned in rule referred to above have been complied with. It is a different matter that the argument of Reddy is based on the ground that the order is arbitrary and mala fide with which we shall deal later.
9. On a perusal of the impugned order passed by the Government of India it would appear that the order fully conforms to all the conditions mentioned in Rule 16(3). It is now well-settled by a long catena of authorities of this Court that compulsory retirement after the employee has put in a sufficient number of years of service having qualified for full pension is neither a punishment nor a stigma so as to attract the provisions of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. In fact, after an employee has served for 25 to 30 years and is retired on full pensionary benefits, it cannot be said that he suffers any real prejudice. The object of the rule is to weed out the dead wood in order to maintain a high standard of efficiency and initiative in the State Services. It is not necessary that a good officer may continue to be efficient for all times to come. It may be that there may be some officers who may possess a better initiative and higher standard of efficiency and if given chance the work of the government might show marked improvement. In such a case compulsory retirement of an officer who fulfills the conditions of Rule 16(3) is undoubtedly in public interest and is not passed by way of punishment. Similarly, there may be cases of officers who are corrupt or of doubtful integrity and who may be considered fit for being compulsorily retired in public interest, since they have almost reached the fag end of their career and their retirement would not cast any aspersion nor does it entail any civil consequences. Of course, it may be said that if such officers were allowed to continue they would have drawn their salary until the usual date of retirement. But this is not an absolute right which can be claimed by an officer who has put in 30 years of service or has attained the age of 50 years. Thus, the general impression which is carried by most of the employees that compulsory retirement under the conditions involves some sort of stigma must be completely removed because Rule 16(3) does nothing of the sort.
10. Apart from the aforesaid considerations we would like to illustrate the jurisprudential philosophy of Rule 16(3) and other similarly worded provisions like Rule 56(j) and other rules relating to the government servants. It cannot be doubted that Rule 16(3) as it stands is but one of the facets of the doctrine of pleasure incorporated in Article 310 of the Constitution and is controlled only by those contingencies which are expressly mentioned in Article 311. If the order of retirement under Rule 16(3) does not attract Article 311(2) it is manifest that no stigma or punishment is involved. The order is passed by the highest authority, namely, the Central Government in the name of the President and expressly excludes the application of rules of natural justice as indicated above. The safety valve of public interest is the most powerful and the strongest safeguard against any abuse or colourable exercise of power under this rule. Moreover, when the Court is satisfied that the exercise of power under the rule amounts to a colourable exercise of jurisdiction or is arbitrary or mala fide it can always be struck down. While examining this aspect of the matter the Court would have to act only on the affidavits, documents, annexures, notifications and other papers produced before it by the parties. It cannot delve deep into the confidential or secret records of the government to fish out materials to prove that the order is arbitrary or mala fide. The Court has, however, the undoubted power subject to any privilege or claim that may be made by the State, to send for the relevant confidential personal file of the government servant and peruse it for its own satisfaction without using it as evidence.
11. It seems to us that the main object of this rule is to instil a spirit of dedication and dynamism in the working of the State Services so as to ensure purity and cleanliness in the administration which is the paramount need of the hour as the Services are one of the pillars of our great democracy. Any element or constituent of the Service which is found to be lax or corrupt, inefficient or not up to the mark or has outlived his utility has to be weeded out. Rule 16(3) provides the methodology for achieving this object. We must, however, hasten to add that before the Central Government invokes the power under Rule 16(3), it must take particular care that the rule is not used as a ruse for victimisation by getting rid of honest and unobliging officers in order to make way for incompetent favourites of the government which is bound to lead to serious demoralisation in the service and defeat the laudable object which the rule seeks to subserve. If any such case comes to the notice of the government the officer responsible for advising the government must be strictly dealt with. Compulsory retirement contemplated by the aforesaid rule is designed to infuse the administration with initiative and activism so that it is made poignant and piquant, specious and subtle so as to meet the expanding needs of the nation which require exploration of "fields and pastures new". Such a retirement involves no stain or stigma nor does it entail any penalty or civil consequences. In fact, the rule merely seeks to strike a just balance between the termination of the completed career of a tired employee and maintenance of top efficiency in the diverse activities of the administration.
12. An order of compulsory retirement on one hand causes no prejudice to the government servant who is made to lead a restful life enjoying full pensionary and other benefits and on the other gives a new animation and equanimity to the Services. The employees should try to understand the true spirit behind the rule which is not to penalise them but amounts just to a fruitful incident of the Service made in the larger interest of the country. Even if the employee feels that he has suffered, he should derive sufficient solace and consolation from the fact that this is his small contribution to his country, for every good cause claims its martyr."
16. The scope of judicial review in a matter relating to compulsory retirement came to be considered in Baikuntha Nath Das and another Vs. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another6, and it was held that opinion of the authority regarding compulsory retirement is his subjective satisfaction which is to be formed on the basis of entire record of service and since the order of compulsory retirement does not amount to punishment hence principles of natural justice are not required to be observed in passing of such an order. The principles, in this regard, were laid down as follows :-
"34. The following principles emerge from the above discussion:
(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary -- in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.
(iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter -- of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.
Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 30 to 32 above.
35. Before parting with the case, we must refer to an argument urged by Sri R.K. Garg. He stressed what is called, the new concept of Article 14 as adumbrated in Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 and submitted on that basis that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice -- audi alteram partem -- is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words, the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement. Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the government, there is no room for importing the said facet of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma."
17. The aforementioned view was reiterated in Posts and Telegraphs Board and others Vs. C.S.N. Murthy7, and it was held that in a matter of compulsory retirement, the subjective satisfaction of the reviewing authority was not open to court's interference in absence of mala fides, perversity, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. It was stated as follows:-
"5. ...F.R. 56(j) authorises the Government to review the working of its employees at the end of their period of service referred to therein and to require the servant to retire from service if, in its opinion, public interest calls for such an order. Whether the conduct of the employee is such as to justify such a conclusion is primarily for the departmental authorities to decide. The nature of the delinquency and whether it is of such a degree as to require the compulsory retirement of the employee are primarily for the Government to decide upon. The courts will not interfere with the exercise of this power, if arrived at bona fide and on the basis of material available on the record. No mala fides have been urged in the present case. The only suggestion of the High Court is that the record discloses no material which would justify the action taken against the respondent. We are unable to agree. In our opinion, there was material which showed that the efficiency of the petitioner was slackening in the last two years of the period under review and it is, therefore, not possible for us to fault the conclusion of the department as being mala fide, perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable. The Division Bench seems to have thought that, since the adverse remarks mentioned in the earlier letter of April 29, 1971 were not repeated in the subsequent letter, it should be taken that they had been given up subsequently or that the respondent had improved in the subsequent year. We do not think that this is a legitimate inference, for the report for 1971-72 only shows that the respondents' propensity to delay matters persisted despite the warning of the previous year. But, even if one assumes that the High Court was correct on this, the adverse remarks made against the respondent in relation to the period 1971-72, standing by themselves, can constitute sufficient material for the department to come to a conclusion in the matter. It is true that the earlier record of the respondent was good but if the record showed that the standard of work of the respondent had declined and was not satisfactory, that was certainly material enabling the department to come to a conclusion under F.R. 56(j). We are of opinion that the High Court erred in setting aside the order of compulsory retirement on the basis that there was no material at all on record justifying the action against the respondent."
18. Considering the nature of compulsory retirement, it was held in the case of K. Kandaswamy Vs. Union of India and another8, that an order of compulsory retirement does not amount to punishment nor does it entail loss of retiral benefits nor is it stigmatic. On the scope of judicial review it was held that the object being public interest the formation of bona fide opinion by the appropriate authority in this regard could be challenged only on the grounds of being based on no evidence or being based on collateral grounds or being arbitrary but could not be challenged on merits. The observations made in the judgment in this regard are being extracted below :-
"8. As seen in the light of documents and in the light of the specific permission sought by the appellant himself on the basis of the special report submitted by the State Government, the Government of India through its appropriate committee reached the conclusion that in view of the doubtful integrity it would not be desirable in the public interest to retain the appellant in service. Accordingly, they have compulsorily retired the appellant from service. Compulsory retirement does not amount to dismissal or removal from service within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. It is neither punishment nor visits with loss of retiral benefits; nor does it cast stigma. The officer would be entitled to the pension that he has actually earned and there is no diminution of the accrued benefits. The object of compulsory retirement of the government employee is public interest. If the appropriate authority bona fide forms that opinion, the correctness thereof on merits cannot be challenged before courts, though it may be open to the aggrieved employee to impugn it. But the same may be challenged on the ground that requisite opinion is based on no evidence or has not been formed or the decision is based for collateral grounds or that it is an arbitrary decision.
9. While exercising the power under Rule 56(j) of the Fundamental Rules, the appropriate authority has to weigh several circumstances in arriving at the conclusion that the employee requires to be compulsorily retired in public interest. The Government is given power to energise its machinery by weeding out dead wood, inefficient, corrupt and people of doubtful integrity by compulsorily retiring them from service. When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement of the government employee is in the public interest, court would not interfere with the order."
19. The scope of judicial review in a matter relating to compulsory retirement again came up for consideration in Pyare Mohan Lal Vs. State of Jharkhand and others9, and reiterating the very limited scope of judicial review in case of compulsory retirement which is permissible only on grounds of non-application of mind, mala fides or want of material particulars, it was held that power to retire compulsorily a government servant in terms of service rules is absolute, provided the authority concerned forms a bona fide opinion that compulsory retirement is in public interest. Referring to the earlier precedents on the point, the law was summarized as follows :-
"18. Thus, the law on the point can be summarised to the effect that an order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment and it does not imply stigma unless such order is passed to impose a punishment for a proved misconduct, as prescribed in the statutory rules (See Surender Kumar v. Union of India (2010) 1 SCC 158). The Authority must consider and examine the overall effect of the entries of the officer concerned and not an isolated entry, as it may well be in some cases that in spite of satisfactory performance, the authority may desire to compulsorily retire an employee in public interest, as in the opinion of the said Authority, the post has to be manned by a more efficient and dynamic person and if there is sufficient material on record to show that the employee "rendered himself a liability to the institution", there is no occasion for the court to interfere in the exercise of its limited power of judicial review."
20. The provisions contained under Regulation 2 (b) and Regulation 2 (c) of the Regulations 1975 being in similar terms as Fundamental Rule 56 (j) of the Fundamental Rules as also the Fundamental Rule 56 (c) of the U.P. Fundamental Rules, the legal principles, which have evolved in terms of judicial precedents on the point of compulsory retirement under the Fundamental Rules, would squarely apply.
21. In the facts of the present case, the records of the case clearly reflect that the order of compulsory retirement has been passed as per the provisions contained under the Regulations, 1975, in terms of the Board Order dated 22.02.1991 and as per the Screening Committee recommendation dated 07.10.1994 on the basis of adverse reports in the character rolls, gross negligence of duties and indiscipline. The subjective satisfaction, having thus been recorded by the appropriate authority under the statutory regulations, the order cannot be said to be without basis or having been passed on extraneous reasons or without there being any material to support the same so as to render it arbitrary.
22. The judgment of the learned Single Judge whereunder the order of compulsory retirement has been set aside by stating the reason that the same has been passed without any material to support it and nothing in that regard had been referred to in the counter affidavit, thus cannot be supported from the facts which are evident from the records.
23. The judgment of the learned Single Judge is thus legally unsustainable and is therefore set aside.
24. The Special Appeal is accordingly allowed.
25. The writ petition stands dismissed.
Order Date :- 21.04.2020 Pratima (Biswanath Somadder,J.) (Dr.Y.K.Srivastava,J.)