Punjab-Haryana High Court
Prithvi Singh S/O Chunni Lal vs The Presiding Officer, Central ... on 31 March, 1995
Equivalent citations: (1996)IIILLJ1115P&H, (1995)110PLR516
JUDGMENT S.S. Sudhalkar, J.
1. Since an identical issue is required to be determined in these two petitions, the same are being decided by a common order. Prithvi Singh, who is petitioner, in C.W.P. No. 11732 of 1994 filed an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short "the Act') for payment of wages for a period of 8 days during which he was prevented from doing his work. He claimed that on account of unlawful action of the management of the Cement Corporation of India and their contractor he was deprived of his job and was laid off illegally for 8 days during the month of November, 1992. He claimed a sum of Rs. 711.84 along with interest with effect from December 7, 1992. The Cement Corporation India (for short "the Corporation') contested the claim and challenged the junsdicton of the Labour Court to entertain the application filed by the petitioner under Section 33-C(2) of (he Act by alleging that the claim made by the petitioner was not based on any award or settlement and no money was due to the petitioner. The Corporation also denied the allegation of the petitioner that he was kept out of the job for a period of 8 days in the month of November, 1992. Even the relationship of master and servant between the Corporation and the petitioner was denied. The respondent-corporation also pleaded that no cement was manufactured between November 23, 1992 and November 30, 1992, that no cement was despatched during that period and, therefore no work was given to the contractor during the aforesaid period. Respondent No. 3 herein, who was respondent No. 2 before the Tribunal, pleaded that he is the contractor for loading the cement and is working under the full control of the Corporation. He further pleaded that a notice was circulated amongst the workers that the Cement Loading Section will remain closed and that there was no wilful action on his part to keep the employees out of job.
2. Similar claim had been made by Hawa Singh, who is petitioner in C.W.P.No. 12285 of 1994. Hawa Singh pleaded that he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 2734.10, on account of having been unlawfully laid off during the month of November, 1992. The respondent-Corporation opposed his claim by pleading that the work of unloading of coal is not of regular nature and also that it was entrusted to independent contractors without any involvement of the respondent-Corporation. It was also pleaded that the petitioner was the employee of an independent contractor and, therefore, the Corporation was not liable to make any payment. The contractor (respondent No. 3 herein) admitted that he was a contractor in relation to Coal and Raw Material Handling Section but he further pleaded that the Corporation had full control over the work performed by him.
3. On the basis of the pleadings, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court framed three identical issues in both the cases. It recorded evidence of both the parlies and after hearing the representatives of the parties held that the claim made by the petitioners was not maintainable under Section 33-C(2) of the Act because the monetary benefits claimed by the petitioners did not depend on any existing right. The Labour Court held that the legality or the otherwise of the lay off cannot be determined in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act and, in fact, an effective remedy was available to the petitioner under Section 10(1) of the Act. The Industrial Tribunal held:-
"Prior to determination of the liability of the respondent to pay wages for the period allegedly illegally laid off. The question necessarily is to be decided whether there has been any illegal lay off or not especially in a case where illegal lay off is not conceded by the management rather disputed. In such cases question is one of determination and not the computation. No order awarding wages can be made without recording the findings that there was illegal lay off and the wages is payable for such illegal laid off. It would be straining the Language of Section 33-C(2) to hold whether there have been a valid or invalid lay off."
4. Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Industrial Tribunal has failed to appreciate the ambit and scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act and has clearly erred in holding that the claim made by the petitioners required determination of the legality of the lay off effected by the employer. Learned counsel argued that on the basis of the admitted facts the petitioners had a right to get wages for the period during which they were unlawfully prevented from doing their work and, therefore, the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 cannot escape their liability of making payment of wages to the workmen. Shri Mehtani, learned counsel for the Corporation argued that various issues involving substantive rights of the parties were required to be determined as a condition precedent to the award of wages to the petitioners and, therefore, the Industrial Tribunal was justified in declining to make adjudication of those issues in proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, which are in the nature of execution proceedings. Shri Mehtani argued that before an order for payment of wages could be made in favour of the petitioner, it was necessary to decide as to whether there existed relationship of master and servant between the respondent-Corporation and the petitioners and also as to whether there was in fact a lay off or not. He argued that neither of these two issues could be determined in proceedings arising out of an application filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
5. Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act reads as under:-
"33-C(2): Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under his Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government within a period not exceeding three months."
6. This section empowers the Labour Court to decide the claim of a workman to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The Labour Court can also decide any question as to the amount due to the workman. The nature of the jurisdiction of a Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act has been examined in various cases.
7. In The Central Bonk of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan (1963-II-LLJ-89), a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court examined the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that Section 33-C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit for which they arc entitled should be computed in terms of money even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based is disputed by the employed and the claim under Section 33-C(2) of the Act clearly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of right and such enquiry must be held to be incidental to the main determination. The Court further held that for the purpose of making necessary determination under Section 33-C(2) of the Act, it would, in appropriate cases, be open to the Labour Court to interpret the award or settlement oh which the workmen's right rests, At (he same time, the Court held that while determining the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act care must be taken not to exclude the cases which legitimately fall within its purview. It must also be bonie in mind that the cases which fall within Section 10(1) of the Act cannot be brought within the scope of Section 33-C of the Act.
8. In the Bombay Gas Co. Ltd. v. Gopal Bhiwa, (1963-II-LLJ-608), the Supreme Court held that the proceedings contemplated under Section 33-C(2) of the Act arc, in many cases, analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court can interpret the award on which the claim is based and it would also be open to it to consider the plea that the award sought to be enforced is a nullity,
9. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd., Bararee Colliery Dhanbad v. Rameshwar, AIR 1968 SC 218, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the scope of Section 33-C(2) of the Act is wider than that of Section 33-C(1) and it is not confined to cases arising under an award, settlement or under the provisions of Chapter V-A. The Court held that benefits provided by a statute or a scheme made thereunder will also fall under the ambit of Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
10. In Taj Mahal Cafe (Private) Ltd. v. Labour Conn. Hubli, (1970-II-LLJ-51), their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that where the workman has been suspended pending domestic enquiry, the Labour Court was competent to determine the amounts payable to the workman during period of suspension and it was competent to direct payment of money in accordance with his conditions of service.
11. In Ramakrishna Ram Nath v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nagpun, (1970-II-LLJ-306), the Supreme Court held that where the employee has made a claim to be paid monetary benefits under Section 25-FFF of the Act, the mere fact that the employer has challenged the factum of closure will not deprive the workman from claiming compensation in terms of Section 25-FFF of the Act.
12. In R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur, (1972-I-LLJ-231) (SC), an application was filed by the workmen under Section 33-C(2) of the Act to claim lay off compensation. The application was contested by the employer on the ground that there was no lay off. Their Lordships made reference to various decisions including the judgments in Sawatram Mills v. Baliram, (1966-I-LLJ-41) (SC), and Kays Construction C. (P) Ltd. v. State of U.P., (1965-II-LLJ-429) (SC), and then held :-
2. "In substance the point urged by the appellants was that if a claim is made on the basis of a layoff and the employer contends that there was no lay-off but closure, it is not open to a Labour Court to entertain an application under Section 33-C(2). The more so it was stated, when the dispute was not between a solitary workman on the one hand and the employer on the other but a whole body of workmen ranged against their employer who was faced with numerous applications before the Labour Court for computation of benefit in terms of money. As has been said already, the Labour Conn must go into the matter and come to a decision as to whether there was realty a closure or a lay-off. If it took the view that there was a lay-off without any closure of the business it would be acting within its jurisdiction if it awarded compensation in terms of the provisions of Chapter V-A. In our opinion the High Court's conclusion that:-
"In fact the business of this Company was continuing, They in fact continued to employee several employees. Their notices say that some portions of the mills continue to work."
was unexceptionable. The notices which we have referred to can only lead to the above conclusion. The Labour Court's jurisdiction could not be ousted by a mere plea denying the workman's claim to the computation of the benefits in terms of money; the Labour Court had to go into the question and determine whether, on the facts, it had jurisdiction to make the computation. It could not, however, give itself jurisdiction by a a wrong decision of the jurisdiclional plea."
(Italicisation is ours).
13. In Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. v. The Workman, AIR 1974 SC 1604, the Supreme Court held:-
"A proceeding under Section 33-C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefits in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for."
14. In P.K. Singh v. Presiding Officer (1988-II-LLJ-363), the Supreme Court distinguished its own judgments in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Khandelwal (R.I.). (1968-I-LLJ-589) State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Gopal Sahal Pareek (1968 -I-LLJ-593), and R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Company's case, (supra), and held that merely because a workman is doing a particular type of work while holding the post of 'C' grade Fitter, he cannot claim that he should be classified as 'B' grade and such relief cannot be granted under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
15. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, (1995-I-LLJ-395) (SC), a claim made by the workman for grant of benefit of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' under Section 33-C(2) was rejected on the ground that claim of daily rated/casual workers to be paid at the same rate as the regular workers cannot be decided under Section 33-C(1) because such matters require determination of a right of the workmen to receive wages according to the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'
16. In Indian Airlines v. Central Government Labour Court, New Delhi, (1987-II-LLJ-512), a learned single Judge of the Delhi High Court held that in an application under Section 33-C(2) of the Act the Labour Court can enquire into the existence of the right of the workmen to claim a benefit in terms of money and such enquiry is incidental in character.
17. On the basis of the above referred decisions, it must be held that the Labour Court has the power to make calculations of the money payable by an employer to an employee and pass an order for payment of money to the workman. Similarly, it can order grant of any benefit to the workman which is capable of being computed in terms of money. Any question which is incidental to the entitlement of the workman to receive monetary benefits can also be determined by the Labour Court, and merely because the employer disputes the claim of the employee to receive a particular benefit does not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
18. Coming back to the facts of these two petitions., it need only be mentioned that respondents did not deny before the Labour Court that the petitioners were doing the work of loading and unloading cement. It was also not disputed by the respondent-Corporation that no wages have been paid for a period 8 days to the petitioner. The respondent-Corporation pleaded that cement was not manufactured between November 23, 1992 to November 30, 1992. the respondent-Corporation and the respondent-Contractor look contradictory pleas on the question of liability to make payment of wages to the petitioners. Whether the action of respondent-Corporation in not providing work to the petitioner can be treated as 'lay-off' under Section 2(kkk) and whether the workmen are entitled to compensation in terms of Section 25-C read with Section 25A are the issues incidental to the claim of the petitioners to be paid the amount of compensation. There is no denying that if the period during which the petitioners were not provided work is to be treated as "lay-off", they are entitled to compensation. It is inconsequential as to which of the respondents is to make payment of compensation. Similarly, the issues as to whether the respondent-Corporation is obliged to make payment of compensation in view of the provisions contained in Sections 20 and 21 of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 is clearly incidental to the claim of the workmen. Merely because these issues arc required to be decided by the Labour Court as a condition precedent to an order for payment of monetary benefits and merely because respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have contested their liability to make payment of wages for the period between November 23, 1992 to November 30, 1992, it cannot be said that the Labour Court did not have the jurisdiction to decide these mailers.
19. A careful reading of the impugned orders passed by the Labour Court, Chandigarh, shows that the learned Presiding Officer. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chandigarh, has declined relief to the petitioners on a wholly erroneous assumption that no substantive issue was required to be determined by him. It was not a case involving adjudication of the rights and liabilities of the parlies simpliciter. Rather, it was a case in which the question as to whether the action of the employer amounted to lay-off was required to be decided only with a view to determine the entitlement of the petitioners to appropriate, compensation. In my considered opinion, the Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court has committed a patent error in dismissing the applications filed by the petitioner. The order passed by respondent No. 1 are contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in R.B. Bansilal Ahirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd., v. The Labour Court, Nagpur. (supra).
20. In the result, the writ petitions are, allowed. Orders dated February 31, 1994 passed by respondent No. 1 arc declared to be illegal and are hereby quashed. Respondent No. 1 is directed to decide afresh the application filed by the petitioners under Section 33-C(2) of the Act.
21. Since the matter has remained pending for a sufficiently long lime, respondent No. 1 should make fresh adjudication of the applications filed by the petitioners within a period of four months of the submission of a certified copy of this order.