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National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Ms Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance ... vs Talari Gowthami Kakinada And 4 Others. on 24 November, 2025

      IN THE NATIONAL CONSUMER REDRESSALCOMMISSION,
                         NEW DELHI

                    SECOND APPEAL NO. 745 OF 2025
  (Against the Order dated 08.01.2024 in First Appeal No.267/2023 of the Andhra
      Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Vijaywada)
                                         WITH
                   IA/13307/2025, IA/13308/2025, IA/13309/2025
(Exemption from filing the certified copy, Condonation of delay, Exemption from dim
                                      documents)

M/s. Kotak Mahindra Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
Plot No. C-12, G-Block, BKC, Bandra (E),
Mumbai-400 051, Maharashtra,
Represented by its Authorized Signatory                           ... Petitioner
                                Versus
1. Talari Gowthami, W/o. Late Siva Prasad,
    D. No. 8-4-73, Sangeetharaopeta,
   Samarlakota, Mandai, Kakinda, Andhra Pradesh.

2. Talari Avanthi Sai Kiranmai, D/o. Late Siva Prasad,
   Student, D. No. 8-4-73, Sangeetharaopeta,
   Samarlakota, Mandai, Kakinda, Andhra Pradesh.

3. Talari Sathvika, D/o. Late Siva Prasad,
   D. No. 8-4-73, Sangeetharaopeta,
   Samarlakota, Mandai, Kakinda, Andhra Pradesh.

4. Talari Ammaji, M/o. Late Siva Prasad,
   D. No. 8-4-73, Sangeetharaopeta,
   Samarlakota, Mandai, Kakinda, Andhra Pradesh .                ... Respondents

BEFORE:
HON'BLE AVM JONNALAGADDA RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM (Retd.),
PRESIDING MEMBER
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA, MEMBER

For the Petitioner               Mr. Kumar Mihir and
                                 Mr. Athul Joseph, Advocates
Dated : 24.11.2025
                                ORDER (ORAL)

1. Heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner.

2. As per the report of the Registry, there is 435 days delay in filing this Second Appeal. The Petitioner filed I.A. No. 13308 of 2025 seeking condonation of delay.

3. In the said Application seeking Condonation of Delay, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that this Second Appeal has been preferred against part of the Order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the Andhra Pradesh State Commission, Vijayawada in FA No. 267 of 2023, wherein, despite partly allowing the Appeal and setting aside the order dated 06.02.2023 passed by the District Commission, Kakinada, the State Commission waived the damages to the extent of Rs. 5,00,000 while upholding the remaining order in CC No. 07 of 2022. Aggrieved by the Impugned Order dated 08.01.2024, the Appellants filed Review Application No. 02 of 2024 in FA No. 267 of 2023 on 13.02.2024 under Section 50 of the Act, 2019, before the State Commission, pointing errors apparent on the face of the record. It was specifically contended in the Review Petition that the State Commission failed to appreciate the vital fact that the life assured had wilfully concealed his pre-existing health ailments, amounting to a breach of the principle of utmost good faith and contractual obligations under the insurance policy. It was further clarified that non-filing of the evidence affidavit and written submissions by the local advocate occurred due to an inadvertent misunderstanding, which led the State Commission to overlook the appellants' primary contention that the life assured had procured the policy fraudulently by suppressing material facts concerning his health condition. However, the State Commission vide order dated 22.04.2024 dismissed the Review Petition, holding that the Impugned Order was passed after due consideration and that no error apparent on the face of the record, as required under Section 50 of the Act, 2019. Consequently, the State Commission held that the Review Application did not fulfil the requisite SA No. 745 of 2025 Page 2 of 9 conditions prescribed under the said provision and was, therefore, not maintainable. Thereafter, the appellants preferred this Revision Petition on 06.06.2024, challenging the Final Judgment and Order dated 08.01.2024 passed by the Hon'ble State Commission in FA No. 267 of 2023. The said Revision Petition came up for hearing before this Hon'ble Commission on 21.10.2024, when notice was issued, and subsequently on 09.01.2025 and again on 24.03.2025, when this Hon'ble Commission passed the following order:

"The RP in question has been filed against the order dated 08.01.2024 of the State Commission in FA. This Commission has examined the issue of maintainability of RP against the order of the State Commission in FA in following matters:

(1) Vivo Mobile India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Mavuram Sujatha & Ors., RP No. 1879 of 2024 decided on 20.01.2025.

(ii) New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Paragon Steels Pvt. Ltd., Diary Nos No.40215/NCDRC/2024-RP, Diary No.40216/NCDRCZ 2024-RP & Diary No.40217/NCDRC/2024-RP decided on 14.01.2025.

(iii) Rajesh Kudi Vs. Ram Singh and Ors., RP No.2121 of 2016 decided on 17.09.2024.

Both sides are granted 3 weeks' time to study the above stated judgments and come prepared to argue the case on maintainability.

II List on 25.04.2025.

4. The matter was, thereafter, listed on 25.04.2025, this Commission pass the following order:

"The counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the present revision petition with liberty to file a second appeal. Accordingly, RP/2501/2024 is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file a second appeal, if it involves any substantive question of law."

5. The appellant contended that pursuant to the said liberty, the appellant instructed counsel to prepare and file the Memorandum of Appeal before this Commission. The appeal, duly prepared, signed, and attested was filed before this Commission on 26.09.2025, thereby occasioning a delay of 582 days in filing the same.

6. The learned counsel submits that the said delay of 582 days in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor intentional but due to bona fide and unavoidable circumstances. The delay is purely inadvertent and beyond the control of the appellant, deserves to be condoned. The learned counsel, therefore, sought condonation of delay in filing the appeal.

7. Heard the learned counsel and carefully perused the records. The reasons advanced to justify the delay have been considered. The law of limitation requires delay for each day of delay to be explained after expiry of the period of limitation. It is necessary that this explanation is rational, reasonable and realistic and to be acceptable. A perusal of the application for the condonation of delay establishes beyond doubt that the delay was caused because the Petitioner dealt with the case in a rather routine and casual manner. In State Bank of India vs B S Agriculture Industries (I) (2009) 5 SCC121 decided on 20.03.2009 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held:

"It would be seen from the aforesaid provision that it is peremptory in nature and requires the consumer forum to see before it admits the complaint that it has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action. The consumer forum, however, for the reasons to be recorded in writing may condone the delay in filing the complaint if sufficient cause is shown. The expression, 'shall not admit a complaint' occurring in Section 24 A is sort of a legislative command to the consumer forum to examine on its own whether the complaint has been filed within the limitation period prescribed thereunder.

12. As a matter of law, the consumer forum must deal with the complaint on merits only if the complaint has been filed within two years from the date of accrual of cause of action and if beyond the said period, the sufficient cause has been shown and delay condoned for the reasons recorded in writing. In other words, it is the duty of the consumer forum to take notice of Section24A and give effect to it. If the complaint is barred by time and yet, the consumer forum decides the complaint on merits, the forum would be committing an illegality and, therefore, the aggrieved party would be entitled to have such order set aside."

[Emphasis added]

8. The Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down that the settled legal proposition of law of limitation under the Consumer Protection Act has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes, though it may harshly affect a particular party. The Petitioner has not been able to provide adequate and sufficient reasons which prevented him to approach this Commission within the limitation.

9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that party who has not acted diligently or remained inactive is not entitled for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in R. B. Ramlingam vs. R. B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC) has also described the test for determining whether the petitioner has acted with due diligence or not and held as under:

"We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition."

10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Lal and Ors. Vs. Rewa Coalfields Limited, AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361 has held as under:

"It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If SA No. 745 of 2025 Page 5 of 9 sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant." [Emphasis added]

11. The burden is on the Applicant to show that there was sufficient cause for the delay. The expression 'sufficient cause' has been elucidated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj & Anr. Vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, 2013 AIR SCW 6510 as under:

"Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever he court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fideor was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See; Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. V. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors, AIR 1964 SC 1336; Lala Matadin V. A.Narayanan, AIR 1970 SC 1953; Parimal V. Veena alias Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 L2011 AIR SEW 1233); and Maniben DevrajShah V. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, AIR 2012 SC 1629: (2012 AIR SCW 2412).

It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim "dura lexsedlex" which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

The law on the issue can be summarized to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamount to showing utter disregard to the legislature". [Emphasis supplied]

12. Further, in Anshul Aggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, (2011) 14 SCC 578, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has advised the Consumer Forums to keep in mind while dealingwith such applications the special nature of the Consumer Protection Act. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:

"It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and SA No. 745 of 2025 Page 7 of 9 revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras." [Emphasis supplied]

13. Examination of the material on record and the arguments advanced reveals that the impugned order was passed on 08.01.2024. The limitation for filing the SA before this Commission is 30 days, which would commence from the date petitioner receivers the order i.e. 21.06.2024. While the limitation lapsed on 20.07.2024, this Second Appeal was filed on 29.09.2025. Thus, there is 435 days delay (21.07.2024 to 28.09.2025) which the Petitioner needs to explain as required under law.

14. It is a clear position that while the limitation lapsed on 20.07.2024 and the Petitioner was expected to file the same within the stipulated limitation period, the Second Appeal was filed on 29.09.2025. Thus, there was 435 days delay, which needs to be explained. However, it failed to show sufficient reason or cause for delay of each day as required under the law.

15. The reasons stated in the instant case are routine in nature and grossly inadequate to justify such delay. There is no justification for such undue delay while the facts are otherwise already known to the Petitioner. The reasons explained do not reflect that the Petitioner has taken actions necessary under law in time.

16. With due regard to the statutory provisions, precedents discussed above and the facts of the case, the Petitioner failed to show sufficient cause for such undue delay in filing the present Appeal. Therefore, the prayer in Application filed seeking Condonation of delay cannot be allowed and accordingly, the same is disallowed on the above grounds.

17. In view of the foregoing, the Application i.e. IA No. 13308 of 2025 filed by the Petitioner is disallowed. Consequently, the Second Appeal No. 745 of 2025 is dismissed.

18. All pending Applications, if any, also stand disposed cjf accordingly.

r Sd/-

( AVM J. RAJENDRA, AVSM VSM, Retd.) "PRESIDING MEMBER Sd/-

( ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA, J.) MEMBER Sangeeta/Rajesh/Court-4/17 SA No. 745 of 2025 Page 9 of 9