Madras High Court
Lakshminarayanan vs Raju @ Kuppa Reddy (Died)
Author: R.Pongiappan
Bench: R.Pongiappan
S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007
BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
Reserved on Pronounced on
11.07.2019 20.08.2019
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R.PONGIAPPAN
S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007
1. Lakshminarayanan
2. Vidhyalakshmi ... Appellants
versus
1. Raju @ Kuppa Reddy (died)
2. Athimuthu
3. Hari Balakrishnan
4. Ovammal
5. Muthu Reddiar
6. Kumarasamy Reddiar
7. Sennammal
8. Naranammal
9. Subbulakshmi
10. Sornambikai
11. Subbulakshmi ... Respondents
(Respondent No.11 is brought on record
as Legal Representative of the
deceased first respondents and
Appellant Nos.1 and 2, who are already on
record, are recorded as Legal Representatives
of the deceased first respondent vide order
dated 10.07.2018 made in C.M.P.(MD)
Nos.6845 and 6846 of 2017)
Second Appeal filed under Section 100 of C.P.C. against the Judgment
and Decree dated 25.08.2006 made in A.S.No.5 of 2006 on the file of the Sub
Court, Kovilpatti, confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 18.01.2005 made in
O.S.No.29 of 2004 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Vilathikulam.
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S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007
For Appellants : Mr.K.Srinivasan
Senior Counsel
for Mr.M.P.Senthil
For R2 : Mr.A.R.L.Sundaresan
Senior Counsel
for Mr.G.Chandrasekar
For R5 to R10 : Mr.G.Chandrasekar
For R11 : Mr.R.Balakrishnan
JUDGMENT
Aggrieved over the concurrent findings made in A.S.No.5 of 2006 on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge, Kovilpatti and in O.S.No.29 of 2004 on the file of the District Munsif, Vilathikulam, the appellants, who are the plaintiffs in the suit, are before this Court with this Second Appeal.
2. In earlier, the appellants herein filed a suit as against the respondents, in O.S.No.29 of 2004, on the file of the District Munsif Court, Vilathikulam and seeking the relief of declaration, declaring that the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit properties as vested remainder holders after the lifetime of the first defendant free from all encumbrances with costs of the suit.
3. By Judgment and Decree dated 18.01.2005, the learned District Munsif, Vilathikulam, dismissed the suit after holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any relief as sought out in the plaint. Against the said finding, the appellants filed an appeal in A.S.No.5 of 2006 on the file of the Sub Court, Kovilpatti.
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4. The learned Subordinate Judge, Kovilpatti, in its Judgment, dated 25.08.2006, confirmed the findings arrived at by the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Feeling aggrieved over the same, the plaintiffs are before this Court with this Second Appeal.
5. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to as, as described before the trial Court.
6. The averments made in the plaint, in short, are as follows:
(i) One Kuppa Reddiar, having got the properties under the partition decree, had executed a settlement deed in respect of the suit properties under a settlement dated 04.12.1972, under which, the settlor and the first defendant should enjoy the suit property without power of alienation, after whose death, it will go to the children of the first defendant. The plaintiffs are the children of the first defendant, who are entitled to the suit properties as vested remainder holders. The first defendant is the father of the plaintiffs and the 2 nd defendant is the father of the first defendant. The settlor in total contravention of the settlement deed seems to have executed a Will dated 29.08.1978 in favour of his son, namely, the second defendant, by cancelling the settlement deed under the cancellation deed dated 25.09.1978.
(ii) Further, the settlement deed executed by the settlor cannot be set aside by an unilateral document in the Sub-Registrar Office. On the strength of the invalid Will, the second defendant sold the first item of the property to the 3rd defendant under a registered sale deed, dated 08.09.1980, for Rs.25,000/-, with http://www.judis.nic.in 3/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 the connivance of the first defendant. The second defendant also sold the second item of the property to the 4th respondent under a registered sale deed dated 27.08.1981. The said sale deeds executed by the second defendant in favour of defendants 3 and 4 are absolutely void and invalid in law and on facts, it is not binding upon the plaintiffs and the first defendant.
(iii) The settlor and the first defendant are in enjoyment of 3rd and 4th items of the property. The first plaintiff came to know about the said invalid documents in the year 1997 only. As the said documents have created cloud upon the title of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration.
7. The averments made in the written statement filed by the 3rd and 6th defendants, which was adopted by 7th to 12th defendants, in short, are as follows:
(i) The suit properties and other properties are the ancestral properties of Kuppa Reddiar, which was proved by proceedings in O.S.No.58 of 1963 on the file of the Subordinate Court, Tuticorin. The deed dated 04.12.1972 executed by Kuppa Reddiar was not a settlement deed. The document contains provisions, which shows that the disposition would come into existence only on the death of the executant of the document. Hence, the document dated 04.12.1972, is not a settlement deed, but, it is a will.
(ii) It is not correct to state that the settlor Kuppa Reddiar and the first defendant should enjoy the properties without power of alienation and that the plaintiffs, who are the children of the first defendant are entitled to the suit properties as vested remainder holders.
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(iii) The settlor Kuppa Reddiar executed a Will dated 29.08.1978 bequeathing his properties to the 2nd defendant. The contention of the plaintiffs that the deed dated 04.12.1972 was a Settlement deed which cannot be revoked unilaterally in the Sub-Register Office is not correct. The said deed was not a settlement deed and the same was validly revoked.
(iv) After the deed dated 04.12.1972, the executant Kuppa Reddiar alone mortgaged the properties to one Rajaram on 28.11.1978. This mortgage deed was executed after revocation to the knowledge of the 1st defendant. The second defendant Subba Reddiar had re-deemed the mortgage. This would go to show that Kuppa Reddiar was the absolute owner of the properties even after the deed dated 04.12.1972.
(v) The 2nd defendant sold the 1st time of the schedule property to the 3rd defendant, on 08.09.1980, for valuable consideration and he also sold the 2nd item to the 4th defendant under a registered sale deed dated 27.08.1981. These sale deeds are absolutely valid in law and they are binding on the plaintiffs and the 1st defendant. Therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled to the suit properties and they were never in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties at any point of time. The defendants 3 and 4 by virtue of sale in their favour are in possession of suit properties from the date of sale till date without any interruption and to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and defendants 1 and 2, have perfected title by adverse possession also to the suit items 1 and 2.
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(vi) The 1st defendant is not entitled to the suit properties and as such, the plaintiffs cannot derive any right, title and interest over the schedule properties after the life-time of the 1st defendant. The plaintiffs are not at all the vested remainder holders to claim declaration of such a right after the life time of the 1st defendant.
(vii) The plaintiffs and the 1st defendant are the members of the Hindu Undivided Family and they lived under the same roof. The 1st defendant has attested the sale deed dated 08.09.1980 executed by the 2nd defendant and as such, the allegation that the 1st plaintiff came to know the sale in favour of 3rd and 4th defendants only in 1997 is false.
(viii) After the 3rd defendant purchased the property, he had demolished the house in the beginning of 1997 and the property is only a vacant site and there is no building over it. The will executed by the settlor on 29.08.1978 was a valid one and that cannot be questioned by the plaintiffs. Therefore, the suit is liable to be dismissed with costs.
8. Based on the above divergent facts set out by either parties, the learned District Munsif, Vilathikulam, framed necessary issues and tried the suit.
9. Before the trial Court, on the side of the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff Lakshmi Narayanan examined himself as P.W.1 and marked one document as Ex.A1. On the side of the defendants, two witnesses have been examined as D.W.1 and D.W.2 and seven documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B7. http://www.judis.nic.in 6/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007
10. Having considered all the materials placed before him, the learned District Munsif, Vilathikulam, dismissed the suit as already referred to.
11. In the appeal, the findings arrived at by the trial Court was confirmed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Kovilpatti, against which, the present Second Appeal has been preferred by the plaintiffs.
12. At the time of admitting the second appeal, this Court has formulated the following substantial questions of law:
(i) Whether in any settlement deed, life interest could be granted?
(ii) Whether on interpretation of the covenants of Ex.A1, it can be termed as a 'Will' with right to revoke the same or is a settlement deed without any right to cancel the same?
Substantial Question of Law No.I
13. It is an admitted fact that the suit properties belonged to Kuppa Reddiar, who got the same under the partition deed. It is the case of the plaintiffs that Kuppa Reddiar had executed a settlement deed dated 04.12.1972, under which, the settlor and the first defendant should enjoy the properties without having any power of alienation and after whose death, it will go to the children of first defendant. The plaintiffs are the children of the first defendant. Therefore, they are entitled to the suit properties as vested remainder holders. http://www.judis.nic.in 7/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007
14. Per contra, the case of the defendants is that the settlement deed dated 04.12.1972 executed by Kuppa Reddiar was not a settlement deed, but, it is a Will. The document dated 04.12.1972 was revoked through the deed dated 25.09.1978 by the settlor Kuppa Reddiar, vide Ex.B1. However, the said Kuppa Reddiar executed a Will dated 29.08.1978 (Ex.B2), through which, he bequeathed his properties to the second defendant. It is the further case of the defendants that Kuppa Reddiar mortgaged the properties unilaterally on 28.11.1978. The said mortgage was redeemed by the second defendant. After redeeming the mortgage, the second defendant sold the 1st item of the property to the third defendant on 08.09.1980 and he had sold the 2 nd item of the property to fourth defendant under a registered sale deed dated 27.08.1981. Thus, the sale deeds are binding on the plaintiffs and the first defendant. As such, the first defendant and the plaintiffs are not entitled to the suit properties as they claimed through the suit.
15. Now, it is relevant to see the recitals found in the settlement deed dated 04.12.1972 (Ex.A1), executed by Kuppa Reddiar in favour of the second defendant.
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16. On perusal of recitals found in Ex.A1 styled as, 'settlement deed', it shows that the settlor has given life estate to the first defendant. Therefore, now, the question to be decided is, whether in the settlement deed, life estate could be granted?
17. In this regard, the learned Senior Counsel Mr.K.Srinivasan appearing on behalf of Mr.M.P.Senthil, learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted that the intention of settlor in earlier period, i.e. at the time when Ex.A1 was executed, is to give the properties to the defendant No.1 that he and the first defendant should enjoy the suit property without power of alienation, after whose death, it would go to the children of the first defendant, which shows that the settlor did not want to give any immediate effect to Ex.A1. Further, the learned Senior Counsel submitted that the undertaking given by the settlor did not create any encumbrance or alienation over the properties during the life time of executor and as such, the said undertaking could not be enforced. Therefore, the role of absolute enjoyment including the possession would be applicable only after the life time of the executor. All the facts would clearly go to prove that there was no immediate interest conferred upon the settlee.
18. On the other hand, the learned Senior counsel Mr.AR.L.Sundaresan, appearing on behalf of Mr.G.Chandrasekar, learned counsel for the second respondent submitted that even though the document dated 04.12.1972 is styled as http://www.judis.nic.in 9/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 a settlement, the nomenclature used by the settlor in the said document would reveal the fact that the said document is a gift deed. In fact, for the deed of settlement, it is necessary to create the right in preasenti in favour of the settlee. But, in this case, the intention of the settlor is entirely different. Since there is a condition precedent in the settlement deed, the life interest could not be granted through the settlement deed.
19. Upon considering the arguments advanced by either side, it is necessary to see the definition of settlement and Will.
20. In the Advanced Law Lexicon, the word 'settlement' is defined as follows:
“Settlement” means any instrument (other than a will or codicil as defined by the Indian Succession Act (39 of 1925), whereby the destination or devolution of successive interests in moveable or immovable property is disposed of or is agreed to be disposed of.
21. Further, the word 'Settlement' is defined under Section 3 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the same is extracted hereunder:
“3. Settlement:
The word “Settlement” as defined in this section means an instrument by which the destination or devolution of successive interests in properties are disposed of or are agreed to be disposed of and the disposition is to take effect during the lifetime of the settlor. Movable or immovable property can be the subject matter of settlement and settlement would include not just an instrument whereby property is disposed of, but also an instrument whereby property is http://www.judis.nic.in agreed to be disposed of. While the normal test for a “settlement” as 10/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 opposed to a will is to determine if the instrument results in immediate divesting of title, the definition of settlement in Specific Relief Act has been widened by inclusion of instruments where the interests are agreed to be disposed of. ”
22. Now, in the definition of Will, which is defined under Section 26 of the Indian Succession Act, the essential characteristics are mentioned as follows:
“2(h) “will” means the legal declaration of the intention of a testator with respect to his property which he desires to be carried into effect after his death.” Essential characteristics of a will:
(i) There must be a legal declaration.
(ii) The declaration must be with respect to the property of the testator.
(iii) The declaration must be to the effect that it is to operate after the death of the testator, i.e. it should be revocable during the life of the testator.
If any of the three essentials is lacking, the document is not a will.”
23. On comparing the above definitions of settlement and Will, only there is a hair line difference between the Will and settlement.
24. Now, on a co-joint reading of the above definitions, it is clear that the Will is to operate after the death of the executor, but, on the other hand, the settlement comes into effect immediately after its execution, thereby, through the settlement, life interest cannot be granted. Similarly, if there is a settlement deed, the disposition in praesenti is very much necessary. Therefore, it cannot be held http://www.judis.nic.in 11/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 that through the settlement, life interest could not be granted in favour of the settlee.
25. In this case, on perusal of the recitals found in the document dated 04.12.1972 (Ex.A1), it reveals that the settlor reserves the right to alienate the suit schedule properties jointly with the settlee. So, absolutely, the same is not having the character of settlement. Accordingly, the substantial question of Law No.1 is answered in affirmative in favour of the respondents. Substantial Question of Law No.II
26. For deciding this Substantial Question of Law, it would be necessary to look into the decision reported in 1979 (II) MLJ 88 (Ramaswami Naidu vs. M.S.Velappan and others), wherein, the Division Bench of this Court has observed as follows:
“While interpreting an instrument, particularly to find out whether it is of a testamentary character, which will take effect after the lifetime of the executant or whether it is an instrument creating a vested right in praesenti in favour of a person, the question has to be examined with care, after looking into the substance of the document, the treatment of the subject by the settlor, the intention appearing both expressly in the instrument or by necessary implication, and avowed intention of the settlor not to revoke the settlement at any time, making it also public by registering the document, under the appropriate law of the country. Some of the important tests laid down in the decided cases appear to be:
(i) the nomenclature used by the settlor in styling the document.
(ii) the express dispositive words used which touch upon the time when the vested interest is created.
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(iii) the reservation of the power of revocation in the instrument;
(iv) the effect of the reservation of a life estate in favour of the executant under the instrument;
(v) registration of the document under the appropriate law.” Applying the said proposition with the case in our hand, in the instant case, while at the time of executing the deed, dated 04.12.1972, the settlor has retained the right to alienate the properties jointly with the settlee. Only after his lifetime, he gave life interest in favour of the settlee, after whose death, the right will go to the children born to the settlee.
27. With regard to vesting rights with the settlor, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that only because of the reason that the settlor is vested with the right of enjoyment, the deed executed by him cannot be termed as a Will.
28. In support of his contention, the learned Senior Counsel placed reliance upon the decision rendered in the case of Sakunthala Ammal and another vs. Pattammal reported in 1976 1 MLJ 296, wherein, this Court has held as follows:
“Where a document expressed a desire on the part of the executant to give the property dealt with thereunder in favour of her husband with an undertaking by her that the property would not be encumbered or alienated by her during her lifetime and she would only enjoy the income therefrom and that after the lifetime of the executant possession was to be taken by her husband and enjoyed from http://www.judis.nic.in generation to generation absolutely, the doucment is a settlement and 13/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 not a will.”
29. He has also placed reliance upon the Judgment reported in 1979 (2) MLJ 88 DB (Ramaswami Naidu vs. M.S.Velappan and others) as already referred to as above, wherein, this Court has held as follows:
“'The accepted definition of a will is that it is an instrument whereunder a person makes a disposition of his properties to take effect after his death and which is in its own nature ambulatory and revocable during his lifetime. So far as the other condition which is also thought of while interpreting an instrument for the purpose of deciding whether it is a will or a settlement, namely, whether it is intended not to take effect until after the death of the donor, reference may be made to Section 19 of the Transfer of Property Act. Though the disposition may be postponed till the lifetime of the settlor and though prima facie it may appear that the disposition consummates only after his death yet, such postponement not being illegal, if in a given instrument there is a present disposition and vesting of right in praesenti and if such a conclusion can be arrived at reasonably by reading the instrument as a whole then, a mere ambulation of interest during the lifetime of the settlor would not make it a testamentary one.
30. In the Judgments relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, there is a condition precedent to the disposition and vesting of right in preasenti. Applying those facts with the case in our hand, the settlor vested with the right of alienation till his lifetime along with the first defendant. Therefore, the deed is not acted upon immediately after its execution. For the reason that the settlor retained the right of alienation till his lifetime, the recitals found in the deed dated 04.12.1972 is in no way support the case of the appellants.
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31. While at the time of disposing the first appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Kovilpatti, placing reliance upon the Judgment reported in 2001 (1) CTC 520 (P.S.Deivaprasad @ P.S.Veerabadhran vs. Dr.P.D.Balaji and 11 others) held that in the document under dispute, such instantaneous transfer of interest in favour of beneficiary is not completed. Thereby, the said document is not a settlement.
32. Further, the learned Subordinate Judge, Kovilpatti, relied upon the Judgment reported in AIR 1996 Andra Pradesh, 1997 L.W. 234 and concluded the appeal, by holding that even though the caption of the deed Ex.A1 is mentioned as settlement deed, the recitals of the document reveal that it is only a Will and hence, there is no transfer of interest in preasenti.
33. At this juncture, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants placed reliance upon the Judgment of this Court reported in 2018 1 LW 918 (Minor Shankar, rep. by his mother Nallammal vs. Muruganandam and others) and made a submission that since the settlor has not reserved any right of revocation, cancellation done by the settlor on 25.09.1978 under Ex.B1 is not a valid one. Therefore, the settlor is not at all having any right of revocation.
34. In the Judgment as referred to above, this Court has held as follows:
“22. Considering the reasons given in Ex.A2 revocation deed, still it is found that as per the above said authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and our High Court, it is seen that after the http://www.judis.nic.in 15/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 execution of the settlement deed, the settlor cannot revoke the deed on any account, as the settlor ceases to have any right over the settled property after the execution of the settlement and in such view of the matter also, it is found that the cancellation deed Ex.A2 is invalid and not binding upon the first defendant, the settlee.”
35. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants has also relied upon the Judgment rendered in the case of Arukkani (died) and others vs. Subramaniam reported in 2007 3 MLJ 845, wherein, this Court has held as follows:
“When power of revocation is not reserved, the settlement deed cannot be cancelled on the ground that the executant had executed the settlement deed on the misrepresentation that it was only a will.”
36. He has also placed reliance upon one another Judgment of this Court, in the case of Beryl Dhinakaran vs. D.Albert and others reported in 2015 6 CTC 689, in which, this Court has held as follows:
“31. So, once the donor retained is only the right to use the property during his lifetime which does not in any way affect the transfer of ownership in favour of the donee by the donor. Considering the above citations along with the construction of Ex.B7, even though the Settlor has retained the possession i.e. Life Estate to himself and thereafter, the First Settlee Life Estate, he vested the Absolute estate to his son. Therefore, Ex.B7 is only a settlement and not a Will.”
37. However, applying those principles with the case in our hand, in this case, even though there is no provision for revoking the said settlement deed, the subsequent http://www.judis.nic.in events committed by the settlor and settlee is very much necessary to 16/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 take into account while considering the issue.
38. First of all, the settlor is vested with the right of alienation along with the settlee. Thereafter, on 29.08.1978, under Ex.B2, he executed a Will in favour of the first and third respondents. Thereafter, under Ex.B3, he cancelled the Will through the document dated 08.09.1980. Accordingly, Ex.A1 has been rightly revoked by the executor as per Ex.B2.
39. After the execution of Exs.B1 and B2, the settlor Kuppa Reddiar had executed a registered mortgage deed, which was marked as Ex.B6 with regard to the first item of the property in favour of one Rajaram. After the death of Kuppa Reddiar, his son redeemed the mortgage and after that, he sold the first item of the property to the 3rd defendant under Ex.B3 and he also sold the second item of the property to the 4th defendant under Ex.B4 dated 27.08.1981. In this occasion, it is to be noted that in Ex.B3, the first defendant, who is the settlee, has also signed as witness in the said documents.
40. It is true, even though the settlement deed cannot be revoked by the settlor, applying the said principle with the case in our hand, for revoking the settlement, the approval given by the settlee, by way of attesting the sale deed, executed by the second defendant, shows that he is not pressing Ex.A1.
41. At this juncture, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent, placed reliance upon the Judgment rendered in the case of P.K.Mohan Ram vs. B.N.Ananthachary and others, reported in 2010 (4) SCC http://www.judis.nic.in 17/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 161, wherein, our Honourable Apex Court has held as follows:
“Although, no straitjacket formula has been evolved for construction of settlement deeds and wills, the consistent view of the Supreme Court and various High Courts is that while interpreting an instrument to find out whether it is of a testamentary character, which will take effect after the lifetime of the executant or it is an instrument creating a vested interest in praesenti in favour of a person, the court has to very carefully examine the document as a whole, look into the substance thereof, the treatment of the subject by the settlor/executant, the intention appearing both by the express language employed in the instrument and by necessary implication and the prohibition, if any, contained against revocation thereof. The form or nomenclature of the instrument is not conclusive and the court is required to look into the substance thereof.”
42. He has also placed reliance upon the Judgment in the case of Murali Doss vs. Tmt. B.Saroja Ammal, wherein, this Court relied upon the decision rendered in a case law, Sagar Chandra Mandal vs. Digamber Mandal reported in 1909 10 Cal.L.J.644, in which, it was held as follows:
“If therefore an instrument is on the face of it of a testamentary character, the mere circumstance that the testator calls it irrevocable, does not alter its quality, for as Lord Coke said in Vynior's case (1619) 8 Coke 82(a), (a) If I make my testament and last Will irrevocable, yet I may revoke it for my act or my words cannot alter the judgment of the law to make that irrevocable. The principal test to be applied, is whether the disposition made takes effect during the lifetime of executant of the deed or whether it takes effect after his death. If it is really of this latter, nature, it is ambulatory and revocable during his life.” http://www.judis.nic.in 18/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007
43. Accordingly, the sum and substance of this case is nothing, but, though no power is vested with the settlor to cancel the deed dated 04.12.1972, the subsequent event that he himself mortgaged the property to the third party, and after his death, while at the time of alienating the suit property by the second defendant, the approval given by the first defendant, who is the settlee, reveals the fact that both the settlor and settlee decided to not to give much importance to the said deed dated 04.12.1972. The said undertaking of both parties clearly establish the fact that they decided to cancel the settlement dated 04.12.1972.
44. In the said circumstances, I am of the considered opinion that the language found in the document and subsequent events clearly prove that the document dated 04.12.1972 is a Will and not a settlement. In fact, if the settlor executed only the settlement deed, it is not necessary for him to retain the right of alienation over the suit property along with the first defendant. Accordingly, the substantial question of Law No.II is answered affirmatively in favour of the defendants.
45. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed, by confirming the Judgment and Decree dated 25.08.2006 made in A.S.No.5 of 2006 on the file of the Sub Court, Kovilpatti. No costs.
20.08.2019 Index : Yes / No. Internet: Yes / No. ogy http://www.judis.nic.in 19/20 S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 R.PONGIAPPAN, J.
ogy To
1. The Sub Court, Kovilpatti
2. The District Munsif Court, Vilathikulam.
Pre-delivery Judgment made in S.A.(MD)No.437 of 2007 20.08.2019 http://www.judis.nic.in 20/20