Patna High Court
Patliputras Industries And Anr. vs Rameshwar Prasad Choudhary on 16 November, 1991
Equivalent citations: 1992(1)BLJR151
ORDER Ram Nandan Prasad, J.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the appellants and the learned Counsel for the respondent.
2. Learned Counsel for the appellants has raised two contentions. The first is that since the appellants Were not heard in the court below the appeal should have been dismissed for non-prosecution as indicated in Order XLI, Rule 17, CPC and the court below should not have passed judgment on merits. Had it been the case of no hearing at all on behalf of the appellants, this contention would have some substance, but in the present case the appellants had submitted their arguments on 1-7-1983 and the case was adjourned on the prayer of the appellants for making further submissions. The next date was fixed as 11-7-1988; thereafter the case was adjourned on several intervening dates up to 1-9-1988. Thereafter, unfortunately the strike of non-gazette employees tools place and the record was placed before the court on 7-12-1988. On that date respondent was present in the court but the appellants were absent. The lower appellate court then adjourned the case to 13 12-1988 but the position was the same and the case was again adjourned by the court to 14-12-1988 and on that due also the appellants were absent and the respondent was present. The court has observed that the appellants have already been heard in part and they are absent and no further submission was put forward on behalf of the appellants. The appellants' case was closed and then the court fixed 15-12-1988 for hearing arguments of the respondent. On 15-12-1988 the case was again adjourned to 16-.2-1988. The appellants were absent also on 15-12-1988 and 16-12-1988. On 16-12-1988 the argument on behalf of the respondent was heard fully and the case was adjourned to 22-12-1988 for judgment on which date the lower appellate court passed judgment on merits.
3. In view of the above facts, it is obvious that it is not a case where the appellants had not been heard but on the contrary their argument was actually heard on the fixed date i.e. 1-7-198S and when they did not turn up on the subsequent dates fisted for further arguments, their case was closed. So it was not a situation where the appeal could have been dismissed for default. Hence, Order XL1, Rule 17, CPC has no application to the present case. In my opinion, therefore, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellants.
4. Mr. Ghosh also submitted that when the case was placed before the court after the strike, it was necessary that either the appellants or their lawyer should have been noticed before the court took up further hearing in the case. This submission may theoretically sound attractive but in practice it is almost impossible to implement. In the district courts, even on a modest estimate not less than 10,000 cases are pending in each district. If it is accepted that after every strike period (and strikes are a very frequent occurrence now a days) notice has to be issued to both the parties in all cases, then probably for another two months after the strike period the courts would not be able to do any work at all. in my opinion, such a practice is not at all feasible. Moreover, it is a matter of common and public knowledge as to when strike has ended, and so when the strike ends, it is the responsibility of the client and his counsel to obtain necessary information about the case in which he is interested. In the present case, after the strike was over the case was put up before the Presiding Officer on 7-12-1988 and thereafter several adjournments were given and during this period it was the responsibility of the appellants as well as their counsel to seek necessary information and if they did not do so there was clearly latches and negligence on their part.
5. It may also be noted that even during the strike period, although case record, due to non-availability of staff, is not put up before the Presiding Officer, still the requirement of preparing and signing the Daily Cause List is followed and one copy of the Daily Cause List is hung up on the Court's notice board and another copy is sent to the Bar Association. This is done in normal course of official business. There is no assertion from the side of the appellants that this was not done during the strike period and, therefore, under Section 114(e) of the Evidence Act it must be presumed that the Daily Cause List had been duly signed and hung up on the Court's notice board and also sent to the Bar Association. As such it cannot be said that the appellants or their counsel had no knowledge of the dates fixed after the strike periods even if no order was recorded on the intervening dates in between 1-9-1988 and 7-12-1988 on the order sheet, information through the Deaily Cause List was available to the appellants and the respondent and the learned Counsels for the parties. In the order sheet dated 7-12-1988 it is mentioned that due to strike record could not be placed before the Presiding Officer during the intervening period. But that does not in any way affect the position about the necessary information being made available through the Daily cause Lists on every fixed date.
Therefore, I do not find any merit in the second contention also of Mr. Ghosh. The appellants have raised no other point. There are concurrent findings of the Courts below to the effect that period of the lease has expired and also that the defendants-appellants are defaulters in the eye of law. No substantial question of law arises for consideration in second appeal. This appeal is dismissed.