Kerala High Court
Sijo Jose vs Rejender Kumar Saini on 14 January, 2020
Author: Anil K.Narendran
Bench: Anil K.Narendran
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL K.NARENDRAN
TUESDAY, THE 14TH DAY OF JANUARY 2020 / 24TH POUSHA, 1941
MACA.No.2091 OF 2009
AGAINST THE AWARD IN OP(MV) No.2979/2001 OF MOTOR
ACCIDENT CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, ERNAKULAM
APPELLANTS:
1 SIJO JOSE, S/O. LATE N.J JOSE
NEELAMKAVIL HOUSE,35/1224,INDIRA ROAD,
PALARIVATTOM PO, EDAPPALLY NORTH VILLAGE,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
2 DIJO JOSE S/O.LATE N.J.JOSE
NEELAMKAVIL HOUSE,35/1224,INDIRA ROAD,
PALARIVATTOM PO, EDAPPALLY NORTH VILLAGE,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
3 REJI JOSE S/O.LATE N.J.JOSE
NEELAMKAVIL HOUSE,35/1224,INDIRA ROAD,
PALARIVATTOM PO, EDAPPALLY NORTH VILLAGE,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
4 JOY SEBASTIAN S/O.SEBASTIAN
NEELAMKAVIL HOUSE,35/1224,INDIRA ROAD,
PALARIVATTOM PO, EDAPPALLY NORTH VILLAGE,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
5 ALIYAMMA SCARIA W/O.JOY SEBASTIAN
NEELAMKAVIL HOUSE,35/1224,INDIRA ROAD,
PALARIVATTOM PO, EDAPPALLY NORTH VILLAGE,
ERNAKULAM DISTRICT.
BY ADV. SRI.P.V.BABY
RESPONDENTS:
1 REJENDER KUMAR SAINI
39, BHAGWAN NAGAR, NEAR JEVAN HOSPITAL,
NEW DELHI.
MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -2-
2 THE UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LTD
DIVISIONAL OFFICE, ERNAKULAM, COCHIN-16
3 NASSEER MUHAMMED NASSEER
S/O.KALLUKHAN, DOOR NO.A/144, GOAGUVA
BADARPUR, NEW DELHI -44
R1 BY ADV. SRI.P.K.MANOJKUMAR
THIS MOTOR ACCIDENT CLAIMS APPEAL HAVING COME UP FOR
ADMISSION ON 14.01.2020, THE COURT ON THE SAME DAY
DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -3-
JUDGMENT
The appellants 1 to 3 are the claimants in O.P. (MV)No.2979 of 2001 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Ernakulam, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation on account of the death of their father N.J. Jose, in a motor accident which occurred on 04.08.2001, while he was travelling in a maruti car bearing registration No.KL-7/8827. At the place of accident, the maruti car was hit by a mini lorry bearing registration No.HR-38/B-493, owned by the 1 st respondent, insured with the 2nd respondent and driven by the 3rd respondent, causing fatal injuries to all the occupants in the car, resulting their instantaneous death. The maruti car was driven by Saji Jose, the brother of appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3. Saji Jose and his wife, Nice Mary Ann Joy died in the very same accident. Alleging that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of mini lorry by the 3rd respondent driver, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal claiming a total compensation of Rs.4,84,500/- under various heads. The parents of Nice Mary Ann Joy, appellants 4 MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -4- and 5 were impleaded as additional claimants 4 and 5 before the Tribunal.
2. Before the Tribunal, the 1st respondent owner filed written statement denying negligence alleged against the 3rd respondent driver of the mini lorry. The 1 st respondent contended that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of maruti car by its driver.
3. The 2nd respondent insurer filed written statement admitting insurance coverage of the mini lorry involved in the accident; however, denying negligence alleged against the 3 rd respondent driver. The insurer contended that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of maruti car by its driver. The insurer disputed the age, occupation, monthly income, etc. stated in the claim petition and it was contended that the compensation claimed is highly excessive.
4. Before the Tribunal, the claim petition was tried along with connected matters. On the side of the claimants, Exts.A1 to A20A were marked. The respondents have not chosen to adduce any oral or documentary evidence.
5. After considering the pleadings and materials on MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -5- record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent driving of mini lorry by the 3rd respondent driver and also due to the rash and negligent driving of maruti car by its driver. The Tribunal fixed negligence between the 3rd respondent driver of the mini lorry and the driver of the maruti car in the ratio 2:1. The Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.3,74,500/- to appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3. In view of the finding on the question of composite negligence, they are found entitled only for a sum of Rs.2,49,667/- (2/3 of Rs.3,74,500/-) together with interest at the rate of 7% per annum from the date of petition till date of award and thereafter, at the rate of 8% per annum till realisation, with proportionate cost, and the 2 nd respondent insurer was directed to satisfy the award. The said amount was ordered to be apportioned among the appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3, equally.
6. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal and also challenging the finding of the Tribunal on the question of composite negligence, the appellants/claimants are before this Court in this appeal. MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -6-
7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/claimants and also the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent insurer. Since insurance coverage of the mini lorry is admitted by the 2nd respondent insurer, service of notice on the 3rd respondent driver was dispensed with, by the order dated 12.11.2019 in C.M.Application No.2425 of 2009.
8. The issues that arise for consideration in this appeal are as to whether the appellants are entitled for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal; and whether the finding of the Tribunal on the question of composite negligence can be sustained in law.
9. The document marked as Ext.A5 is a true copy of the charge sheet filed in Crime No.499/01 of Komarapalayam Police Station, registered in connection with the motor accident in question. The police, after investigation, charge sheeted the 3rd respondent driver of the mini lorry for an offence punishable under Section 279 and Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. As per Ext.A5 charge sheet, the car was proceeding along the left side of the road. In the impugned award, the Tribunal noticed that, the exact place of MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -7- accident is not gatherable from Ext.A4 scene mahazar or the rough sketch prepared by the police, and both sides have not chosen to adduce evidence to prove the exact place of accident.
10. In New India Assurance Company Ltd. v.
Pazhaniammal and others [2011 (3) KHC 595] a Division Bench of this Court held that, as a general rule it can safely be accepted that production of the police charge sheet is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. If any one of the parties do not accept such charge sheet, the burden must be on such party to adduce oral evidence. If oral evidence is adduced by any party, in a case where charge sheet is filed, the Tribunal should give further opportunity to others also to adduce oral evidence and in such a case the charge sheet will pale into insignificance and the dispute will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence. In all other cases such charge sheet can be reckoned as sufficient evidence of negligence in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Wherever, on the facts of a given case, the MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -8- Tribunal feels that the police charge sheet does not satisfy its judicial conscience, the Tribunal can record that the charge sheet cannot be accepted and can call upon the parties, at any stage, to adduce oral evidence of the accident and the alleged negligence. In such a case, the issue of negligence must be decided on the other evidence, ignoring the charge sheet. Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the said decision read thus;
"7. In this context we feel it appropriate to refer to the practice adopted by many Tribunals in the State. Wherever a crime has been registered in respect of the accident and the investigation has culminated in the filing of a charge sheet by the police, such charge sheet is filed and the same is reckoned as sufficient to establish negligence on the part of the indictee. The practice has not received formal judicial approval and hence some Tribunals insist on oral evidence in support of negligence invariably. This consumes a lot of judicial time and the heavily over worked Tribunal spends its time on unnecessary oral evidence of negligence. We would certainly not want the Tribunals to be prisoners of the conclusions of police officers. If the Tribunal finds it suspicious, it can insist for better evidence. But as a general rule it can safely be accepted that production of the police charge sheet is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. A system cannot feed MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -9- itself on a regular diet of distrust of the police. Prima facie, charge sheet filed by a police officer after due investigation can be accepted as evidence of negligence against the indictee. If any one of the parties do not accept such charge sheet, the burden must be on such party to adduce oral evidence. If oral evidence is adduced by any party, in a case where charge sheet is filed, the Tribunals should give further opportunity to others also to adduce oral evidence and in such a case the charge sheet will pale into insignificance and the dispute will have to be decided on the basis of the evidence. In all other cases such charge sheet can be reckoned as sufficient evidence of negligence in a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. We mean to say that on production of such charge sheet the shifting of burden must take place. It is not as though we are not conscious of the dangers and pit falls involved in such an approach. But we feel that adoption and recognition of such practice would help to reduce the length of the long queue for justice before the Tribunals. The judicial recognition of the practice will help the Tribunals to ensure the optimum use of judicial time at their disposal for productive ventures.
8. We do not intend to say that collusive charge sheets need be accepted. Wherever on the facts of a given case the Tribunals feel that the police charge sheet does not satisfy their judicial conscience, the Tribunals can record that the charge sheet cannot be accepted and can call upon the parties, at any stage, to adduce oral evidence MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -10- of the accident and the alleged negligence. In such a case, the issue of negligence must be decided on the other evidence, ignoring the charge sheet."
11. In view of the law laid down in Pazhaniammal, the production of Ext.A5 charge sheet filed in Crime No.499/01 of Komarapalayam Police Station, registered in connection with the motor accident in question, in which the 3rd respondent driver of the mini lorry was charge sheeted for an offence punishable under Section 279 and Section 304A of the Indian Penal Code, is prima facie sufficient evidence of negligence on his part, for the purpose of a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Moreover, as per Ext.A5 charge sheet, the car was proceeding along the left side of the road. The exact place of accident is not gatherable from Ext.A4 scene mahazar or the rough sketch prepared by the police, and both sides have not chosen to adduce evidence to prove the exact place of accident. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to the contra, the Tribunal ought to have held that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of mini lorry by the 3rd respondent driver. In such circumstances, the finding to the contra in the impugned MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -11- award is set aside, by holding that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of mini lorry by the 3rd respondent driver.
12. In Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121] the Apex Court laid down the principles governing determination of quantum of compensation in the case of death in a motor accident. The Apex Court held that, the compensation awarded does not become 'just compensation' merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by following the well settled steps, namely, ascertaining the multiplicand (annual contribution to the family), the multiplier and calculation of loss of dependency by multiplying the multiplicand by such multiplier. MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -12-
13. In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of 'just compensation' and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of 'just compensation' has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the Tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to be guided by the expression, i.e., just compensation.
14. In the instant case, the compensation awarded by MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -13- the Tribunal under various heads reads thus;
Heads Amount awarded
Loss of dependency 352000
Transportation Expenses 2500
Funeral expenses 5000
Pain and suffering 5000
Loss of estate 10000
Total 374500
15. The accident occurred on 04.08.2001. At the time of accident, the deceased was aged 54 years. He was working as a Head Clerk in the Integrated Fisheries Project, Kochi, drawing a monthly salary of Rs.10,051/-. The document marked as Ext.A20 is the salary certificate of the deceased, as per which, he was having 3 more years to retire from service on superannuation. The monthly income of the deceased, while in service, can be fixed as Rs.10,051/-, as shown in Ext.A20.
16. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, the determination of 'just compensation' has to be on the foundation of evidence brought on record as regards the age and income of the deceased and thereafter the apposite multiplier to be applied. The formula relating to multiplier has MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -14- been clearly stated in Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121] and it has been approved in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 65]. The age and income, as stated earlier, have to be established by adducing evidence. The Tribunal and the Courts have to bear in mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a well accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just compensation having uniformity of approach. There has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum. In such an adjudication, the duty of the Tribunal and the Courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour has been made by this Court for standardization which in its ambit includes addition of future prospects on the proven income at present. As far as future prospects are concerned, there has been standardization keeping in view the principle of certainty, stability and consistency. In Pranay Sethi the Apex Court approved the principle of 'standardisation' so that a specific and certain multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier on the MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -15- basis of age.
17. In Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54], a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, in case of self-employed persons also, if the deceased victim is below 40 years, there must be addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects. In Munna Lal Jain v. Vipin Kumar Sharma [(2015) 6 SCC 347] another Three-Judge Bench followed the principle stated in Rajesh. In Pranay Sethi, after expressing the opinion that the dicta laid down in Reshma Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and not the decision in Rajesh, the Constitution Bench observed that, in Munna Lal Jain, the Three-Judge Bench should have been guided by the principle stated in Reshma Kumari which has concurred with the view expressed in Sarla Devi or in case of disagreement, it should have been well advised to refer the case to a Larger Bench.
18. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] the Constitution Bench held that, while determining the income, an addition of 50% of actual salary to the income of the MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -16- deceased towards future prospects, where the deceased had a permanent job and was below the age of 40 years, should be made. The addition should be 30%, if the age of the deceased was between 40 to 50 years. In case the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years, the addition should be 15%. Actual salary should be read as actual salary less tax. The Apex Court held further that, in case the deceased was self-employed or on a fixed salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40 years. An addition of 25% where the deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the necessary method of computation. The established income means the income minus the tax component.
19. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 54 years. At the time of accident, the deceased was earning monthly income of Rs.10,051/- as Head Clerk in the Integrated Fisheries Project, Kochi. In this appeal, MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -17- the monthly income of the deceased, while in service, is fixed as Rs.10,051/-. At the time of accident, the deceased had a permanent job. Therefore, the deceased can be treated as on permanent employment. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, an addition of 15% of the monthly income of the deceased, fixed in this appeal, can be made towards future prospects, since the deceased was between the age of 50 to 60 years.
20. Therefore, for the purpose of granting compensation under the head loss of dependency till superannuation, 15% of the monthly income of the deceased fixed in this appeal as Rs.10,051/-, i.e., a sum of Rs.1,507/- (10,051 x 15/100) has to be added towards future prospects. In the result, the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of fixing compensation under the head loss of dependency till superannuation, is reckoned as Rs.11,558/- (10,051 + 1,507).
21. In Sarla Verma [(2009) 6 SCC 121], the Apex Court, after referring to its earlier decisions in Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -18- [(1994) 2 SCC 176], U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Trilok Chandra [(1996) 4 SCC 362] and New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Charlie [(2005) 10 SCC 720] held that the multiplier to be used should be as mentioned in column (4) of the Table in paragraph 40 of the said decision [prepared by applying Susamma Thomas, Trilok Chandra and Charlie], which starts with an operative multiplier of 18 [for the age groups of 15 to 20 and 21 to 25 years], reduced by one unit for every five years, i.e., multiplier of 17 for 26 to 30 years, multiplier of 16 for 31 to 35 years, multiplier of 15 for 36 to 40 years, multiplier of 14 for 41 to 45 years, and multiplier of 13 for 46 to 50 years, then reduced by two units for every five years, i.e., multiplier of 11 for 51 to 55 years, multiplier of 9 for 56 to 60 years, multiplier of 7 for 61 to 65 years and multiplier of 5 for 66 to 70 years.
22. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, as far as the multiplier is concerned, the Claims Tribunal and the Courts shall be guided by Step 2 that finds a place in paragraph 19 of MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -19- Sarla Verma, read with paragraph 42 of the said judgment.
23. In the instant case, as on the date of accident, the deceased was aged 54 years. In the light of the decisions of the Apex Court in Sarla Verma's case and Pranay Sethi's case referred to supra, the proper multiplier to be applied is
11.
24. In Kumaran and others v. Roy Mathew and others [2017 (1) KHC 594] the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with a case in which, the deceased, at the time of death, was working as a Drawing Teacher in Government Boys High School, Wadakkancherry, drawing a net salary of Rs.17,933/- per month. The deceased was aged 52 years, and at the time of death, he was left with a service of 4 more years, till her retirement at the age of 56 years. The Tribunal found that the correct multiplier to be adopted in the case is
11. But taking note of the deduction in the extent of income after her retirement, a split multiplier was adopted. For the period of 4 years left in her service, the full salary was adopted for determining the multiplicand. For the remaining period of 7 years, the multiplicand was fixed by adopting 50% MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -20- of the salary, observing that if she would have alive she will be entitled only for a monthly pension, which will only be half of the salary.
25. In Kumaran, relying on the decision of the decision of the Apex Court in Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy [(2013) 15 SCC 45] it was contended before the Division Bench that, adoption of a split multiplier method by the Tribunal is illegal. In Puttamma the Apex Court observed that, in the absence of any specific reason and evidence on record the Tribunal should not apply any split multiplier in a routine course and should apply the multiplier applicable as per decision in Sarala Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121], which is affirmed in Reshma Kumari v. Madan Mohan [(2013) 9 SCC 65]. In support of the above proposition reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the Apex Court in Madhusudhan v. Administrative Officer [(2011) 4 SCC 689]. In the said case, the split multiplier adopted by the High Court was reversed by the Apex Court, observing that, the High Court introduced the concept of split multiplier and departed from MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -21- the multiplier used by the Tribunal, without disclosing any reasons thereof. In Madhusudhan the multiplier of 11 adopted by the Tribunal was reduced to 6 by the High Court, without specifying any reasons.
26. In Kumaran, after considering the rival contentions, the Division Bench of this Court opined that, in both the decisions of the Apex Court in Madhusudhan as well as in Puttamma, the dictum laid is only to the effect that in the absence of any specific reasons and availability of evidence on record, split multiplier should not be adopted in a routine course and the multiplier as specified in Sarala Verma, which is affirmed in Reshma Kumari shall be adopted. But, in the case at hand, the specific reason mentioned for adopting different multiplicands for different periods, within the multiplier of 11 years, is based on evidence available and the reasoning mentioned thereof is well founded. Another Division Bench of this Court in Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Valsa [2015 (1) KHC 729] held that, while fixing the compensation a balancing of all essential factors, including disadvantages will have to be MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -22- adopted by the Court. When there is a sure date of superannuation it cannot be ignored that there will be a reduction in the multiplicand. In case of a Government employee, it is sure that the deceased would earn only a monthly pension after his/her retirement. Accepting the arguments of the Insurance Company, the Division Bench in Valsa observed that, while taking the multiplier of 13 a reduction of salary going by the date of superannuation will be justified. Therefore, the Division Bench in Kumaran found no illegality or error committed by the Tribunal in adopting dictum contained in Valsa.
27. In Kumaran the Division Bench concluded that, when there is a certainty with respect to future earnings of the deceased, if he/she would have been alive, the Tribunal shall not shut its eyes with respect to such certainties. Therefore, when there is clear evidence with respect to the date or year of retirement of the deceased on attaining superannuation, it cannot be contended that the Tribunal should adopt the same rate of earning also for the period of post retirement. The considerable reduction in the income, MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -23- which would definitely fall in the life of the deceased after attaining superannuation if he she would have been alive, is a factor which may be taken note of by the Tribunal. Such specific reason for adopting a different multiplicand for different periods, specifically split up from the entire period of multiplier, is based on reasons available in the evidence on record. Application of split multiplier in such cases with different rates of multiplicand is not illegal or erroneous, nor it run against the dictum contained in the decisions of the Apex Court in Puttamma, Sarala Verma, Madhusudhan and Reshma Kumari.
28. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased, who was aged 54 years, was working as a Head Clerk in the Integrated Fisheries Project, Kochi, drawing a monthly salary of Rs.10,051/-. As Ext.A20 salary certificate of the deceased was having 3 more years to retire from service on superannuation. His date of retirement was 31.10.2004. The monthly income of the deceased, while in service, has already been fixed in this appeal as Rs.10,051/-, as shown in Ext.A20. Adding 15% of the monthly income of the deceased MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -24- towards future prospects the monthly income of the deceased, for the purpose of fixing compensation under the head loss of dependency till superannuation, is reckoned as Rs.11,558/- (10,051 + 1,507). His notional monthly income after retirement from service can be taken as Rs.5,025/- (50% of Rs.10,051/-). In view of the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Kumaran, the split multiplier of 3 (while in service) and 8 (after retirement from service) can be adopted for assessing the compensation payable under the head loss of dependency.
29. In Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121] the Apex Court, on the question of deduction towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased held that, the personal and living expenses of the deceased should be deducted from his monthly income, to arrive at the contribution to the dependents. Where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased should be one-third where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3; one- fourth where the number of dependent family members is 4 MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -25- to 6; and one-fifth where the number of dependent family members exceeds 6. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependent. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father. Thus even if the deceased is survived by parents and siblings, only the mother would be considered to be a dependant, and 50% would be treated as the personal and living expenses of the bachelor and 50% as the contribution to the family. However, where family of the bachelor is large and dependent on the income of the deceased, as in a case where he has a MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -26- widowed mother and large number of younger non-earning sisters or brothers, his personal and living expenses may be restricted to one-third and contribution to the family will be taken as two-third.
30. In Reshma Kumari [(2013) 9 SCC 65] a Three- Judge Bench of the Apex Court reproduced paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of Sarla Verma and approved the same, in paragraph 38 of the decision, by stating that, the standards fixed in Sarla Verma provide guidance for the appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses. One must bear in mind that the proportion of a man's net earnings that he saves or spends exclusively for the maintenance of others does not form part of his living expenses but what he spends exclusively on himself does. The percentage of deduction on account of personal and living expenses may vary with reference to the number of dependent members in the family and the personal living expenses of the deceased need not exactly correspond to the number of dependants. Therefore, the standards fixed in Sarla Verma on the aspect of deduction for personal living expenses in paras 30, 31 and 32 MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -27- must ordinarily be followed unless a case for departure in the circumstances noted in the preceding paragraph is made out. In paragraph 43.6 the Apex Court directed that, insofar as deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals shall ordinarily follow the standards prescribed in paragraphs 30, 31 and 32 of the judgment in Sarla Verma, subject to the observations made in para 38 of Reshma Kumari.
31. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, after considering the analysis made in Sarla Verma, which was reconsidered in Reshma Kumari, approved the method provided therein by stating that, as far as the guidance provided for appropriate deduction for personal and living expenses is concerned, the Tribunals and Courts should be guided by the conclusion in paragraph 43.6 of Reshma Kumari.
32. In the instant case, at the time of accident, the deceased was aged 54 years. His wife pre-deceased him. At the time of accident, appellants, 1 to 3, who are the children of the deceased, were aged 23-25 years. They can be treated MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -28- as the dependants of the deceased. Appellants 4 and 5, the parents-in-law of his deceased son Saji Jose, cannot be treated as his dependants. Therefore, a deduction of 1/3 of the monthly income of the deceased has to be made towards his personal and living expenses.
33. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.3,52,000/- as compensation under the head loss of dependency. Taking the monthly income of the deceased, while in service, as Rs.11,558/- (adding 15% towards future prospects); his notional monthly income after retirement from service as Rs.5,025/-; applying the split multiplier of 3 (while in service) and 8 (after retirement from service); and deducting 1/3 towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased, compensation under the head loss of dependency is re-fixed as follows;
(11,558 x 12 x 3 x 2/3) = Rs.2,77,392/-
(5,025 x 12 x 8 x 2/3) = Rs.3,21,600/-
2,77,392 + 3,21,600 = Rs.5,98,992/-
Deducting Rs.3,52,000/- awarded by the Tribunal under the head loss of dependency, appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3 MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -29- are granted an additional compensation of Rs.2,46,992/- (5,98,992 - 3,52,000) under this head.
34. In the impugned award, towards funeral expenses, the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.5,000/-. Towards loss of consortium the Tribunal awarded no compensation to appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3. The Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.10,000/- under the head loss of estate.
35. In Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children.
36. In Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the head relating to loss of care and guidance for minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh refers to Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited [(2012) 6 SCC 421], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -30- Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the Tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, the reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years, MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -31- which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads.
37. In Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh [(2018) 9 SCC 146] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted compensation on conventional heads, in terms of the figures standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, to the wife and children of one Puran Chand, who died in a motor accident, which occurred on 30.12.1992.
38. In Sureshchandra Bagmal Doshi v. New India Assurance Company Limited [(2018) 15 SCC 649] the Apex Court granted the figures on conventional heads standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, i.e., Rs.15,000/- as loss of estate; Rs.40,000/- towards loss of consortium; and Rs.15,000/- as funeral expenses to the parents [appellants before the Apex Court], who lost their only daughter in a motor accident which occurred on 16.08.1998. In the said decision, Rs.40,000/- granted in Pranay Sethi towards loss of consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the parents of the deceased, towards loss of love and affection. Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus;
MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -32-
"1. Fate can be cruel. This is a tragic case where the only daughter of a lawyer husband and a doctor wife, who got married early and unfortunately became a widow also at a young age, died in a vehicular accident, which took place on 16.8.1998. The claim of the parents (appellants herein) in respect of this unfortunate demise forms the subject matter of the present appeal.
xxx xxx xxx
14. Now coming to the last aspect, i.e., the
conventional heads, in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], it has been standardised at Rs.15,000 for loss of estate; Rs.40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs.15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs.70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 percent in the span of every three years. However, we are still within the window of three years." "underline supplied"
39. In Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram [(2018) 18 SCC 130], after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the Apex Court held that in legal parlance, 'consortium' is a compendious term which encompasses 'spousal consortium', 'parental consortium' and 'filial consortium'. The right to consortium would include the MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -33- company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of 'company, society, co-operation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation'. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of 'parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training'. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit.
40. In Magma General Insurance the Apex Court held that consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -34- Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions, therefore, permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In a case where parents have lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court held further that, the amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under 'loss of consortium' as laid down in Pranay Sethi.
41. In Magma General Insurance, the deceased was MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -35- aged 24 years, who was engaged in the business of manufacturing 'namkeen products', who died in a motor accident which occurred on 01.12.2013. The father, brother and sister of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal did not award any compensation to the brother of the deceased, as he could not be considered to be a dependent. Compensation was awarded to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, who were held to be dependents. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court found that the Claims Tribunal used the wrong principle for application of multiplier. The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased and not that of his father. The High Court, while re-assessing the compensation granted a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rs.50,000/- x 2) towards loss of love and affection to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased. The insurer filed S.L.P. before the Apex Court contending, inter alia, that the father and sister of the MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -36- deceased could not be considered as dependants, and were not entitled to compensation. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs.1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses is erroneous. It was contended that only Rs.30,000/- could have been awarded as per the judgment in Pranay Sethi. [i.e., loss of estate - Rs.15,000/- and funeral expenses - Rs.15,000/-] The Apex Court held that, considering that the deceased was living in a village, where he was residing with his aged father, who was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister, the High Court correctly considered them to be dependants of the deceased, and made a deduction of 1/3 rd towards personal expenses of the deceased. [Para.16 @ page 135 of SCC] The Apex Court found that the deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had pre-deceased him. The father of the deceased was about 65 years old and his sister was unmarried. The deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the father and MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -37- unmarried sister of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under his dependants. [Para.18 @ page 136 of SCC] Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs.1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, and Rs.25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para.52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi, decreased the compensation under the head funeral expenses from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-. However, the amount awarded under the head loss of love and affection was maintained. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court deem it appropriate to award the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium.
42. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, which was followed in Santhosh Devi and Suresh Chandra Bagmaldoshi referred to supra, the compensation payable under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs.15,000/-, 40,000/- and MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -38- Rs.15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years.
43. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the surviving spouse is entitled for spousal consortium; children of the deceased are entitled for parental consortium; and parents of a deceased child, who died in a motor accident, are entitled for filial consortium. The amount of compensation that has to be awarded will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under the head loss of consortium, as laid down in Pranay Sethi.
44. In Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72] one of the contentions raised was that, any direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the reasons, if any, given for exercising such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by that Court under Article 141. It was also pointed out that, other MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -39- Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. The Apex Court left open that question, observing as follows; "Though there appears to be some merit in the first respondent's submission, we do not propose to examine that aspect." Though the said question was left open, the Apex Court observed as follows in Para.26 of the judgment;
"26. ....... Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article
142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/ relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/ relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The Courts should MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -40- therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. ......"
45. In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih [(2014) 8 SCC 883] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the view taken in ABS Marine Products' case (supra) holding that, the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held further that, the directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. Paras.11 to 13 of the judgment read thus;
"11. Article 136 of the Constitution of India was legislatively intended to be exercised by the Highest Court of the Land, with scrupulous adherence to the settled judicial principle well established by precedents MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -41- in our jurisprudence. Article 136 of the Constitution is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and make the law operational to make it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague. In short, it declares the law, as under Article 141 of the Constitution.
12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law. The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. 'Declaration of Law' as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution:
is the speech express or necessarily implied by the Highest Court of the land. This Court in the case of Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [(2006) 5 SCC 72], Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381] and in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667], has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -42- under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case.
13. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions of the Court based on different scales of Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be best weighed on the same grounds of reasoning and thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no conflict in the views expressed in the first two judgments and the latter judgment."
46. In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., the Apex Court maintained the compensation awarded by the High Court at the rate of Rs.50,000/- to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased towards loss of love and MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -43- affection. However, the compensation under the head funeral expenses was decreased from Rs.25,000/- to Rs.15,000/-, after quoting para 52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court awarded the father and unmarried sister of the deceased an amount of Rs.40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium.
47. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of love and affection and such other matters. In such circumstances, once the surviving spouse is awarded compensation towards spousal consortium; or the children of the deceased are awarded compensation towards parental consortium; or the parents of the deceased child are awarded compensation towards filial consortium, they are not entitled for award of further compensation under the head loss love and affection, as it would result in duplication or overlapping of compensation under the relevant MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -44- heads.
48. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. In Magma, after noticing the fact that the mother of the deceased had pre-deceased him, his father was aged 65 years old, his sister was unmarried, and the deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival, the Apex Court granted a sum of Rs.40,000/- as compensation to unmarried sister of the deceased under the head filial consortium, after maintaining the compensation (Rs.50,000/- x 2) awarded by the High Court towards loss of love and affection, which can only be treated as a direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the exercise of such power cannot be considered as law laid down by the Apex Court under Article MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -45- 141 of the Constitution of India.
49. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. referred to supra, Rs.5,000/- awarded by the Tribunal in the impugned award towards funeral expenses is enhanced to Rs.15,000/-, resulting an an additional compensation of Rs.10,000/- (15,000 - 5,000); Appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3, who are the children of the deceased are granted Rs.1,20,000/- (40,000 x 3) under the head parental consortium.
50. The Tribunal awarded Rs.10,000/- as compensation towards loss of estate. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680] an amount Rs.15,000/- can be granted under the head loss of estate. Accordingly, the appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3 are granted a sum of Rs.15,000/- towards loss of estate, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.5,000/- (15,000 - 10,000).
51. The Tribunal awarded Rs.5,000/- as compensation towards pain and suffering of the deceased.
52. In Jyni and others v. Raphel P.T. and others MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -46- [2016 (2) KHC 870] a Division Bench of this Court held that, death in an accident is generally the result of violent impact on the body resulting in serious injuries causing severe pain. The magnitude of the ordeal may vary from case to case depending upon the nature of injuries sustained. In cases of instantaneous deaths also pain and suffering is invariably present, as in the case of survival for hours or days. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some notional amount is payable under the head pain and suffering. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs.5,000/- to Rs.15,000/- could be awarded under the head pain and suffering in such cases.
53. In the instant case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries at the place of accident itself. Considering the said fact, the compensation of Rs.5,000/- awarded by the Tribunal towards pain and suffering of the deceased is just and reasonable, which requires no enhancement in this appeal. MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -47-
54. Towards transportation expenses the Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.2,500/-. The accident is of the year 2001, which occurred at Pachampalayam in Coimbatore - Salem National Highway. The deceased was a resident of Palarivattom in Ernakulam District. Considering the said fact, the compensation under the head transportation expenses is re-fixed as Rs.10,000/-, resulting an additional compensation of Rs.7,500/- (10,000 - 2,500).
55. As already noticed, in the instant case, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs.3,74,500/- to appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3. In view of the finding on the question of composite negligence, the appellants are found entitled only for a sum of Rs.2,49,667/- (2/3 of Rs.3,74,500/-). The finding of the Tribunal, in the impugned award, on the question of composite negligence, has already been set aside in this appeal, by holding that the accident occurred solely due to the rash and negligent driving of mini lorry by the 3 rd respondent driver. Therefore, appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3 are entitled for the entire amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal, resulting payment of an additional amount of MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -48- Rs.1,24,833/- (3,74,500 - 2,49,667).
56. In the result, the appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3 are entitled for payment of an additional compensation of Rs.5,14,325/- (Rupees five lakhs fourteen thousand three hundred and twenty five only) [2,46,992 + 10,000 + 1,20,000 + 5,000 + 7,500 + 1,24,833] in this appeal, which will carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of petition till realisation. The additional compensation granted in this appeal shall be apportioned among appellants 1 to 3/ claimants 1 to 3, equally. The 2nd respondent insurer shall satisfy the additional compensation granted in this appeal, together with interest, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. The disbursement of additional compensation to appellants 1 to 3/claimants 1 to 3 shall be made taking note of the law on the point and in terms of the directives issued by this Court in Circular No.3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No.D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019. Appellants 1 to 3/ MACA. No. 2091 of 2009 -49- claimants 1 to 3 shall provide their Bank account details (attested copy of the relevant page of the Bank Passbook having details of the Bank Account Number and IFSC Code of the branch) before the Tribunal, with copy to the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.
This appeal is disposed of as above. No order as to costs.
Sd/-
ANIL K.NARENDRAN JUDGE das