Priyanka Pathak Narain vs Swami Ramdev on 28 April, 2018

[Cites 17, Cited by 0]

Delhi District Court

Priyanka Pathak Narain vs Swami Ramdev on 28 April, 2018

IN THE COURT OF JSCCASCJGJ, EAST DISTRICT, KARKARDOOMA
                      COURTS, DELHI

Presided By : Sh. Jay Thareja, DJS

MCA No: 08/2017

Priyanka Pathak Narain
C/o M/s. Juggernaut Books (Publisher)
At 4th Floor, 118, KS House,
Shahpur Jat, New Delhi110049.                               ... Appellant
                                          Versus
1. Swami Ramdev
Through GPA holder Dr. Jaideep Arya,
C51, Preet Vihar, Delhi - 110092.
2. M/s. Juggernaut Books
At 4th Floor, 118, KS House,
Shahpur Jat, New Delhi110049.
3. M/s. Amazon India
At Brigade Gateway, 8th Floor,
26/1, Dr. Raj Kumar Road,
Malleshwaram, West Bengaluru560055,
Karnataka.
4. M/s. Flipkart Internet Pvt. Ltd.
At Vaishani Summit No. 6/B, 7th Main,
80 Feet Road, 3rd Floor, Koramangala,
Bengaluru - 560034, Karnataka.

5. M/s. Manipal Technologies Ltd.
At Udyavani Building, Udyavani Road,
Manipal - 5761041.                                           ... Respondents

              APPEAL UNDER ORDER XLIII, RULE 1(r) OF THE
                   CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 

                                             DATE OF INSTITUTION : 13.10.2017

MCA No. 08/2017
Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.
Page No.1 of 23
                      DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS : 15.03.2018
                                     DATE  OF DECISION : 28.04.2018

                                      JUDGMENT

1. The appellant, in this appeal, is the author of the book, "Godman to Tycoon: The Untold Story of Baba Ramdev", ISBN No.9789386228383. The appellant has filed this appeal in this Court, under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (henceforth 'CPC, 1908') feeling aggrieved by the Order dated 27.09.2017, passed by the Court of Ld. Commercial Civil Judge, East, KKD Courts, Delhi (henceforth 'Ld. Trial Court') in Suit No.619/2017, Swami Ramdev v Priyanka Pathak Narain and Ors. (henceforth 'subject suit'). By way of the said Order (henceforth 'impugned Order'), the Ld. Trial Court has dismissed the application filed by the appellant under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of CPC, 1908 seeking vacation of the exparte adinterim injunction Order, passed by the Ld. Trial Court on 04.08.2017, allowed the application filed by the respondent no.1 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC, 1908, purportedly seeking a prohibition/ban on the publication and sale of the book of the appellant and directed the appellant to appear in person.

2. In order to sustain the challenge qua the impugned Order, the appellant has interalia pleaded in this appeal that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by ignoring the plea of the appellant that the institution of the subject suit before the Ld. Trial Court, by Sh. Jaideep Arya, on behalf of the respondent no.1, was improper as the General Power of Attorney dated 03.08.2017, executed by the respondent MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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no.1, in favor of Sh. Jaideep Arya did not specifically authorize Sh. Jaideep Arya to institute the subject suit, before the Ld. Trial Court; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court without giving due credence to the plea of the appellant that the plaint of the subject suit was defective, as the pleadings made therein had been verified by Sh. Jaideep Arya on 02.08.2017, without having any authority from the respondent no.1, on 02.08.2017; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by perversely rejecting the plea of the appellant that the Ld. Trial Court did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the subject suit; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by ignoring the plea of the appellant that CPC, 1908 does not permit use of honorifics by a party and does not permit filing of a suit without the actual name of a person; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by ignoring the plea of the appellant that in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 had failed to properly value the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, rendering the plaint of the subject suit, nonest in law; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court without giving due credence to the plea of the appellant that the pleadings made in the plaint of the subject suit do not disclose sufficient cause of action for the respondent no.1 to seek a prohibition/ban qua the publication and sale of the book of the appellant; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court without giving due credence to the plea of the appellant that in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has nowhere specifically pleaded that the contents of the book of the appellant, are false; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by going beyond the pleadings of MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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the plaint of the subject suit; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, without giving due credence to the plea of the appellant that the facts and observations stated/made in the book of the appellant are justifiable on the grounds of truth, fair comment and fair reporting, which are legitimate defenses qua a suit based on the tort of defamation; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court without giving due credence to the right of freedom of speech guaranteed to the appellant under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India and right to freedom of trade and profession, guaranteed to the appellant under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by ignoring the plea of the appellant that since the respondent no.1 was guilty of suppressing prior publications qua his life, from the Ld. Trial Court, the respondent no.1 did not deserve the grant of any discretionary relief, by the Ld. Trial Court; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court without giving due credence to the plea of the appellant that by permitting previous publications qua his life and conduct to remain on public space/forums, the respondent no.1 has acquiesced in publication of material qua his life and conduct, including the book of the appellant; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by perversely concluding that the conduct of the respondent no.1, is not a matter of public interest; that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by wrongly observing that book of the appellant should have been published with prior consent of the respondent no.1, the research reflected in the book of the appellant should have resulted in definite conclusions and the paragraphs/sections of the book of the appellant should have been properly referenced; that the MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court by failing to observe that Order VI Rule 14A of CPC, 1908 does not mandate, a party to provide his/her/its residential address and that the impugned Order has been passed by the Ld. Trial Court, by ignoring that there is no law, permitting a Civil Court to direct personal appearance of a party.

3. The respondents no.2, 3, 4 and 5 have not contested this appeal. In the reply filed by the respondent no.1 qua this appeal, on 27.11.2017, the respondent no.1 has interalia pleaded that there is no perversity in the impugned Order, warranting any interference by this Court; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly dealt with the pleas of the appellant qua General Power of Attorney dated 03.08.2017 and irregularity in verification of the plaint of the subject suit; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly ignored the plea of the appellant qua improper valuation of the subject suit because the respondent no.1 had duly instituted the subject suit before the Ld. Trial Court; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly rejected the objection of the appellant qua territorial jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court to entertain the subject suit because in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has interalia pleaded that the Ld. Trial Court has the jurisdiction to entertain the subject suit, as the book of the appellant was being sold within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ld. Trial Court; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly ignored the plea of the appellant that CPC, 1908 does not permit use of honorifics by a party and does not permit filing of a suit without the actual name of a person, because there are plenty of precedents where Courts of this country have MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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ignored such objections and preferred to decide cases on facts; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly decried the plea of the appellant that the facts and observations stated/made in the book of the appellant are justifiable on the grounds of truth, fair comment and fair reporting, because the book of the appellant is substantially based on unverified personal interviews, incredible online articles/websites/magazines and youtube videos and not public records and because in paragraph 5 of the preliminary submissions and objections, pleaded in the the written statement filed by the appellant in the subject suit, the appellant has pleaded the defence of 'truth' in a subjective manner and not as objectively, as is required in a suit based on the tort of defamation; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly given more credence to the right of reputation and privacy guaranteed to the respondent no.1 under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, in contrast to the rights guaranteed to the appellant under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India; that in the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly observed that personal life of the respondent no.1, cannot be a subject matter of public interest and that in impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has rightly dealt with, all the pleas of the appellant.

4. In order to adjudicate upon this appeal, I had heard Sh. Amit Agarwal, Ld. Advocate for the appellant and Sh. Arjun Diwan, Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, on 12.12.2017, 21.12.2017, 29.01.2018, 03.02.2018, 20.02.2018 and 08.03.2018.

5. After considering the submissions made by the Ld. Advocate MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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for the appellant and the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, on the aforesaid dates and perusing the file of the Ld. Trial Court as well as this Court, I find that in order to effectively adjudicate upon this appeal, this Court is required to examine the following aspects:

(a) Whether the plaint of the subject suit was duly instituted before the Ld. Trial Court, by Sh. Jaideep Arya, on behalf of the respondent no.1?

(b) Whether the Ld. Trial Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the subject suit?

(c) Whether the plaint of the subject suit, has been properly valued by the respondent no.1, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction?

(d) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was/is apposite to prohibit/ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant, till the final disposal of the subject suit?

(e) Whether the prima facie finding of the Ld. Trial Court qua any of the aforesaid aspects is perverse and warrants this Court to modify or set aside the impugned Order?

6. In respect of the first aspect identified in the aforesaid paragraph, I find that in paragraphs 25.1 to 25.5 of the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has expressed doubt regarding the due institution of the subject suit before the Ld. Trial Court, by Sh. Jaideep Arya, on behalf of the respondent no.1 and thereafter directed the respondent no.1, to appear in person, before the Ld. Trial Court for the purpose of ratifying the acts of Sh. Jaideep Arya. Further, upon perusal of the file of the Ld. Trial Court, I find that the respondent no.1 has appeared in person before the Ld. Trial Court on 05.12.2017 and ratified all the acts of Sh. Jaideep Arya, MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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including institution of the subject suit before the Ld. Trial Court, by Sh. Jaideep Arya, on behalf of the respondent no.1. The statement made by the respondent no.1, before the Ld. Trial Court, on 05.12.2017, is reproduced below: "I am the plaintiff to the present suit. I had authorized the Dr. Jagdeep Arya son of Shri Om Prakash aged about 45 years, R/o 82, Prem Nagar, Karnal, Haryana, presently resident of C51, Preet Vihar, Delhi to institute and prosecute the present suit on my behalf and ratify all the acts of the said agent of mine already done by him towards prosecution of present suit."

7. In my view, the aforesaid statement made by the respondent no.1, before the Ld. Trial Court, on 05.12.2017, obviates the objections taken by the appellant qua the due institution of the subject suit before the Ld. Trial Court, by Sh. Jaideep Arya, on behalf of the respondent no.1, Therefore, it is held that prima facie, there is nothing wrong in the institution of the subject suit, before the Ld. Trial Court, by Sh. Jaideep Arya, on behalf of the respondent no.1.

8. In respect of the second aspect, identified in paragraph 5 of this judgment, paragraph 23.1 of the impugned Order is relevant. In the said paragraph, Ld. Trial Court, upon examining the pleadings made in paragraph 17 of the plaint of the subject suit and law laid down by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Frankfinn Management v Subhash Motiwani and Anr., (2008) 154 DLT 95, has concluded that it has the territorial MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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jurisdiction to entertain the subject suit. In my view, there is nothing wrong in the said conclusion of the Ld. Trial Court. Therefore, it is held that prima facie, the Ld. Trial Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the subject suit.

9. In respect of the third aspect identified in paragraph 5 of this judgment, the Ld. Advocate for the appellant as well as the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 had made elaborate submissions. The Ld. Advocate for the appellant had submitted that the impugned Order is silent qua the plea of the appellant that the respondent no.1 has not been properly valued the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction; that in paragraph 18 of the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has not properly valued the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, by failing to value each and every relief, sought by way of the subject suit; that as per the law laid down in Rampur Distillery and Chemicals Co. Ltd. v Union of India, 1995 (32) DRJ 733, it was the duty of the respondent no.1, to value each and every relief, sought by way of the subject suit; that the failure of respondent no.1 to properly value the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, has caused prejudice to the right of appellant, as expounded in paragraph 10 of the judgment in M.L. Sethi v R.P. Kapur, (1972) 2 SCC 427 and that the failure of respondent no.1 to properly value the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, has rendered the plaint of the subject suit, to be non est, as explained in Dr. Zubair Ul Abidin and Ors. v Sameena Abidin @ Sameena Khan, FAO (OS) No. 427/2013, decided by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi on 14.07.2014. Per contra, the Ld. MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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Advocate for the respondent no.1 had submitted that while hearing an appeal under Order XL1, Rule 1(r) of CPC, 1908, this Court cannot examine whether or not, the plaint of the subject suit, has been properly valued for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, by the respondent no.1 and that by filing an application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908, before the Ld. Trial Court, on 01.09.2017, the respondent no.1 has already taken steps towards rectification of errors, if any, in the plaint of the subject suit. Having duly considered the aforesaid submissions of the Ld. Advocate for the appellant and the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, I find that the submission made by the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 to the effect that while hearing an appeal under Order XLVII Rule 1(r) of CPC, 1908, this Court cannot examine, whether or not, the plaint of the subject suit, has been properly valued for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction by the respondent no.1, is meritless because in order to ascertain whether or not the Ld. Trial Court has the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the present suit, the Ld. Trial Court was duty bound to examine whether the plaint of the subject suit has been properly valued for the courtfees and 'jurisdiction' by the respondent no.1 and since, the Ld. Trial Court has failed to do so, it is the duty of this Court to examine whether or not, the plaint of the subject suit, has been properly valued for the purpose of courtfees and 'jurisdiction', by the respondent no.1. 1 Further, upon perusal of paragraph 18 of plaint of the subject suit, I find that the respondent no.1 has not properly valued the subject suit for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction because in the prayer of the subject suit, the 1 In this regard, it is noteworthy that till a plaintiff properly values the plaint of a suit, for the purpose of courtfees and particularly, 'jurisdiction', as per the provisions of the Courtfees Act, 1870 and the Suits Valuation Act, 1871, it is not possible for a Court to conclude that it has the pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the suit.

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respondent no.1 has sought 7 distinct reliefs, requiring independent valuation for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, but in paragraph 18 the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has given an omnibus value of Rs.390/ to the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction. In my view, on account of the law laid down in Rampur Distillery and Chemicals Co. Ltd. v Union of India, 1995 (32) DRJ 733, the respondent no.1, was/is interalia duty bound to separately value every distinct relief of injunction, sought in the prayer of subject suit, as per Section 7(iv)(d) of the Courtfees Act, 1870 and Section 8 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1871 and till the respondent no.1, does not do so, and pays the appropriate courtfees thereof, it was/is inapposite for the Ld. Trial Court to proceed with the proceedings of the subject suit, on account of the embargo, provided in Section 4 of the Courtfees Act, 1870. 1 In respect of the submission made by the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 that by filing an application under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908, before the Ld. Trial Court, on 01.09.2017, the respondent no.1 has already taken steps towards rectification of errors, if any, in the plaint of the subject suit, I find that in the application filed by the respondent no.1, under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908, 01.09.2017, the respondent no.1 has not sought any amendment in paragraph 18 of the plaint of the subject suit, wherein, the respondent no.1 has made pleadings qua the valuation of the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction and therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the respondent no.1 to contend before this Court that he has already taken steps for correction in valuation of the subject suit.

1 In this regard, reference is craved to the observations of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in paragraph 7 of the judgment in Sahara India Airlines Ltd. v R.A. Singh, 1997 SCC OnLine Del 736, (1997) 43 DRJ 217 (DB).

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10. In respect of the fourth aspect identified in paragraph 5 of this judgment also, the Ld. Advocate for the appellant and the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 had made elaborate submissions. The Ld. Advocate for the appellant had submitted that it was/is inapposite to ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant, till the final disposal of the subject suit because in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has not made pleadings, as warranted by the judgments in W. Hay and Ors. v Aswini Kumar Samanta, AIR 1958 Calcutta 269 and M J Zakharia Sait v T M Mohammed and Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 396 and thereby rendered the plaint of the subject suit to be vague/devoid of sufficient cause of action; because the respondent no.1 being a public personality/person of public interest, cannot be permitted to question fair criticism by a journalist/author, like the appellant, as explained in R. Rajgopal alias R.R. Gopal and Anr. v State of T N and Ors. (1994) 6 SCC 632; because in accordance with the law laid down in Khushwant Singh and Anr. v Maneka Gandhi AIR 2002 Del 58, the plea of the appellant that the facts and observations stated/made in the book of the appellant are justifiable on the ground of truth, fair comment and fair reporting, was/is sufficient to defeat the prayer of the respondent no.1 qua prohibition/ban on the publication and sale of the book of the appellant; because the mistakes, if any, in the book of the appellant, fall within the scope of permissible mistakes, by a journalist/author; because the pleadings made in the plaint of the subject suit qua violation of right to reputation and privacy of the respondent no.1, are incompetent and do not provide sufficient basis for seeking a ban on the publication and sale of the book of MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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the appellant; because the book of the appellant is already available in the market for reading by the public, on account of the publication and sale done by the respondent no.2, before passing of the exparte adinterim injunction Order, by the Ld. Trial Court, on 04.08.2017; and because the Courts in Delhi, particularly the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, when presented with similar facts and circumstances, always lean in favour of protecting the right of freedom of speech and expression of an individual/journalist/author, as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, in contrast to protecting the right of reputation and privacy, guaranteed to an individual under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. In respect of the latter submission, the Ld. Advocate for the appellant had relied upon the judgments in Khushwant Singh v Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58, His Holiness Shamar Rimpoche v Lea Terhune, 2005 (79) DR 465, Indu Jain v Forbes Incorporated, (2007) ILR 8 Delhi 9, Tata Sons v Greenpeace International and Anr., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466 and Dr. Shashi Tharur v Arnab Goswami and Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12049.

11. In order to controvert the aforesaid submissions made by the Ld. Advocate for the appellant, the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 had submitted that since the entire book of the appellant, is defamatory and since the entire book of the appellant violates the right of privacy of the respondent no.1, the respondent no.1 cannot be expected to plead the entire book of the appellant, as part of the plaint of the subject suit; that as per the definition of 'public interest' given in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, the book of the appellant cannot be accepted to have MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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been written in 'public interest'; that the law laid down in Khushwant Singh and Anr. v Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58 does not apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case, because the subject matter of the said case was "Truth, Love and a Little Malice", an autobiography of Late Sh. Khushwant Singh and the defence of truth pleaded therein by Late Sh. Khushwant Singh was based on his personal knowledge whereas, the subject matter of the present case viz. the book of the appellant, is not an autobiography and the defence of truth, pleaded by the appellant is not based on her personal knowledge; that the pleadings made in paragraph by way of 5, 6, 14 and 19(i) of the plaint of the subject suit, qua violation of right to reputation and privacy of the respondent no.1, are competent and provide sufficient basis for the respondent no.1 to seek a ban on the publication and sale of the book of the appellant and that while adjudicating this case, this Court should rely upon the judgment in R. Rajgopal @ R.R. Gopal and Anr. v State of T N and Ors., (1994) 6 SCC 632, as it squarely applies to the facts and circumstances of the case. Also, Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 submitted that it was/is apposite to ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant, till the disposal of the subject suit because the book of the appellant, in effect, is a biography of the respondent no.1, published without the consent of the respondent no.11; because the book of the appellant is substantially based on unverified personal interviews, incredible online articles/websites/ magazines and youtube videos and not public records; because as per the 1 The said submission of the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, was found to be devoid of any foundation, in the plaint of the subject suit because in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has nowhere, expressly or impliedly pleaded that the book of the appellant, in effect, is a biography of the respondent no.1, published without the consent of the respondent no.1.

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judgment of Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul in K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, the respondent no.1 has the exclusive right to control dissemination of his personal information, including the information published in the book of the appellant; and because as per the judgment in Selvi J. Jayalalitha v Penguin Books India, 2012 (3) MWN (Civil) 171, the appellant has no authority to publish any account regarding the personal life of the respondent no.1.1

12. Having duly considered the aforesaid submissions of the Ld. Advocate for the appellant and the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, I find that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was/is inapposite to prohibit/ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant because of multiple reasons.

13. Firstly, it was/is inapposite to prohibit/ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant because the book of the appellant is already available in the market for reading by the public, on account of the publication and sale done by the respondent no.2, before passing of the exparte adinterim injunction Order, by the Ld. Trial Court, on 04.08.2017. In my view, the said fact singularly tilts the balance of convenience in favour of appellant because (a) the damage, if any, to the reputation and the privacy of the respondent no.1 that has already occurred, on account 1 The last two submissions of the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, were also found to be devoid of any foundation, in the plaint of the subject suit because in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has nowhere, expressly or impliedly pleaded that the book of the appellant violates the right of the respondent no.1 to exclusively control dissemination of his personal information and that the book of the appellant violates the right to privacy of the respondent no.1. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the word 'privacy' does not feature anywhere in the plaint of the subject suit.

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of the books published and sold by the respondent no.2, in the market, before 04.08.2017 cannot be regulated by banning the publication and sale of the book of the appellant w.e.f. 04.08.2017, because (b) the damage, if any, that may occur to the reputation and privacy of the respondent no.1, in the future, can also not be effectively regulated by banning the publication and sale of the book of the appellant w.e.f. 04.08.2017, as the copies of book of the appellant, already published and sold by the respondent no.2 in the market, before 04.08.2017, will continue to be sold/resold/exchanged and be read by new persons. Further, in my view, the aforesaid fact makes it pragmatic for this Court, to protect the right of freedom of speech and expression guaranteed to the appellant under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, which is the usual course of business, in suits like the present suit.1

14. Secondly, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was/is inapposite to ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant because the pleadings in the plaint of the subject suit are incompetent and do not provide sufficient basis for seeking a prohibition/ban on the publication and sale of the book of the appellant. In this regard, it is 1 In this regard, reference is craved to the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Khushwant Singh v Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58, Indu Jain v Forbes Incorporated, (2007) ILR 8 Delhi 9, Tata Sons v Greenpeace International and Anr., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466 and Dr. Shashi Tharur v Arnab Goswami and Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12049. In the said judgments, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi, after taking due note of the judgment in Bonnard v Perryman, (1891) 2 CH 269 and other notable judgments, has observed that in suits like the present suit, ordinarily a Civil Court should not grant a prohibitory injunction, prohibiting/banning publication of the alleged defamatory content and should leave it for the plaintiff to remedy the damage caused to his/her reputation, by seeking damages from the defendant; and that only as an exception, a Civil Court should grant a prohibitory injunction, prohibiting/banning the publication of the alleged defamatory content, when (a) the balance of convenience lies in favour of the plaintiff and when (b) the defence of the defendant, appears to be completely meritless.

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noteworthy that apart from the contentious1 pleading made in paragraph 9 of the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has nowhere specifically pleaded in the plaint of the subject suit that any fact in the book of the appellant, is false and consequently defamatory qua the reputation of the respondent no.1; that in paragraph 8 and 11 of the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has not explained the defamatory meaning of the innuendos/insinuations identified therein, as required by the law laid down in W. Hay and Ors. v Aswini Kumar Samanta, AIR 1958 Calcutta 269 and M J Zakharia Sait v T M Mohammed and Ors., (1990) 3 SCC 396 and that in the plaint of the subject suit, the respondent no.1 has neither expressly pleaded that the book of the appellant violates his right to privacy nor identified the exact paragraphs/chapters of the book of the appellant, which violate his right to privacy. In my considered view, on account of the aforesaid deficiencies, the plaint of subject suit, as it stands today, certainly does not deserve grant of the interim prohibitory injunction/ban qua the publication and sale of the book of the appellant. During the hearing of arguments, the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1 had referred to the judgments in Dhyanapeta Charitable Trust v Nakkheeran Publications, 2010 (5) CTC 283 and G.L. Publications Ltd. and Ors. v North Eastern Indian Trust for Education and Development (NEITED) and Ors., 2009 (4) GLT 97 and submitted that since the entire book of the appellant, is defamatory and since the entire book of the appellant violates the right of privacy of the respondent no.1, the respondent no.1 cannot be expected to plead the entire book of the appellant, as part of the plaint of the subject suit. In respect of the said 1 Only by way of trial, it can be deciphered whether or not, the respondent no.1 did or did not have a fall out with Acharya Karamveer.

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submission of the Ld. Advocate for the respondent no.1, I find that it is untenable because it is inconsistent with settled principle of law, recognized since the judgment in Siddik Mahomed Shah v Mst. Saran, AIR 1930 PC 57(1)1, that the pleadings in a plaint or a written statement have to specific, so that the opposite party gets a fair opportunity to prosecute/defend its case, effectively. In my view, in the present case, the respondent no.1 is duty bound to identify the paragraphs/chapters of the book of the appellant, which are either defamatory qua the reputation of the respondent no.1 or violate the right to privacy of the respondent no.1 because certainly each and every paragraph/chapter of the book of the appellant does not defame the respondent no.1 or violate his right to privacy, because till the respondent no.1 does not do so, the appellant and other other defendants of the subject suit, will not get a fair opportunity to defend the subject suit and because till the respondent no.1 does not do so, it will not be possible for any Court to fairly conclude whether only some parts of the book of the appellant are required to banned or the entire book of the appellant, is required to be banned.

15. Thirdly, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was/is inapposite to ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant because the plea of the appellant that the facts and observations stated/made in the book of the appellant are justifiable on the grounds of truth, fair comment and fair reporting, although weak, is competent to present a defence qua the case of the respondent no.1, as narrated in the plaint of subject suit. In this regard, it is noteworthy that in the plaint of the 1 The principle of law laid down in the said judgment, has been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajgopal (Dead) by LRs v Krishan Gopal and Anr., (2003) 10 SCC 653.

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subject suit, the respondent no.1 has, in effect, only claimed the insinuations/conclusions in the book of the appellant to be defamatory and not raised any challenge qua the facts that have led the appellant to make said the insinuations/conclusions and that as such, only upon a thorough trial, it can be deciphered by the Ld. Trial Court, whether the insinuations/conclusions in the book of the appellant are defamatory or not. Also, in this regard, it is noteworthy that the import of the judgments of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Khushwant Singh v Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58, Indu Jain v Forbes Incorporated, (2007) ILR 8 Delhi 9, Tata Sons v Greenpeace International and Anr., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466, Dr. Shashi Tharur v Arnab Goswami and Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12049 is that in suits like the present suit, a Civil Court should grant a prohibitory injunction, prohibiting/banning the publication of the alleged defamatory content, not as a rule, but, as an exception, only when the defence of the defendant, appears to be completely meritless.

16. Fourthly, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was/is inapposite to ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant because the plea of the respondent no.1 that he is not a person of public interest, is not borne from the plaint of the subject suit and because even otherwise, the said plea of the respondent no.1, is completely meritless. In regard to the latter reason, it is noteworthy that there are numerous books about the life of the respondent no.1, being published and sold in the market, including an authorized biography, "Swami Ramdev: Ek Yogi Ek Yodha". Clearly, a person, who has permitted numerous books about his life to be published and sold in the market and who has an authorized MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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biography being published and sold in the market, cannot claim that he is not a person of public interest because the very reason, a person permits such books to be published and sold in the market and permits his authorized biography to be published and sold in the market, is that the said person believes himself/herself to be a person of public interest.

17. Fifthly, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it was/is inapposite to ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant because the plea of the respondent no.1 that the book of the appellant violates his right to privacy, is not borne from the plaint of the subject suit. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the word 'privacy' does not feature anywhere in the plaint of the subject suit.

18. Thus, on account of the aforesaid five reasons, it is held that prima facie, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it was/is inapposite to prohibit/ban the publication and sale of the book of the appellant, till the final disposal of the subject suit.

19. In respect of the fifth aspect, identified in paragraph 5 of this judgment, I find that the the failure of the Ld. Trial Court to consider the the plea of the appellant that the respondent no.1, had not properly valued the plaint of the subject suit, for the purpose of courtfees and jurisdiction, in the impugned Order, is a perversity/infirmity that warrants this Court to set aside the impugned Order. Also, I find that the prima facie finding of the Ld. Trial Court that in the facts and circumstances of this case, it is apposite to prohibit/ban the publication and sale of the book, is MCA No. 08/2017 Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.

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perverse/infirm and warrants this Court to set aside the impugned Order, because (a) while giving such finding, the Ld. Trial Court has gone beyond the pleadings of the plaint of the subject suit, because (b) while giving such finding in impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court has not noted that the book of the appellant was already available in the market for reading by the public, on account of the publication and sale done by the respondent no.2, before passing of the exparte adinterim injunction Order, by the Ld. Trial Court, on 04.08.2017 and as a consequence thereof, as aforesaid, the balance of convenience qua the prohibition/ban on the publication and sale of the book of the appellant, actually exists in favor the appellant and because (c) while giving such finding, the Ld. Trial Court has not noted that as per the law laid down in Khushwant Singh v Maneka Gandhi, AIR 2002 Del 58, Indu Jain v Forbes Incorporated, (2007) ILR 8 Delhi 9, Tata Sons v Greenpeace International and Anr., 2011 SCC OnLine Del 466, Dr. Shashi Tharur v Arnab Goswami and Anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12049, the usual course, in suits like the present suit, is to protect the right of freedom and speech guaranteed to an individual/journalist/author, as guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, unless the defense of truth, fair comment and fair reporting, pleaded by the individual/journalist/author, appears to be completely meritless. 1

20. As a consequence of the aforesaid findings qua the five aspects identified in parapraph 5 of this judgment, the present appeal is allowed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs. The impugned Order 1 The findings in this paragraph have been given keeping in view the law laid down in Ramdev Food Products (P) Ltd. v Arvindbhai Rambhai Patel, (2006) 8 SCC 726 and Wander Ltd. v Antox India P. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727.

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is set aside to the extent that henceforth, there shall be no prohibition/ban upon the appellant to publish and sell her book, "Godman to Tycoon: The Untold Story of Baba Ramdev", ISBN No.9789386228383. The direction given by the Ld. Trial Court, by way of the impugned Order, to the appellant, to appear in person before the Ld. Trial Court, is left untouched because while hearing an appeal under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) of CPC, 1908 or any other provision of Order XLIII Rule 1 of CPC, 1908, it is not permissible for this Court to examine the legality of the said direction of the Ld. Trial Court.

21. Before parting with this judgment, it is clarified that apart from the aforesaid reasons, the impugned Order is liable to be set aside because the prayer in the application filed by the respondent no.1 under Order XXXIX Rule 1 and 2 of CPC, 1908, before the Ld. Trial Court, is at complete variance with subject matter of the subject suit as well as the relief granted by the Ld. Trial Court to the respondent no.1, by way of the impugned Order and because in my view, before passing the impugned Order, the Ld. Trial Court should have (a) settled the issue regarding the exact identity of the respondent no.3, raised before the Ld. Trial Court, on 01.09.2017 (b) settled the issue regarding the identity of the respondent no.2, raised by the Trial Court itself in impugned Order and (c) decided the application filed by the respondent no.1 under Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, 1908, on 01.09.2017, seeking drastic amendments in the plaint of the subject suit. In my view, the failure of the Ld. Trial Court to do so has prejudiced the parties to the subject suit, particularly the respondent no.1.

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22. Also, before parting with this judgment, it is clarified that the net import of this judgment is not that respondent no.1 has not suffered any damage to his reputation on account of publication and sale of the book of the appellant. Instead, it is that since the book of the appellant, is already available in the market, for reading by the public, on account of the publication and sale done by the respondent no.2, before passing of the exparte adinterim injunction Order, by the Ld. Trial Court, on 04.08.2017; since, the case of the respondent no.1 has not been pleaded in the plaint of the subject suit, in the best possible manner, as required by law; and since, the defense of truth, fair comment and fair reporting, pleaded by the appellant, is not completely meritless, in wake of the pleadings in the plaint of the subject suit, it is apposite (a) not to prohibit/ban the publication and sale of the book of the the appellant and stifle the right of freedom and speech and expression guaranteed to the appellant under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India, till the final disposal of the subject suit and (b) to leave the respondent no.1 to remedy the damage caused to his reputation, by seeking damages from the appellant.

23. The Ahlmad of this Court, is directed to send a certified copy of this Judgment to the Ld. Trial Court along with the record of the Ld. Trial Court. Also, the Ahlmad of this Court is directed to consign the appeal file to the record room, after completion of necessary formalities.

    Announced in open Court                                (Jay Thareja)
    today on 28.04.2018                          JSCC/ASCJ/GJ/EAST DISTRICT
                                                   Karkardooma Courts/Delhi

                                                                             Digitally signed by JAY
                                                                             THAREJA
MCA No. 08/2017
                                  JAY
Priyanka Pathak Narain v Swami Ramdev and Ors.
Page No.23 of 23
                                                                             Location: East District
                                                                             Karkardooma Courts,
                                  THAREJA                                    Delhi
                                                                             Date: 2018.04.28
                                                                             16:21:52 +0530

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Priyanka Pathak Narain vs Swami Ramdev on 28 April, 2018