Madhya Pradesh High Court
State Of Madhya Pradesh And Ors. vs G.L. Patel And Company And Ors. on 13 March, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997MP74, AIR 1997 MADHYA PRADESH 74
Bench: A.K. Mathur, Chief Justice
JUDGMENT S.C. Pandey, J.
1. This is a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent against the Order dated 29-11-1995, passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in M.C.C. No. 382/95"(State of M.P. and two others v. G.L. Patel), arising out of order dated 16-2-1995, passed by the learned single Judge in M.P. No. 1037/94. The State has also challenged in this appeal, the order passed by the learned single Judge in M.P. No. 1037/94, decided on 16-2-1995. It has also filed an application for condonation of delay in filing the Letters Patent Appeal under Section 5 of Limitation Act against the order dated 16-2-1995 in M.P. No. 1037/94.
2-3. The State has also filed L.P.A. No. 206/95 against the order, passed by a learned single Judge in M.C.C. No. 383/95 which arose from the order, dated 16/2/1995, passed in M.P. No. 1158/94. In this appeal also an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order 16-2-1995 in M.P. No. 1158/94 has been filed by the State.
3. It may be mentioned here that both these appeals are connected because M.P. Nos. 1037/94 and 1158/94 were heard as connected writ petitions. Similarly M.C.C. Nos. 382/95 and 383/95 were also heard together. The learned single Judge has passed the main order in M.P. No, 1037/94 and in review petition in M.C.C. No. 382/95.
4. The reasons given in disposal of this L.P.A. shall also goyern L.P.A. No. 206/95,
5. In M.P. No. 11037/94, 61 petitioners filed a petition against the State Govt., the Conservator-in-Chief, Forest Department, Bhopal and Divisional Forest Officer (Production Harda. It was alleged in the petition that the Divisional Forest Officer, Harda issued an auction notice for holding auction of nearly 450 lots of timber on 20/21-2-1994 , at Timarni as per tender conditions, annexed to the petition as Annexure-A. It was alleged to the petition, inter alia, that the petitioners were the persons who accepted the tender , conditions and were allowed to bid in the auctions aforesaid in respect of the forest produce as defined under Section 2(O) of the M. P. Vanopaj (Vyapar Viniyaman) Adhiniyam, 1969. They had deposited the earned money as per the tender condition prior to , making the bid. Thereafter when bid was knocked in their favour, the petitioners, or their forest agents, signed the bid-sheet and the D.F.O. (Production) Harda, counter signed the bid-sheet in token of acceptance of the bid. The relevant allegation made by the petitioners is in paragraph 6 of the petition, which is reproduced as under:
"That in the auction proceedings highest offers in respect of respective petitioners in respect of lots detailed in the statement appended with the petition have been accepted and respective petitioners, his partner or his authorised agent was required to sign the bid sheet, counter signed by the D.F.O., (Production), Harda, in token of the ac-
ceptance thereby requiring each petitioner to deposit the balance sum to make up 25% of his accepted bid. A pro forma of the bid-list is hereto annexed as Annexure-E." ' The petitioners further alleged that they also deposited 25% of this sale price immediately or within the time prescribed for tender notice and were ready and filling to deposit the rest of the 75% price as per tender conditions. However, they were; given cyclostyled order collectively marked by them in their petition as Annexure-G, dated 18-3-1995, whereby their auction was cancelled by the State.
6. The petitioners contended in the petition and other connected petition, that after the bid was knocked in their favour by the fall of hammer, the State Govt. did not have any power or authority to cancel the sale. For this purpose, they relied upon a reported decision of this Court Jai Bhawani Timber, Jabalpur v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1992 MPLJ 423 : (AIR 1992 Madh Pra 250). In this connection, it is necessary to reproduce paragraph 15 of the petition which is as follows;
"That in similar situation, the matter has come before this Hon'ble Court in Jai Bhawani Timber, Jabalpur v. State of M.P., 1992 MPLJ 423 : (AIR 1992 Mad 250) wherein this Hon'ble Court was pleased to quash the action of arbitrary cancellation of the highest bids. This Hon'ble Court has held that in view of the provisions of Sections 62 and 64 of the Sale of Goods Act, the contract was complete between the successful bidder and the Government since the highest offer was accepted and the bid sheet is signed by the highest bidder for binding himself of this highest offer and the same is counter signed by the concerned Divisional Forest Officer. This decision squarely applies in the instant case and hence the action of the Divisional Forest Officer in can celling the auction in respect of lots stated in the cancellation order is rendered illegal, mala fide and arbitrary."
An identical petition appears to have been filed in M.P. No. 1158/94 by 86 purchasers in respect of same law on identical facts and grounds.
7. It appears from the record that the appellants did not file a detailed parawise return against the petition by the return dated 5-7-1994. The stand taken by the return was that during the auction which was held on 20/21-2-1994 at Timarni Depot, Harda Forest (Production) Division, Harda, total 624 lots of various grades and timber species were put to action. It was stated in the return - that immediately after the auction, the State Govt. received complaint to the effect that the timber lots were sold at cheaper rates than the rates which were prevailing in the open market. It was stated that in order to verify the complaint, a Senior and responsible officer of the Forest Department was deputed to make a fact finding enquiry regarding the allegations made in the complaint. The said officer after visiting the spot found as under:--
(i) That the upset price rates were riot revised for the last six months before the auction. As per direction of the Forest Department, the upset price had to be revised every two months on the basis of average rates received during last two auctions and also considering the market price of the timber according to the report of the said officer. The upset price of timber lots particularly of III A and III B grade teak timber were under lower side.
(ii) That the III grade teak timber was sold in such a quantity that there was no proper competition between the various bidders.
(iii) Most of the lots of III A and III B grade teak timber were sold at much lower price which was obtained in the State Govt. Depots, during the same period and it was further found that the price of the aforesaid grade of teak timber should have been roughly 20% more than the upset price.
In the submission of the appellants, in view of the aforesaid report given by the Enquiry Officer, the State Govt. after carefully considering the report, directed vide order dated 16-3-1994 to cancel the auction sale in respect of lots of grade III A and III B of teak timber which fetched less than 20% over and above the upset price fixed during the auction. It is, therefore, stated in the report that sale of only those, lots numbering 328 for which the price was less than 20% over and above, the upset prices fixed in the auction were cancelled. According to the respondents, there was no mala fide or arbitrariness involved in the cancellation of the sale of 328 lots. Some of these lots, out of the 328 lots, were knocked in favour of the petitioners in both the writ petitions. According to the return, submitted by the respondents, the case of Jai Bhawani Timber (AIR 1992 Madh Pra 250) (supra) did not apply and the auctioneer had a right to cancel the auction for justifiable reasons. In the return, it was further alleged that the property in the goods did not pass to the petitioners until the full price was received by the auctioneer and, therefore, the sales were not complete and the respondent had a right to cancel the auctions as the price for the goods was found to be much less than that was available in the open market. It was further contended that the rights arising from an auction sale are contractual in nature and, therefore, petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India did not 'lie. It appears that a similar return was filed in connected Writ Petition No. 1158/94.
8. The learned single Judge followed the decision of Jai Bhawani Timber's case AIR 1992 Madh Pra 250 (supra) and held that the moment the bids were knocked 'down in favour of the petitionef s, the property in the goods passed to them and the State Govt. had no power to cancel the auction. He also referred to another decision dated 9-1-1995 in M.P. No. 2893/85 and held that the aforesaid decision of Jai Bhawani Timber's case (supra) was approved in M. P. No. 2893/85 ( Aryodaya Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh). The learned single Judge did not accept the contention of the State that the Jai Bhawani Timber's case (supra) required reconsideration in view of the decision of Supreme Court in State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1234. The learned single Judge specifically quoted the decision of this Court in M.P. No. 2893/85. In view of the learned single Judge, the two Division Bench cases referred to by him in his judgment were complete answer to: the argument of the counsel for the State. Accordingly, the writ petition was allowed in respect of all the petitioners and the cancellation of sales in their favour quashed. Similar order was passed in M.P. No. 1158/94 for the reasons given in order passed by the learned single Judge in M.P. No. 1037/94.
9. Thereafter the appellants filed M.C.C. No. 382/95 against the order dated 16/2-1995 in M.P. No. 1037/94 and M.C.C. No. 383/95 in M.P. No. 1158/94. These were review petitions. These petitions were heard by the learned single Judge on 22-9-95 and the learned single Judge by order of the same date issued notices to the respondents why this petition should not be admitted for final bearing and directed that status quo be maintained. He also ordered that the case will be filed on a date to be fixed by the office and also ordered issuance of notice Hamdast. Thereafter' on 11-10-1995, the final arguments were heard by the learned single Judge and the review petitions were rejected by the learned single Judge by orders dated 29-11-1995.
10. It appears that thereafter both these Letters Patent Appeals Nos. 205/96 and 206/96 were filed by the respondents on 12-12-1995. In these Letters Patent Appeals, both the orders, that is to say, order passed by the learned single Judge in the original writ petition on 16-2-1995 as well as the order passed by the learned single Judge in the review petition were challenged. It appears that so far as review petitions were concerned, the L.P.A. against them were filed within 30 days from the date of passing of final order in . review petition. However, both these appeals against the orders dated 16-2-1995 passed in M.P. Nos. 1937/94 and 1158/94 appear to have been barred by 269 days. The appellants have filed applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act in both the cases and tried to show that there was sufficient cause for filing the petition late. According to the appellants, after the delivery judgment on 16-2-1995, they received the certified copy on 25-3-1995. The opinion given by the office of the Advocate General on 6-4-1995 was that a review application should be filed. However the law department on 15-5-1995 and 17-5-1995 differed with the opinion of the Advocate General and decided that a Special Leave Petition should be filed against both the orders in Supreme Court. After collecting the relevant papers on 24-5-.1995, the papers were sent to the standing counsel for the State in Supreme Court of India. On 17-6-1995, after going through the papers, the standing counsel of the State in Supreme Court of India opined that the matter should be filed before the High Court itself. Therefore,, the necessary instructions were issued to the Forest Department on 27-7-1995 for taking further steps in the matter and appointing the O.I.C. After doing the necessary formalities, the review petitions were filed on 9-8-1995. Thereafter the review petition was entertained by the learned single Judge by issuing show cause notices on 22-9-1995 in both the cases and on 29-11 -1995 the order was passed. After obtaining the certified copy of that order, those appeals were filed on 12-12-1995.
11. It would be clear that if these Letters Patent Appeals be stated as filed against the order passed by the learned single Judge in review petitions alone then these appeals would be within the period of limitation because they were filed within 30 days of the orders made by the learned single Judge in review petition. However, there is delay of 269 days in filing the Letters Patent Appeals and the question would be whether there is sufficient cause for condoning the delay because this was the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondents after notice by this Court. It appears that there is no reply 'filed to the application for condonation of delay.
12. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, made oral submission that there was no case for condonation of delay on the facts stated by the appellants. According to the counsel for the respondents, the appellants should have filed directly L.P.A. within 30 days of the order passed in writ petitions by the learned single Judge instead they filed a review petition and there was no ground for reviewing the order passed by the learned single Judge as the matter was covered by reported decision in Jai Bhawani Timber's case (AIR 1992 Madh Pra 250) (supra). The counsel for the appellants, in reply to the preliminary objection, said that the matter was so complicated that there was a difference of opinion between the office of the Advocate General and the Law Department of the State and, therefore, the matter was referred to the Standing Counsel of State for the Supreme Court of India, who has given the opinion that the matter should be filed in High Court itself. Thereupon the review petitions were filed by the appellants and it was entertained by the learned single Judge. The learned single Judge did not dismiss the review'peti-tion on the ground of limitation and issued show cause notice to the respondents. Therefore, it 'is apparent that there was sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the appeal against the order dated 16-2-1995. In the alternate, the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that this Court has wide powers under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent and it can entertain an appeal against the order passed in the M.C.C. Nos. 382/95 and 383/95 and there was no delay in filing the appeal against the orders of the review petition as they were filed within 30 days.
13. Before entering into the merits of Letters Patent Appeal, we propose to dispose of the preliminary objection raised by the counsel for the respondents. It is true that the view applications were filed beyond 30 days, but the learned single Judge had issued notice to the respondents to show cause why the review applications should not be allowed. Thereby the learned single Judge has exercised his inherent powers to review the order passed in the writ petitions by him. Once the learned single Judge has entertained these review petitions, it can be inferred that the learned single Judge has considered that there was prima facie case for entertaining the review petitions despite the fact the review petitions were considerably delayed. There is no express power under the Constitution for filing a review petition against the petition decided under Articles 226/ 227 of the Constitution of India. However, the Supreme Court in Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 1909 has said that the High Court has power to review its own order. Such power is inherent in a court of plenary jurisdiction to correct palpable errors. Therefore, the learned single Judge was prima facie exercising his inherent power for reviewing the orders passed by himself. It may be another matter that he did not find the case to be fit for review. The fact, nevertheless, remains is that he entertained the review petition and heard it finally. The learned single Judge, however, in his final conclusion, has reverted to the aspect of delay while dismissing the review application. He was of the view of that since these applications were considerably delayed, therefore, he would not exercise powers of review. According to learned single Judge, the review applications should have been made within reasonable time. It appears that it was not canvassed before the learned single Judge that the review petition should be filed within 30 days because it was submitted before him by the counsel for the respondents that there was no limitation prescribed for filing a review petition against the order passed in writ petition. However, it appears to this court that Article 124 of Limitation Act prescribed limitation for 30 days. Therefore, the final order of the learned single Judge does not amount to dismissal on the ground of limitation, but on the ground of unreasonable delay. The final order of the learned single Judge is to the effect that there is unreasonable delay on the part of appellants to file review application and, therefore, he will not exercise his discretion in their favour. So far, as delay is concerned, it may be made clear that this is one of the aspect of the order passed by the learned single Judge. The question, therefore, arises so far as the point of preliminary objection is concerned whether the learned Judge rejected the review application on the ground of limitation. The answer is, he did not. He appears to have exercised his jurisdiction under inherent powers not to review the order passed by him on the ground that there is considerable delay. It appears to us that the observation made by the learned single Judge in paragraph 12 of the order that the review applications were not made within reasonable time relates to delay from the point of view that inherent power could not be exercised beyond a reasonable time. It appears to us that the learned single Judge has refused to exercise his jurisdiction to review the impunged orders passed in the writ petitions from the point of view that it would not be just and proper to exercise review jurisdiction as the review applications were considerably delayed and they were made with a device to gain time when the time for filing L.P.A. had expired. We think that this aspect of the order of the learned single Judge relates not to the refusal to condone delay in filing the review applications on the ground of limitation but on the ground that he will not exercise his suo motu power of review under the facts and circumstances of the case. It is well established that even if the review application is barred by time, the Court has suo motu power of review to correct its own error and in such cases when inherent powers are, exercised, the question of limitation does not bar the remedy. On the other hand, the facts of this case are such that after going through the review petition, the learned single Judge issued notices to the respondents-and he heard it finally. For the purpose of judging whether there was sufficient cause in filing the L.P.A. the fact of entertainment of review petition itself is of great consequence. It appears to us that the learned single Judge on the basis of it thought after hearing the learned Deputy A.G. on 22-9-1995 that there was a case of i review and, therefore, he issued the notice. After hearing the parties, he may have come . to the conclusion that there was delay, but the fact that he entertained these review petitions and heard it finally entitles the appellants to claim condonation of delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act. It is well established that while condoning the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act, the Court must advance the cause of justice and a liberal construction should be given to Section 5 of Limitation ' Act. (See: Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 and G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, , Bangalore, AIR 1988 SC 897. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katji, AIR 1987 SC 1353 the following observations , were made by the Supreme Court guiding the ' courts in approaching the problem pf sufficient cause under Section 5 of Limitation Act:
"1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic, manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to 'have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on Recount of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so."
Tested in the light of aforesaid cases, we find that under the facts and circumstances of the case, the very fact that the appellants were allowed to pursue their remedy under review petition without any specific objection on the part of respondents that the review petition is barred by limitation under Article 124 of Limitation Act and a final order was allowed to be passed, there is sufficient cause for 'condoning the delay under Section 5 of Limitation Act because it gives chance for the belief on the part of the appellants that review application may be allowed. It may be another matter that finally the result went against the appellants, but that is not germane for considering whether there was sufficient cause in condoning the delay in filing these Letters Patent Appeals. Even otherwise, we think that these appeals are within limitation I against the order of the review.
14. Having disposed of the preliminary objection, raised by the Counsel for the respondents, now stage is set for deciding the merits of the case. The learned Govt. Advocate Shri V.K. Shukla had tried to argue that the State Govt. had a right to cancel the auctions in all the cases because of the report of the Enquiry Officer. However, after going through the report of the Enquiry Officer, we do not find that there is any justification for cancelling the concluded contracts and the State Govt. had no power to cancel the contracts on this ground, raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. If this was the only point on which the fate of these appeals rested, we would have endorsed the view of the learned single Judge and dismissed both the Letters Patent Appeals. However, the facts of the case are suclithat we are called upon to consider in these appeals a point which should have been specifically taken by the appellants in their return. In M.P. No. 1037/94, 61 petitioners have filed the petition and in M.P. No. 1158/94,86 persons have filed the petition. They were filed by the petitioners as if all the petitioners had identical cases and merely because the auctions were held on 20/21-2-1994. We have, therefore, quoted paragraph Nos. 6 and 15 of the petition in M.P. No. 1037/94. It is clear from the allegation made in both these petitions that the petitioners alleged that the moment bids were knocked in their favour and the D.F.O. (Production) signed the bid sheet, the contracts of sale was complete. These two petitions were fought on these footings. It is true that all the petitioners were allowed to join in these two petitions as if a common question of law and fact had arisen. It appears to us that if in one petition a number of petitioners have joined, it is the duty of counsel for the parties to sift the facts of each case and ascertain that a common question of law and fact arises as if a single petition has been filed. The counsel for the respondents/petitioners assumed that the moment the bid was knocked in their favour and the bid sheet was signed by the D.F.O. (Production), the sale was complete in their favour. However, the conditions of sale (Annexurc-A) itself do not say that in each and eveiy case the acceptance of the D.F.O. would be final. The condition Nos. 10 and 11 of Annexure-A show that certain sales may be beyond the power of the D.F.O. and there will be another competent authority to sanction the sale and in such cases, the sales would be complete only after the sanction has been granted by the competent authority. It appears to us that the allegations made in the petition misled the State Govt. into thinking that the cases of all the petitioners are identical and no attempt was made by the authorised officer to verify whether in all the cases of the sales, the D.F.O. would be competent to sanction the sale by signing the bid-sheet. Nor was any attempt made by the Govt. Advocate, who drafted the return, to file a parawise reply to both the petitions. In such circumstances, the counsel for the State Government failed to bring to the notice of the learned single Judge at the time of argument that the sale beyond one lakh of forest produce, the power to sanction sale is not within the competence of D.F.O. and beyond one lakh and up to three lakhs, the Conservator-in-Chief has right to sanction and beyond three takes up to five lakhs, the Conservator of Forest has right to sanction. Therefore, in view of either return or oral contention on part of the State Govt. this point went unnoticed at the time of argument on merits before the learned single Judge and both the petitions were decided as if all the contract for forest produce are within one lakh. It was only in the review petition, filed by the appellants, this point was - specifically taken. We quoted from M.C.C. No. 382/95 thus:
"Facts and Grounds:--
(A) That the petitioners did not disclose before this Hon'ble Court that the bid is not finalised after the hammer is fallen. As per the Conditions Nos. 10 and 11 of the auction notice the same is finalised subject to the sanction by the competent authority. Conditions Nos. 10 and 11 are reproduced for ready reference (Annexure P-I) 'Conditions Nos. 10 and 11' ' (Condition No. 10) The Sales of Contracts beyond the power of sanction of D.F.O. shall be subject to the sanction of the competent authority and the successful bidder shall remain bound by his bid and until orders are passed by the competent authority.
(Condition No. 11) The successful bidder whose bid has been accepted by the competent authority shall be the purchaser.
Condition No. 11 makes it clear that the contract comes into existence only when the bid is sanctioned by the competent authority.
In' the present case the contract in question was beyond the power of sanction of D.F.O. The present applicants are filing circulars issued under M.P. Book Financial Power 1983, Part II made effective w.e.f. 1-5-1984 in respect of sanctioning power of forest authorities. The power of sanction of D.F.O. is limited only up to Rs. 1 lac and beyond that the sanction has to be accorded by Conservator of Forest up to Rs. 3 lac and from 3 lac to 5 lac the sanctioning authority is Chief Conservator of Forest and beyond that the power of sanction is reservedw with the State Government. Copy of circular along with the Condition No. 24 of Volume-Ill of Book of Financial Power 83 is annexed as Document-A. (B) That as per the conditions of auction notice in the bid sheets also it was made clear to the higest bidder that highest bid is accepted subject to sanction by the competent authority. Copy of bid sheet to show the same conditions is annexed as Document-B. (C) That from Grade III-A and III-B, 328 lots were rejected. Out of which 23 bidders have not come before this Hon'ble Court whose highest bid was rejected. Out of remaining 305 lots, 80 lots were the lots which were to be sanctioned by the Conservator of Forest. The bid amount in those auction was more than 1 lac, Thus it is clear that 'the D.F.O. alone was not competent to finalise the bids in the auction. The sanction was necessary from the C.F. which has not been done in the present case. Copy of list of those lots is being annexed as Document-C in which the bid amount was more than 1 lac and the sanction was necessary from the C.F. which has not been done in the cases. Thus the view of the Hon'ble Court that the bid was finalised as soon as the hammer had fallen is contrary to the auction condition and the conditions incorporated in the bid sheet.
15. We have perused the order passed by the learned single Judge in the review petition, and we find that even though this point was specifically taken by the appellants in the review petition, this was not considered by the learned single Judge.
16. During the argument, the learned counsel for the appellants argued that as many as 80 lots of forest produce were sold for more than one lakh and, therefore, the State Govt. was within its competence to cancel their contracts mainly because the D.F.O. signed the bid sheet and the petitioners deposited 25% of the price, the contracts were not complete and, therefore, cases are not covered by the case of Jai Bhawani Timber, (AIR 1992 Madh Pra 250) (supra). He referred to copy of circular along with the Condition No. 24 of Volume III of Book of Financial Power 83 which is annexed as Document-A to M.C.C. No. 382/95. In that case, this Court has also referred to another decision of the Division Bench of this Court which is unreported, that is to say, M.P. 28/1981 (Darshan Singh v. State of M.P.) which was decided on 30-3-1981 on identical point. In this case, considering the Conditions 'Nos. 10 and 11, it was observed:
"As this was not a case where sanction of any higher authority was needed for making the acceptance of the bids by the Divisional . Forest Officer final, the sales became complete on acceptance of the bids by him,"
These observations relates to conditions Nos. 10 and 11, already quoted by us, and also relate to the financial power of the D.F.O., who was not competent to sanction sale beyond 1 lakh. Therefore, it follows that the D.F.O. even if he signed a bid sheet and sanctioned the sale, that sanction would not be legal as per conditions Nos. 10 and 11 of the tender condition (Annexure-A) unless 'and until the competent authority sanctions the sale of forest produce, the sale would not be complete and the dictum of Jai Bhawani Timber's case (supra) would not be applicable. In view of this matter, we think that the learned Govt. Advocate was right in his submission that so far as 80 lots were concerned, which were beyond 1 lakh, the Govt. has complete power to cancel the auction before the competent authority has sanctioned the sale. The learned counsel for the respondents/petitioners referred to us M/s. Timber Kashmir Pvt. Ltd. v. The Conservator of Forests, Jammu, AIR 1977 SC 151 and contended that by accepting 25% deposit, the appellants/State granted implied sanction. After going through that case, we find that this case does not support the contention of the counsel for the respondents to the effect that the appellants are not entitled to cancel the contracts in respect of these 80 lots for the reason that after signing the bid by the D.F.O. (Production), the petitioners had deposited the requisite 25% of the price as per sale conditions. On the other hand, in this case the finding recorded by the Supreme Court is that the forest lease agreement was entered on 27th Feb. 1963, 28th February, 1963 and 27lh March, 1963 and the notification dated 23rd Feb. 1957 delegated power to enter into contract of forest lease to the Conservator of Forest without limit and Conservator of Forest had entered into formal contracts in accordance with Section 122 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. That section is akin to Article 299 of our Constitution. The Supreme Court held that since the authorised officer had entered into these impugned lease by entering into formal contract and, therefore, the appellant Company was bound by arbitration clause. It is nobody's case that any officer authorised in this behalf had entered into formal contract with the respondents/ petitioners, Thus there was no sanction granted to the respondents/petitioners by the appropriate authority in respect of 80 lots.
17. It appears to us that even though this point was not taken in the return and was raised only at the time of review of these orders and that too appears to have been pressed by the State Govt. in the forefront of its argument at the time of hearing of review petition, and, therefore, it is possible that this point may have escaped the attention of learned single Judge when he decided the review petition. A number of points were advanced and may be this point may have been feebly pressed by the learned Advocate General who argued the review petition. At the time of argument, in order to satisfy our conscience, we called the original bid list of the auction case and the learned Govt. Advocate showed it to us that bid sheets were not signed by any Conservator of Forest in case of these 80 lots, but signed by the D.F.O because learned counsel for the respondents, had orally submitted that bid sheets were signed by the Conservator of Forest who was present at the time of the auction. The original record was shown to us on 14-2-1996 after close of the argument and learned Govt. Advocate Shri Shukla has assured us that the original file was also shown to the counsel for the respondents Shri V.S. Dabir. Thus we have satisfied our conscience that so far as 80 lots are concerned, the sale could not have been sanctioned because the Conservator of Forest did not sign the bid sheets. It is signed by the D.F.O. (Production).
18. In view of the aforesaid discussion, our conclusion is that so far as 80 lots are concerned, the cancellation of auction sale was within the power of the Government and was not liable to be quashed as done by the learned single Judge. These auctions relates to the case of the following respondents/ petitioners as per list given by the learned Govt. Advocate:
Sl. No. Purchaser's Name Lot No. LPA No. Respondent No.
1.
Sardar Sons Maler, Kotla 287 205/95 45
2. Shankar Vijay Saw Mill, Khirkiya 257
-"-
083. G.L. Palel & Co., Khirkiya 263 "
014. Ganesh Timber Mart, Harda 303 205/95 28
5. __ " __ 260 __"__ _"_
6. __ " __ 252 _"_ _"_
7. __ " __ 131 _"_ _"_
8. Kanhaiya Timber Mart, Sagar 289 _"_ 47
9. Patel Brothers, Harda 305 _"_ 27
10. V. A. Patel, Sagar 267 __ " __ 48
11. Ghanshyam Saw Mill, Sagar 320 __ " __ 46
12. Dwarka Vijay Saw Mill, Indore 391 __ " __ 52
13. Kailash Timber Industries, Harda 293 __ " __ 30
14. Kailash Timber Mart 319 __ " __ 16
15. Ganesh Saw Mill, Sagar 361 __ " __ 43
16. Shiv Traders, Harda 324 "
1717. __ " __ 256 _"_ __ " __
18. Paras Timber Traders, Indore 272
-"-
5819. Raghuvir Singh & Co., Indore 144 "
5720. Prabhat Timber Mart, Sagar 264
-"-
4221. Kundani Traders, Indore 259 "
5422. Maruti Timber, Harda 92
-"-
2123. Kailash Timber Industries, Harda 316 "
3824. Nemichand Harishankar, Seoni 262 206/95 75
25. Laxmi Timber Depot, Kolhapur 139 "
5526. Laxmi Saw Mill, Nagda 99 206/95 58
27. Ganesh Timber Store, Khandwa 271
-"-
3228. R. V. Patel, Navsari 294 206/95 56
29. R. D. Patel, Surat 266
-"-
4030. V. H. Patel, Surat 273 "
4131. M. S. Patel, Sion 277 "
4432. B. K. Patel, Sion 283
-"-
4233. Bharat Saw Mill, Baroda 276
-"-
4334. Patel Timber Mart, Burhanpur 196 _"_ 26
35. H. R. Patel, Puna 325 _"_ 51
36. T. S. Patel, Nagpur 297
-"-
6637. Kamal Traders, Nagpur 275 "
7038. New Saify Timber Mart, Indore 270 "
3139. _"_ 313 "
_ "_
40. Gajanan Saw Mill, Manmod 315 "
5741. R. A. Patel, Nagpur 356 "
5342. Purushottam Timber, Indore 362 "
2143. Bhagat Traders, Jabalpur 304 _"_ 04
44. Nahar Meghaji, Ratlam 288 "
6245. Patel & Company, Khandwa 195 _"_ 35
46. Saraswati Saw Mill, Itarsi 358
-"
7847. Shiv Timber Mart, Indore 284 "
1948. Geeta Timber Traders, Itarsi 342 "
8049. _"_ 197 "
_"_
50. Lucky Timber Supplier, Udaypur 274 "
2551. Laxmi Timber, Indore 121
-"-
52 52Subhash & Co., Indore 184
-"-
5053. A-One Teak Product, Indore 261 "
1054. Chamunda Saw Mill, Indore 396
-"-
1755. Amar Timber Company, Jabalpur 278
-"-
0156. Amar Timber, Indore 269 "
4657. _"_ 94 _"_ _"_
58. Bhurhani Wood Works, Indore 102
-"
4559. Saifi Timber Mart, Indore 118 "
0660. _"_ 13 "
_"_
61. Reliable Traders, Indore 393 "
8462. D. R. Patel & Co., Harda 133 "
2963. Shankar Saw Mill, Harda 102 _ "_ 28
64. _"_ 112 "
_"_
65. _"_ 186 "
_"
_
66. Vinod Kumar Shankar Lal, Basbada 86 "
7667. Surya Vijay Saw Mill, Jabalpur 268 _"_ 02
68. Surya Vijay Saw Mill, Jabalpur 93 206/95 02
69. Swadesh Saw Mill, Itarsi 15 "
8170. Lunawat Saw Mill, Lonawala 127 "
6471. Arvind Traders, Jabalpur 111 "
0572. D. H. Patel, Nagpur 150 "
6973. Shabbir Hussain Saw Mill, Indore 120 "
8274. S. B. Parmar, Nagpur 128 67
75.
"142
"
"
76. Jyoti Timber Industry, Itarsi 138 "
7977. Laxmi Saw Mill, Rajnandgaon 108 "
5478. S. K. Patel, Khandwa 136 "
3779.
"96
"
"
80. Kanjibhai Patel & Co., Khandwa 117 38
19. Before parting with the case, we observe with some concern that there must be amendment in the rules framed by this Court to limit the number of petitions in one single petition in cases where several orders are impugned and the writ petition is filed on the ground that common question of law and facts arise. We find in these petitions only one single affidavit each was filed in both the petitions whereas 61 petitioners were involved in M.P. No. 1037/94 and 86 petitioners were involved in M.P. No. 1158/94. Yet the petitions were treated as ripe for ad-mission and heard as such. The clubbing of number of petitioners without care and caution deliberate or otherwise is bound to create confusion and the Court may render decision on garbled version of facts.
20. Therefore, we come to the conclusion that both these appeals succeed in respect of the respondents/petitioners mentioned herein above in respect of lots which were of value more than one lakh. We hold that so far as the rest of the lots of respondents/petitioners are concerned, the order of the learned single Judge shall prevail. However, so far aforesaid 80 lots the aforesaid respondents are concerned, the appeals will succeed and we hold that the cancellation of their sale was within the competence of the State Govt. as sales were not complete and their petitions in respect of lots more than one lakh are liable to be dismissed. Accordingly we further modify the orders passed in M.P. No. 1037/94 and M.P. No. 1158/94. Similarly the orders passed in M.C.C. Nos. 382/95 and 383/95 are also modified. Thus these appeals partly succeed to the extent indicated above. There shall be no order as to costs of these appeals.