Allahabad High Court
Abdul Wasi vs Bhairamdeen Alias Bacchi And Ors. on 19 May, 2003
Equivalent citations: III(2003)ACC307, 2004ACJ885, 2003(4)AWC2711
Author: K.N. Ojha
Bench: K.N. Ojha
JUDGMENT S. P. Srivastava, J.
1. Heard the learned counsel for the Insurer-Appellant.
2. The appellant feels aggrieved by the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, determining an amount of Rs. 1,20,000 as Just compensation, to which the dependents of the deceased Km. Shilu aged about 7 years were found entitled to on account of her untimely death in an accident involving the offending motor vehicle insured by the present Insurer-Appellant.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously urged that no liability could be fastened on the appellant for the payment of the amount of award as he had already transferred the offending motor vehicle in favour of Rajendra Prasad, the respondent No. 3 on 10.3.1998 and the accident which had resulted in the death of Km. Shilu had taken place on 2.11.2000.
4. The Tribunal, while considering the above submissions, had come to the conclusion that since no steps had been taken either by the transferor or by the transferee to get the relevant entries altered in the registration certificate indicating the change of the ownership and the present appellant continued to be the "owner" of the offending motor vehicle as envisaged under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act even on the date of the accident, he could not escape from the liability to pay the amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal.
5. In the aforesaid connection, the Tribunal had drawn support from the observations made by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Josh (T.V.) v. Chacko P. M. alias Thankachan, 2002 (1) TAC 1.
6. The expression "owner" has been defined under Section 2(30) of the Motor Vehicles Act. It means a person in whose name a motor vehicle stands registered, and where such person is a minor, the guardian of such minor, and in relation to a motor vehicle which is the subject of a hire purchase agreement, or an agreement of hypothecation, the person in possession of the vehicle under that agreement.
7. A perusal of the aforesaid provision clearly indicates that the Legislature has taken recourse to a statutory fiction while defining the expression "owner" of a motor vehicle. In the aforesaid view of the matter, taking into account the implications arising under the statutory fiction, there can be no manner of doubt that the person in whose name the offending motor vehicle stood registered had to be taken to be the owner of the said vehicle.
8. In the aforesaid connection, it may also be noticed that even under the rules framed under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act known as Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the Rule 55 thereof prescribes a procedure which has to be followed in the case of change of ownership of a motor vehicle. In the present case, there is no dispute that the requisite steps for the change of the ownership and altering the name of the registered owner in the registration certificate had not been taken either by the transferor or by the transferee of the offending motor vehicle.
9. Much stress has been laid on a copy of the letter which the transferee claims to have sent to the registering authority. The Tribunal has not given any importance to the aforesaid letter as the said letter had not been acted upon at all. The appellant has filed a certificate showing that the aforesaid letter had been posted under a postal certificate on 16.3.1991. The appellant has not taken care to send such a letter even by registered post. In the circumstances, no presumption was available about the service of the aforesaid letter on the concerned Regional Transport Authority. Moreover, the statute requires entirely different procedure for sending the information in the case of transfer of the motor vehicles.
10. It must be emphasised that when the law requires a particular thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that manner or not at all. The Tribunal, in the circumstances, cannot be said to have erred in discarding the aforesaid letter and attaching to it no importance or significance holding it to have no legal effect. The aforesaid finding of the Tribunal is not liable to be disturbed.
11. It may be noticed that a similar question had come up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in the case of Parma Lal v. Shri Chand Mal and Ors., 1980 ACJ 233. Noticing the statutory provision in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, regulating the transfer of the ownership of a motor vehicle, the Apex Court had observed that while the transfer of the ownership is permitted, the statute had cast an obligation on the transferee to report to the registering authority concerned regarding the transfer of the vehicle along with a certificate of registration and then get the registration certificate transferred in his name. In the circumstances, it was, therefore, the duty of the transferee to have applied to the registering authority and get the registration transferred in his name. If the transferee did not choose to move the registering authority, he was not entitled to relief of the refund of the purchase money or claim damages. From the perusal of the aforesaid decision, it is apparent that the transfer without following the procedure prescribed statutorily was liable to be ignored with the result that the liability arising out of the use of the motor vehicle had to be taken to be of the registered owner as contemplated under the Motor Vehicles Act.
12. In the present case, the deceased was a minor and was aged about 7 years. The Tribunal has awarded an amount of Rs. 1,24,000 towards compensation and has utilised the multiplier of 15 treating her income to be Rs. 1,000 per month. This obviously has been done taking into account the services rendered by her and further the fact that she was found to be a precocious child. This Court in its decision in the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Naukhey Lal Singh, 2002 (2) TAC 657, rendered by a Division Bench had awarded an amount of Rs. 1,50,000 in the case of minor who was aged about 7 years.
13. So far as the use of multiplier is concerned, it may be noticed that for the purpose of calculating the just compensation, the annual dependency of the dependants has to be determined in terms of the annual loss due to the abrupt termination of life. The suitable multiplier has to be determined by taking into consideration the number of years of the dependency of various dependants as well as the number of years by which the life of the deceased was cut short and the various imponderable factors such as the early natural death or the deceased becoming incapable of supporting the dependants due to Illness or other natural handicap or calamities, the age of the dependants and their developing, their independent sources of Income, etc. excluding, however, the amount of insurance policies of the deceased to which the dependants may become entitled on account of its maturity on account of the death. It must further be emphasized, however, that the method of multiplying the amount of annual loss to the dependants with the number of years by which the life has been cut short without anything else cannot be sustained.
14. The choice of multiplier has, however, to be made by the Court using its own experience and having due regard to the peculiar facts of each case because the ultimate goal is not to adhere to any rigid formula but to award a compensation which is just. The age of the deceased person cannot be taken to be either a conclusive or a paramount factor in the determination of the compensation, except in those cases where the remaining years of the life expectancy are less than the multiplier which is sought to be applied.
15. Considering the circumstances of the case, the choice of multiplier does not require any interference.
16. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts and circumstances as brought on record, no justifiable ground has been made out for any interference in the amount of compensation determined by the Tribunal which cannot he held to be unjust.
17. This appeal is totally devoid of merits, which deserves to be and is hereby dismissed in limine.
18. As prayed, the amount of Rs. 25,000 deposited in this Court by the insurer appellant under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act be remitted to the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal concerned within one month from the date an application is filed by the appellant for the purpose so that it may be disbursed to the claimant.