Punjab-Haryana High Court
Satpal And Anr vs State Of Punjab on 6 July, 2012
Author: Mehinder Singh Sullar
Bench: Mehinder Singh Sullar
CRM No. M-17564 of 2012 -1-
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH
CRM No. M-17564 of 2012
Date of decision:-6.7.2012
Satpal and Anr. ...Petitioners
Versus
State of Punjab ...Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE MEHINDER SINGH SULLAR
Present:- Mr.Amit Rawal, Senior Advocate with
Mr.M.S.Dalal, Advocate for the petitioners.
Mehinder Singh Sullar, J. (Oral)
Petitioners Satpal & Yashpal sons of Barkat Ram have preferred the instant petition for the grant of anticipatory bail in a case registered against them, vide FIR No.89 dated 3.5.2012, on accusation of having committed the offence punishable under Sections 406, 409 & 420 read with section 34 IPC, by the police of Police Station Dina Nagar, District Gurdaspur, invoking the provisions of Section 438 Cr.P.C.
2. The epitome of the facts, which needs a necessary mention for the limited purpose of deciding the present application for anticipatory bail and emanating from the record, is that, the petitioners are partners/owners of M/s Baba Nanak Rice & General Mill, Gurdaspur. The Markfed of Punjab Government entrusted/supplied 178077 bags weighing 66176.95 quintals of grade-1 paddy for shelling/milling into rice as per the agreement (Annexure P1). The firm acknowledged the receipt of the stock and was required to return the rice of the same quality to the Markfed within the stipulated period. Instead of returning the A-class quality of rice of required quantity, the firm of the petitioners returned a CRM No. M-17564 of 2012 -2- very less quantity (weight) of rice, that too, of very inferior quality. The remaining stock of paddy 154318 bags weighing 54011.30 quintals was stated to have been misappropriated by the firm causing a huge loss to the Markfed.
3. Levelling a variety of allegations and narrating the sequence of events, in all, the prosecution claimed that the petitioners-accused misappropriated indicated bags of rice of Markfed and thus they have committed the criminal breach of trust and cheated it. In the backgrounds of these allegations and in the wake of complaint of District Manager of the concerned department, the instant case was registered against the petitioners-accused, in the manner indicated here- in-above.
4. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, having gone through the record with his valuable help and after bestowal of thoughts over the entire matter, to my mind, there is no merit in the present application in this context.
5. Ex facie, the arguments of learned counsel that the petitioners have been falsely implicated in the instant case and since there is an arbitration clause in the agreement and no offences in question are made out against them, in view of the observations of Hon'ble Apex Court in cases Kailash Verma v. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation and another 2005(1) RCR (Criminal) 727 and Tarsem Lal v. State of Punjab 2006(3) RCR (Criminal) 889, so, they are entitled to concession of anticipatory bail, are not only devoid of merits but misplaced as well.
6. As is clear that in Kailash Verma's case (supra), the appellant was discharged by the Chief Judicial Magistrate and revisional Court confirmed that order after elaborately considering the facts and circumstances of the case, but the High Court reversed the order. The respondent-Corporation had also initiated steps for arbitration proceedings. On the peculiar facts and in the circumstances of that CRM No. M-17564 of 2012 -3- case, it was observed that "the High Court was not justified in exercising its inherent power under section 482 Cr.PC as it cannot be said that there was mis- carriage of justice warranting interference by the High Court." The same view was reiterated in Tarsem Lal's case (supra) that simple breach of contract or the case involving pure civil nature, would not attract the penal provisions of section 406 IPC.
7. Possibly, no one can dispute with regard to the aforesaid observations, but, to me, the same would not come to the rescue of the petitioners in the instant controversy. As is evident from the record, that there are direct allegations, that the petitioners were entrusted 178077 bags weighing 66176.95 quintals of grade-1 paddy for shelling. They misappropriated 154318 bags weighing 54011.30 quintals of rice and caused huge loss to the Markfed. Moreover, the criminal and arbitral proceedings are entirely different. There is neither any statutory provision nor any legal principle that if there is an arbitration clause, then, the criminal proceedings cannot continue. In the present case, the arbitrator cannot decide the question of criminality/crime committed by the petitioners. As the jurisdiction of criminal Court and arbitration tribunal are entirely different and distinct, therefore, the mere fact of existence of arbitration clause, ipso facto, is not a cogent ground to grant the concession of anticipatory bail, as (contrary) urged on behalf of petitioners. This matter is no more res integra and is now well settled.
8. An identical question arose before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in case State of Punjab v. Pritam Chand and Ors. 2009 (3) RCR (Criminal) 376, wherein, it was observed that under such circumstances, there is no bar for prosecution under the criminal law as well, although there may be a contract between the parties containing an arbitration clause. The same view was again reiterated by this Court in case Mohinder Singh v. The State of Punjab & CRM No. M-17564 of 2012 -4- Anr. CRM No. M-44541 of 2007 decided on 16.2.2012. Therefore, the contrary submissions of the learned counsel that no pointed offence is made out against the petitioners "stricto sensu" deserve to be and are hereby repelled under the present set of circumstances, as the observations in Pritam Chand and Mohinder Singh's cases (supra) "mutatis mutandis" are applicable to the facts of the present case and are the complete answer to the problem in hand.
9. Moreover, the anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of course in all cases. The grant or refusal of such bail depends on the variety of circumstances, the cumulative effect of which, should enter the judicial verdict. The power under Section 438 Cr.PC is to be exercised sparingly and in exceptional cases keeping into focus the facts and circumstances of each case. The order of anticipatory bail cannot be allowed to circumvent normal procedure of arrest and investigation of the police. The Court has also to see that the investigation is in the province of the police and an order of anticipatory bail should not operate as an in- road into the statutory investigational power of the police, in exercising the judicial discretion in granting the anticipatory bail. The Court should not be unmindful of the difficulties likely to be faced by the investigating agency and the public interest likely to be affected thereby.
10. In the light of aforesaid reasons and without commenting further anything on merits, lest it may prejudice the case of either side during the course of trial of main case, the instant petition for anticipatory bail filed by the petitioners is hereby dismissed, in the obtaining circumstances of the case.
11. Needless to state that, nothing observed, here-in-above, would reflect, in any manner, on merits of the case, as the same has been so recorded for a limited purpose of deciding the present petition.
(Mehinder Singh Sullar) JUDGE 6.7.2012 AS