Digvijay Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 March, 2020

[Cites 60, Cited by 0]

Madhya Pradesh High Court

Digvijay Singh vs The State Of Madhya Pradesh on 17 March, 2020

Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2020 MP 1744

1. This petition has been filed on 16.08.2018 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR dated 22.05.2018 registered at Police Station Deonagar District Raisen for the offence punishable under Section 306/34 of IPC and also for quashment of Challan No. 169/2018 filed before the trial Court.

2 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018

2. It is an admitted fact that the deceased Sadhna was marry with the applicant No.1 Digvijay Singh since ten years back. Out of their wedlock one son was also born who is aged about 5 years. On 23.04.2018, the deceased Sadhna was admitted in the Green City Hospital by the applicant No.1 Digvijay Singh and she expired on 29.04.2018, due to the burn injuries. Thereafter, the police received the information and registered the Marg No. 0/2018 on 29.04.2018 at Police Sation, Goutam Nagar, Bhopal. Upon the basis of aforesaid zero number information, original Marg No. 12/1988 was registered at Police Station, Deonagar. After the inquiry into marg on 22.05.2018, Crime No. 136/2018 under Section 306/34 of IPC was registered. Police investigate the matter and after investigation challan No. 169/2018 filed before the trial Court.

3. It is submitted by the applicants that the deceased Sadhna was residing with her husband , while Mahendra Singh and Parwati Thakur were living separately since six years back. As per the applicants no case is culled against the applicants under Section 306/34 of IPC, even if the entire prosecution story is treated to be a gospel truth. The dying declaration of the deceased was recorded and her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. was also recorded. In both the statements, no any allegation has been made against the applicants. The deceased herself said in the dying declaration and her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. that she had gone to the kitchen for cooking the food, but there was no light in the kitchen so she had to light a Chimni which was kept over and almarah near the place where she was working. When she stood up the Chimni fell on her. Due to which her sari caught fire and she got severely burnt. When she scream for help then husband/applicant No.1 reached to the room. The deceased also said in her statement that her mother-in-law and father-in-law/applicant Nos. 1 and 2 are residing separately and the deceased is resides with her husband and child. The dying declaration have been recorded by the Executive Magistrate. Therefore, no case is made out upon the basis of the dying declaration and statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C.

3 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018

4. It is submitted by the applicants that registration of FIR and continuance of criminal case against the applicant is a gross abuse of process of law. In the light of various judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court the necessary ingredients of Section 107 of IPC are not culled out in the factual matrix of the instant case. The applicants have not played any passive role in the instigating the deceased to commit the suicide. In absence of any prima facie case against the applicants, benefits of doubt ought to have been granted to the applicants. The entire story is based on the inadmissible and concocted evidence. Therefore, this is a fit case for quashment of FIR by exercising the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. If such criminal prosecution are allowed to stand then it shall lead to travesty of justice. Upon the aforesaid ground, it is prayed that FIR [Annexure A/1] be quashed by using the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and also to quash the consequent challan in the interest of justice.

5. At the time of oral arguments, learned applicant's counsel also submitted that the applicants are innocent person who have been falsely implicated in this case. As per documents Page. 72 and 130, the applicants Nos. 2 and 3 are living separately. The dying declaration at Page 65 and the statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C at page 87 were recorded on 24.04.2018 in which it was stated that the accident was the result of falling the Chimni. No any allegation was made against the applicants. No any visible injury is found in the postmortem report. If the deceased demanded the ornaments and the applicants refused to give, even then it cannot constitute the offfence under Section 306 of IPC. During the period of ten years, no any FIR was lodged, no any panchayat was conducted and no any medical examination was done.

6. On the other side, the State strongly opposed the petition. It is submitted by the State that the matter has been duly investigated. The deceased was 80% burn and the reason of her death was extensive burn. In the case of burn the injury may not be visible. The applicant No.2 Mahendra Singh who is the father-in-law of deceased is a practicing Advocate. When 4 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 the dying declaration was recorded at that time no any member of the family of the deceased was present. The dying declaration and the statement was the result of pressure created by applicants or the undue adjustment by the Doctor/Police. Counsel for the State also draws the attention towards the statements of Tulsiram Ahirwar (Chowkidar) and Prahlad and submits that from the aforesaid statements, it is clearly established that the applicant No.2 was present at the time of incident. False information was given by the husband about the accidental burn. Therefore, the prosecution is based upon strong evidence and not liable to be quashed at the primary stage. Sufficient grounds are available to proceed further. Therefore, petition is liable to be dismissed.

7. In Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad , AIR 1945 PC 18 and Lala Jairam Das v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC 94, the Judicial Committee has taken the view that Section 561-A of the old Code which is equivalent to Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. gave no new powers but only provided that already inherently possessed should be preserved. This view holds the field till date.

8. In Raghubir Sharan (Dr.) v. State of Bihar,AIR 1964 SC 1 Court observed as under (AIR p.11, para 31.) ".31.....every High Court as the highest court exercising criminal jurisdiction in a State has inherent power to make any order for the purpose of securing the ends of justice .... Being an extraordinary power it will, however, not be pressed in aid except for remedying a flagrant abuse by a subordinate court of its powers ...."

In the said case, the court also observed that the inherent powers can be exercised under this section by the High Court (1) to give effect to any order passed under the Code; (2) to prevent abuse of the process of the court; (3) otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

9. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary, [1992] 4 SCC 305 the court observed as under:- (SCC p.355, paras 131-32).

"131. Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561-A of the old 5 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 Code and to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur id sine quo ipsa, ess uon potest" which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist.

132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles."

10. In Kurukshetra University and Another v. State of Haryana and Another, [1977] 4 SCC 451, court observed as under: (SCC p.451, para 2) "Inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim or caprice. That statutory power has to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. Thus, the High Court in exercise of inherent powers under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code cannot quash a first information report more so when the police had not even commenced the investigation and no proceeding at all is pending in any Court in pursuance of the said FIR." (AIR p.2229)

11. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 = 1960 Cri.L.J. 1239, the Apex Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings :-

(I) Where institution / continuance of criminal proceedings against an accused may amount to the abuse of the process of the court or that the quashing of the impugned proceedings would secure the ends of justice;

(II) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the said proceeding, e.g. want of sanction;

(III) where the allegations in the First Information Report or the complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and 6 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 (IV) where the allegations constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legal evidence adduced or evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge.

12. In Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi ,[1976] 3 SCC 736 = 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 the court said that the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside : -

"(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused;

(2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused;

(3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like". (SCC p.741, para 5)

13. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy and Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1489 = (1977) 2 SCC 699, the Apex Court observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. Court held as under :

"In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court 7 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice between the State and its subjects it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction."

14. In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, [1977] 4 SCC 551= (1977) 4 SCC 551 a three-Judge Bench of Apex court held as under:

(SCC p.551) "(1).....In case the impugned order clearly brings out a situation which is an abuse of the process of the court, or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. Such cases would necessarily be few and far between. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction. The present case would undoubtedly fall for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, that the invoking of the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible."

15. In the case of Drugs Inspector v. Dr. B.K. Krishna [1981 (2) SCC 454] : (AIR 1981 SC 1164) it was held by Court that in a quashing proceeding, the High Court has to see whether the allegations made in the complaint petition, if proved, make out a prima facie offence and that the accused has prima facie committed the offence.

16. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi [1983 (1) SCC 1] : (AIR 1983 SC 67) it was held that when on the allegation 8 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 made in the complaint, a clear case was made out against all the respondents (accused persons), the High Court ought not to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence.

17. in Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar; AIR 1987 SC 877, it has been held :-

"It is a well established proposition of law that a criminal prosecution, if otherwise justifiable and based upon adequate evidence does not become vitiated on account of malafides or political vendetta of the first informant or the complainant."(At p. 891, Para 16 of AIR)

18. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, [1988] 1 SCC 692, the Apex Court observed as under: (SCC p.695, Para7) "7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilized for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage."

19. State of Haryana and others Appellants v. Ch. Bhajan Lal and others, 1992 CRI. L. J. 527 = MANU/SC/0115/1992 : (1992) Supp (1) SCC 335 Apex court said that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the F.I.R. or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. The Court again said that it may not be possible to lay 9 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formula and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. The court pointed out certain category of cases by way of illustrations wherein the inherent power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The same are as follows :-

1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F. I. R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3. Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4. Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

5. Where the allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/ or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/ or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.

20. In B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr., AIR 2003 SC 1386 : (2003 AIR SCW 1824), Court held that inherent power must be 10 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 utilised with the sole purpose of preventing the abuse of the process of the court or to otherwise serve the ends of justice. In exercise of inherent powers, proper scrutiny of facts and circumstances of the case concerned are absolutely imperative.

21. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, court observed as under (SCC pp. 526-27, para 5) :-

"5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in a case of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The section does not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely:

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code,

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quando lex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest (when the law gives a person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the Court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to 11 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

22. Apex court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque ,(2005) 1 SCC 122 observed thus: (SCC p. 128, para 8) "8. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers, court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/ continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto."

23. In State of Orissa and Anr. v. Saroj Kumar Sahoo (2005) 13 SCC 540, it has been held that probabilities of the prosecution version cannot be analysed at this stage. Likewise the allegations of mala fides of the informant are of secondary importance. The relevant passage reads thus :

"It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with."

24. T. Vengama Naidu v. T. Dora Swamy Naidu and Ors., AIR 2007 SC (Supp) 231 [27-2-2007] Court said that at the stage of investigation, the only inquiry which could be made is whether FIR contains allegation of any offence and if Prima facie there were ingredients of offences complained than F.I.R. and investigation cannot be quashed on ground that no offences were made out, and it was a civil dispute. In para 7 the court said :-

"7. ....... It is settled law that an FIR and the consequent investigation cannot be quashed unless there is no offence spelt out from the same. The law in this respect is settled that the said FIR has 12 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 to be taken on its face value and then it is to be examined as to whether it spells out the offences complained of. There was no question of considering the merits of the allegations contained in the FIR at that stage or testing the veracity of allegations. In this case, admittedly, the investigation was in progress. The police had also not reported back to the Magistrate the result of their investigation. Under such circumstances, the FIR could have been quashed only and only if there appeared to be no offence spelt out therein......."

25. Three Judges Bench in Manjula Sinha v. State of U.P. and Ors. 2007 AIR SCW 4555 said in para 8 that Section 482 Cr.P.C. does not confer any new power on the High Court. It only saves the inherent power which the Court possessed before the enactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances under which the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely,

(i) to give effect to an order under the Code,

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

(iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

Court again said in para 8 and 9 that :-

"8.......it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexible rule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No legislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for all cases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the section which merely recognizes and preserves inherent powers of the High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle "quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest"

(when the law gives a person anything it gives him that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powers under the section, the court does not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent 13 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 abuse. It would be an abuse of process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would otherwise serve the ends of justice.

9. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case, where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See: Janata Dal v. H. S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305), and Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar (AIR 1964 SC 1)]."

26. In Central Bureau of Investigation v. K. M. Sharan, 2008 AIR SCW 1649 [21-2-2008] the court said that High Court should not embark upon enquiry whether allegations in FIR and charge sheet were reliable or not or about veracity of allegations. If the ingredients of offences charged were clearly made out than High Court was not justified in quashing FIR. The powers possessed by the High Court under S. 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. The Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where all the facts are incomplete and hazy; more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of such magnitude that they cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court ought to exercise its extraordinary 14 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 jurisdiction of qushing the proceedings at any stage. In such a case, the High Court in its jurisdiction under S. 482, Cr. P. C. would not be called upon to embark upon the enquiry whether the allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet were reliable or not and thereupon to render definite finding about truthfulness or veracity of the allegations. These are matters which can be examined only by the concerned Court after the entire material is produced before it on a thorough investigation and evidence is led.

27. Three Judges Bench in State of A. P v. Vangaveeti Nagaiah AIR 2009 S.C. 2646 said in para 6 and 7 :-

"6............it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an inquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Judicial process no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the Section is not an instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.

7. ...........the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in 15 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. ......"

28. In Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh ,(2009) 7 SCC 495 Apex court observed as under: (SCC pp.504-05, para 24) "24. There is no dispute with regard to the aforementioned propositions of law. However, it is now well settled that the High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. When the allegations made in the first information report or the evidences collected during investigation do not satisfy the ingredients of an offence, the superior courts would not encourage harassment of a person in a criminal court for nothing."

29. In State of Maharashtra and Ors v. Arun Gulab Gawali and Ors., AIR 2010 S.C. 3762 Apex court said that F.I.R. for heinous offence affecting the society at large, therefore cannot be quashed merely on presumption that there would be no chance of conviction or that victim himself is not supporting or has compromised matter, Victim may resile back under undue pressure or influence of accused .

30. In State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh ,(2010) 11 SCC 226 this court observed that the power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is vide and they require care and caution in its exercise. The interference must be on sound principle and the inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution. The court further observed that if the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is up to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code.

31. Apex court in the case of Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor 16 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 (2013) 3 SCC 330 delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.:-

(i) Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e., the material is of sterling and impeccable quality?

(ii) Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e., the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e., the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false.

(iii) Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such,that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant?

(iv) Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice?

The Court said that if the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused.

32. In the Case of Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan and Anr. Etc. AIR 2018 SC 1923 = 2018 CriLJ 2412 = 2018(2) Crimes 58 (SC ) = (2018) 5 SCC 678 the deceased was the son of the Appellant married to the second Respondent. There was dispute between the couples which led to filling of various complains by both the parties. It was alleged that the deceased was under a constant fear of arrest and harassment because of false implication in criminal case. Thereafter, a compromise was entered into between the deceased and the second Respondent. But the second Respondent again filed an FIR against the deceased. Due to continuous humiliation and suffering 17 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 inflicted upon by the wife the deceased committed suicide leaving two suicide notes. An FIR was lodged against the second Respondent. The accused Respondents approached the High Court for quashment of FIR. The High Court allowed the Respondent's application and quashed the FIR. Aggrieved by present appeal was preferred. But The Apex Court while allowing appeal said :-

"11. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and perusing the material available on record we are of the opinion that the High Court has prematurely quashed the FIR without proper investigation being conducted by the Police. Further, it is no more res integra that Section 482 of CrPC has to be utilized cautiously while quashing the FIR. This court in a catena of cases has quashed FIR only after it comes to a conclusion that continuing investigation in such cases would only amount to abuse of the process. In this case at hand, the court abridged the investigation which needed to ascertain certain factual assertions made in the FIR concerning the existence or non-existence of any prior mental condition of the deceased prior to the commission of suicide.

12. We are apprised of the FSL report which categorically states that the handwriting of the deceased and the handwriting as present in the suicide note has similarities.......

13. In light of the fact that the enquiry was pending and there are aspects which may require investigation, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR at the threshold itself without allowing the investigation to proceed. We cannot agree with the reasons provided under the impugned judgment concerning certain factual assertions made by the Respondents as to the condition of the deceased and reasons for committing suicide because acceptance of the said would not be in consonance with the settled jurisprudence under Section 482 of CrPC as laid down by various judgments of this Court."

33. In Nike India Private Limited & Others Vs. My Store Private Limited, 2019 (4) JLJ 85 the Apex court said that it is settled law that in the proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. with regard to quashment of the proceeding of the trial court the documents which are unimpeachable can be considered with a view to whether continuity of the proceeding would be meaningful or mere wastage of the time etc.; or the proceeding has been launched to take vengeance or malice.

18 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018

34. Counsel for the applicants cited the case of M. Mohan Vs. State (2011) 3 SCC 626 and draws the attention towards the para 51 to 67. It appears from the aforesaid paras that the Hon'ble Apex Court referred the above mentioned cases of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 = 1960 Cri.L.J. 1239, Smt. Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi , [1976] 3 SCC 736 = 1976 SCC (Cri) 507 , State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, [1977] 2 SCC 699 , Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra, [1977] 4 SCC 551, Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia & Others v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, [1988] 1 SCC 692 ,Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary,[1992] 4 SCC 305 , Raghubir Sharan (Dr.) v. State of Bihar,AIR 1964 SC 1 Connelly v. Director of Public Prosecutions 1964 AC 1254, Kurukshetra University and Another v. State of Haryana and Another, [1977] 4 SCC 451, State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp(1) SCC 335, G. Sagar Suri & Another v. State of UP ,(2000) 2 SCC 636, State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522 , Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. & Others v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque ,(2005) 1 SCC 122 , Devendra and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh ,(2009) 7 SCC 495 State of A.P. v. Gourishetty Mahesh ,(2010) 11 SCC 226.

35. Therefore legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. Inherent power should not be exercised to stifle the legitimate prosecution. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence, it is up to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code. When the Court come to the conclusion that the registration of FIR and continuance of criminal case against the applicant is a gross abuse of process of law then High Court Court can use the power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashment of the FIR and further proceedings. F.I.R. for heinous offence affecting the society 19 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 at large, therefore cannot be quashed merely on presumption that there would be no chance of conviction. High Court ordinarily would exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the allegations made in the first information report, even if given face value and taken to be correct in their entirety, do not make out any offence. It will not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material.

36. This case is related to the offence under Section 306 of IPC. The deceased was the wife of the applicant No.1 and the daughter-in-law of applicant Nos.2 and 3. Her marriage was took place about ten years back. The deceased was the mother of a male child aged about 5 years. The death was the result of excessive burn injuries. For the purpose of Section 306 of IPC, the counsel for the applicants cited the following cases:-

(1) Gangula Mohan Reddy Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (2010) 1 SCC 750.

(2) S.S. Chheena Vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Another (2010) 12 SCC 190.

(3) Madan Mohan Singh Vs. State of Gujarat and Another (2010) SCC 628.

      (4)    M. Mohan Vs. State (2011) 3 SCC 626.
      (5)    Gurucharan Singh Vs. State of Punjab (2017) 1 SCC 433.
      (6)    Rajesh Vs. State of Haryana 2019 SCC OnLine SC 44.
                                   20                            M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018

37. In order to properly comprehend the scope and ambit of Sec. 306 IPC, it is important to carefully examine the basic ingredients of Sec. 306 IPC. The said Section is reproduced as under:

"306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

38. The word 'suicide' in itself is nowhere defined in the I.P.C., however its meaning and import is well known and requires no explanation. 'Sui' means 'self' and 'cide' means 'killing' thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.

39. The question as to what is the cause of a suicide has no easy answers because suicidal ideation and behaviors in human beings are complex and multifaceted. Different individuals in the same situation react and behave differently because of the personal meaning they add to each event, thus accounting for individual vulnerability to suicide. Each individual's suicidability pattern depends on his inner subjective experience of mental pain, fear and loss of self-respect. Each of these factors are crucial and exacerbating contributor to an individual's vulnerability to end his own life, which may either be an attempt for self-protection or an escapism from intolerable self.

40. From a bare reading of the provision, it is clear that to constitute an offence under Section 306, IPC, the prosecution has to establish:

(i) that a person committed suicide, and

(ii) that such suicide was abetted by the accused.

In other words, an offence under Section 306 would stand only if there is an "abetment" for the commission of the crime. The parameters of "abetment" have been stated in Section 107 of the IPC, which defines 21 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 abetment of a thing as follows :

"107. Abetment of a thing.- A person abets the doing of a thing, who :-

First.- Instigates any person to do that thing; or' Secondly.- Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly.- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing".

Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with Sec. 107 reads as under:

"Explanation 2.- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act".

41. Reading of section 306 and 107 together it is clear that if any person instigates any other person to commit suicide and as a result of such instigation the other person commits suicide, the person causing the instigation is liable to be punished under S. 306 of the I.P.C. for abetting the commission of suicide. A plane reading of this provision shows that before a person can be convicted of abetting the suicide of any other person, it must be established that such other person committed suicide.

42. As per the Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing a thing, if he, firstly, instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly, engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation to Section 107 states that any willful misrepresentation or willful concealment of material fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within the contours of "abetment". It is manifest that under all the three situations, direct involvement of the person or persons concerned in the commission of offence of suicide is essential to bring home the offence 22 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 under Section 306 of the IPC.

43. As per clause firstly in the said Section, a person can be said to have abetted in doing of a thing, who "instigates" any person to do that thing. The word "instigate" is not defined in the IPC. The meaning of the said word was considered by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh[(2001) 9 SCC 618 : (2001 AIR SCW 4282)]. It has been said that instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of "instigation", though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes "instigation" must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. Where the accused had, by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct, created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, in which case, an "instigation" may have to be inferred. A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow, cannot be said to be instigation.

44. The Supreme Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), = AIR 2010 SC 1446 = 2010 AIR SCW 645 = (2009) 16 SCC 605 had an occasion to deal with this aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning of the words 'instigation' and 'goading'. The Court said :-

"Thus, to constitute "instigation", a person who instigates another has to provoke, incite, urge or encourage doing of an act by the other by "goading" or "urging forward". The dictionary meaning of the word "goad" is "a thing that stimulates someone into action : provoke to action or reaction" (See : Concise Oxford English Dictionary); "to keep irritating or annoying somebody until he reacts" (See : Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary - 7th Edition). Similarly, "urge" means to advise or try hard to persuade somebody to do something or to make a person to move more quickly and or in a particular direction, 23 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 especially by pushing or forcing such person. Therefore, a person who instigates another has to "goad" or "urge forward" the latter with intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter."

45. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618 = AIR 2001 S.C. 3837 = 2001 AIR SCW 4282, (Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court) a dispute was between the husband and wife, the appellant husband uttered "you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever you like". Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh Kumar, committed suicide. The Court in para 20 has examined different shades of the meaning of 'instigation'. Para 20 reads as under :-

"20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do 'an act'. To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation."

46. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal (AIR 1994 SC 1418 = 1994 AIR SCW 844 = 1994 Cri LJ 2104 ) the Supreme Court has observed that the Courts should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the Court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance, discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence 24 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 of suicide should be found guilty.

47. In the case of aforesaid case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), = AIR 2010 SC 1446 = 2010 AIR SCW 645 = (2009) 16 SCC 605, the appellant along with other two accused "in furtherance of common intention", mentally tortured Jitendra Sharma (the deceased) and abetted him to commit suicide by the said act of mental torture. Apart from the suicide note, it was appeared from the statements recorded by the police during the course of investigation, that on account of business transactions with the accused, including the appellant, the deceased was put under tremendous pressure to do something which he was perhaps not willing to do. The court said that It is trite that words uttered on the spur of the moment or in a quarrel, without something more cannot be taken to have been uttered with mens rea. The onus is on the prosecution to show the circumstances which compelled the deceased to take an extreme step to bring an end to his life. Briefly dealing with the material available on record, the court held that clause firstly of Section 107 of the IPC is attracted & it cannot be said that the trial court was in error in drawing an inference that the appellant had "instigated" the deceased to commit suicide and, therefore, there was ground for presuming that the appellant has committed an offence punishable under Section 306 read with Section 34, IPC.

48. The Apex Court in the aforesaid case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), reported in 2009 (16) SCC page 605 :

(AIR 2010 SC 1446)], reiterated the legal position laid down in its earlier three Judges Bench judgment in the case of Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, reported in AIR 2001 SC page 3837 : (2001 Cri LJ 4724) (1) and held that where the accused by his acts or continued course of conduct creates such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide, an instigation may be inferred. Their Lordships in the aforesaid case of Chitresh Kumar, (AIR 2010 SC 1446) (supra), summed 25 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 up the legal position as under :-

"In other words, in order to prove that the accused abetted commission of suicide by a person, it has to be established that:

(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which may even be a wilful silence until the deceased reacted or pushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful omission or conduct to make the deceased move forward more quickly in a forward direction; and,

(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge or encourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting in the manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mensrea is the necessary concomitant of instigation."

The Court opined that there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person suicidability pattern is different from the other. Each person has his own idea of self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases. Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and circumstances.

49. In the Case of S. S. Cheena Vs. Vijay Kumar and another, [2010] 12 SCC 190 the Supreme court said that :-

"abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court is clear that in order to convict a person under Sec. 306 IPC there has to be a clear menserea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide. Human sensitivity of each individual differs from the other. Different people behave differently in the same situation. In the instant case, the deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life."

50. In Radha Vs. State of M.P., ILR (2008) M.P. 3333, it has been held that Cruel or insulting behaviour cannot be taken as an act of abetting suicide, more active role which can be described as instigating or aiding 26 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 doing of a thing is thus required before a person can be said to be abetting suicide.

51. After taken in to consideration Pancharam Vs. State. 1984 (2) Crimes 787 and Brijlal Vs. State 1971 JLJ Short Note No. 80 it has been said by the Highcourt in Ram Kumar Vs. State of M.P. , 1997 MPLJ (2) S.N. 11 that refusal of permission of husband to wife to go to parents house would not be a penal offence and conviction under Sec. 306 of the I.P.C. on such count is not suspensible.

52. In Bhoj Ram Vs. State of M.P., 2000(2) MPLJ (SN) 23 suicide was committed by the deceased after beating by the accused. The lower court was of the view that because of the beating by the accused the deceased probably felt bad therefore he must have committed suicide. In the above circumestances the court said that in absence of the positive evidence that either of the accused instigated some person to do a particular thing or engaged himself or someone for commission of the offence or for illegal omission or intentionally aided in commission of the act by their own acts or illegal omissions it would not be entitled to secure a conviction of the accused persons. The Court observed :-

"Sec. 109 of I.P.C. provides punishment of abetment, if the act abetted is committed in consequence and where no expression provision is made for his punishment. As Sec. 306 makes special and express provisions for punishment, the provision of Sec. 109 would not be applicable. For providing abetment a Court is obliged to see not only the evidence brought on record but also the definition which defines abetment. The prosecution unless proves application of either of the clauses provided under Sec. 107, IPC would not be successful in securing the conviction of the accused. The prosecution had miserably failed in showing the application of any of the clause provided in Sec.

27 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018

107, IPC. ..................; The criminal jurisprudence begins with the presumption that unless otherwise proved the person facing the trial would be deemed to be an innocent. The burden to prove the ingredients constituting the offence is on the prosecution and not on the accused. If the prosecution fails to connect the act of the accused with the ultimate crime and material links which constitute the chain are missing the accused would be entitled to an acquittal."

53. In Kanhai Vs. State of M.P., 2000(4) MPHT 277 the Dead body of wife of accused was found in a well. It was alleged that accused used to quarrely with deceased and harassed her. On the date of incident also quarrel took place in the family. Accused / husband slapped the deceased. Deceased jumped into the well along with her infant daughter. Both of them died in the well. It was held that it is proved that marriage took place about 4-5 years prior to date of incident. Deceased was harassed and ill-treated. Harassment was to the extent that villagers has to intervene to subside the quarrel. She was immediately before death subjected to cruelty. She was under constant threat. Deceased was subjected to utmost cruelty. The act of accused clearly amounts to abetment of suicide under Sec. 306 and cruelty under Sec. 498- A, IPC.

54. In the case of "Mohd. Hoshan and another v. State of A.P."AIR 2002 S.C. 3270 = 2002 AIR SCW 3795 , Hon'ble Supreme court observed that whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impact of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the mental cruelty was 28 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 established or not. In this case out of 11 months of married life, the deceased was forced to live in her parents' house and could live with her husband for a period of two months in different spells. The Court also took note of the fact that the accused did not try to save the deceased although he was present when burn injuries were caused to her therefore accused is liable to be convicted for offences under section 306 and 498-A, I.P.C.

55. In Raja Babu & anr. Vs. State of M.P., AIR 2008 SC 3212, the deceased wanted to be married in a literate family. She was not happy with the fact that her husband was illiterate and also with the status and condition of the family of her husband. She was also required to do some domestic work as the family was poor, for which she was not happy. The deceased was of the view point that her life has been spoiled by marrying Appellant. The court considered the letter reflects the attitude of the in-laws of the deceased towards the deceased and observed that in the said letter there was no reference of any act or incident whereby the appellants were alleged to have committed any willful act or omission or intentionally aided or instigated the deceased to commit suicide.

56. In the case of Milind Bhagwanrao Godse v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2009 S.C. 1828 a letter was written by the deceased to her parents, just before she had committed suicide. The deceased wrote in the letter that she was an unlucky girl. She thought that she would have some moments of happiness, but it was not possible because of the nature of her husband (the appellant herein). She mentioned that on the last day and night, the appellant had quarreled with her and in the morning the appellant cursed the father of the deceased. She stated that the appellant had gone to the extent of saying that since she was so proud of the influence of her father, she should live with her father in matrimony and also said many things of that sort. She specifically stated that the appellant had harassed her so much that it would not be possible for her to live with him any more. She further stated in the 29 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 letter that it is one thing of not earning money and another to frequently dishonour and to give trouble to the deceased and her son Rohit. She stated in the letter that the appellant deliberately twisted the leg of Rohit (his small son) and broke his bone. She also stated in the letter that the appellant did so because he had a brother Arvind who was physically handicapped and he wanted Rohit to be like Arvind and also because the deceased loved her son Rohit intensely. She stated in the letter that the appellant had unusual attraction towards other girls, particularly towards deceased's sister Asha, Sushma, Sandhya, sister of Charuhas, wife of Anil Pangrikar. The deceased wrote in the letter that the appellant, in order to torture and mentally harass her, used to say that these girls had good physical figures and looked beautiful. The deceased also stated in the letter that the appellant used to say that there would be a row of girls now for marriage with him. She requested her parents to take care of her minor son Rohit and wanted that there should not be a shadow of the appellant on Rohit. The court held that these comments led to severe mental torture and the letter is indeed very emotional and was written in extreme distressing mental condition. This letter clearly demonstrates that the deceased was so much mentally tortured by the appellant that she had decided to put an end to her life. Therefore conviction under Sec.s 498-A and 306 and punishment thereof held proper.

57. In the case of Thanu Ram Vs. State of M.P. (Now Chhatisgarh), [2010] 10 SCC 353, the victim committed suicide in fourth year of marriage when she was six months' pregnant. Supreme court said that, Sec. 107 IPC clearly defines abetment to mean that a person abets the doing of a thing who instigates a person to do that thing. Ordinarily a woman in an advanced stage of pregnancy would not commit suicide even when treated with cruelty. Only in extreme circumstance, may a woman decides to take her life and that of her unborn child when she reaches a point of no return and is in a mental state to take her own life.

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58. In the case of Sudarshan Kumar vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2011 SC 3024 = 2011 INDLAW SCO 521 [SC] = [2011] 8 JT 284 = 2011 8 SCALE 115, the appellant was married in 1980. She could not conceive & committed suicide on 23.02.1989. The appellant had been maltreating and beating his wife and saying that if she dies, he will be remarried. She was physically assaulted and sent to her father's house where she stayed for one and half years but due to the intervention of the panchayat members and the promise of the appellant that he would not harass her again and his request for pardon, she came back. However, it appears that she was again harassed and tormented and ultimately driven to suicide. The appellant was convicted by the trial Court for abetting the suicide under Sec. 306 IPC, and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. The Supreme court confirmed the conviction and said that from the facts disclosed, it is evident that wife was harassed and beaten because she could not have a child. The Court said :-

"It is natural that everyone wants children, but if a woman does not have a child, that does not mean that she should be insulted or harassed. In such a situation, the best course would be to take medical help, and if that fails, to adopt a child. Experience has shown that an adopted child gives as much happiness to the adoptive parents as any natural child does. Hence, we see no justification to condone such an act of harassing or tormenting a woman just because she did not give birth to a child. It may not be the fault of the wife that she did not have a child. At any event, that is no justification for tormenting or beating her, and this reveals a feudal, backward mentality."

59. In the case of Madan Mohan Singh (Supra) the deceased was the driver who committed suicide leaving behind a suicide note and the FIR was lodged by his wife in which it was stated that during the period between the year 2003 to 21.02.2008, the Head of the Department was entrusting his housework to her husband but her husband had not done the work entrusted to him and, therefore, he had bias against her husband and insulted him in front of the staff several times and because of this, her husband got depressed and committed suicide. After examination of FIR and the suicide note the Court observed in para 10 and 11 as under:-

"10. We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in 31 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 this suicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewed as an offence much less under Section 306 IPC. We could not find anything in the FIR or in the so- called suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide.

11. In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression. In the so-called suicide note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this."

60. In the aforesaid case of Madan Mohan Singh, the Court referred to Section 306 of IPC and said in para 12 and 16 as under:-

"12. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring about the suicide of the person concerned as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306 IPC either in the FIR or in the so- called suicide note.

16. Insofar as Section 294(b) IPC is concerned, we could not find a single word in the FIR or even in the so-called suicide note. Insofar as Section 306 IPC is concerned, even at the cost of repetition, we may say that merely because a person had a grudge against his superior 32 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 officer and committed suicide on account of that grudge, even honestly feeling that he was wronged, it would still not be a proper allegation for basing the charge under Section 306 IPC. It will still fall short of a proper allegation. It would have to be objectively seen whether the allegations made could reasonably be viewed as proper allegations against the appellant-accused to the effect that he had intended or engineered the suicide of the person concerned by his acts, words, etc. When we put the present FIR on this test, it falls short."

61. In the case of M. Mohan Vs. State (Supra), the Apex Court after referred to the Section 306 of IPC and the cases of Ramesh Kumar Vs. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC 618, State of W.B. Vs. Orilal Jaiswal (1994) 1 SCC 73 and Chitresh Kumar Chopra Vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605, said that in paras 44 and 45 as under:-

"44. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.

45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide."

62. In the case of Gurcharan Singh, (Supra), the Apex Court after quoting the Section 306 of IPC, said in para-21 as follows:-

"21. It is thus manifest that the offence punishable is one of abetment of the commission of suicide by any person, predicating existence of a live link or nexus between the two, abetment being the propelling causative factor. The basic ingredients of this provision are suicidal death and the abetment thereof. To constitute abetment, the intention and involvement of the accused to aid or instigate the commission of suicide is imperative. Any severance 33 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 or absence of any of these constituents would militate against this indictment. Remoteness or the culpable acts or omissions rooted in the intention of the accused to actualize the suicide would fall short as well of the offence of abetment essential to attract the punitive mandate of Section 306 IPC.

Contiguity, continuity, culpability and complicity of the indictable acts or omission are the concomitant indices of abetment. Section 306 IPC, thus criminalises the sustained incitement for suicide."

63. In the case of Rajesh Vs. State of Haryana (Supra), it was stated that the deceased committed suicide due to the beheviour of accused who made false allegation against the deceased regarding demand of dowry. A panchayat was held in the village at the instance of the accused during which the appellant slapped the deceased. The appellant and his sister used to threaten the deceased on telephone at the instance of their father. The case was registered under Section 306 of IPC. The Apex Court after quoting the section 306 and 107 of IPC, said in para 9 as under:-

"9. Conviction under Section 306 IPC is not sustainable on the allegation of harassment without there being any positive action proximate to the time of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or compelled the person to commit suicide. In order to bring a case within the purview of Section 306 IPC, there must be a case of suicide and in the commission of the said offence, the person who is said to have abetted the commission of suicide must have played an active role by an act of instigation or by doing certain act to facilitate the commission of suicide. Therefore, the act of abetment by the person charged with the said offence must be proved and established by the prosecution before he could be convicted under Section 306 IPC."

64. In the aforesaid case the Apex Court again referred the case of Chitresh Kumar Chopra (Supra) and Praveen Pradhan Vs. State of Uttranchal (2012) 9 SCC 734 and said in para -12 as under:-

"12. We are of the opinion that the evidence on record 34 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 does not warrant conviction of the appellant under Section 306 IPC. There is no proximity between the Panchayat held in September, 2001 and the suicide committed by Arvind on 23.02.2002. The incident of slapping by the appellant in September, 2001 cannot be the sole ground to hold him responsible for instigating the deceased to commit suicide. As the allegations against all the three accused are similar, the High Court ought not to have convicted the appellant after acquitting the other two accused."

65. Now, we shall examine the fact of present case, it appears from the case diary that the Marg No.0/18 was registered under Section 174 of Cr.P.C., upon the information given by Dr. R.S. Chhabara, Green City Hospital, Bhopal. In the aforesaid information, it has been stated that the Sadhna was admitted in the hospital on 23.04.2018 by her husband Digvijay Singh and the aforesaid patient has been expired on 29.04.2018 at 09:25 A.M. The aforesaid marg intimation was registered at Police Station Goutam Nagar, District Bhopal who forwarded it to the concerned police station Deonagar District Raisen, where the original marg No. 12/2018 was registered on 01.05.2018. The S.D.O.P., Begumganj conducted the marg inquiry. He recorded the statements of father of deceased Prahlad Singh, mother Roopmati, brother Shripal and maternal uncle Ramgulam. He also recorded the statements of village Chowkidar Tulsiram Ahirwar and the witness Raghveer Aadivasi. In addition to aforesaid statements he also recorded the statements of police personnel, ASI Sudhakar Soni, Head Constable No. 335 Ramesh Parashar and Head Constable No. 125 Ramesh Evane, all three posted at Police Station, Deonagar. During marg inquiry, the police prepared the spot map and seizure of articles, inquest panchnana and collected the postmortem report. Thereafter, come to the conclusion that the death of deceased was the result of abetment of all three applicants who are the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased. Therefore, crime No. 136/2018 under Section 306/34 of IPC was registered on 22.05.2018. During investigation, the police also recorded the statements of various witnesses and come to the conclusion that the offence is proved 35 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 against the present applicants. Therefore, police filed the challan No. 169/2018 dated 14.07.2018 before the trial Court.

66. Minute marshaling of evidence recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C and the prosecution documents cannot be done at primary stage. Only it is required to be seen whether any sufficient ground was available to registered the FIR and to investigate the matter. In this case the FIR was registered upon the basis of aforementioned documents and the statements of ten witnesses.

67. The applicants strongly rely upon the dying declaration recorded by the Executive Magistrate, Raisen. Primfa facie this document create a suspicion. In the aforesaid document date "22.04.2018" has been mentioned. The time when the statement was started is mentioned as "12:49 pm" while the Medical Officer, who signed and paste the seal below the statement has mentioned the time "12:49 pm" after mentioning the fact that after recording of the statement the condition of victim was found satisfactory. The doctor mentioned - c;ku nsus ds i'pkr~ fifM+rk dh gkyr Bhd ikbZ xbZA below this remark he signed and mentioned time "12:49 p.m." while the same time was mentioned in the beginning of the statement for showing the fact that the recording of the statement was started at 12:49 pm. Another fact also create some suspicion which is the time mentioned by the doctor with the date in the beginning of the statement. In the beginning of statement doctor mentioned that - fifM+rk c;ku nsus dh gkyr esa gSA . Above the aforesaid remark doctor mentioned the date and time as "24.04.2018 at 12:49 pm.". Therefore, prima facie it appears that the doctor gave the back dated certificate but "true" has come out by the mistake of himself. Therefore, when the doubt is created upon any statement or document, then it may be resolved or justified only by the elaborate statement before the trial Court. Prima facie this statement cannot made the basis for quashment of FIR.

68. As per the aforesaid statement and the statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. it is tried to convince that the death was the result of an accident. The 36 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 deceased had gone to the kitchen for cocking the food but there was no light in the kitchen. Therefore, she lighted a chimni/ [lamp] and kept over in almirah and when she stood up the chimni fall on her. This story is not convincing at this stage. Because it is not the case of applicants that there was no any electric connection in the house. The incident was happened at about 9:00 am in the morning. Therefore, it may be presumed that the sufficient light was available. If there was deem light then the electric light was also available. It is stated in the aforesaid marg that the deceased was going to flame the chulha. While the spot map shows that the cocking gas was also available in the house. A cane of diesel was also found there. The burn portion of the body have been mentioned in the postmortem report by making a sketch. The aforesaid sketches also indicates that this may not the result of falling the small chimni.

69. Only upon the basis of separate living of any accused it cannot be believed that he could not participate in the crime like 498-A and 306 of IPC related to the women. From the statement of Raghuveer Aadivasi, it is transpired that the applicant No.2 was present in front of the house of the deceased. The brother of applicant No.2 Pratap Singh Dangi also supported the fact that the applicant No.2 was present at the time of the incident and he called the vehicle of police.

70. Prahlad Singh is the father of the deceased who said in his statement that just after the marriage all three applicants were harassing the decease for demand of dowry and they also beated the deceased for several times. When the Digvijay Singh met with an accident, the witness gave the Rs. 1,50,000/- but the accused did not satisfy and they continuously creating the pressure upon the deceased by abusing her to took the money from her parents. The aforesaid accident was occurred after three years of marriage. The witness said that the husband beated the deceased for so many times. Before five months from the death at the time of makar shankranti the witness took her 37 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018 daughter to his home and when the again had gone to the house of accused for dropping of his daughter, at that time Mahendra misbehaved and abuse and also quarrel with the deceased and assult on deceased by throwing a plastic chair upon the deceased. The deceased sustained injury and 16 stitches were put by the doctor upon the aforesaid injury. The ornaments given at the time of marriage was also taken by the applicants and when the deceased was demanding her ornaments the accused person quarrel with her and beated her, but they did not give the ornaments to the deceased. It is also stated in the statement that on 22.04.2018, the accused Digvijay Singh give the telephonic information to Shripal who is the son of the Prahlad Singh and told that Sadhana sustained burn injury but there are "minor-burn", therefore, they may come on tomorrow. Thereafter, in the night about 1.30 the witness and other family members reached to the hospital.

71. The other witnesses Roopmati, Shripal and Ramgulam also supported the aforesaid statement of Prahlad Singh. It appears that the Digvijay Singh give the false information to the parents that the deceased sustained some "minor-burn" therefore, they may come on tomorrow. This circumstance created doubt upon the statement of dying declaration and the statement of under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Both statements have been recorded in the absence of mother, father and other relatives of the deceased. Prima facie it appears from other statements that the all accused continuously created the pressure upon the deceased to take the money from her parents. They also beated the deceased from time to time. They also did not give the ornaments to the deceased. Accused person by their acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide. Normally, a mother of 5 years old child cannot choose the way of suicide. If the circumstances are extreme in that condition the women may commit the suicide. Continuous torture, or the circumstances against a person may also create a mental torture and this is also a form of abetment of suicide.

38 M.Cr.C.No.33397/2018

72. Therefore, it appears that sufficient material is available to proceed further. The FIR was registered upon the basis of sufficient evidence and the documents. Hence, this is not a fit case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashment of the FIR.

73. Hence, this petition is dismissed.

(B.K.SHRIVASTAVA ) JUDGE dixit/-

Digitally signed by MAHENDRA KUMAR DIXIT Date: 2020.03.17 16:05:02 +05'30'

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